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Between 1945 and 1960 the British and French governments sent thousands of regular and 
conscript soldiers to Malaya and Indochina. There, assisted by locally-raised troops and units 
from other parts of the British Commonwealth and the French Union (or the former empires 
respectively), they attempted to suppress communist-inspired insurgencies.  
     This thesis examines responses of British and French army personnel, both male and female, 
to these conflicts, the territories and local communities. It begins with an analysis of the forces’ 
composition and the international context they operated in. It then asks whether soldiers labelled 
the conflicts as local disturbances, wars of decolonisation or Cold War theatres. In parallel, it 
inquiries if they saw their enemies as bandits, nationalists or communist agents. The last two 
chapters investigate military views on centres of population, infrastructure, environment and 
peoples, or rather, the extent to which they occupied soldierly minds. Behind this scrutiny lies an 
attempt to identify imperial affinities, pre-conceived colonial images and pronouncements on 
Britain’s and France’s imperial records.   
     In scrutinising these issues the thesis seeks to verify the often-cited, but insufficiently 
supported, claim that Britain’s and France’s armed forces were strongly linked and attached to 
the colonial empires through conquest, policing and defence. More specifically, the project seeks 
to fill a gap in the existing literature in regard to military reactions to the end of empires. It does 
so through a comparative and interdisciplinary approach, drawing from and feeding into imperial, 
military, political, social, European and Southeast Asian history. 
     The project has relied to a large extent on oral sources. Careful consideration has therefore 
been given to the ways, in which events have been remembered, how this memory has been 
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Timetable of the Malayan Emergency 
 
1928 South Seas Communist Party, later named Malayan Communist Party (MCP), is 
founded in Singapore. 
Feb. 1942 Singapore’s garrison surrenders to the Japanese after the latter have swept the 
British-controlled peninsula in barely three months.  
1943  Britain’s Special Operations Executive (SOE) sends the newly launched Force 
136 into occupied Malaya to contact and cooperate with the Chinese-dominated 
Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). The force subsequently 
provides the latter with training, arms and other equipment. 
August 1945  The Japanese surrender after nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The 
end of hostilities forestalls a British invasion of Malaya (Operation Zipper). 
Sept. 1945  British troops enter Malaya. The MPAJA agrees to disband and hand over its 
weapons but stores considerable quantities of the latter in jungle dumps. 
Sept. 1945-   The British Military Administration (BMA) attempts to rebuild the Malayan 
March 1946  infrastructure, alleviate hunger and reintroduce administration but    
 succeeds only partially. 
 
1946 The British government introduces the Malayan Union, aimed at centralising the 
administration, reducing the role of sultans, offering full citizenship to more 
Chinese and Indians while preparing Malaya for eventual self-government. 
 Malays shun the initiation of the Union. Dato Onn bin Jaafar founds the United 
Malay National Organisation (UMNO). 
 Communists systematically infiltrate unions and schools while sparking strikes. 
March 1947  Chin Peng assumes leadership of the MCP after his predecessor and suspected 
double agent, Lai Teck, disappears. 
Feb. 1948  The British government yields to strong pressure from Malays and British ex-civil 
servants and abandons the Malayan Union. It opts for a federation instead, which 
comprises nine Malay states and two British settlements (Penang and Malacca). 
 Malays enter the executive and legislative councils. 
March 1948  After a communist conference in Calcutta armed uprisings in India and Burma 
erupt. Indonesia and the Philippines are to follow.  
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June 1948  The MCP calls up veterans of the MPAJA. Re-formed units and individuals begin 
to destroy communications, slash rubber trees and attack plantation managers. 
After the killing of three European planters High-Commissioner Gent declares a 
state of emergency. Mandatory registrations of the population, round-ups, 
destruction of housing, detention without trial and deportations of (suspected) 
communists and supporters ensue. 
Dec. 1948 Scots Guards shoot 24 Chinese villagers under controversial circumstances.  
Feb. 1949 Tan Cheng Lock founds the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) as a 
counterweight to the MCP.   
April 1949  The MPAJA temporarily withdraws into the jungle to reorganise. It changes its 
name to Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA). 
April 1950  Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs is appointed director of operations. He 
initiates a comprehensive counter-insurgency programme involving 
resettlements, food control, expansion of Special Branch as well as coordinating 
bodies composed of civilian and military personnel on district, state and federal 
level. 
Oct. 1951  High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney is assassinated near Fraser’s Hill.  
The MCP issues new directives (‘October resolutions’) to replace indiscriminate 
violence with selective terror and subversion. Larger units are to be split up and 
cultivations in the jungle to be developed.  
By then the number of active rebel fighters is officially estimated at roughly 7,000. 
They are aided by several hundred thousand Chinese civilians, mostly squatters. 
Feb. 1952  General Sir Gerald Templer assumes the roles of high-commissioner and director 
of operations. 
Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttelton promises independence for Malaya provided 
‘racial harmony’ (i.e. agreement between the main ethnicity-based parties) takes 
hold.  
Elections for city, town and village councils are held. The newly formed alliance 
between the UMNO, now under Tunku Abdul Rahman, and the MCA win a 
majority in Kuala Lumpur. 
1953  The first ‘white’ (i.e. pacified) area is declared, restrictions are lifted and 
development works begun. 
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 The arrival of helicopters prompts the establishment of first jungle forts in 
aboriginal areas. 
June 1954  Templer hands over responsibilities to Sir Donald MacGillivray and Lieutenant-
General Sir Geoffrey Kemp-Bourne. Under his reign attacks on civilians, security 
forces and infrastructure have been reduced by 20% from their peak in 1951. At 
the same time the MNLA has lost two-thirds of its strength. Before Templer’s 
departure he announces federal elections. 
July 1955  The UMNO-MCA alliance, now joined by the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), 
wins 51 of 52 possible seats in the legislative council and a majority in the 
executive council. Rahman becomes chief minister and chairman of the 
Emergency Operations Council. 
Dec. 1955  Truce talks between ‘the Tunku’ and Chin Peng fail as the former refuses to allow 
the MCP entry into the political arena and demands screening of its members. 
1956  Most of eastern Malaya has turned ‘white’. 
January- During a conference in London a date is set for Malayan independence February 
1956  and a constitution drafted. 
August 1957  Malayan independence is declared. The high-commissioner hands over to 
Rahman, the federation’s first prime minister. Until then the emergency has cost 
the British and Malayan governments £700,000,000. 
1958  The communist insurgency largely collapses after two high-ranking leaders hand 
themselves in to the security forces. 
1959 All security forces are concentrated on two remaining hard-core areas in the 
north. 
 
1960  The emergency officially ends. Only approximately 400 communist rebels remain 
on the Thai border, including Chin Peng. 
1989  A Thai-brokered ceasefire is signed by the Malaysian government and the 
insurgents. ‘Peace’ and ‘friendship’ villages are set up in southern Thailand for the 
remaining rebels. Due to Chin Peng’s refusal to give up his beliefs, he is not allowed 
to return to Malaysia. 
 
Source: R. Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War: The Emergency in Malaya 1948-1960 (2003), pp. 183-8. R. F. Holland, 
European Decolonization 1918-1981n Introductory Survey (1985), pp. 103-12, K. Hack, Defence and Decolonisation in 
Southeast Asia: Britain, Malaya and Singapore, 1941-1968 (2001), p. 139, C. Bayly & T. Harper, Forgotten Wars: The End 
of Britain’s Asian Empire (2007), pp. 12-3, 449-56 and 473, A. Khoo, Life as the River Flows: Women in the Malayan Anti-
Colonial Struggle (2007), p. 1,  ‘Review of the Emergency in Malaya from June 1948 to August 1957’, by the Director of 
Operations Malaya to the War Office, September 1957, NA, WO 106/5990. 
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Timetable of the Indochina War 
 
Feb. 1930 A small circle around Ho Chi Minh (alias Nguyen Tat Thanh/Ai Quoc) founds the 
Vietnamese Communist Party in Hong Kong. It is renamed Communist Party of 
Indochina (PCI) the following autumn. 
 Peasants around Yen Bai (North Annam) revolt against mandarins and notables. 
The first autonomous soviets are established. The rebellion is not crushed until 
spring 1931. 
June 1940 Following a Japanese ultimatum, Governor and General Catroux signs a treaty 
in which Nippon recognises French sovereignty in Indochina. In exchange the 
French accord the Japanese ‘privileged treatment of imperial interests’. Further 
ultimatums and treaties follow, coupled with an influx of Japanese troops into 
Indochina. 
 Vichyist Admiral Decoux replaces Catroux who sides with de Gaulle. 
May 1941 Upon re-entry into Indochina Ho Chi Minh founds the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong 
Minh Hoi (League for the Independence of Vietnam), later simply referred to as 
Viet Minh. He and his followers aim for the unification of the three kys (Tonkin, 
Annam and Cochinchina) and the establishment of a socialist state.  
July 1943  The Permanent Military Committee in Alger decides to intervene in the Pacific and 
to set up an expeditionary corps, for which preparations begin in spring 1944. 
March 1944 De Gaulle declares that France will not cede power in Indochina but proposes a 
federation of autonomous states.  
March 1945 The Japanese occupy French administrative and military institutions imprisoning 
and/or killing most staff and troops. But roughly 6,000 men under Generals 
Sabattier and Alessandri escape into Chinese territory. Encouraged by the 
Japanese, Emperor Bai Dai proclaims Vietnam’s independence. The rulers of 
Cambodia and Laos follow suit. 
August 1945 The Allies decide at Potsdam to divide Indochina along the 16th parallel after 
the war and to temporarily allocate the north to the Chinese and the south to 
the British. 
 Japan capitulates after the US drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  
Following the outbreak of a revolution, Ho establishes a government in Hanoi, 
initially supported by other nationalist groups. Bao Dai abdicates. 
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Sept. 1945 Ho proclaims an independent republic of Vietnam. Laos and Cambodia follow 
suit. In the ensuing insecurity 400 French and Eurasians are killed or abducted 
during the Heyraud massacre, probably by the Viet Minh. British troops, and the 
first detachments of the French expeditionary corps clash with Vietnamese 
nationalists in the ensuing months. 
Oct. 1945 General Leclerc arrives with reinforcements in Saigon. The new high-commissioner, 
Admiral d’Argenlieu, follows a few days later.  
Jan. 1946 British General Gracey hands over responsibility for southern Indochina to the 
French. The latter also negotiate a withdrawal with the Chinese in exchange for 
economic concessions in China.  
March 1946 The Ho Chi Minh-Sainteny agreement spells out recognition of a free Vietnamese 
state within the Indochinese Federation and the French Union. It also foresees 
future negotiations over Vietnam’s final status and French interests. A referendum 
should decide over unification of the three kys while French troops are to be 
withdrawn over five years. 
After pacifying much of southern Indochina, French troops embark in Haiphong 
where skirmishes with the Chinese occur.  
April and  Conferences at Dalat between d’Argenlieu and (initially) Viet Minh, (other)  
Aug. 1946  Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian delegations over the future of Indochina 
produce little of substance. 
 
June  1946 To the consternation of the Viet Minh the Republic of Cochinchina is proclaimed. 
July-Sept. A conference at Fontainebleau between a Viet Minh delegation and the French  
1946  government produces only a last-minute agreement on a modus vivendi. 
 
Winter 1946 The French bombard Haiphong. This follows skirmishes with the Viet Minh as a 
result of disagreements over customs revenues. The latter attack the former in 
Hanoi and other larger towns. Ho declares war in December. 
May 1947 President Ramadier expels communist ministers from the government, which 
allows the latter to openly agitate against the ‘dirty war’ in Indochina. 
June 1948 The Bay of Along accords envision the establishment of a formally sovereign 
Vietnamese state within the French Union. Similar agreements are later signed 
with Laos and Cambodia. In all three cases France retains control over defence 




July and The state of Vietnam is proclaimed. Emperor Bao Dai becomes its head. Laos 
Nov. 1949  and Cambodia turn into associated states within the French Union. 
Sept. 1949 The ‘generals’ affair’ explodes after a critical report by chief-of-army staff General 
Revers is aired on a Viet Minh radio and printed copies circulate. 
Oct. 1949 The Peoples’ Republic of China comes into being. Communist troops arrive on 
the Vietnamese border by the end of the year. 
1950 Following a month-long conference at Pau, France agrees to cede further powers 
to the three associated states, including customs, the following year. 
March 1950 The arrest of Indochina veteran and anti-war activist Henri Martin leads to 
widespread protests in France and the former’s eventual release. 
June 1950 The first American material arrives in Indochina after the US and Great Britain 
recognise Bao Dai as legitimate leader of Vietnam. Earlier the USSR and China 
officially back Ho Chi Minh. 
Oct. 1950 A badly conceived evacuation of the French garrison at Cao Bang results in the 
death and capture of roughly 5,000 French, Foreign Legion and African troops. 
Lang Son and other northern towns are abandoned while the French authorities 
prepare the evacuation of Hanoi. 
Dec. 1950 Having been appointed commander-in-chief and high commissioner General de 
Lattre arrives in Indochina. He restructures the high command, initiates a line of 
fortifications in the Tonkin delta and pushes for the expansion of the nationalist 
armies of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Much of the latter is to be paid by the 
US, which eventually assumes 70% of the war’s costs. 
Jan.-Nov. Viet Minh General Giap orders a number of attacks on French positions, notably 
1951  at Vinh Yen and Hoa Binh. None yields any gains but they result in heavy casualties. 
Jan. 1952 Having left Indochina de Lattre succumbs to cancer. General Salan and High- 
Commissioner Letourneau succeed him. 
Nov. 1952 Salan orders the set up of air-supported bases at Na San and Lai Chau. The 
former is successfully defended against repeated Viet Minh attacks. 
March 1953 The Viet Minh penetrate Laos stopping short of taking Luang Prabang.  
 
King Sihanouk embarks on his ‘crusade for independence’, thereby achieving 




May 1953 The Mayer government devaluates the Indochinese piastre to end the 
scandalous traffic with the currency. Relations with the associated states sour 
and France eventually has to grant them full independence. 
Oct. 1953 Vietnam’s National Congress rejects the French Union “in its current form”. 
Jan. 1954 Operation ‘Atlante’ is launched along the central Annamese coast as part of the 
‘Plan Navarre’. 
March 1954 The battle of Dien Bien Phu erupts following the establishment of a huge French 
garrison. 
April 1954 The Geneva Conference begins with the aim to find solutions to the wars in Korea 
and Indochina. 
May 1954 Dien Bien Phu falls. Roughly 15,000 men of the expeditionary corps are killed, 
injured, disappear or go into captivity. One day later delegations in Geneva turn 
to discussing Indochina. 
French troops retreating from An Khe are almost wiped out through a series of 
Viet Minh ambushes. 
June 1954 French and Vietnamese delegations sign a treaty of “independence and 
association”. Ngo Dinh Diem becomes head of southern Vietnam toppling Bao 
Dai four months later.  
 Pierre Mendès France becomes French president. He vows to end the war within 
a month. 
The peace conference in Geneva ends with an agreement to partition Indochina 
along the 17th parallel into a communist north and a democratic south. But the 
envisioned country-wide elections never take place. In parallel French and Viet 
Minh troops are ordered to leave Laos and Cambodia. The war has cost France 
almost 3,000 billion francs. 
Spring 1955 The ‘war of the sects’ breaks out in Cochinchina. Diem’s troops succeed in 
breaking their power. 
May 1955 French forces evacuate northern Vietnam, accompanied by roughly one million 
refugees. 





Sources: J. Dalloz, La guerre d’Indochine 1945-1954 (1987), pp. 279-84, P. Masson, Histoire de l’armée française de 
1914 à nos jours (2002), pp. 391-413, A. Clayton, The Wars of French Decolonization (1994), pp. 39-78, S. TØnnesson, 
‘The Longest Wars: Indochina 1945-1975’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 22, no. 1 (March 1985), pp. 9-29, P. Brocheux, 
‘L’homme qui devient Ho Chi Minh’, Les collections de l’histoire: Indochine - Vietnam: colonialisation, guerres et 
communisme, no. 23 (April-June 2004), pp. 32-6 and M. Bigeard, Ma guerre d’Indochine (2004), chronology (book 































Remembering the wars and Southeast Asia 
 
On June 6, 2007 up to one hundred British veterans of the Malayan Emergency and family 
members attended the opening ceremony of ‘Malaysia Week’ in Covent Garden. This followed 
an invitation of the Malaysian government to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the country’s 
independence. During the opening ceremony the veterans and their relatives watched as carefully 
selected Malay, Chinese and Indian singers and dancers performed on stage. After the show 
much of the audience proceeded to the various artefact and food stands. Ultimately, though, the 
veterans' main target was a large tent reserved for them. There they recounted their tours, while 
throwing in a few anecdotes from recent travels to Southeast Asia. 
     The public gathering and travelling appears to be a newer phenomenon. Back in the 1950s 
and 1960s the majority of returning servicemen put their military service behind them, unless they 
decided to become regular soldiers. Most of the over 4,000 members,1 who eventually joined the 
National Malaya and Borneo Veterans’ Association (NMBVA), did so in the autumn of their lives. 
The association was founded on June 1, 1994 in Nottingham. It resulted from a meeting between 
veterans two years earlier who had attended a reunion in Malaysia. The original aim consisted in 
obtaining medals for those who had served in Southeast Asia during WWII and the ensuing 
conflicts in Malaya and Borneo.2 The association, which grew out of it, now boasts over twenty 
branches with members in Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, Fiji, Singapore 
and the US.3 During the regular branch meetings and at above celebration there is an underlying 
theme: pride in having done their part in steering Malay(si)a towards independence, democracy, 
stability and prosperity. 
     The jokes and laughter that one could overhear during ‘Malaysia Week’ stands in stark contrast 
to the lingering anger and sadness felt by French veterans of the Indochina War. Many of the 
survivors are today members of the Association nationale des anciens et amis de l’Indochine et 
du souvenir indochinois (ANAI), if they have not opted for the umbrella organisation, the Union 
nationale des combattants (UNC).  
       On a visit to the ANAI on November 11, 2006 I entered grey and sparsely illuminated offices 
where a small staff was silently going about its business. The organisation’s administrative 
director, Henri Dupont, received me with a mixture of curiosity and apprehension. The latter visibly 
disappeared from his face when I explained my research. After leaving me to sift through 
brochures and books Dupont casually informed me that he had served in Hanoi’s headquarters 
during the Indochina War. There he had received the frantic messages of his colleagues encircled 
in Dien Bien Phu. When asked whether he had ever returned to Southeast Asia, the director 
                                                          
1 The figure includes veterans of the confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia from 1963 to 1966, in  
which British and Commonwealth forces assisted the former. 
2 The Malaysian government issued medals to British soldiers who served in the country between 1957 
(independence) and 1960.  
3  Information provided by webmaster Annie Burden by e-mail on 26.7.2010. 
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responded in the negative. He argued somewhat enigmatically that his memories were those of 
a twenty-year old. What he did not spell out is that a return might have revived traumatic images.   
      Judging from the journals studied at the ANAI, celebrations by French veterans appear to be 
rather sombre occasions. Images feature serious-looking, elderly men in dark suits displaying 
impressive rows of medals and carrying flags. This frame of mind also shines through 
photographs of the war’s most revered figure, former paratrooper, General Marcel Bigeard. The 
latter visited Vietnam, including Dien Bien Phu, in 1994 for the purpose of a book. On its back 
Bigeard is quoted as stating: “I have always said that I would not return to Dien Bien Phu but 
reduced to ashes and wrapped in a parachute. However, forty years later, I have come back to 
pay my respect to the young men of twenty years who died for France.”4 Contrary to most of his 
colleagues and his British counterparts, Bigeard met his former opponents during his return, most 
notably Colonel Pham Xuan Phuang. As a young captain the latter had stood on the other side of 
the battlefield. He now received Bigeard as representative of Vietnamese veterans. During their 
encounter presents were exchanged and experiences shared in an atmosphere of respect but 
with the knowledge that ideologies were still miles apart.5 Another returning visitor, Colonel Allaire, 
recalled scenes of the battle in the company of another former opponent, Nguyen Dinh Ti for a 
French documentary. What is most striking about their meeting is that the latter continuously 
attempted to look his French counterpart in the eyes, while Allaire stared into the sky.6  
     Given the relative indifference of the French public at the time, it is ironic that the succeeding 
generations in general and the art scene in particular have taken a keen interest in (former) 
Indochina over the last two decades. The area has become a favourite destination for French 
tourists and investors.7 An exhibition on Angkor Wat at Paris’ grand palais in 1996 attracted large 
numbers of visitors. On an official level, too, relations have long been revived. Vietnam has been 
a member of the Agence intergouvernementale de la francophonie since 1970, for which the 
government staged a conference in Hanoi during November 1997. Meanwhile, a once ambivalent 
French government has paid tribute to its soldiers. While the Algerian War remained a taboo until 
the late 1990s, President Mitterrand unveiled a memorial for the Indochina War in Fréjus on 
February 16, 1993.8 Nowadays Paris even features a tiny Square des combattants d’Indochine.9        
     1992 also saw three comparatively successful, and in two cases award-winning, films on 
Indochina: Indochine by Régis Wargnier (whose father fought in the war), Jean-Jacques Annaud’s 
L’amant and Pierre Schoendorffer’s Dien Bien Phu. The latter, who had served as a cameraman 
in the war, had already directed La 317e section in 1965 and Le crabe tambour in 1977, both 
based on his earlier novels.  
                                                          
4 Bigeard, Ma guerre d’Indochine.  
5 Despite a recent economic liberalisation Vietnam is officially still a communist country. 
6  See D. Rousselier, Vietnam, la première guerre (documentary film, 2005/6). 
7  The director of Vietnam’s national tourism administration outlined in 2006 that between 1996 and 2005 the 
number of French tourists travelling to Vietnam had increased from 87,000 to 126,402. At the time France also 
ranked seventh among countries investing in Vietnam’s tourism infrastructure, having spent 188 million dollars. 
The director nevertheless expressed his desire for more visitors and ventures. See: 
www.lalettrediplomatique.fr/contribution_detail.php?id=9&idrub=9&idrubprod=31. 
8  www.memorial-indochine.org. 
9  R. Aldrich, ‘Putting the Colonies on the Map: Colonial Names in Paris Streets’ in T. Chafer & A. Sackur, 
Promoting the Colonial Idea: Propaganda and Visions of Empire in France (2002), p. 220. 
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     In view of this fascination, Nicola Cooper has noted that:“… Indochina seems to have lent itself 
more readily than France’s other former colonial possessions to a nostalgic, complacent, 
backward-looking and exoticising view.” Indochine and Dien Bien Phu in particular “… seem 
symptomatic of a culture which is still reluctant to fully embrace a post-colonial identity and 
thereby relinquish its control over the history and culture of its Asian Other.”10 The author would 
probably have been equally dismissive of the latest film adaption of Marguerite Duras’ 1958 novel 
Un barrage contre le Pacifique, even though the director, Rithy Panh, is Cambodian.11 
      Despite their questionable tones, the films represent an active artistic effort, which is not 
evident in the case of Malaya or the emergency. The closest Britain – or its film and media industry 
respectively – has come to remembering them are one radio and one TV documentary of note.12 
In both productions the Southeast Asian territory and conflict merely form part of wider topics, i.e. 
National Service and British counter-insurgency campaigns at the end of empire. This compares 
with at least three printed press collections, two TV and one longer radio documentary on the 
Indochina War alone.13 
      Perhaps British veterans are not too unhappy with this state of affairs. Some might fear too 
much exposure of and credit to their former foes. When Chin Peng, published his memoirs14 some 
British veterans were appalled by what they regarded as printed lies. Many also seem to support 
the refusal of the Malaysian government to allow Chin Peng's return. A few would go even further. 
Former National Serviceman Tony Rodgers suggested that the communist leader be transported 
south in the traditional way of the emergency – dangling from a pole.15 It is not difficult to imagine 
the reaction to a highly critical book on the counter-insurgency effort in Malaya (yet to be written), 
if one considers the storm, which erupted after the publication of David Anderson’s and Caroline 
Elkins’ books on the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya.16  
     Despite differing responses in Britain and France, the veterans of the Southeast Asian conflicts 
share things. They have generally guarded strong memories of their tours. They regularly pay 
tributes to their fallen comrades.17 Members of both groups feel that their efforts and conflicts 
have been forgotten by their governments and the population at large. In both cases their 
struggles have been overshadowed by later, noisier, bloodier and nearer conflicts: Algeria in 
France’s case, Northern Ireland in Britain’s.  
                                                          
10 N. Cooper, France in Indochina: Colonial Encounters (2001), pp. 203-18 (quotes pp. 205 and 218). 
11  The film hit the screens in 2009 and starred Isabelle Huppert. 
12  C. Wheeler, The Peacetime Conscripts, BBC Radio 4 (2000/1) and K. Townsend & J. Ash, Empire Warriors: The  
British Empire at War, 1945-1967, documentary, BBC 2 (2004/6).  
13  Historama-Historia Spécial, no. 28, La guerre d’Indochine, 1946-1954: les vraies raisons d’une défaite (March-
April 1994), Les collections de l’histoire, no. 23, Le Monde, Dossiers & Documents, no. 331, Les guerres 
d’Indochine (May 2004), F. Albert, Le silence des rizières (2003), Rousselier, Vietnam, la première guerre and 
P. Gélinet/Radio France, La guerre d’Indochine 1945-54 (1991). 
14  I. Ward, I. O. Miraflor and Chin Peng, My Side of History: Alias Chin Peng (2003). Chin Peng subsequently 
engaged in discussions with academics and veterans. The result is C. C. Chin’s and K. Hack’s (eds.), 
Dialogues With Chin Peng: New Light on the Malayan Communist Party (2004).  
15 Interview, 21.8.2006. Rogers had served with an infantry battalion. 
16 D. Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: Britain’s Dirty War in Kenya (2005/6) and C. Elkins, Britain's Gulag: The 
Brutal End of Empire in Kenya (2005). Anderson gave a paper, titled An Empire of Atrocities? Coming to Terms 
With Britain’s Colonial Past at Senate House on 5.12.2005. He informed the audience that mostly ex-colonial 
administrators had threatened him and Elkins with lawsuits, disruption of lectures and even criminal actions, 
while discouraging people from reading the books.  
17 George Tullis, former head of the NMBVA, compiled a complete roll of honour, listing all British and  
Commonwealth casualties of the emergency and the site of graves to facilitate visits.  
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Thesis aims and hypotheses  
      
The parallels and differences in recollection partly explain the origins and purpose of this thesis. 
The other part stems from my long-standing interest in decolonisation, especially the experiences 
of those ‘at the sharp’ end of it.  
      As the title suggests, the thesis represents a study of how British and French soldiers’ reacted 
to and have remembered the conflicts raging in Malaya and Indochina during the 1940s and 
1950s. Equally, it deals with soldierly perceptions and recollections of the area and its peoples. 
One can deduce from the vast literature on imperial culture, to be discussed below, that these 
responses and impressions were in many cases coloured by images conveyed through the media, 
literature, art, music and other vehicles in Britain and France prior to military tours in Southeast 
Asia. In addition to recapitulating reactions to the conflicts, environment and populations, the 
thesis seeks to verify if and to what extent such influences can be traced in military memory. The 
project thus represents an attempt at detecting what colonial representations servicemen brought 
to the region, what they recorded during their service, how they categorised these imprints, and 
what they took back in terms of remembrance. 
     The questions, arguments and structure of the thesis are largely a result of the available 
sources and their content, particularly in the case of interviews and questionnaires. While I held 
vague assumptions about soldiers experiences at the beginning of my research, i.e. at least some 
military awareness of Britain’s and France’s shrinking realms and a degree of familiarity with 
Southeast Asia, I eventually put these aside to make room for veterans’ own tales – partly 
because the latter diverged from my suppositions. From these I picked the parts that I regarded 
as most original and fascinating. The majority of books on the British and French counter-
insurgency efforts in Southeast Asia have centred on military themes. Unsurprisingly it is also 
what most veterans tend to discuss. Yet I was most struck by their statements on colonial politics, 
development, race, sex and nature – in so far as they have issued any of note. These tales then 
determined the final form of the written work. The result is in some ways a military history largely 
devoid of weaponry and battles. 
     Generally speaking, this research project has uncovered rather uniform opinions and technical 
attitudes on the British side in regard to Malaya, its communities, the emergency and the 
opposition. Cold War and military-strategic deliberations have weighed much heavier in soldierly 
assessments than social, economic, ethnic, cultural and environmental dimensions. For many 
veterans this is natural. As one drily remarked: “We were fighting a joint enemy, not taking a 
poll.”18 While the chapters provide evidence of such attitudes they also echo alternative and more 
compound opinions. These have been voiced by men with somewhat distinctive backgrounds or 
placed in particular situations at the time.  
     In comparison, French military memories betray more curious, emotional, critical and 
independent-minded protagonists, who have frequently pondered extensively on their roles in the 
                                                          
18  Questionnaire filled out by Terence Haley on 5.6.2007. He served in the territory as a National Serviceman  
 and in the infantry. 
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Indochina War, natural challenges as well as on interactions with friends and foes. The result is 
a greater variety in evaluations of the conflict, the enemy, Indochina and its peoples depending 
on personal situations. While social origins, time and nature of military tours, pre-emergency 
events, official information and the conflicts’ outcomes all played their part in the varying output, 
the thesis also implies that differing cultural norms have shaped viewpoints and behavioural 
patterns. In other words: army personnel from the two countries might simply have been 
encouraged or discouraged to reflect on their tasks based on national and military traditions. That 
in turn can offer clues as to why decolonisation proved a more painful process for the French than 
the British military. Such a possibility constitutes one of the original and underlying raison d’êtres 
of this project. 
     These results go against contemporary academic assessments insomuch as the term 
‘decolonisation’ has not figured as prominently in soldierly remembrance as it does in 
contemporary literature dealing with the period and the area. Similarly, they suggest that scholars 
have either overstated or downplayed the extent of imperial culture in Britain and France when 
the reality was rather less clear-cut for those potentially influenced by it. 
     The dissimilar stances and reactions of the two forces explain the choice of two case studies. 
A comparison tends to allow for broader conclusions while highlighting nuances and parallels. In 
view of developments during WWII, the nature of the conflicts raging there following VJ-Day, the 
communist opposition, the duration of the wars and the comparable regional settings, Southeast 
Asia seemed a sensible choice for such a comparison. I thus follow in the once lonely footsteps 
of Robert Holland, who introduced a first comparative outline on decolonisation in 1985 and one 
on emergencies in 1994.19 The timing for the first book was no coincidence. The author saw 
obstacles to an earlier publication stating: “...while most constituents of the old empires had been 
shunted into the post-colonial age, there were always enough awkward survivals [...] to keep alive 
befuddling myths and rhetoric.”20 It is only recently that Lawrence Butler, Bob Moore and Martin 
Thomas went down the same route, as did Martin Shipway. The former three have detected limits 
but also many parallels in European decolonisation, among them “a sluggish public realization [in 
imperial European countries] of what was being done in their name in the colonial territories”.21 
When the realisation set in and triggered responses, as during Suez and the Algerian War, it 
might have led, as Shipway has suggested, to “a post-colonial disillusion” in Britain and France.22  
     One might ask why European soldiers and colonial conflicts in Southeast Asia deserve special 
attention. One answer is simple: Little has changed since John MacKenzie lamented that “colonial 
warfare has been ill-served by historians” and that “We need many more [...] studies.”23 In 
particular we are still lacking academic analyses of British soldiers’ voices during the imperial 
                                                          
19  R. F. Holland, European Decolonization 1918-1981: An Introductory Survey (1985) and (as editor), 
Emergencies and Disorder in the European Empires after 1945 (1994). In fairness one should also mention 
J.-L. Miège’s earlier Expansion européenne et décolonisation: de 1870 à nos jours (1975). Yet the year 1870 
in the title betrays a distinctly French angle. 
20  Preface. 
21  M. Thomas, B. Moore & L. J. Butler, Crises of Empire: Decolonization and Europe’s Imperial States, 1918-1975  
(2008), p. 425. 
22  M. Shipway, Decolonization and its Impact: A Comparative Approach to the End of the Colonial Empires  
(2008), p. 239. 
23  J. M. MacKenzie (ed.), Popular Imperialism and the Military, 1850-1950 (1992), pp. 221-2. 
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sunset – as opposed to earlier periods. David Killingray and David Omissi did edit a collection of 
essays dealing with the forces guarding the borders and interior of colonial territories. In so doing 
they have highlighted the crucial contribution to colonial control these relatively few, mostly loyal 
and non-European mercenaries made.24 Very recently, Killingray and Martin Plaut followed up 
with a study of Africans fighting for Britain during WWII – a conflict, the authors have argued, that 
lasted much longer for them than for Europeans.25 Yet neither of these books cover Southeast 
Asia after WWII or European servicemen. Four non-academic authors have made up for this but 
their focus has largely laid on conditions, equipment, strategies and battles.26 Political aspects 
have dominated more in the works of David French and Hugh Strachan. Both have paid attention 
to (the end of) empire in their works on the British military but not exclusively so. French mainly 
sought to find references in Britain’s military past that might guide contemporary planners.27 
Journalist Trevor Royle for his part wrote what is now a standard work on National Service, including 
a chapter on the Malayan Emergency.28 As the title suggests though, the work largely leaves out 
professional soldiers. Otherwise, a long list of books by regimental historians exists, which depict 
the various campaigns of individual regiments over the centuries.29 Unfortunately, chapters on 
Malaya, if they exist, tend to be fairly short and technical. The area is treated in more depth in 
Thomas Mockaitis’ and John Nagl’s recent publications30 but their emphasis is, again, on the 
conflict’s lessons. The latter have had personal and very direct relevance for Nagl who 
participated in both Iraq wars and has taught at West Point. Perhaps with the first Iraq campaign 
in mind, Mockaitis has emphasised the continuing relevance of minimal force.31  
     Although not necessarily concerned with the military, the strategies behind the crushing of 
(potential) revolts has also caught the attention of Martin Thomas. In his latest book he has 
outlined the precariousness of inherently unjust colonial rule in North Africa and the Middle East 
during the interwar years, and the reliance on intelligence to control disaffected communities.32 
Despite their quality, these publications do not usually address views of those on the spot 
regarding (the retreat from) empire, colonial territories and communities.  
     In the French case a considerable literature, often featuring testimonials, can be found which 
covers the wars of decolonisation. However, the dominant themes have centred on the conditions 
of war and the reasons for the military and political disasters in the 1950s and 1960s. Due to epic 
battles like Dien Bien Phu, the controversial 1961 putsch in Algiers and the mythical status of the 
                                                          
24 D. Killingray and D. E. Omissi (eds.), Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers c.  
1700-1964 (1999), pp. 1-24. 
25  D. Killingray with M. Plaut, Fighting for Britain: African Soldiers in the Second World War (2010), p. 8. It is 
possible that Killingray was inspired by his erstwhile collaborator, Anthony Clayton, who wrote a similar book 
but covering French Africa and a lengthier period. It is titled France, Soldiers and Africa (1988). 
26  (Major) M. Tugwell (ed.), The Unquiet Peace: Stories from the Post-War Army (1957), C. Allen, The Savage 
Wars of Peace: Soldiers’ Voices 1945-1989 (1990), A. Walker, Six Campaigns: National Servicemen on Active 
Service 1948-1960 (1993) and R. Neillands, A Fighting Retreat: The British Empire 1947-1997 (1996). 
27 D. French, The British Way in Warfare, 1688-2000 (1990). One should also mention his more recent work 
Military Identities: The Regimental System, the British Army and the British People, c. 1870-2000 (2005). 
Strachan’s main title is The Politics of the British Army (1997).  
28 T. Royle, The Best Years of Their Lives: The National Service Experience 1945-63 (1986). 
29  A relevant title is J. Baynes, The History of the Cameronians (Scottish Rifles), vol. 4: The Close of Empire  
1948-1968. (1971). 
30  J. A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (2002).  
31  T. R. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era, 1919-1960 (1995), pp. 143-6. 
32  M. Thomas, Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914 (2008). 
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Foreign Legion though, the French military has generally been closer associated with the empire 
and its demise than its British counterpart. Authors have regularly taken either the 1940 armistice 
or the end of WWII as a starting point and the Algerian War as a culmination. Raoul Girardet 
sought to explain the roots of the military’s worsening malaise by citing issues with recruitment 
and composition.33 Like many non-French, Georg Kelly and Alistair Horne saw the difficulties 
more in inflexible leadership, ossified hierarchies and political meddling.34  
     The wide interest in the French military has led to collections, which often cover several 
decades, some of them compiled by non-academics.35 This might explain why not all of these 
publications entail central arguments but summarise events. Regardless of the outlook of these 
works, empire and decolonisation automatically seeped into the chapters due to the intensive 
colonial wars. One of the most interesting publications is Eric Duhamel’s, Olivier Forcade’s and 
Philippe Vial’s Militaires en République, 1870-1962: les officiers, le pouvoir et la vie publique en 
France (1999). Its title hints at the existence of a body more politicised than its British counterpart. 
Yet, despite military attempts to interfere with politics, the authors have reminded their readers 
that such excursions have been the exception rather than the rule.36   
     Still one of the best overviews of the military’s role during decolonisation has come from 
Anthony Clayton, who has also published on the British military, empire and counter-insurgency.37 
He has attributed the French military’s difficulty of coming to terms with the politics of 
decolonisation to the absence of a consolidating break after WWII, the lack of suitable doctrines, 
a “thinking in absolutes” and a tendency to overreact.38 The importance of WWII is exemplified in 
Martin Thomas’ The French Empire at War 1940-1945 (1998), which depicts the struggle for 
control in the empire between Vichy and the Free French. Martin Alexander39 and Martin Evans40 
for their part, have paid special attention to the French Army and the Algerian War. While the 
former has concentrated on strategic and political aspects, Evans has relied heavily upon 
testimonials. 
     The academic silence in Britain regarding soldiers and decolonisation puzzles if one considers 
that the army and the police habitually were the first in line when colonial troubles broke out. 
Hence the fitting title of Georgina Sinclair’s book At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the 
Imperial Endgame, 1945-80 (2006). Her point in regard to policing in Malaya and Hong Kong – 
that attempts to introduce a “more civil side” to the force’s tasks were hampered by the threat of 
the Cold War41 – contradicts to some degree Richard Stubb’s deliberations. In his view the 
                                                          
33  R. Girardet, La crise militaire française, 1945-1962: aspects sociologiques et idéologiques (1964). 
34  G. A. Kelly, Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947-1962 (1965) and A. Horne, The  
French Army and Politics, 1870-1970 (1984). 
35  J. Nobecourt, Une histoire politique de l’armée. vol. 1: de Pétain à Pétain, 1919-1942 (1967), J. Planchais, vol. 
2: de de Gaulle à de Gaulle,1940-1967 (1967), P. Carles, Des millions de soldats inconnus: la vie de tous les 
jours dans les Armées de la IV République (1982) and P. Masson, Histoire de l’armée française de 1914 à nos 
jours (2002). Carles made his name through film documentaries while Planchais specialised as a journalist in 
military matters for Le Monde before becoming the newspaper’s editor-in-chief. 
36  P. 704. 
37  See for instance: The British Empire as a Superpower, 1919-1939 (1986). 
38  The Wars of French Decolonization (1994), p. 6.  
39  The latest publications are (with J. F. V. Keiger) (ed.), France and the Algerian War, 1954-1962: Strategy, 
Operations and Diplomacy (2002) and (with K. Mouré) Crisis and Renewal in France, 1918-1962 (2002). 
40  Two examples from a very long list: The Memory of Resistance: French Opposition to the Algerian War (1954- 
1962) (1997) and (with J. Phillips) Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed (2007). 
41  P. 185. 
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government’s “abandonment of a coercion and enforcement approach in favour of hearts and 
minds” proved crucial and left a relatively peaceful legacy in Malay(si)a.42  
     Surprise about the literary hole in Britain also owes to the imperial tradition that ran as much 
in the British forces as it did in the French. Branches like the Indian Army owed their existence to 
imperial conquest and policing. As a result and as shown by MacKenzie, the military often 
appeared in popular literature, film, music and education.43 One would therefore assume that the 
impact of decolonisation proved particularly intense in these circles. This project aims, among the 
previously mentioned goals, to investigate whether that was actually the case. As it turned out, 
the responses were rather muted or would come later.  
     As pointed out, veterans have habitually complained that the emergency and the Indochina 
War represent forgotten conflicts. However, the literature doesn’t necessarily bear out such a 
claim. Neither are colonial rule in Southeast Asia and its end neglected subjects. What justifies 
this thesis is its angle, i.e. an academic analysis of soldiers voices during decolonisation. 
     To underline the absence of such an approach in the existing body of work on British Malaya 
and the emergency, it is worth having a look at the latter. As regards the conflict, an early but 
ground-breaking work by Anthony Short44 was followed by a long pause. A second wave followed 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, led by Richard Stubbs’ previously-mentioned book. It is no 
coincidence that by then the 30-year closure of governmental documents was coming to an end. 
Six years after Stubbs Simon Smith analysed relations between the Malay sultans and the British 
authorities before and during the emergency. In so doing he has outlined how both the British 
administration and the independent Malaysian government underestimated the sultans’ influence 
and popularity at their peril.45 Anthony Milner followed with a related work on nationalism and Tim 
Harper with a study on the social, political and economic aspects of the emergency.46 Karl Hack, 
who has questioned Short’s and Stubbs’ preoccupation with General Templer or hearts and minds 
respectively,47 and Tobias Rettig later turned their focus on British defence in Southeast Asia. They 
have highlighted the unsuccessful British attempt to reduce military commitments in the area until 
the final departure.48 Shortly before them Margaret Shennan presented one of few depictions of 
the British expatriate community in Malaya since Somerset-Maughan’s Far Eastern Tales.49 
Finally, the years 2004 and 2007 saw the publication of Christopher Bayly’s and Tim Harper’s 
                                                          
42  R. Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960 (1989), p. 264. 
43  J. M. MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960 (1984), pp. 
80-1, 210-3 and 228-30. 
44  A. Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-60 (London, 1975). Short’s work is particularly intriguing 
because of his involvement in the emergency and his subsequent, almost unrestricted access to governmental 
records. A new edition was published in 2000 titled In Pursuits of Mountain Rats: The Communist Insurrection in 
Malaya. 
45 S. C. Smith, British Relations with the Malay Rulers: From Decentralization to Malayan Independence, 1930- 
1957 (1995). 
46 A. Milner, The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya: Contesting Nationalism and the Expansion of the  
 Public Sphere (1994) and T. N. Harper, The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya (1998).  
47  See K. Hack, ‘“Iron Claws on Malaya”: The Historiography of the Malayan Emergency’, Journal of Southeast  
Asian Studies, 30, 1 (March 1999), pp. 99-125. 
48 K. Hack, Defence and Decolonisation in South-East Asia: Britain, Malaya and Singapore 1941-1968 (2001)  
 and K. Hack & T. Rettig (eds.), Colonial Armies in Southeast Asia (2006).  
49 M. Shennan, Out in the Midday Sun: The British in Malaya, 1880-1960 (2000). W. Somerset-Maughan’s tales  
came out in a new edition in 1993. 
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volumes on Britain’s wars in Southeast Asia in the 20th century.50 The work of these two scholars 
has lent a voice to many ordinary men and women involved in and affected by the turmoil.  
     Perhaps still the most important specialist on Malaya remains Anthony Stockwell. In addition 
to his British Documents on the End of Empire volumes,51 he has contributed various articles on 
aspects accompanying decolonisation in the area.52 Among them also features a little known 
piece written for the BBC History Magazine, in which Stockwell has argued against using the 
emergency as a blueprint for other counter-insurgency campaigns, particularly Iraq, due to its 
unique ethnic and political circumstances.53 
     While the Algerian War has dwarfed France’s presence in and departure from Indochina the 
latter has still triggered a greater literary output than (the exit from) Malaya. Nicola Cooper has 
nevertheless complained that much of this literature has centred on the war – a complaint that 
one could repeat in regard to Malaya. She has insisted that colonial Indochina still offers scope 
for research. She herself has filled some gaps by analysing French perceptions and 
representations of the territory, as opposed to the reality experienced by colonisers and colonised 
between 1900 and 1939. Cooper has come to the conclusion that Indochina represented for the 
French on the one hand “a discursive construction, a mythical, dreamed-for place” but also “a 
very real lived experience, both for the subjugated peoples and for the Europeans who settled in 
Indochina.”54 
     Yet, as her own bibliography demonstrates, Indochina has long occupied French and foreign 
minds. Administrators, explorers and writers, such as Marshal Lyautey, Pierre Loti, André 
Malraux, Marguerite Duras and Graham Greene passed on early images of the exotic lands.55 
Admittedly, it took a while for academics to produce studies of the French presence there. One of 
the first works was Pierre Brocheux’, William Duiker’s, Claude Hesse D’Alzon’s and Paul Isoart’s 
L’Indochine française 1940-45 (1982), which was quickly succeeded by Charles Meyer’s La vie 
quotidienne des français en Indochine 1860-1910 (1985). Meyer was well placed to produce such 
a study, having lived and worked in Vietnam and Cambodia from 1945 to 1970.  
     The 1990s saw Valerie Daniel’s La Francophonie au Vietnam (1992), as well as Pierre 
Brocheux’s and Daniel Hémery’s Indochine, la colonisation ambiguë, 1858-1954 (1995). The two 
specialists have highlighted the French inability to win over especially Vietnamese hearts during 
roughly one hundred years of domination. The result, as they have put it, was not a 
“decolonisation but a revolution” resulting in a renewed form of domination – communism.56 Luc 
Garcia for his part has scrutinised missionary activities in Vietnam between 1920 and 1960. In 
                                                          
50 C. A. Bayly & T. N. Harper, Forgotten Armies: Britain’s Asian Empire and the War With Japan (2004) and 
Forgotten Wars: The End of Britain’s Asian Empire (2007). 
51  The most relevant being his edited Malaya, part II: The Communist Insurrection, 1948-1953 (BDEE, series B, 
vol. 3) (1995). The two others in the series are Malaya, Part I: The Malayan Union Experiment, 1942-1948 and 
Malaya, Part III: The Alliance Route to Independence, 1953-1957 (1995). 
52  An important one is his article ‘British Imperial Policy and Decolonization in Malaya, 1942-52’ in the Journal of  
Imperial And Commonwealth History, xiii, 1 (1984), pp. 68-87. It is discussed in some detail in chapter 3. 
53 ‘Looking for a Way out’, BBC History Magazine, vol. 7, no. 3, (March 2006), pp. 46-9 (reprinted in the NMBVA Journal 
2006).  
54 Cooper, France in Indochina, 2. 
55  P. Loti, Un pèlerin d’Angkor (1912), Marshal Lyautey, Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar, 1894-1899 (1920), 
A. Malraux, La voie royale (1934), M. Duras, L’amant (1984), G. Greene, The Quiet American (1955) and 
Ways of Escape (1980). 
56  P. 370. 
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doing so he has highlighted the limited penetration of the church into Vietnamese society and the 
uncertain allegiance of the converted in the face of growing nationalism.57 The powerful Banque 
de l’Indochine has inspired two studies.58 Pierre Franchini and the controversial George 
Boudarel59 edited fascinating, larger volumes on Saigon and Hanoi, in which they have drawn 
attention to the link between the cities’ structure and communities.60 Panivong Norindr looked 
behind the colonial stereotypes unmasking them as constructed myths.61 Finally in 2003, Eric 
Deroo and Pierre Vallaud brought out a new survey spanning one hundred years of the French 
presence.62  
     David Marr has covered the span between earliest nationalist agitation and the Vietnamese 
revolution of 1945 in Vietnamese Anticolonialism 1885-1925 (1971), Vietnamese Tradition on 
Trial, 1920-45 (1981) and Vietnam 1945: The Quest for Power (1995). In the first cited he has 
outlined the different strands of nationalism and their merger in the crucial years between 1925 
and 1945. In so doing he has flagged up the failure of traditional resistance leading to a search 
for alternatives outside Vietnam.63 Martin Shipway produced a detailed analysis of the tensions 
between the colonial administration and metropolitan governments prior to the outbreak of the 
war.64 The latter itself has resulted in a large number of books by French, British and American 
authors. It includes Jacques Dalloz’ standard work La guerre d’Indochine, 1945-54 (1987),65 Alain 
Ruscio’s La guerre française d’Indochine: 1945-1954 (1992)66 and Pierre Brocheux’s (as editor) 
Du conflit d’Indochine aux conflits indochinois (2000). The latter complements the existing 
literature in pointing to often overlooked themes. Among them figure the pre-colonial, hegemonic 
aspirations of the Dai Viet dynasty and the Angkor empire, which spilled into the 20th century in 
the form of tensions between the Vietnamese and the (Cambodian) Khmer.67  
     Quiang Zhai offered a much-needed glimpse into Chinese deliberations in China and the 
Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (2000). Hugue Tertrais took stock of the conflict’s costs in La piastre 
et le fusil: le coût de la guerre d’Indochine, 1945-1954 (2002). Finally, Eric Deroo and Christophe 
Dutrône edited a fresh portrait of the enemy in Le Viet-Minh (2009). And then there is Michel 
Bodin. He has delivered the most meticulous digests of archival documents held at the Service 
historique de la défense (SHD),68 complementing them with interviews and memoirs. The result 
are La France et ses soldats, Indochine 1945-1954 (1996), Soldats d’Indochine, 1945-54 (1997), 
Les combattants français face à la guerre d’Indochine, 1945-1954 (1998), Les Africains dans la 
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guerre d’Indochine, 1947-1954 (2000), Dictionnaire de la guerre d’Indochine 1945-1954 (2004) 
as well as numerous articles.69 While these books provide a wealth of information on composition, 
numbers, conditions in Indochina and reactions in France, one thirsts for central arguments, 
particularly on decolonisation. 
     In addition to above, a number of collections depicting soldiers’ lives and struggles in Indochina 
have appeared. The authors have included former protagonists, journalists, writers and even a 
film director. Further, three illustrated books are available with numerous archival images of the 
war.70 While none of these works necessarily propagates a particular argument, they remind us 
of the media’s relatively close observation of the conflict. Despite this impressive output, Daniel 
Hémery has lamented that most of these publications have focused on political choices, economic 
implications, military events and metropolitan reactions as well as on “circumscribed, social and 
cultural spaces”.71 It is hoped that this research project fills some of the gaps. 
 
 
Structure, research questions and scope 
 
The thesis is arranged into three main parts, each featuring a ‘British’ and a ‘French’ section. 
Chapters one and two detail, supported by appendices A to D, the composition, build-up, 
command structures and cooperation with civilian bodies of the anti-communist forces engaged 
in Southeast Asia. In parallel they highlight the pressures on both the British and French military 
resulting from demobilisation, other imperial trouble spots and NATO commitments, as well as 
from rising human and financial costs in Southeast Asia. In both cases the authorities attempted 
to overcome these difficulties through conscription, local recruitment and import of non-British and 
non-French personnel. As the section indicates, these measures resulted in rather heterogeneous 
forces but did not necessarily bring about the desired results in both theatres.    
     A closer examination of the forces engaged in Southeast Asia seemed necessary to me 
because some of the earlier-quoted books on the conflicts and military can sometimes give the 
misleading impression of rather anonymous and homogenous forces. One exception here is 
Robert Jackson’s The Malayan Emergency: The Commonwealth Wars 1948-1966 (1991),72 
which by its title insinuates the diverse military apparatus engaged in Malaya. The two chapters 
and the supporting appendices are also helpful because they offer insight into a large section of 
British and French society at the time, i.e. men and women between the ages of eighteen and 
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Confrontation: The Commonwealth’s Wars 1948-1966 (2008). 
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roughly sixty years. In particular they disclose educational and health standards as well as 
economic situations. 
     Chapters three and four deal with servicemen’s understanding of the political context 
surrounding the conflicts, i.e. their causes and nature as well as the opposition faced. A full list of 
questions put to veterans can be found in appendix K. The main inquiries for these two chapters 
were: Have British and French (ex-)army personnel labelled the conflicts as local, colonial 
uprisings, wars for independence or as theatres of the Cold War? What were the roots of the 
conflicts in their eyes? Could they identify with their tasks at the time? And have they regarded 
their (former) enemies simply as criminal gangs, nationalist movements or communist forces?  
     The two chapters demonstrate that a number of issues impacted on military views. Among 
them figured international events before, during and after the emergencies, military and political 
traditions in Britain and France, personal circumstances and, not least, the outcomes of the 
counter-insurgency campaigns themselves. Particularly in the case of Indochina and the French 
Expeditionary Corps space is reserved in the section for a recounting of events during WWII, 
which go a long way to explain developments, takes and actions between 1945 and 1954. Chapter 
four also investigates to what extent French military opinions followed official and later academic 
compartmentalisations of the war, i.e. the transformation from an initially colonial campaign into 
an international conflict. In addition, ensuing ‘lessons’ for individual French servicemen and the 
army as a whole are analysed.  
     I also deemed it helpful to compare British and French viewpoints on conflicts and enemies 
with motivations and experiences of the opposition. I believe that the wide gap in perceptions 
between the former belligerents has justified this decision. In a way it also mirrors my comparisons 
throughout the thesis between military judgements of protagonists, events or settings and later 
academic studies of these aspects. Such contrasting highlights for instance the mistaken belief 
among some British veterans that Malaya had been promised independence even before WWII.  
     Chapters five and six explore soldierly reactions to Southeast Asia and its communities. 
Underlying questions include: how did impressions fit pre-conceived images, provided they 
existed at all? How strongly did soldiers connect with the colonial setting, particularly local 
populations? How have (ex-)servicemen judged the colonial record in regard to infrastructure, 
health and living conditions? And how intensive and lasting have imprints of Southeast Asia and 
its wars been on the participants? 
     The two parts stress that strategies employed, alliances built, personnel employed, conditions 
endured before and during the insurgencies as well as exposure to the British and French Empires 
in general (or lack thereof) impinged on views of racial groups, colonial road and rail networks, 
villages, towns and cities, work places and general, non-European wellbeing. Especially in this 
part one notes striking similarities, such as the extent or limit of imperial culture absorbed by 
(future) soldiers in Europe, (un-)familiarity with Southeast Asia and clear preferences for certain 
ethnicities. 
     The thesis is supplemented by several appendices. They provide details on protagonists 
quoted, regiments and battalions involved in the insurgencies, ranks, unit sizes and structures, 
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chronologies and research inquiries used in questionnaires. On the one hand their purpose lies 
in offering facts and figures for readers not infused with military language. On the other hand they 
make up to a degree for the absence of traditional military deliberations in the chapters. 
     How does all this fit into the wider literature on decolonisation? While enormous by now the 
latter has paid insufficient attention to military experiences, at least in the British case. Analyses 
of the process in Britain’s case began to appear as early as the late 1940s,73 evidently triggered 
by India’s and Pakistan’s independence. The following decades saw the appearance of related 
publications every now and then.74 The flood gates of imperial literature really opened in the 
1980s and 1990s thanks to works like John Gallagher’s published Ford lectures. In them the latter 
debunked a few popular myths about the (end of) empire, among them the notion that “empire 
was [...] a continuous process of decline”.75 Since then John Darwin in particular has provided 
comprehensive surveys of the social, political and economic implications of decolonisation. He 
has cautioned against simplistic explanations for Britain’s decolonisation. Significantly in regard 
to Malaya, he has held that: “Public revulsion at terrorist outrages was always prone to be 
balanced by irritation at the inability of the security forces to defeat terrorist movements, and 
eventually by a feeling that the loss of (British) life was not justified by the purpose supposedly 
served by a military presence.”76 Here then lies one rationalisation for Britain’s determination to 
hand over power in Malaya rather sooner than later.  
     In the last couple of years a flurry of further overviews has followed. Authors include Lawrence 
Butler, Ronald Hyam and Andrew Stewart.77 The latter has highlighted the paradox in the 
intensive cooperation between Britain and her dominions during WWII that nevertheless led to 
maturity and emancipation on the part of the latter. One could add to this that these developments 
did not prevent Australia and New Zealand from playing an active part in the Malayan Emergency. 
      Other writers have focused on specific fields and areas within the discipline. (In the latter case 
I have earlier limited the discussion to Malaya.) Frank Henlein studied the political decisions 
governing the British decolonisation process as a whole.78 Nicholas White has analysed the 
economic disentangling in Malaya. He has thereby pointed out that the territory’s importance as 
a dollar earner waned in the mid-1950s.79 (This argument offers another important reason for the 
territory’s independence in 1957, despite the continuing emergency.) Susan Carruthers and John 
McKenzie have shed light on governmental spins in the portrayal of the violent clashes 
accompanying Britain’s expansion and retreat, not least in Malaya.80 John Stuart has depicted 
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the uneasy relationship between missions, the colonial administration and African nationalism.81 
Missions played a much greater role in Indochina than in Malaya due to Islam’s dominance in the 
latter territory. It explains the scarcity of books on the subject.   
     Ronald Hyam, Roger Louis and Steven Howe have made the connection between British party 
politics and decolonisation.82 These works have shattered any simplistic equation featuring a 
‘progressive left’ and an ‘intransigent right’ when it comes to decolonisation.83 Influential prime 
ministers, colonial secretaries and administrators have also been the subject of studies. The 
authors to mention in this context are Philip Murphy, Philip Ziegler, Richard Aldous, Sabine Lee 
and Anthony Kirk-Greene.84 Murphy’s biography is insomuch of importance as Lennox-Boyd 
served during the second half of the emergency. To some extent he has been overshadowed in 
the historiography by his predecessor Oliver Lyttelton, who oversaw the more crucial years.    
     The frequent violence accompanying the painful political separations in the empire has 
triggered controversial books and articles by David Anderson, Caroline Elkins, Huw Bennett, 
Daniel Branch and Brian Simpson.85 These publications contain passages on the military(’s 
misconduct) but are not necessarily based on soldiers’ accounts. Anderson’s book for instance 
focuses on proceedings in Nairobi’s courtrooms that all to often resulted in hanging for those 
suspected of involvement in the Mau Mau rebellion. That said, he also included passages on the 
military confrontations in Kenya’s highland jungles and Kikuyu reservation.  
     As regards French decolonisation, a small but steady trickle of publications over the decades 
turned into a considerable flow in the 1990s – but probably not one quite as extensive as in Britain. 
One of the first surveys was published by Henri Grimal shortly after the end of the Algerian War.86 
It took a relatively long time until further surveys appeared. Especially Charles-Robert Ageron 
kick-started the next round thereby establishing himself as a leading authority on empire and 
decolonisation. It is striking that he, his co-writers and other French scholars87 have referred to 
public opinion polls as well as to attitudes of the media, unions and the church to prove the limited 
French interest in the (end of the) colonial empire.88 Equally noteworthy is the fact that France’s 
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dramatic (colonial) history has exerted a strong pull on many British and American academics, 
among them Raymond Betts.89  
     In parallel, more specific works on individual groups, personalities, institutions and regions 
(see earlier discussion on Indochina) embroiled in and affected by decolonisation have sprung 
up. Noteworthy publications comprise Paul Sorum’s Intellectuals and Decolonization in France 
(1977), which has outlined the difficulty of journalists, editors and academics to come to grips with 
growing nationalism in the colonies.90 Two other important contributions are Jacques Marseille’s 
Empire colonial et capitalisme français: histoire d’un divorce (1984) and Olivier Colombani’s 
Mémoires coloniales: la fin de l’empire français d’Afrique vue par les administrateurs coloniaux 
(1991). The latter has highlighted parallels to the experiences of French commanders in the 
Indochina War, i.e. the scarcity and late arrival of resources for the control of immense territories. 
Despite its title, it features passages on (military) administrators in Indochina.  
     After a longer pause Nicolas Bancel, Daniel Denis and Youssef Fates introduced a study of 
youth movements in the colonial context.91 One could argue that the portraits of all these groups 
equaled for some time a French approach more rooted in social history than a British one 
emphasising political history. Although the scope has opened up in Britain Roger Louis’ and 
Ronald Robinson’s classic article on US-British relations during decolonisation constituted a fairly 
representative angle until recently.92 (That said, Louis is American.) 
     Above-mentioned suspension of works on decolonization, if one can call it that, might have 
something to do with the re-emergence of the Algerian War as a heated topic during the late 
1990s. It also explains why, in comparison, decolonisation in Indochina and other parts of the 
French Empire have taken a backseat. Owing to the involvement of large numbers of French 
conscripts it was some of the more critical and vocal soldiers, who initially drove the recollection 
of the ‘war without a name’.93 Following the end of the war the ensuing silence was occasionally 
interrupted by controversial publications and films.94 It definitely ended when the French 
parliament officially recognised the conflict as a war in June 1999. One year later former insurgent 
Louisette Ighilahriz described in Le Monde how she had been tortured by the French military in 
1957 – a claim rejected by General Bigeard but indirectly accepted by General Massu. In October 
2000 twelve former French militants called on the government to recognise and condemn the 
atrocities committed, some of which General Aussaresses freely described in his memoirs.95 In 
November Le Monde published long interviews with the latter and Massu.96 These public debates 
eventually resonated with the likes of Benjamin Stora, Jean-Charles Chauffret, Raphaëlle 
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Branche and Sylvie Thénault in France and with Martin Alexander and Martin Evans in Britain.97 
Branche has been particularly prominent due to her chilling depiction of the increasingly 
institutionalised system and spread of torture. There are also references to such practices in 
Indochina, which brings us back to this thesis. 
      The progression from political categorisations (chapters three and four) to impressions of 
territories and populations (chapters five and six) makes sense if one considers that the British 
and French authorities devolved power to Asians during the conflicts. They did so in order to 
counter nationalist arguments of imperial suppression. Instead of focusing on pacification military 
and political efforts thus turned towards re-establishing peace and stability for eventual self-
government. Officially European servicemen no longer fought for western control but for vaguely 
defined cultural and economic links within a newer framework. This could have begged the 
question for the men on the spot of whether these areas and peoples merited their sacrifice. As 
chapters four and six demonstrate, such questions loomed much larger in French than in British 
military minds. 
     The term ‘imperial culture’ has surfaced several times. The thesis sections also attempt to 
measure the extent of the latter in Britain and France prior to soldiers’ involvement in the wars. 
Furthermore, perceptions of Southeast Asian political affairs, society, gender and infrastructure 
in particular also require to some extent metropolitan reference points. Experiences at home 
inevitably shaped military judgments. Such references have found their way into several chapters.  
     If chapters five and six explore the degree of soldiers’ imperial ‘infusion’, they do so against 
the background of an ongoing, and often heated, academic debate on both sides of the channel. 
At times it has included discussions on the impact of decolonisation. Before the advent of this 
discipline, the assumption prevailed in Britain that empire had left the British masses relatively 
cold and that they had accepted decolonisation without much grumbling. As John Darwin stated 
as late as 1991: “... British opinion at home was simply not interested in it [empire], knew little or 
nothing about it, and was, consequently, quite unwilling to see scarce resources spent on 
preserving it.”98 Such notions have been challenged by many scholars, beginning with John 
McKenzie in 1986. The latter edited essays highlighting the (apparently) strong and influential 
imperial bearing of vehicles, such as the BBC, the Empire Marketing Board, paintings and 
children’s books between 1870 and 1950.99 Fourteen years later Cathrine Hall inquired how 
travellers, missionaries or colonial officials turned into colonisers and how “colonialism was lived 
domestically”.100 Stuart Ward embraced similar aspects albeit focusing on the end of empire. He 
and his colleagues scrutinised popular appreciations of imperial decline as (potentially) witnessed 
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through arts, sports, transport, immigration and singular events like the Everest expedition. Ward, 
like his colleagues, has questioned the ‘minimal impact thesis’, calling instead for a more nuanced 
approach.101  
     Building on his earlier work, Andrew Thompson has struck a careful note but has 
acknowledged the subtle impact of empire. He has stressed that the colonial realm impacted 
differently on the various sections of British society, which in turn responded in differing ways.102 
Wendy Webster (and her contributors) has addressed comparable questions, spotlighting crucial 
developments and events such as WWII or the Queen’s coronation. While insisting that the loss 
of empire resonated in British society she has admitted that the extent is difficult to measure.103  
     Given their own nationalities, Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich have contested the Britain-
centred approach of existing literature, calling instead for an examination of the British Empire as 
“a phenomenon of migration and mass settlement”. In their view these aspects were “key 
element[s] in the development of “Britishness”.104 Phillip Buckner and Douglas Francis added 
weight to this argument with an analogous collection. Despite putting a question mark behind the 
concept of a British World, they too, have held that the empire was central to it – and with it the 
dominions.105   
     Martin Lynn then added a volume centring on the crucial and distinct 1950s. Although colonies 
were gaining independence during that period Lynn has argued that these years also 
demonstrated the importance of the imperial economy to Britain. Partly as a result, especially the 
Tories attempted to maintain a world role for Britain.106 Bernard Porter has offered a more 
sceptical view. He has maintained that allegedly imperial aspects and discourses of 19th and 20th 
century British society had more to do with domestic or universal issues at the time.107 
     In France, early works, like Henri Brunschwig’s Mythes et réalités de l’impérialisme colonial 
français, 1871-1914 (1961), suggest that imperial culture occupied French academic minds early 
on. Even so, Amanda Sackur and Tony Chafer have noted the influence of John McKenzie on 
French scholarship.108 Generally, British and French schools of thought have developed along 
similar lines. Early French historians of empire, too, have held that colonies were the business of 
a small but fairly active elite. One of the earliest advocates of this theory was Raoul Girardet, who 
analysed the role of imperialism in France and the various debates. Some of these centred on 
the pros and contras of assimilation or association.109 He has noted the importance of empire 
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during WWII and the heated debates surrounding the Algerian War. But he has also sensed a 
rapid closure after the French withdrawal and a lack of an imperial hangover in the metropolis.110  
      Not much after afore-mentioned Paul Sorum coined the term “passively imperialist” when 
referring to the French populace. He has attributed this to the fact that (colonial) politics was 
habitually discussed and shaped by a small circle of politicians and intellectuals, to whom voters 
had delegated responsibility.111 Stuart Persell followed a similar line emphasising the smallness 
but dedication of the colonial lobby.112 Charles-Robert Ageron and his co-editors have supported 
this thesis, citing, among other things, the limited commercial exchange with the colonies. They 
have also dubbed the apparent imperial consensus during the Colonial Exhibition of 1931 a 
“legend”.113 
     These traditional concepts have been contested in recent years in France and in Britain. 
Abdelkebir Khatibi, Catherine Hodeir and Michel Pierre were among the first to do so.114  After a 
longer pause Tony Chafer, Amanda Sackur and others combined intriguing articles examining 
the imperial traces in education and propaganda. The editors have emphasised the “integrative 
and unifying role” of empire even after the expansionary rush. But they have equally 
acknowledged that this did not necessarily result in great familiarity with or passion for the 
colonies. Instead, the latter: “…fostered a particular sense of French identity based on ‘grandeur’ 
and ‘racism’”. It made it easier to swallow the 1871 defeat against Germany but the final divorce 
from empire very painful. Far from advocating an immense cultural impact of empire though, the 
editors have held that popular culture has to be taken into account in order to grasp the 
metropolitan echo of colonialism and decolonisation.115  
     Across the channel, Pascal Blanchard has driven the study of imperial culture, insisting on a 
strong impact of empire on France. The first of two edited volumes, covering the period of 
expansion, features several essays on such aspects as science or the Agence générale des 
colonies. Despite his views on imperial culture, Blanchard and his co-editor, Sandrine Lemaire, 
have admitted that not all external influences in France were necessarily imperial. Equally, they 
have reminded us that imperial culture did not least serve to provide moral guidelines for France 
itself, while legitimising the changing regimes. Their second volume covers the years until (oddly) 
1961 and ventures into such differing topics as food or the Vichy regime. In its introduction, the 
editors have maintained that the imperial influences and links became even stronger after the 
1930s and helped to unify the nation.116 
     Martin Evans has shown more caution. His introduction provides a helpful overview over 
imperial expansion, contraction and lasting influences. Contrary to others, he has traced colonial 
                                                          
110  R. Girardet, L’idée coloniale en France de 1871 à 1962 (1972), pp. 194-201 and 258-285. 
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coloniale (1993). 
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influences in Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt as well as in the travels and resulting art of French 
painters.117 It seems as if such caution has turned into a general weariness, resulting in a 
somewhat declining interest in imperial culture. Or perhaps discussions have simply shifted to 
related topics like post-colonialism and immigration. Unsurprisingly, it has often been 
descendents of immigrants who have engaged in such deliberations.118  
     Thesis chapters five and six also connect with the burgeoning literature regarding European 
views of the ‘exotic other’ or ‘orientalism’, which was so thoroughly dissected by Edward Said.119 
The latter mainly cited writers, philosophers and colonial administrators when exposing the 
inherent racism in western observations of eastern customs. In some ways Frederick Cooper’s 
and Ann Stoler’s edited volume is more comprehensive in that it entails debates on missions, 
motherhood, citizenship, architecture, education and labour. The unifying subject in their work is 
the “imaginary and physical space in which the inclusions and exclusions built into the notions of 
citizenship, sovereignty, and participation were worked out”. In discussing these spaces the 
authors have argued “for careful interrogation of the relationship of colonial state to metropolitan 
state”.120  
  
Having outlined content and structure of the thesis, as well as the relevant historiography, a word 
needs to be said in regard to the project’s boundaries and the terminology employed. The focus 
of this study lies on male, British and French (former) army personnel. That said, voices from the 
navies, air forces, the police, expatriate communities and (former) enemies have also been 
considered. I have attempted to include testimonies of as many ranks, units and social origins as 
possible. Likewise, I have tried to pay equal attention to regular and conscript soldiers. For 
reasons explained in chapter two, this was possible only in the British case.  
     The period covered is evident from the title but some testimonials also cover earlier and later 
years. This owes to the fact that British troops re-entered Malaya as early as September 1945, 
with some staying until and beyond the day the emergency was declared. Vice versa, some of 
the protagonists (and their units) quoted here remained in Malaya after 1960 because their tasks 
demanded it. The case was similar in Indochina.    
     The area concerned also requires clarification for readers unfamiliar with its history. The 
administrative realm of British Malaya during the emergency covered the peninsula, stretching 
down from the Thai border to the Straits of Malacca. It did not include Singapore, Sabah and 
Sarawak. French Indochina on the other hand comprised Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. While 
the war concerned all three territories Vietnam saw the bulk of clashes. As a result, the majority 
of testimonies have come from servicemen fighting in the largest and most populous territory. 
     Last but not least, I have omitted accents in Southeast Asian words for the sake of simplicity. 
 
 
                                                          
117 M. Evans (ed.), Empire and Culture: The French Experience, 1830–1940 (2004), pp. 1-23. 
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Primary sources employed 
 
This research project has relied to a considerable degree on testimonies of British and French 
servicemen. These have taken the form of interviews, questionnaires, memoirs (published and 
unpublished), private collections, and reminiscences on veterans’ sites. Radio and TV 
documentaries, newspaper articles, various military journals (past and contemporary), 
handbooks, ministerial and parliamentary papers as well as photographs have complemented 
them. This diversity offers insights from various angles and helps to avoid oversimplifications or 
partisanship. This is especially important as oral history looms large in this thesis. 
     The discipline owes its birth to Allan Nevins, a historian at Columbia University. His speciality 
lay in diplomatic history which required many interviews. Nevins’ approach was boosted by the 
rise of the civil rights and feminist movements, whose protagonists were interviewed with newly 
available and cheap tape recorders. One of the most important works in this regard is 
Autobiography of Malcom X. While the new devices allowed to record the voices of society’s 
margins, traditionalists questioned the accuracy of the findings. To accommodate the critics, the 
interviewers discarded any statements made by allegedly forgetful or distrustful interviewees. It 
was only when Italian Alessandro Portelli and others accepted and interpreted the inaccuracies 
in the discussions that the discipline gained more acceptance. Interestingly but not surprisingly, 
the breakthrough occurred in Italy, which was deeply divided between communist and neo-fascist 
factions throughout the second half of the 20th century. Portelli was used to take ideologies into 
consideration when reading newspaper articles, archival sources or books.121   
     He has to some extent been overshadowed by compatriot Luisa Passerini, who added new 
features to oral history. Concentrating first on the experiences of the Turin working classes in the 
1930s and 1940s122 she moved to the events of 1968. Her Autobiography of a Generation: Italy 
1968123 combines elements of her own psychoanalysis years after the momentous year, her life 
up to those sessions, including her involvement in the events of 1968, and  interviews with student 
activists of the time. In so doing she, like other oral historians, “... explore[d] the ways in which 
the relationship between private and public, personal and political is negotiated.”124 In Passerini’s 
case a feminist undercurrent has flown into these analyses. 
     While an increasing number of historians have used oral history the latter has struggled to 
shake off its seemingly unscientific nature. As Ronald Grele has pointed out, oral historians 
themselves have habitually been very excited about the discipline in public while guarding 
reservations in private. As a result, the discipline has been pushed into archives and libraries. 
Indeed, it is probably no coincidence that staff at the Imperial War Museum (IWM) in London or 
the Bureau des témoignages oraux (part of the Service historique de la défense (SHD)) in Paris 
                                                          
121  Alexander Stille, ‘Prospecting for Truth Amid the Distortions of Oral History’, The New York Times, March 10, 
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have conducted a considerable number of interviews with war veterans, many of which still await 
academic scrutiny. The hesitation is not entirely logical, as Portelli has highlighted:  
 
... written and oral sources are not mutually exclusive. They have common as well as 
autonomous characteristics, and specific functions which only either one can fill […] Very 
often, written documents are only the uncontrolled transmission of unidentified oral sources 
[…] The passage from these oral ur-sources to the written document is often the result of 
processes which have no scientific credibility and are frequently heavy with class bias. […] 
This applies to parliamentary records, minutes of meetings and conventions, and interviews 
reported in newspapers: all sources which are legitimately and widely used in standard 
historical research. 
 
     Some oral historians have exacerbated the scepticism by simply asking time witnesses about 
specific events, instead of verifying the facts beforehand. In addition, they have often 
underestimated the complexity of interviews. Portelli has pointed out that the historian is always 
part of the source. He or she draws up the questions, selects the interviewees and writes the 
transcript, thereby considerably shaping and possibly tainting the final result. During transcription 
the interviewer might not always correctly interpret the true meaning of intonation, rhythm, pauses 
or dwelling on certain events. Apart from that, memory can fail the interviewee125 – especially if 
he is as old as the veterans considered for this project. Some of them have warned themselves 
that they might not remember everything, despite not particularly struggling in the ensuing 
sessions.  
     There are other issues to consider: Luisa Passerini has noted that oral testimonies have a 
tendency to veil tragic aspects and intense sentiments.126 Portelli for his part found that witnesses 
placed the death of a worker, named Luigi Trastulli, into the context of mass firings in 1953, 
instead of demonstrations against Italy’s decision to join NATO in 1949.127 He concluded: 
 
Oral sources tell us not just what people did, but what they wanted to do, what they believed 
they were doing, and what they now think they did. […] The importance of oral testimony may 
lie not in its adherence to fact, but rather in its departure from it, as imagination, symbolism, 
and desire emerge. Therefore, there are no ‘false’ oral sources. Once we have checked their 
factual credibility […] the diversity of oral history consists in the fact that ‘wrong’ statements 
are still psychologically ‘true’ and that this truth may be equally as important as factually 
reliable accounts. […] But what is really important is that memory is not a passive depository 
of facts, but an active process of creation of meanings. Thus, the specific utility of oral sources 
for the historian lies, not so much in their ability to preserve the past, as in the very changes 
wrought by memory.128 
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     Oral historians must also take into account interviewees’ backgrounds and circumstances. A 
former National Serviceman of humble origins, who left Britain against his will while his family lost 
a bread-winner for two years, might have looked back on his tour in Malaya with a degree of 
resentment. This is even more likely if he lost close friends on patrol or was himself seriously 
injured. Vice versa, a young, adventurous, ambitious and outdoor-loving regular officer, whose 
father and grandfather had already served in the army, could have guarded very fond memories 
of his spell. Equally, a French private, seeking to escape war-torn France after WWII, arrived in 
Indochina with a distinctly different outlook than a professional officer, who had spent all his life abroad. 
     Despite these deliberations, oral history makes particular sense for this project because it has 
allowed the inclusion of voices from the military and the lower classes – both of which have taken 
a backseat in (imperial) history. However, other researchers asked the questions in archival 
interviews, not all of them relevant for this project. Especially at the IWM technical inquiries 
outnumber those on social and cultural aspects. In contrast, BTO staff have habitually left much 
scope and initiative to the interviewees – with often fascinating results.  
     To complement oral testimonies I conducted my own interviews in Britain. I also sent out 
hundreds of questionnaires to branches of the NMBVA and the ANAI. While this latter approach 
proved efficient, it entailed certain disadvantages. To begin with, the limited space provided and 
the bureaucratic appearance resulted in sometimes very short and vague answers. In many cases 
potential participants were simply discouraged to fill out the questionnaires. This was due to, as 
one British veteran put it, a traditional abhorrence of forms dating back to their military tours. 
Whatever the reasons, some forms were returned empty. The questionnaires also highlight again 
the need to be conscious of circumstances. While British National Servicemen at times had made 
up the bulk of units in Malaya, the majority of respondents were former regulars, among them 
many NCOs. 
     As regards specific answers, a few British veterans seem to have felt irritated, thus producing 
slightly moody replies. Others indicated in their replies that they would have preferred to elaborate 
on the British effort in Malaya, individual operations and friendships. One former serviceman 
inserted detailed answers into the form but followed up with a letter. In it he offered his take on 
the political and military aspects of the emergency.129 In a few cases I sensed a general 
uneasiness with my research approach and academia in general that proved difficult to pin down. 
But I also discerned an eagerness by many respondents to get the story out during follow-up calls, 
as well as a gratefulness that someone showed interest. Several non-associated veterans 
contacted me after learning about my research through colleagues. 
     The process was more delicate in France where my initial mailing produced only polite but 
evasive replies. Addressed branch secretaries referred to the president, General Simon. Initially 
unhappy with the questions in the forms, the latter nevertheless offered his opinions on the war 
after I explained my research in more detail.130 
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     The third source heavily used for this project are memoirs. Their benefit lies in the ability of the 
authors to choose the content, which reveals much about their take on history. Some authors 
have clearly aimed to highlight or defend the efforts and decisions of certain groups and 
individuals (i.e. theirs or those of certain units) or to correct the official story of the conflicts.131 
Like interviews, military memoirs have largely been ignored by academia if one believes John 
Newsinger. The latter has also held that such discarding is unfortunate as: 
 
This literature is particularly important because of the way in which it demonstrates that 
militarism and imperialism are central aspects of British national culture and not peripheral 
concerns [...] The memoirs of the [...] Emergency [...] tell the story of colonial warfare waged 
by young white men in an exotic locale against an alien foe: the very stuff of the imperial 
imagination.132 
 
     Biographies have suffered a similar fate according to Graham Dawson. He has bemoaned the 
“relative neglect of biography in cultural studies [especially] in studies of the narratives of Victorian 
imperialism”.133 Dawson knew what he was complaining about, having studied the careers of and 
myths surrounding Scott Waverly, Henry Havelock and T. E. Lawrence. 
     The neglect is unfortunate as the emergency has generated a considerable number of 
published, personal accounts. A first wave saw the light during the campaign and immediately 
after. Among them are Arthur Campbell’s Jungle Green (1953), Mark Henniker’s, Red Shadow 
Over Malaya (1955), Oliver Crawford’s The Door Marked Malaya (1958) and Richard Mier’s Shoot 
to Kill (1959). The martial titles can be confusing. Miers’ memoirs for instance contain critical and 
sensitive observations not only of military but also political, social and economic aspects in 
Malaya.  
     With the escalation of the Vietnam War, former senior military figures felt compelled to advise 
Americans on the does and don’ts of counter-insurgency. Two of them were Sir Robert 
Thompson134 and Richard Clutterbuck.135 In comparison, the later 1970s remained rather quiet if 
one ignores the more general works of another participant, the later General Sir Frank Kitson.136 
But since the 1980s there has been a steady trickle of memoirs, intensifying in the last couple of 
years. The latest work is John Chynoweth’s Hunting Terrorists in the Jungle (2004/7). The fact 
that the author died before publication explains the recent burst and the growing activities on the 
internet. Many veterans want to get their story out before they die. 
     It is interesting that the early authors were often company and battalion commanders while the 
more recent authors tended to serve as National Servicemen. Among them have featured two or 
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three subalterns.137 On the other hand, former commanders-in-chief have remained silent – in 
marked contrast to their French counterparts. In two cases biographies filled the gap.138 One can 
muse about the silence among the highest ranks. Perhaps generals felt bound by an unofficial 
apolitical tradition. It was General Sir Walter Walker who broke with this custom in 1997,139 
encouraging some successors to do the same.140 
     In France, senior commanders have been at the forefront of printed remembrance. Previously 
mentioned Generals Aussaresses, Bigeard, Massu and Navarre as well as Admiral Thierry 
d’Argenlieu, Generals de la Bollardière and Ely all produced their memoirs. General Salan even 
wrote several volumes.141 While these held senior ranks, other veterans-turned writers served in 
more junior roles in the 1940s and 1950s. That applies to Hélie de Saint Marc, who has become 
a self-styled representative of veterans of the wars in Indochina and Algeria.142 One could argue 
that this has produced a slightly one-sided and elitist picture of the French effort in Indochina. Yet, 
as will be demonstrated, a considerable number of French participants were indeed officers and 
NCOs. One of the most ordinary figures at the time was the later actor Alain Delon, then a marine. 
He was one of several veterans, who would later make their mark in French arts and 
entertainment. Together with Pierre Schoendoerffer, Jean Lacouture and Jules Roy, these 
protagonists have turned the memory of the war into a sort of celebrity affair. If one adds 
controversial figures like the later leader of the Front National, Jean-Marie Le Pen, a picture 
emerges of a special group of soldiers shaped by unusual circumstances, i.e. WWII, resistance 
and the traumas of Indochina and Algeria.  
     However, one could argue that these men and their outlooks were not necessarily 
representative of French servicemen over the 19th and 20th centuries. Pierre Miquel has held that 
it was largely inconceivable by the turn of the century that an officer publicly expressed his opinion 
on governmental decisions. Those who ignored the rule often did so under pseudonyms in specific 
journals.143 Thus resulted the army’s nickname, la grande muette.144 It should also be borne in 
mind that many Indochinese veterans later served in Algeria. If they wrote memoirs, they were 
frequently recounted through the North African prism. By citing the trauma of abandoning loyal 
Indochinese communities, as de Saint Marc did, they have explained their involvement in the 
1961 putsch.  
     Generally, one should be aware that there are underlying factors to memoirs and other 
recollections, which are difficult to measure. Are the varying British and French testimonies due 
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to actual, contrasting experiences, national characteristics or what could be termed as ‘testimonial 
traditions’? Early memoirs have undoubtedly set the tone for succeeding ones. Veterans’ 
meetings have further shaped the way the conflicts and areas have been remembered. The jokes 
and technical elaborations I overheard during British reunions for instance can be found in the 
earliest witness accounts. On the other hand, one can discern a French pattern of accusations 
and counter-accusations, paired with an expressed fondness for Indochina and its people. It could 
well be that individuals in either military camp have felt differently from the bulk but have hesitated to 
express their alternative views.  
     Perhaps as a result, some memoirs never made it into print. They have, together with letters, 
reports and photographs, remained in private collections. Their content has evidently been filtered 
by the person submitting the records and sometimes again by archival staff. But it has usually not 
been edited or censored, which makes them highly original and often rich sources.  
     The story is slightly different in the case of articles in regimental journals. In Britain, the latter 
are habitually stored in regimental museums. The texts tend to feature reports on kills and almost-
kills, sporting events and mess activities – all accompanied by jokes.145  Reading them one could 
easily get the impression that it was all great fun. Despite that, such texts offer useful insights into 
army life, conditions, traditions and values. The same goes for the rather tedious patrol reports or 
regimental diaries. These texts also tell us much about how events have been officially 
remembered and what former soldiers have regarded, or have been expected to regard, as 
important.  
     In my search for material on Indochina I also sifted through veterans’ journals and newsletters, 
as well as through somewhat exotic almanachs. These are held at veterans’ associations in Paris. 
It appears as if nobody used this material before, not least because some of it was hidden in the 
cellar of the UNC. Many of the articles contained, habitually written by senior officers, represented 
rallying calls for the troops engaged. They did not necessarily echo the views of ordinary soldiers. 
     Given the focus on personal experiences in this project, I have paid less attention to 
governmental papers. French reports, telegrams and letters commonly spotlight the scarcity of 
equipment and manpower, as well as the difficulties of delegating tasks to Indochinese forces. 
The underlying tone suggests that the war could have been won with better and more numerous 
resources. British documents are even more technical. Normally, they focus on potential 
improvements of an already (and seemingly) efficient campaign. Both sets tell us little about the 
experiences of the troops on the ground. The limits of official reports is best illustrated by the 
depiction of bombing campaigns and large sweeps in Malaya. While most servicemen on the 
ground regarded them as ineffective and even dangerous, the reports almost always conclude 
that the objectives were achieved. Here too, the authors’ agendas have to be kept in mind. On 
one hand they did not wish domestic interference. On the other hand they desired more 
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resources. In either case the official picture had to look challenging but bright enough to justify 
further expenses.    
     There is also the issue of censorship. Britain’s Freedom of Information Act has resulted in 
better access to files hitherto kept away from the public. But vague titles, lengthy administrative 
procedures and unexplained rejections can make a researcher’s life arduous, even if that is not 
necessarily the intention. That said, recent research has put at least a question mark behind the 
official will to shed light on some less positive aspects of British decolonisation.146 At the SHD, 
requests for files often produce a slip featuring the comment “non communicable”.  
     Further, this thesis also relies on newspaper and magazine articles. These were often written 
by journalists, who were close to the action and profited from relatively unrestricted access to 
servicemen. Back in the 1950s no such thing as ‘embedded journalism’ existed but censorship 
and propaganda certainly did. At times it shows. Some generals, such as Templer, waged their 
own private wars against unwanted journalists but luckily with little success.147 As a result, some 
of the articles, increasingly available in online archives, are refreshingly frank. 
     The internet for its part has generally facilitated the research. In fact, my breakthrough in Britain 
owed to the NMBVA’s website. Further web searches have unearthed various personal and 
institutional homepages with usually intriguing texts and photographs. However, anyone could 
place such material onto a website. I have therefore always attempted to contact the authors (or 
their offspring), asking very specific questions and requesting some kind of proof. In many cases 
the latter is visible on the sites where photographs show the person in the past and present. In 
some cases original documents were placed on the sites or sent to me. Speaking of the internet, 
one should also mention the growing number of archives, such as the IWM or the Institut nationale 
de l’audiovisuel (INA), which contain news clips. Some of these are more government propaganda 
than anything else, which does not diminish their historical worth. Newer documentaries feature 
less of the former but, especially if they are French, carry with them a touch of left-wing agenda.148 
     In sum and unsurprisingly, all these sources have advantages and disadvantages. Keeping in 
mind motivations and spins, it is the combination, comparison and complementarity which offsets 
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Chapter 1: The British Army, allied forces and the Malayan Emergency 
 
Before scrutinising soldiers’ views on Malaya and the emergency it is helpful to provide some 
information surrounding the troops serving there, decisions by the authorities responsible for them 
and the global outlook at the time. Further details on quoted protagonists, units, composition, 
ranks and structures are listed in appendices A, C, E, G and I. 
     While many details can be gathered from testimonies and the literature, gaps and uncertainties 
inevitably remain. The reasons lie in missing information in existing primary sources, the sheer 
number of troops involved in the emergency, the rapid turnover of personnel and the constant re-
adjustments made in London. In particular information on regional, family, educational and 
professional backgrounds has at times been difficult to obtain. On the other hand, service units 
have regularly been left out in order of battles. 
 
 
Backgrounds of army personnel serving in the Malayan Emergency 
 
British regulars and conscripts serving in Malaya, together with their Commonwealth 
counterparts, came from all regions and classes. They ranged in age from barely eighteen to 
slightly over fifty. A closer examination reveals certain patterns in an otherwise very 
heterogeneous group. As in other conflicts, the majority of troops in Malaya acted in support of 
infantry units. They did so as drivers, mechanics, signallers, surveyors, store men, caterers, 
administrators, doctors, dentists and nurses. Within the infantry one notes a comparatively high 
proportion of Gurkha, Scottish and, later, Commonwealth units, prompting Robert Jackson to label 
the emergency as a Commenwealth war.149  
     The veterans, who filled out questionnaires and sat through my interviews, were for the most 
part born in England between the mid 1920s and 1930s. The majority entered the army after 
WWII. Most declared themselves to be of working or middle class background. Of the National 
Servicemen, among whom many left school at an early age, only a minority opted for regular 
service after the end of their mandatory spells. On the other hand, a majority within the entire 
sample used for this research consisted of regular commissioned and non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs). On average these served between five and seven years. Most had seen action in various 
imperial and WWII theatres, most notably in South Asia, prior to their involvement in the 
emergency.  
     During National Service ‘potential officer material’ was separated from the bulk of recruits in 
the early stages of basic training. The selection committee looked for men who showed self-
confidence, mixed easily, spoke clearly, learnt quickly and performed well in tests. The majority 
fitting this profile came from public schools and well-to-do-families. In fact, sons of aristocrats, the 
landed gentry and Tory MPs were automatically put forward for selection to short-service 
commissions. Some graduates from grammar schools were also encouraged to apply, even if 
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only “to make up the numbers”. But few recruits with rural accents and modest origins followed 
this encouragement. Those who did frequently stumbled during the first trials or were taken aback 
by the prevailing attitudes and stiff competition.150 
     Logically, then, the representatives of the Malayan high command showed similarities in their 
backgrounds. All ten commanders (if one includes Major-General Sir William Oliver) had been 
born around the turn of the century. Four of them had fathers with the rank of a (lieutenant-) 
colonel. With the exception of Lieutenant-General Sir Geoffrey Kemp-Bourne and Major-General 
Sir Douglas Ashton Wade, all were infantry men and had attended Sandhurst. Everyone, bar the 
Generals Templer and Oliver, had served in South Asia (and five also in the Arab World) prior to 
their tour in Malaya. Generals Sir Charles Boucher, Sir Harold Briggs, Kemp-Bourne and Sir 
Robert Urquhart had all joined the Indian Army. Lieutenant-General Sir Roger Bower had enjoyed 
an Indian spell but with the King’s Own Light Infantry while Ashton Wade had held staff 
appointments in Simla, Delhi and Madras. Major-General Sir Hugh Stockwell had grown up in 
India without entering its army. Crucially, none had entered Malaya before the emergency broke 
out although Ashton Wade had participated in preparations for the invasion of Malaya.151  
     The middle ranks could usually not make up for the lack of local knowledge hampering these 
senior officers. Experienced jungle fighters from the Burma campaign were demobilised at the 
end of WWII while new National Servicemen had to be trained for tropical counter-insurgency.152 
Between June 1945 and the start of 1947 alone 3,887,321 men and 403,533 women were 
discharged under the release scheme.153 Speaking of the latter, only nineteen women of the 
Women’s Voluntary Service (WVS) looked after the welfare of troops in Malaya.154 
     The British effort there relied to a considerable degree on junior ranks, many of them 
conscripts. These second lieutenants, sergeants and even corporals led small patrols or oversaw 
ambushes. A typical patrol further included a radio operator, a Bren gunner and several riflemen. 
The majority of these troops were in their early twenties, as older soldiers would have struggled 
in the strenuous climate and terrain. Even regular infantrymen were taken out of the jungle after 
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Re-entry into Malaya, turnovers and the outbreak of the emergency 
 
The surprise of Japan’s sudden surrender accounts for the fact that the first British and Indian 
troops did not land in Penang until September 3.156 Between their arrival and the emergency the 
Allied Land Forces Southeast Asia fell from almost 250,000 in October 1945 to just under 30,000 
by 1948 due to demobilisation.157  
     To man garrisons like Malaya, Whitehall hoped to replace India with Africa as a recruiting 
ground between 1946 and 1947.158 Given metropolitan resistance and the short duration of 
National Service the use of British conscripts was largely out of the question. But on 9 November 
1947 an agreement was reached with the governments of Nepal and India for the use of Gurkhas 
after the British exit from the subcontinent. As a result, eight battalions were transferred to the 
British Army with the majority ending up in Malaya where they replaced British and Indian 
troops.159 
     Meanwhile, the British Military Administration (BMA) attempted to stabilise the turbulent social 
and economic situation in Malaya prior to handing over to civilians in April 1946. But its staff – 
consisting of locally hired planters and traders as well as of demobilised servicemen – failed to 
tackle many of the pressing problems while acting severely against organised protests.160  
     When the emergency was declared Major-General Sir Ashton Wade had only thirteen infantry 
units at his disposal. They included seven partially formed Gurkha battalions, three British and 
two (British officered) Malaya Regiment battalions. In addition, one British artillery regiment acted 
in an infantry role. The 12,000 police officers were gradually reinforced by 25,000 (part-time) 
special constables, who would prove crucial for the protection of isolated plantations.161 
       Over the years these forces steadily grew allowing the army to abandon its initially passive 
role. When General Sir Gerald Templer arrived in 1952 he could draw on approximately twenty-
three battalions (excluding SAS units),162 roughly 67,000 police officers and 250,000 home 
guards.163 The police itself was divided into 22,187 regular officers and 44,878 special 
constables.164 These ground forces were supported by a considerable air fleet. By December 
1953 it included six and a half squadrons for offensive warfare, three transport and two 
reconnaissance squadrons plus various planes for communication purposes, including 
propaganda. Towards the end of the conflict the navy and air force would also provide up to three 
squadrons of helicopters for transport and evacuation. In addition, various navy ships prevented 
enemy infiltration and bombarded coastal areas.  
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      These combined forces lost 4,377 men through injuries, death and disappearance. The police 






During an interview conducted in 1984 the later Field-Marshal Sir John Harding described the 
higher military and political set-up in Malaya and Southeast Asia during his tenure there between 
1949 and 1951.166 At the top of the regional set-up Harding joined, stood the British Defence Co-
ordination Committee (BDCC) headed by Malcolm MacDonald, the Governor-General of British 
Southeast Asia.167 The committee, which also included the navy’s and air force’s regional 
commanders-in-chief, defined defence strategies and policies in the Far East. The commanders’ 
area of responsibility reached from Burma to Japan so that Harding was in charge of troops in 
Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong. His job also included “a watching brief over any requirements 
in Borneo and the liaison with the French in Indo-China”. One year after his arrival the Korean 
War also entered his agenda.   
     The lower organisational levels were repeatedly debated, dissolved and restructured. 
Nevertheless, the principle of three defence layers remained more or less intact during the 
emergency. In 1951 this meant that the BDCC was in charge at a theatre level, i.e. the Far East 
including Southeast Asia. At the area level, i.e. Malaya and Singapore, stood the Malayan 
Defence Coordination Committee (MDCC) comprising the high commissioners/governors and the 
four local service commanders. Further, each separate, (colonial) territory featured a local 
defence committee, headed by the governments’ departmental officers and local service 
commanders’ staff. Under the Briggs Plan the Malayan set-up was expanded into, from top to 
bottom, the Federal War Council (later merged into the Executive Council and assisted by the 
Federal Joint Intelligence Advisory Committee), State War Executive Committees (SWECs) and 
District War Executive Committees (DWECs). The committees and councils were usually 
composed of the most senior administrator, police officer (including Special Branch 
representatives), military commander plus community representatives at the corresponding 
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levels. At the height of the emergency they met daily and operated alongside the traditional 
administration.168 
     When Harding assumed his responsibilities, Major-General Boucher had replaced Ashton 
Wade as commander of the troops in Malaya. Units stationed in Singapore were commanded by 
General Dunlop. Up until April 1950 the commissioner of police coordinated operations against 
the communist insurgents in Malaya with the army and air force in support.169 Commanders of 
the latter two reported to High-Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney.  
     Harding emphasised that he was not directly involved in the conduct of the counter-insurgency. 
He ‘merely’ oversaw the overall administration of troops, thus making sure they were efficiently 
used and morale was maintained. Even so, he gained the impression that the entire security 
apparatus lacked “operational urgency”, especially the police. He also bemoaned the absence of 
up-to-date and qualified intelligence personnel, equipment (particularly armoured vehicles) and 
institutions. Given these impressions, he pushed London for a man in overall charge of security 
operations and with direct access to the high-commissioner. This man would be Lieutenant-
General Sir Harold Briggs. Despite improved coordination of the security forces and growing 
isolation of the insurgents under the latter’s tenure, Briggs himself still deemed his responsibilities 
too restrictive. Hence General Templer’s combined task of commander-in-chief170 and high-
commissioner. He reported directly to the colonial secretary, Oliver Lyttelton. 
 
 
Attempting to shift the burden  
 
The huge military, political and financial171 effort made in Malaya (and in Korea between 1950 
and 1953) ran counter to London’s intentions to scale down the number of regional British troops 
and to entrust regional defence to an expanded Malaya Regiment and Gurkha reserves. (As a result 
and like the French, they struggled to provide the divisions promised to NATO for the defence of 
Europe.) The continued focus on (Southeast) Asia owed to London’s realisation that the region, 
particularly the valuable dollar-earner Malaya, was experiencing ‘hot conflicts’ within the Cold 
War. While London eventually accepted the inevitability of a long-term political disentanglement, 
it was not prepared to hand over power to communists, who were likely to sever the economic 
ties, too.172 
     Nevertheless, the foundation for the original reduction plans had existed for some time. The 
Malay Regiment had been raised as early as the 1920s and had participated in the defence of 
the peninsula in 1941. Resurrected after WWII, it was comprised of four entirely Malay battalions 
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by the end of 1950.173 In 1953 the legislative council set the target for 1962 at nine battalions for 
the Malay Regiment and three battalions for an ethnically mixed Federation Regiment. The total 
would be 12,000 men. But due to recruiting problems and prevailing communist sympathies, 
particularly among the Chinese, only seven and one came into being. Templer also pressed for 
the creation of the Federation Military College in Port Dickson to kick-start officer training. Thanks 
to these efforts internal security could be handed over to the Malayan government in January 
1956. Yet the 1957 Defence Agreement cemented Britain’s continuous international duties in the 
area and its supporting role to the new government.174 A small garrison thus remained. 
     By 1951 three Malayan Auxiliary Air Force squadrons had also been put together. But even 
after independence neither air personnel nor equipment could perform without British assistance. 
The same applied to the Royal Malayan Navy, based in Singapore. (The situation turned even 
more complicated following the break-up of the union of Malaya and Singapore in 1965.)  
     Meanwhile, Britain still operated its own Far East fleet to protect communications in the 
Commonwealth. Yet budget restrictions led to a rapid reduction by 1947. In addition to the 
involvement in Malaya, the diminishing fleet assisted UN/US forces in Korea and penetrated the 
Yangtze for the possible evacuation of British personnel.  
     Furthermore, Britain turned towards the wider empire or Commonwealth respectively. After 
lengthy stalling the Australian government ordered a limited number of transport aircraft and 
bombers to Malaya in May 1950. Five years later an infantry battalion followed. New Zealand, 
too, maintained a squadron of the SAS regiment in the territory between January 1956 and August 
1957.175 Additional contingents from East Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Fiji permitted a 
reduction of British and Gurkha units by 1956. That year twenty-three multi-ethnic battalions were 
operating on the peninsula.176 
 
 
The British military after WWII – general situation 
 
Most British regiments not only provided battalions and companies for the emergency but also for 
many other imperial garrisons and conflicts. This piled further pressure on a badly weakened 
economy, which had seen total foreign debt explode from £500,000,000 to £3,250,000,000 from 
1939 to 1945. Worse, the US terminated the lend-lease deals without delay after Japan’s 
surrender. British military planners also had to take into account that Britain’s fleet had been 
reduced by eleven million tons during the global conflict. Despite recognising the need for cuts, 
the government was still spending twenty percent of its gross national product on defence in 
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1946.177 By the end of the emergency the estimated cost of the (total) defence programme for 
1960-1 amounted to 1,616 million pounds, i.e. roughly a quarter of total government expenditure.178 
     Apart from Malaya, earlier policing and counter-insurgency tasks in Italy, Greece, Palestine, 
Burma, India, Indonesia and Indochina presented the greatest obstacles to budgetary and 
administrative reductions.179 The task facing the allied commander for Southeast Asia, Admiral 
Louis Mountbatten, was particularly daunting. After Japan’s surrender he was responsible for over 
one and a half million square miles, 128 million people, his own forces and 738,000 surrendered 
Japanese soldiers.180  
     Apart from areas previously controlled by other (European) countries, Britain also had to 
occupy the defeated Axis powers themselves and defend them against possible Soviet 
aggression. Set up in 1946, the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) eventually counted four 
divisions181 and placed a particularly heavy burden on the Royal Armoured Corps and the Royal 
Artillery.  
      In the early 1950s the Egyptian Wafd Party pressed for a complete British withdrawal from 
the canal zone. The ensuing Suez crisis (1956) required the costly involvement of the navy and 
airborne troops. Britain also intervened in support of allied governments or to safeguard British 
economic interests in Iran (1951-3), Jordan (1958), Kuwait (1961) and Aden (1964-7). It declared 
further emergencies in Kenya (1952-9), Cyprus (1955-9), where counter-insurgency campaigns 
ensued, and in the Central African Federation (1959). On numerous occasions army units also 
had to support local police during strikes, demonstrations and other limited disturbances all over 
the remaining British possessions. 
     Contrary to the situation in Malaya, Britain could no longer count on the support of its imperial 
or Commonwealth partners on those occasions. Canberra and Wellington signalled their focus 
on Asia and the Pacific through the signature of the ANZUS treaty in 1951. India had ceased to 
provide imperial troops on the cheap since the 1920s. After independence even that option was 
politically and financially no longer feasible.182 
 
 
National Service and the Sandys White Paper 
 
A possible solution to all these troubles lay in metropolitan conscription. But after WWII the 
government had reduced the period of military service to one year and had introduced peacetime 
accounting. It aimed at reducing the forces to 940,000 by March 1948 from a wartime peak of 5.1 
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million.183 By 1949 the figure was down to 700,000 men. Military planners fretted over the fact 
that the average six-months training and three-month journeys to and from postings left conscripts 
little time for adjustments to overseas theatres. Equally worrying was the lack of seasoned cadres, 
which necessitated unusual promotions for the remaining ones. To ease the pressure on these 
regulars, frequently used for training purposes, the authorities improved service pay and 
allowances184 to attract more men for longer service – to little avail.185 As a result, a large 
percentage of soldiers posted to Malaya and other hotspots were conscripts.186  
     In 1947 the British Army possessed roughly 77 infantry battalions (excluding specialists corps), 
eight Gurkha Rifles units, plus 69 artillery and 30 armoured regiments. In these units served 
1,132,872 National Service officers and other ranks who participated in 57 conflicts between 1947 
and 1963. (More than two million were called up for all three services combined.)187 Of the 2,912 
killed in action 395 were conscripts.  
     In Malaya National Servicemen were especially numerous. They made up half of the 1st 
Battalion of the Suffolk Regiment for instance. The same went for 90% of all lance-corporals and 
50% of corporals of the succeeding 1st Battalion the Somerset Light Infantry.188 Overall half of the 
army consisted of conscripts by 1951. Not all of them (or their professional colleagues) saw actual 
combat. Most were needed for support services and the many garrisons still spread over the empire.  
     The original National Service Bill passed in July 1947, set the duration of conscription at one 
year. (Those called up under wartime regulation still had to do two years.) It was to be followed 
by five years in the reserve. As military commitments multiplied the National Service Amendment 
Act was introduced in December 1948 extending mandatory service to eighteen months (but 
limiting reserve duties to four years). The outbreak of the Korean War prompted a further 
extension to twenty-four months (plus three and a half years in the reserve). This set-up remained 
in force until the termination of National Service in 1963. Until then every British man between 
eighteen and twenty-six had to do his military duty. This included all British citizens resident in the 
United Kingdom and nationals of the Dominions (including Ireland) having resided in the UK for 
at least two years and opting not to return. From 1949 on it also applied to residents on the 
Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. Officially, the authorities excluded blacks, Asians and 
Northern Irish deeming them potential risks for the cohesion of the armed forces. In the case of 
the former two no law actually spelled this out. As a result a few hundred coloured men did actually 
serve. The authorities equally ruled out members of the clergy, persons held or treated in 
connection with lunacy and mental (treatment) acts, the blind and those otherwise categorised as 
physically unfit. The same applied to conscientious objectors if the courts accepted them as such. 
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Candidates claiming hardship (as the only sons of dependent widows for instance), coalminers, 
(certain) agricultural workers, merchant seamen and seagoing fishermen (if they were prepared 
to enter the Royal Naval Reserve) could defer their service, potentially beyond the age of 30. So 
could apprentices, students and people in professional training, albeit only until the termination of 
their courses.189 
     Although the military appreciated the large manpower available it increasingly worried about 
the latter’s quality. With reason: the large number of conscripts put off many potential regular 
servicemen. The problems became obvious during the Suez crisis when training and equipment 
left much to be desired. Thankfully, the final departure from the canal (and previously from India), 
coupled with the availability of long-range aircraft and nuclear weapons, reduced the need for a 
large strategic reserve. With Britain experiencing a boom in the 1950s it was the economy that 
required more young employees. These deliberations led to the phasing out of conscription with 
the last intake entering the forces in 1960. On May 16, 1963 the last National Serviceman was 
discharged.190 
       Six years earlier Defence Secretary Duncan Sandys had published a white paper on the 
future British military strategy. He held the opinion that Britain’s best safeguard lay in a strong 
economy and that the latter depended on deep cuts in the military budget. He expressed his hope 
that nuclear armed V-bombers would allow for a reduction in manpower to 375,000 by 1962 (thus 
making conscription superfluous). Similar cutbacks would apply to the navy and air force. Smaller 
bases in Kenya, Singapore, Cyprus and Aden, mobile troop reserves and a naval amphibious 
force in the Indian Ocean would allow for rapid responses to future emergencies. Based on this 
scheme defence spending was cut from 6.9% of GNP to 5.9% between 1957 and 1965. Despite 
this, roughly 100,000 men still served east of Suez in the early 1960s, some of them fighting in 
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Chapter 2: The French Army, allied forces and the Indochina War 
 
The following passages shed some light on the composition of the Corps expéditionnaire de 
l’Extrême-Orient (CEFEO).192 In parallel, they outline the state of and developments within the 
French Army (and to some extent its sister branches) at the outbreak of the Indochina War.  
     Existing sources provide us with fairly exact details on troop numbers in Indochina, units, 
compositions and soldiers’ backgrounds. (They are systematically listed in appendices B, D, F, H 
and J.) But limits and ambiguities remain. Understandably military administrators did not concern 
themselves too much with regional, social and educational origins of servicemen. One has to 
attempt to gather these details from personal testimonies. Yet background information is 
especially rare when it comes to ordinary soldiers and NCOs, who are under-represented in 
archival records and literature.193  
      Not all archival files are available. Several requests for instance were refused at the SHD 
without explanations.194 On the other hand, available statistics do not always clearly state which 
parts of the military have been considered. For instance, the gendarmerie and the gardes 
républicaines,195 both of which can be regarded as entities separate from the army, are often 
included in official figures without being specifically mentioned. Similarly, estimates of 
metropolitan personnel have not always spelled out whether or not the large French cadres 
(generally more numerous than British ones) commanding African, Asian and Foreign Legion 
units have been taken into account. Tracing the history of a particular unit can also be a daunting 
task. Many were disbanded, merged or re-created over the decades and especially so after WWII. 
Demobilisation, voluntary departures, purges and losses during and after the latter could further 
alter their make-up.196 Then there is the sometimes confusing structure of the army itself. The 
(Armée) coloniale for example used to be part of the navy (marine) until 1900 and again from 
1958 on. Like the Armée d’Afrique197 it contained mixed units. Both branches also featured 





These statistical difficulties aside, the CEFEO sample used for this research entails striking 
features. To begin with, the bulk of servicemen cited held the ranks of officers, with the majority 
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having graduated from St. Cyr and the Ecole polytechnique.199 As regards age, the oldest 
protagonist, General de Lattre, was born in 1889, the youngest, the later actor, Alain Delon, in 
1935. Among those, whose place of birth is indicated, seven originated outside of France. In the 
entire group one finds many with military ancestors. During WWII most of the servicemen 
considered here rallied to the Free French (and the allies) either in 1940 or in 1942/3. One also 
finds several who joined the resistance. Following that decision, they were either arrested and 
sent to labour and concentration camps. Or they linked up with the troops amassing in North Africa. 
Of these, many participated in the Italian campaign and/or landed in Provence. 
     It is obvious that the troupes coloniales, among them many former Free French, and 
representatives of the Armée d’Afrique, as well as the Foreign Legion, initially made up the bulk 
of manpower employed in Indochina.200 Logically, many of these protagonists had had spells in 
North Africa while very few of the entire CEFEO had ever set foot on Indochina. In the course of 
the war Indochinese troops, both regular and irregular, replaced above as the largest faction 
fighting the Viet Minh. Although difficult to ascertain for lack of specific sources, it can be expected 
that, like in the British case, the majority of troops were service units. Testimonies suggest that 





French governments had already dispatched expeditionary corps to Madagascar (1895), China 
(1900 and 1902), the Dardanelles (1915 and 1916), Scandinavia (1940) and Italy (1943). The 
birth of the CEFEO dates back to July 1943 when the Permanent Military Committee in Algiers 
decided on a French intervention in the Pacific. But the corps’ organisation, starting in spring 
1944, was marred by various difficulties. Transport for instance depended almost entirely on 
British vessels and planes. Access to Indochina had to await American approval, which was 
initially not forthcoming. All these aspects led the military authorities to conclude that they could 
not envision a deployment before spring 1946. Yet the sudden capitulation of Japan in August 
1945 necessitated a quicker re-entry.202 Instead of fighting alongside the allies against the 
Japanese, the CEFEO now had to reassert control of a territory in turmoil and temporarily 
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Military and civilian responsibilities during the conflict 
 
Officially, the definition of military operations and the political strategy in Indochina rested in the 
hands of the provisional government in Paris, i.e. the president (of the council) and increasingly, 
the Ministry for Overseas France.203 Supported by the Comité interministériel de l’Indochine204 
they were supposed to issue orders for the high-commissioner, the first being Admiral d’Argenlieu. 
(The first commander-in-chief, General Leclerc, should have reported to the latter but never fully 
accepted the set-up.) In reality and in regard to the conduct of war, the Defence Committee 
studied and suggested actions, which were then decided on by the Higher Council of National 
Defence (presided over by the head of the provisory government). Technically, the Ministry of the 
Armies and The Ministry for Overseas Territories represented the executive. In truth, decisions 
could come from eight different bodies but were often left to the men on the spot. It was not until 
1955 that the president assumed overall coordinative responsibility.  
      As in peacetimes, the budget for operations was devised one year in advance based on 
expenditures in the previous year. Unsurprisingly, this led to frequent delays and shortages.205 
The military organisation in Indochina itself consisted of five classic bureaux and up to five 
regional headquarters. Navy and air force were at the disposition of the commander-in-chief but 
took their orders from the high-commissioner.206 
 
 
Build-up of forces 
 
On September 12, 1945 120 men of the 5e Régiment d’Infanterie coloniale (RIC) disembarked in 
Saigon (alongside elements of the 20th Indian Division) marking the beginning of the re-conquest. 
Further reinforcements arrived steadily but slowly. As late as September 25, 1945 French forces 
in Indochina amounted to not more than approximately 2,500 men. They derived from Leclerc’s 
Groupe mobile (GM)/2e Demi-brigade (DB), the 5e RIC, as well as from the 9e and parts of the 3e 
Division d’Infanterie coloniale (DIC). 1,400 survivors of the 11e RIC, who had been imprisoned by 
the Japanese, eventually reinforced this contingent. By the end of the year the CEFEO had 
swollen to 27,907 men. By March 15, 1946 it counted 3,118 officers, 7,965 sous-officiers207 and 
41,170 soldiers (homes de rang). Over time a further 1,151 officers, 2,896 NCOs and 4,979 men 
(including indigenous troops) recovered on the spot, joined them. Five months later though 36,000 
servicemen, exhausted or due for demobilisation, were already repatriated. Among them figured 
                                                          
203  The resort initially fell into the responsibility of the Ministry for the Colonies and from 1950 on (also) into that of 
the Ministry for the Associated States. See A. Ruscio, La guerre française d’Indochine, 255-7. 
204  Created in February 1945 Comindo was headed by General de Langlade and composed of the cabinet chief, 
representatives of concerned ministries, the head of the services spéciaux and the director of political affairs 
within the Ministry of Colonies. See Dalloz, Dictionnaire de la guerre d’Indochine, 65-6. 
205  De Lattre at one point bitterly complained about slow deliveries of ammunition. See: ‘Ravitaillement du Corps 
Expéditionnaire en munitions et artillerie’, de Lattre to the minister responsible for relations with the associated states, 
June 1951, SHAT, 10H 212. 
206  Cpt. J.-C. Raguet, ‘Logistique et décision dans l’Indochine de 1945-1946’ in Revue historique des armées, n° 3,  
1996, p. 52.  
207  NCOs. 
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the approximately 9,000 men of the Armée d’Indochine,208 the 9e DIC, GM./2e DB. and the 
Elément organique de corps d’armée (EOCA).  
     By 1948 land forces comprised 63 infantry battalions, 6 parachute battalions, 12 armoured 
group-squadrons, 14 artillery groups, 4 transport groups, service battalions and companies, as 
well as 3 legions of republican guards. Within these units the number of French personnel 
progressively diminished, particularly in infantry and service units. Whereas all soldiers were 
French in 1945, their percentage reached an all-time low of 41.3% (land forces) by October 1952. 
In the first half of the conflict the tendency was to make up the figures by filling the gaps with 
African troops and Foreign Legionnaires.209 The figures for the Forces terrestres de l’Extrême-
Orient (FTEO) show these changes:210 
 
Year French Legionnaires  North-Africans (other) Africans  Total 
1945 27,297    27,297 
1946 61,924    61,924 
1947 63,815    71,857211 
1948 43,989 11,886 13,318 5,014 74,234 
1949 45,496 16,952 24,364 12,090 98,420 
1950 44,067 16,844 21,356 13,389 95,656 
1951 51,479 19,479 32,712 19,434 123,034 
1952 50,342 19,360 29,571 17,917 117,190 
1953 53,227 18,440 37,409 18,646 127,767 
1954 50,243 14,462 34,772 18,887 118,364 
      




Lack of resources plagued the CEFEO throughout the conflict. During the war only 1,000-1,500 
French signed up in all military branches per month. Alarmed, the army’s chief-of-staff, General 
Blanc, pointed out that France could not guarantee the necessary reliefs to even maintain the 
number of troops stationed in Indochina either in 1950 or in 1951.212 To compensate for slow 
reinforcements normal tours in Indochina (including training), which normally lasted 24 to 27 
                                                          
208  In the 1930s it had consisted of two infantry divisions and two independent brigades. See General Staff, War  
Office, Handbook of the French Army (1940, reprinted by the IWM in 2004), p. 155. 
209  Both paragraphs and table taken from Bodin, La France et ses soldats, 5-22 and 36.  
210  All figures refer to estimates on the 1st of December of each year, except in 1954 (1st of July). The author has 
not explained whether these forces included the gendarmerie, republican guards and female personnel. It 
should also be noted that Bodin has quoted different figures for Africans in Les africains dans la guerre 
d’Indochine, 10. 
211  It is unclear how this total has been calculated. 
212  ‘Note relative à l’Indochine’, General Blanc to unknown recipient, 4.2.1950, SHAT, 10H 212.   
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months, were frequently extended by several months.213 Some experienced NCOs and officers 
stayed in Indochina for much longer. 41 captains of the artillery and cavalry were found to be 
older than 40 in April 1953 after serving in the territory for more than four years. 
     The search for French personnel led on occasions to the enlistment of physically and 
psychologically handicapped men. In 1952 169 personnel had to be repatriated after three 
months. Among them were 24 mentally ill, 10 alcoholics and 14 tuberculosis cases. By the same 
token, 80% of volunteers for the land forces were illiterate in the second semester 1952.214  
     Until 1951 troops were sent to Indochina after five to six months of previous military service. 
In the ensuing years their successors embarked with only three months experience. These 
deficiencies, coupled with exhaustion, meant that the number of servicemen, who could only serve in 
static roles, steadily rose. Even the commander of the elite 2e Bataillon étranger parachutiste lamented 
in 1950 that rebels escaped his men because the legionnaires were too exhausted to pursue them 
beyond a hundred yards.215 
     Despite that, the average French soldier performed more or less satisfactorily in the services. 
But particularly men from the increasingly exploited reserve216 proved to be unsuited for combat 
units. The quality of NCOs was deemed “problematic” in the infantry, “worrying” among 
engineering and artillery units, and “very worrying” in transmission.217 A third of all officers serving 
in 1954 turned out to be insufficiently adapted to their tasks or incapable to do them at all, not 
least because many had never served with Asian or African troops. 
     Despite various recruitment drives, the quantity of servicemen remained below target, 
especially in the infantry and transport. By 1949 the infantry lacked 37% of officers and 64% of 
soldiers. The services were short by 16% and 35% respectively. While the target for officers in 
the land forces was 4.5% in 1949 it oscillated between 3.07% and 3.9% from 1948 to 1949. Over 
the eight years of the war the percentage of NCOs ranged between 16.06% and 17.99%. (In 
parachute battalions officers and NCOs made up merely 2.2% and 11.4% by 1953.) Since many 
of these cadres were stationed in headquarters and smaller garrisons the percentage for 
combatant troops was even lower. Some units lacked between 20-30% of the original manpower 
due to wounds, sickness, recovery or leave. In the later stages of the war some lacked 80% of 
their adjudants. The expeditionary corps also lost the equivalent of two battalions through judiciary 
proceedings (condemnations and preventive decisions) after 1950.218  
                                                          
213  This could mean excessive tours for Africans in particular. A Colonel Schneider calculated that an African 
serving even an official 27-month tour in Indochina was really away from home for 39 months if one included 
training, wait, transport and leave. See ‘Ministère de la France d’outre-mer, dépenses militaires pour 1954’. 
France, Journal Officiel, 1954, January-June, Débats (de l’Assemblée de l’) Union Française, 18.2.1954, LSE 
44 (R26) AUF1. 
214  This obviously included many non-Europeans. 
215  D. Porch, The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History (1991), p. 529. 
216  The authorities encouraged NCOs and officers from the reserve to re-enlist. Many, often from more modest 
backgrounds, demanded themselves to be integrated after a short period of re-training. By May 1948 13,3% of 
all officers and 2,3% of all NCOs came from the reserve.  
217  A report on French officers and NCOs seconded to the 4e Division vietnamienne issued in March 1951 echoed 
these problems. The author quoted the examples of one lieutenant regarded as inept while a captain was 
deemed “unstable”. A lieutenant and a subaltern/2nd lieutenant had to be hospitalised and a further lieutenant 
had lost an eye in an accident. Five more officers were held on hold because they could not be trusted to 
command small garrisons. The total of officers was 76. See Private collection of General Georges Fricaud-
Chagnaud, SHAT 1K 590. 
218  Entire section based on Bodin, La France et ses soldats, 19, 21 and 131-142. 
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Additional French personnel  
 
Indochina saw almost 14,000 gendarmes and republican guards serving in Indochina where their 
main tasks consisted in training local units. On October 15, 1951 the Defence Committee also 
decided to allow the dispatch of volunteering conscripts to Indochina, provided they had already 
served for six months. (Previously they could not be sent into the war.) Their tours in Southeast 
Asia, consisting mostly of garrison duties, lasted between eight and nine months. Conscripts could 
petition the authorities to let them join combat troops and 58 volunteered to fight in Dien Bien Phu. 
Still, their overall number stood at a meagre 425 in 1951, rose to 2,430 in 1952 and fell again to 
570 by the end of the war. Equally few enlisted after their mandatory military service ended. Only 
580 joined the FTEO in the second semester 1950.219 In addition to conscripts, navy commandos 
operated in Indochina, particularly in the deltas. 
     The Foreign Legion for its part actively recruited (and often press-ganged) POWs at the end 
of WWII, which explains the high deserting rates. Further, WWII-collaborators, among them 
former members of the Légion des volontaires français contre le bolchevisme (LVF)220 constituted 
two companies of the Bataillon d’infanterie légère d’Outre-mer (BILOM).221 
     Moreover, between 700 and 1,600 Personnel féminin de l’armée de terre (PFAT) served in 
Indochina,222 together with 120 in the air force and 30 in the navy.223 Another 470, mostly wives 
of military and civilian personnel stationed in Indochina, acted as social assistants, nurses (often 
coupled with flying and driving duties) and secretaries in the forces. Almost one hundred of all 
these women, many of whom earned medals for their bravery, were killed during the conflict. One 
should also mention the hundreds of (mostly North African) prostitutes on the military’s payroll, who 





Indochinese had served under the French long before 1945, usually as tirailleurs, and did so again 
soon after the latter’s return. The French undertook early recruitment among minorities such as 
the Muong (of which only 1% became officers). From 1947 on it became an official practice to 
complement mostly European regiments and battalions with units raised in operational areas. The 
French referred to any local reinforcements (prior to the 1950s) as either autochtones,225 
supplétifs226 or simply partisans. (The difference between such categories has never been entirely 
clear.227) Ideally, a regiment would feature one battalion of indigenous troops while a battalion 
                                                          
219  Ibid., 41-2. 
220  Legion of French volunteers against bolshevism. 
221  Ibid., 44 and R. Muelle, ‘Le bataillon des réprouvés’ in Historia Spécial, no. 28 and 34-9. 
222  Bodin, Les combattants français face à la guerre d’Indochine, 8. The two figures quoted refer to the years  
1948 and 1953. 
223  It is not specified if these are yearly or cumulative figures. 
224  Mobile outdoor brothels. Rest of paragraph based on Fall, Street Without Joy, 131-140. 
225  Literally ‘native’. 
226  ‘Auxiliaries’. 
227  Dalloz, Dictionnaire de la guerre d’Indochine, 235-6. 
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would include one such company. Many were later transferred to the national armies of Vietnam, 
Laos and Cambodia.228  
     Supplétifs have been brought in connection with watch towers that later dotted the deltas. 
Partisans for their part, usually highlands minorities, came to enlist in so called Groupements de 
commandos mixtes aéroportés229 (GCMA). Employed in operations behind enemy lines (where 
they existed), this maquis230 comprised up to 12,000 men at its peak.  
      With the escalation of the war in 1950/1 the French authorities, aided by US money and 
material, rushed the recruitment for and training of the national armies. Once deemed battle-fit, 
units were posted to more quiet sectors to free French, African and Foreign Legion troops for 
operations in hotter areas. In 1950 the Vietnamese army counted 50,000 regular troops, the 
Cambodian 6,000 and the Laotian 1,200. By January 1954 these figures had risen to 170,000 
(plus 46,800 supplétifs), 16,600 (plus 2,900 supplétifs) and 20,000 (plus 2,900 supplétifs). 
Vietnam also built up a minuscule navy and air force.231 
     In addition, the French collaborated with the three southern sects, the Binh Xuyen, Cao Dai 
and Hoa Hao. All of them formed their own militia comprising several thousand men. So did 
Colonel Leroy, a French-Vietnamese, who ruled over 500,000 people in the southern region of 
Ben Tre and commanded the Unités mobiles pour la défense des chrétientés232 (UMDC).233  
 
 
Manpower and human costs 
 
Roughly 560,000 men served in Indochina throughout the whole war on the French/nationalist 
side. Of these 200,000 were of European234 and 135,000 of African origin. Local troops 
constituted the rest. The authorities also threw into the battles 360 planes by 1954, plus a 
considerable naval fleet ranging from aircraft carriers to tiny river craft. 
     Dalloz has estimated that the expeditionary corps lost 20,000 French (among them 1,900 
officers), 11,000 Legionnaires, 15,000 Africans and 46,000 Indochinese (not including supplétifs 
and partisans) in the conflict. Of the 21,220 French prisoners of war languishing in the notorious 
Viet Minh prison camps only 9,319 sick and starved were liberated by October 1954 – compared 
to only 9% of captured pro-French, indigenous troops. The civilian losses for Indochina and those 




                                                          
228  M. Windrow & M. Chappell, Men-at-Arms series: The French Indochina War, 1946-54, p. 13.  
229  ‘Mixed air-borne commando groups’. 
230  Resistance modelled after the French version during WWII. 
231  ‘Ministère de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées; développements des crédits’, 11.3.1954, Débats, 
Union Française, LSE, 44 (R26) AUF 1. 
232  ‘Mobile units for the defence of Christendom’. 
233  Dalloz, ‘Des combattants indochinois contre le Vietminh’ in Les collections de l’histoire, no. 23, 50-1. 
234  French and the various European nationalities serving with the Foreign Legion.  
235  Dalloz, La guerre d’Indochine, 251, Masson, Histoire de l’armée française, 406 and 410 and Le Monde,  
Dossiers & Documents, no.331, 2. Figures can vary considerably depending on sources. 
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The French military after WWII 
           
To better understand some of the difficulties in Indochina and to get a sense of the pool the 
CEFEO could draw on it is helpful to consider the general situation of the French military following 
D-Day.  
     Upon France’s liberation the authorities faced the formidable task of demobilising a large and 
very heterogeneous force amounting to 1.7 million men (and women). These included eight 
divisions contributing to the (re-)conquest of France and Germany, the lightly armed 1ère, 10e and 
27e Divisions alpines of the Forces françaises de l’intérieur (FFI), three divisions of the Forces de 
l’Atlantique,236 two large units earmarked for the CEFEO, forty regional regiments, the police, 
gardes mobiles, the gendarmerie, 127 battalions of sécurité and pioneers attached to US forces, 
as well as African and Indochinese units (originally) stationed in the overseas territories. The air 
force (Armée de l’air) counted 140,000 men manning and supporting 700 mostly outdated planes. 
Due to its large-scale destruction the even smaller navy relied to a large extent on American and 
British vessels. 
     A report issued on June 4, 1945 foresaw a ‘peace-time’ force of twenty-one divisions or 
770,000 men (plus 70,000 in the air force and 68,000 in the navy). Yet the maintenance of these 
forces and equipment absorbed 40% of the national revenue by 1946. In view of France’s existing 
debt of 2,875 billion dollars237 the army was reduced to 460,000 men, the air force to 67,000 and 
the navy to 55,000 until the end of 1946. This combination still cost France 140 billion francs while 
leaving a mere 130,000 men for the metropolitan defence. All personnel (much of it under-
qualified) used for the most part material acquired and taken over from Britain, the US, Germany 
and Italy.238 In an interview Defence Minister René Pleven outlined that, due to new global 
commitments, troop numbers would swell again to 905,000 by 1953 with military credits reaching 
1,279 billion Francs. The Indochina War absorbed 26,5 % of officers and 42,2% of NCOs in the 
army alone (then roughly 420,000 men strong). The 215,000 troops needed in Southeast Asia left 
only 67,000 in the rest of the overseas territories.239  
   
 
Fusion, demobilisation, homogenisation and purges 
   
The bulk of troops for the peace-time army was initially taken from the Free French, the Armée 
d’Afrique, the Coloniale and the resistance. Fusing these branches required consideration of the 
differing levels of training as well as combat and command experience. This posed particular 
challenges in the case of FFI officers, who often possessed little of either and were met with 
reservation from their regular colleagues. Of the FFI’s 24,000 cadres 16,439 were channelled into 
                                                          
236  Both forces constituted part of the resistance. 
237  Most of this were US credits. The debt quoted dates back to spring 1946. 
238  Masson, Histoire de l’armée française, 364-73. 
239  Revue de défense nationale, 9e année, tome XVI, January 1953, p. 93, Liddell Hart Archive. 
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the active military by 1945 and 4,054 into the reserve, sometimes after promotion from lower 
ranks.240  
     Their mental state and lack of fitness put a question mark behind the recall of 2,000 officers 
deported to concentration camps during WWII241 and the 6,000 released from ‘regular’ German 
prison camps (Oflags).242 On the other hand, a considerable number of officers quit the army 
following the announcement of cuts within the corps by 12,000 individuals as part of the general 
demobilisation. But as casualty rates in Indochina grew, many of those (often forcibly) released 
were re-integrated.243 
     Purges had already begun in North Africa after the allied landings and ended with the re-
establishment of an independent French state. The authorities mainly targeted those who had 
actively obeyed Vichy orders, served alongside the Axis powers or failed to aid the resistance. 
This especially concerned Vichy’s former high command plus openly pro-German forces such as 
the Phalange africaine. Officers purged but wishing to be re-instated had to explain their attitude 
and actions since June 1940.  
     Behind these draconic measures stood an official determination from 1947 on to rejuvenate 
the armed forces, particularly the officer corps. However, many professional officers accused the 
left (presumably behind the cuts) of taking revenge on the right’s elite. D’Abzac-Épezy has 
maintained though that figures circulating at the time were often exaggerated. 658 army officers 
had actually been purged by May 1949, 12,679 demobilised, 604 had parted voluntarily, while 
3,585 (of the FFI) and 1,134 others had been re-incorporated. The disengagements after the war 
concerned for the most part older NCOs, lieutenants and captains eligible for pensions.244 Among 
them figured many who had hastily been recalled in the final months of the war either from the 
reserve or the FFI. Still, the author has admitted a lasting speculation surrounding the departures. 
For certain the arbitrariness, denunciations and tension accompanying the process left a bitter taste 
in military circles. On the other hand the relative leniency involved owed to the desire to figure 
among the victors in 1945 at the cost of maintaining  an elitist force.245 
     The reduction in troop numbers went hand in hand with a degradation of service conditions. 
In comparison to (higher) civilian employments the salary of an army colonel fell from third to ninth 
place between 1945 and 1950. A French major earned two-thirds of his British counterpart.246 
Correspondingly entries into training institutions dropped while the proportion of officer cadets at 
St. Cyr coming from military families rose to 40% between 1945 and 1958. (Admittedly, this trend 
had already manifested itself in the 1930s.) On the eve of WWII the percentage of officers 
graduating from the Grandes écoles had shrunk from 52% to 36% compared with 1913. A quarter 
had come through the ranks and 9% from the reserve.247  
                                                          
240  It is not entirely clear whether the quoted figures apply to the army, the air force and the navy. That said, officers   
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241  Revue de la défense nationale, 2e année, Sept. 1946, p. 400. 
242  Bodin, La France et ses soldats, 27. 
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République, 667-686. 
246   Horne, The French Army and Politics, 74. 





The authorities re-introduced conscription in 1946. Those French found healthy enough became 
eligible for military service on their 21st birthday although various nuances existed.248 They served 
in France, Germany, Austria and North Africa. Born and naturalised French residing overseas 
(but not in North Africa or the mandated territories) served in their nearest units, which were 
usually part of the Coloniale. Conscription also concerned Algerian Muslims having become 
French citizens in 1947. In the case of native personnel, voluntary engagements and conscription 
alternated or complemented each other depending on needs. Habitually, governors fixed quotas 
and their subjects drew lots. Conscription for the national armies of Indochina was initiated in 
1951 but was marred by corruption and avoidance.  
     The French government initially fixed the duration of mandatory military service at one year 
(two for Algerian Muslims) but extended it to eighteen months in 1950. After their service 
conscripts entered the reserve for twenty-seven years. They could be recalled, as happened in 
1947 and 1956. If considered suitable, they joined the NCO and officer corps where they made 
up 15, 5% and 8, 5% respectively. The air force, more so than the navy, picked only those men 
who held specific diplomas or possessed otherwise relevant experience. 
     After the first call-up in 1946 conscripts accounted for 14, 3% of all forces combined. At the 
end of 1953 the percentage stood at 33, 8% and reached 59% in 1957. Yet even during the 
Algerian War the left’s vision of a popular army did not materialise. At the beginning of the war 
professional soldiers made up 52,1% of all army personnel. Imperial enthusiasts were equally 
disappointed as the three forces remained largely French. Their percentage in the army, which 
received the largest share of non-Europeans, lingered around 60%. Asians accounted for a mere 
5% at the end of 1946 (excluding supplétifs).249 
 
 
European defence and nationalism 
 
Due to European commitments and turbulences overseas the French military could never devote 
all necessary resources to the Indochina War. That said, the European (Military) Cooperation, 
envisioned by the signatories of the Brussels Pact, faltered in March 1948. But the creation of and 
French involvement in NATO the next year required high military spending and troop provisions. 
Thankfully it also brought American aid through the Marshall Plan and the Mutual Defence 
Assistance Act. For France the latter resulted in $555 million for defence purposes alone.  
     While the military greatly appreciated the assistance it was well aware of the resulting 
dependence and additional expenditures. Despite the latter the country was unable to provide the 
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twenty modern divisions promised for the defence of Europe. The reason lay in the crippling 
combination of reconstruction, modernisation, re-armament and the Indochina War.  
     After 1949 the latter turned into the military’s major focus. The reason behind this was as much 
political and economic as psychological. The 1940 armistice and the Japanese coup of 1945 had 
instilled in the French government and military a strong desire for a return to the old, more 
grandiose days. In addition, even someone less colonially-minded like de Gaulle knew that 
without its empire France would only be a mid-ranked power. Furthermore, the country had 
considerably invested in Indochina’s infrastructure and left a strong cultural imprint, not least its 
30,000 or so settlers. Like Malaya, the territory also functioned as a major rubber-producer while 
also representing the rice chamber of Southeast Asia. Finally, and as we will see later on, 
Indochina held strategic importance in the Cold War, not least because it bordered (eventually) 
Maoist China. Yet France’s embroilment in Southeast Asia led the US administration to conclude 
in 1950 that France could no longer constitute the cornerstone of a European defence. It turned 
towards Germany and Italy despite vehement French protests.250  
     Gallic indignation had already done little to postpone British-induced independence to the 
mandated Lebanon and Syria during WWII. Still, departure did not ensue until 1946 following the 
suppression of a revolt.251 Further to the west security forces killed 6,000 Algerians after French 
settlers had been slaughtered by locals during the Sétif massacre in May 1945. It would turn out 
to be a prelude to a war involving up to 2.5 million French soldiers (among them many conscripts). 
It would also spill over into France, lead to a failed military putsch in 1961, cost up to 400,000 
Algerian lives and ended with the exodus of between 600,000 and 800,000 European settlers as 
well as over 100,000 harkis.252  
      The Malagasy uprising between 1947 and 1949 again caused several ten thousand mostly 
indigenous casualties. It tied down roughly 18,000 French, African and Foreign Legion troops despite 
poorly armed opposition. Meanwhile, Afrique occidentale française (AOF)253 and Afrique 
équatoriale française (AEF)254 remained calmer. This owed in part to the moderating influence 
but clever negotiating of nationalist leaders like Senegal’s Léopold Senghor. Where they broke 
out, protests centred on income and working conditions of the ever more numerous wage earners. 
On a few occasions police and white settlers dispersed demonstrations by simply shooting into 
the crowds, as happened at the port of Douala (Cameroon) in 1945 and in Dimbokro (Ivory Coast) 
in 1950. But the only organised armed struggle would occur in Cameroon between 1956 and 1958.  
     The protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia saw more of the latter during the 1950s. Yet much 
nationalist pressure was applied via the UN, the Arab League and the Non-Aligned Movement 
while French residents, the monarchies and nationalist parties bargained. Even so, the 
mountainous interior but also centres of population saw uprisings and demonstrations, in which 
the police, soldiers and white settlers were at times targeted. In Morocco Berbers and Arabs 
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turned on each other. Security forces and settlers on the other hand showed little restraint when 
confronted by demonstrators. During the Casablanca Massacre on December 7 and 8, 1952 they 
shot scores of Moroccans.          
     Accorded the status of either Départements d’outre-mer (DOM) or Territoires d’outre-mer 
(TOM) under the 1946 constitution, the financially dependent islands in the West Indies, the Indian 
Ocean and the Pacific were spared such upheaval thanks to gradual administrative 
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Chapter 3: “Part of a wider Soviet-inspired drive” – 
British soldiers’ views on the Malayan Emergency and insurgents 
 
In his 1957 report for the War Office256 director of operations, General Sir Roger Bower, described 
the origins and changing strategy of the communist guerrillas as follows: 
  
The Malayan Communist Party’s (MCP) campaign in Malaya is part of a wider Soviet-inspired 
drive to obtain control of what is strategically and economically one of the most important 
areas in South-East Asia. Its aim is to overthrow the Malayan Government and to set up in its 
place a Communist-controlled Peoples’ Democratic Republic. […] The formation and official 
recognition of the Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) in 1941 gave it an army 
which was not completely disbanded in 1945 and which became the instrument with which it 
could pursue its aim by force. […] In June 1948, on the instructions of the Cominform issued 
at two conferences in Calcutta four months earlier, the MCP started a campaign of murder, 
sabotage and terrorism designed to paralyse the Government and develop into armed 
revolution. […] By mid-1949 the leaders had realised that a quick decision was not possible. 
[…] They modified their methods with a view to wearing down the Government and in due 
course dominating selected centres of population. These they planned to group into liberated 
areas where civil administration could be taken over and a regular army built up […] In October 
1951 the MCP […] directed that operations should be confined to military and para-military 
targets in the rural areas and that every effort must be made to infiltrate into and conduct 
subversive activities in all walks of life in the centres of population. [Following a series of 
setbacks between 1951 and 1955] They realised that their attempt to seize control of the 
country by force had failed. [Since then] The MCP have adopted a ‘wait and see policy’, in the 
hope that when the Federation attains full Independence, they will be allowed to leave the 
jungle […] to lead a United Front of left wing parties. 
 
     Much further down the pecking order National Serviceman and 2nd lieutenant257 Oliver 
Crawford agreed, musing in his memoirs: 
 
… both sides in Malaya could feel the threat of China […]. The terrorists drew their inspiration 
from Peking Radio, and the number of terrorist incidents mounted noticeably after the fall of 
Dien Bien Phu. In Malaya we felt the French were fighting in the same war as ourselves, and 
at the worst time of the Indo-China crisis […] there would have been little surprise if British 
battalions had suddenly found themselves sailing from Singapore to Indo-China. Like the 
terrorists, we felt both wars were the same war. From that, it was a small step to seeing this 
struggle as part of the same global struggle that had now erupted at different times in Korea 
and Formosa, Indo-China and Malaya, Greece and Berlin. Kennan’s ‘Containment of 
Communism’, as a phrase, seemed to hold particular meaning for us in Malaya. Yet no-one 
could say we fought this war merely as an ideological war. Perhaps the terrorists did: their aim 
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was to establish a Communist Government composed of themselves […]. But we did not fight 
them just because they were Communists. […]. [They] were terrorists. They carried weapons. 
They wore uniforms. They killed.258 
 
For Harold Kirk, a regular gunner, the communists “were intimidating all and sending [them] into 
the communist way of life.” Unlike the officers cited above, Kirk came from a farming family and 
had enjoyed only a very short education.259 
     Given such opinions, it will be maintained in this chapter that the majority of (former) British 
servicemen included in this study – provided they have given it any thought at all – have put the 
Malayan Emergency not in the context of decolonisation but in that of the Cold War. Similarly, 
they have labelled the insurgents they fought as (misguided) ‘communist terrorists’ rather than 
nationalists, thereby following the official terminology of the time. The roots of the conflict then lay 
in the spread of Marxist thinking in Malaya rather than in social, political and economic triggers. 
Only a minority have identified Singapore’s fall and the ensuing Japanese occupation during 
WWII, administrative failures by the returning British, economic upheavals, ethnic tensions and 
Britain’s fading influence in the world as causes for upheaval. A few advocates of such causes 
have suffered psychological or physical scars during and after the conflict, prompting them to 
question their involvement in Malaya. Others gained access to intelligence information during the 
emergency or were briefed in unusual frankness on Malaya’s economic importance. A small 
number had closer links with the territory due to birth, childhood or relatives residing there. And one 
or two stayed on after independence thereby gaining additional insight.  
 
This chapter outlines views of the majority and minority while also explaining how the relative 
uniformity might have developed.  
 
 
Influences that shaped opinions 
 
Andrew Thompson has held that peoples’ origins impinged on their view of empire.260 Bernard 
Porter has gone further in maintaining that the British upper classes were generally more aware 
of empire and decolonisation than the middle or working classes. Such a take would allow for a 
class analysis of popular imperialism.261 It is therefore possible that many officers, who even by 
1945 were habitually drawn from the upper classes, linked the emergency with the end of empire 
prior to their departure to Malaya. The sources used for this project do indeed suggest that class 
and education played into military perceptions. Yet backgrounds have not necessarily divided  
(ex-) servicemen into a camp also connecting the conflict with decolonisation and focusing on the 
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Cold War. But it is certainly not a coincidence that many (former) soldiers graduating from public 
schools have portrayed the conflict in more complexity than their lower middle and working class 
colleagues. Equally, those deviating from the traditional Cold War take on the conflict have spoken 
and written very articulately in testimonies. On the other hand, more thoroughly educated veterans 
have at times offered fairly clear-cut explanations. Among them has figured Peter Leigh, a 
National Serviceman, platoon commander and intelligence officer. Prior to his tour he had 
attended a public school and later Sandhurst. Asked about the task at hand, he answered that it 
consisted in stopping “Malaya (from) being taken over by the communists”.262 Former corporal 
and conscript, Leonard Spicer, for his part quoted ‘working class’ as background. This did not 
stop him from attending evening classes and then university later on in life nor from writing a book 
about the emergency.263 In regard to above question he replied somewhat cautiously: “We were 
given to understand we were protecting the interest of the UK against a ruthless, well-armed 
enemy...”264 His response has to be seen in the context of the unusually forthright briefing he 
received from his Australian commander at the time, who highlighted the economic importance of 
Malaya.265 Spicer’s caution probably also stems from the research for his own book. Crucially 
though, he and Leigh have not fundamentally questioned the roots and nature of the insurgency as 
outlined by the authorities.  
      Part of the reason why (former) British combatants have classified the emergency as a Cold 
War theatre is that they have been, of course, largely correct. It was the MCP and its armed wing, 
the MNLA, which led, planned and carried out the insurgency. Their aim consisted in establishing 
a socialist state modelled after Mao’s China or the USSR. Throughout their struggle they 
maintained relations with other communist movements although external assistance did for the 
most part not result in the provision of supplies and training. In this context Chin Peng attributed 
the decision to take up arms to a meeting with the Australian communist Laurence Sharkley266 
and to an increasingly assertive clamp-down by the colonial authorities. Sharkly confessed during 
a meeting in Singapore that his party ‘eliminated’ strike breakers. This contradicted Bower’s 
assumption (subsequently taken up by many writers) that the MCP reacted to direct or indirect 
signals from the Cominform conference in Calcutta, to which the MCP had actually not been 
invited.267 
     Bower’s report apart, it is often difficult to ascertain whether soldierly reasoning has been borne 
out of personal experiences, government propaganda, the later study of literature or discussions. 
For example, a former National Serviceman, E. G. Guest, commented that: “During my time in 
Malaya I rarely encountered anyone who had any sympathy for their [the guerrillas’] cause.”268 
But the same veteran confessed that he had very little contact with the population, which puts his 
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assessment in a different perspective. As it was, many British servicemen never spotted, let alone 
spoke to an insurgent, either.269  
     It helps to recall the mood in the western world in order to understand the agreement between 
the higher and lower military strata in regard to the Malayan Emergency. Throughout the conflict 
international developments appeared frightening to anyone who did not favour socialist rule. 
Multiparty rule had given way to communist regimes across Eastern Europe. Uprisings in 
Germany and Poland were brutally crushed with Hungary and Czechoslovakia to follow. Berlin 
suffered a blockade for several months in 1948. War-torn Greece was on the brink of turning 
communist while Turkey came under massive Soviet pressure. US and allied troops were badly 
outnumbered in Europe in relation to the communist block. In China Mao’s forces relentlessly 
squeezed the Kuomintang out of China until the latter collapsed completely. Further to the south 
and west the French rapidly lost ground in Indochina until they, too, conceded defeat. And in 
Korea communist troops proved equal to their UN opposition. Worse, many of the newly 
independent states in the Third World leaned towards socialism.270 In regard to Southeast Asia 
in particular, The Times’ editor-in-chief found disturbing patterns:  
 
Most of the rich lands [of South East Asia] are suffering Communist upheavals; most of them 
contain large Chinese minorities, and the Communists among those Chinese look first to the 
example and practice of Mao Tse-Tung. […] The seriousness of the outbreaks has varied, but 
everywhere the tactics have been identical, aiming at economic chaos and political confusion 
to undermine organized authority and to prepare the way, if possible, for Communist 
regimes.271 
 
     Not all servicemen read The Times. But newspapers carrying similar editorials and stories 
were read in British homes and dropped to troops in the Malayan jungle. They helped to reinforce 
widely held beliefs. Former Royal Marine, Donald Mott, saw the danger not only in Asia but also 
at home when he summarised: “The Cold War had become a major threat to [the] UK in [the] late 
50s.” 272   
      Nonetheless, international developments alone cannot explain the common worry about a 
communist takeover. It is necessary to consider the analysis and portrayal of actual 
developments. Susan Carruthers has depicted in great detail how communication experts on the 
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spot and their superiors in London273 manipulated public opinion. They were largely successful in 
their efforts despite the uneasy relationship between the British military and the press. Even so, 
the Colonial and Foreign Offices quarrelled for some time over the extent and intensity of the 
conflict as well as over the enemy to be fought. They eventually agreed on the need to paint a 
picture of a wider communist scheme. Part of the ensuing communication strategy lay in denying 
the existence of a nationalist movement in Malaya and in emphasising the largely Chinese 
character of the MCP. Equally, they sought to heighten tensions between Moscow, China and 
Southeast Asian communists by claiming that the MCP and MNLA received their directions not 
from China but Moscow. At the same time, British communication officers did their best to stress 
that the colonial power did not suppress critical voices per se but intended to work with moderates 
towards Malayan independence. Carruthers has further underlined that throughout the whole 
communication campaign terminology played a crucial part and largely produced the right stories. 
This was so despite the relative absence of censorship outside the Federation and Singapore.274 
That said, where the desired results could not be obtained, the British government and 
administration did not shy away from curbing the flow of information.275  
     By 1952 the official version of the Malayan conflict also found its way into a handbook on the 
emergency.276 Yet none of the veterans considered, who served from that date on, have 
mentioned receiving and reading the latter. But it was probably distributed among senior military 
staff, administrators and the press. On the final pages readers could find a questions and answers 
section. The first of these read: “Are the communist bandits leading a national liberation 
movement?” The answer went:  
 
No. They are a small minority seeking to impose their ideas against the wishes of the great 
majority in the country. They are attempting to do this by violent means. Their violence 
consists of intimidation, extortion and murder. The doctrines, aims and techniques of the 
Malayan Communist Party are implacably Stalinist in conception and execution. 
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     It appears as if these ideas trickled down the hierarchy as most (ex-)military judgements have 
featured in aspects of the above statement. 
     Yet this kind of official dissemination was rare. Few servicemen received any meaningful 
information on the conflict other than purely technical matters involving jungle warfare. Critical 
questions about the Malayan malaise were not encouraged, either. One finds little evidence in 
the sources for discussion sessions within battalions, companies or platoons.277 Raymond Hill, at 
the time a Royal Marine, remembered only being instructed to rid the country of communism.278 
Another veteran, ex-dragoon guard Noel Baptiste, later expressed his astonishment about the 
lack of psychological preparation. He maintained that soldiers were not told why they were in 
Malaya and what they were supposed to do.279 On the other hand, few seem to have actively 
sought information, perhaps because they did not want to unduly attract the attention of their 
superiors. As former private White commented: “Way back then one didn’t ask awkward 
questions. It was enough to get through a day and survive.”280   
     This approach derived to some extent from decisions made in London. After WWII new regular 
and conscripted recruits initially had to attend two hours per week of current affairs and citizenship 
discussions throughout their training. But demobilisation, economic difficulties and the beginning of 
National Service resulted in younger and less knowledgeable instructors having to teach less 
concerned intakes. Budgets were continuously cut and departments closed while the overall 
number of sessions decreased. In parallel former left-wing members of the army’s education 
committees left to start civilian careers. As the forces became more marginal within British society, 
the left’s hopes of social engineering – so dearly held during WWII – faded. At the same time the 
heads of the War Office and the director of army education, Bellenger (followed by Shinwell) and 
Lloyd, feared that the end of the coalition government would result in politically biased 
instructions.281 As a consequence, they decided to produce their own information material from 
1952 on. It contained more technical and therefore neutral issues, such as NATO’s aims and set-
up. As MacKenzie has summed up: “The educational ferment of the war years had faded away, 
to be replaced by a harsh, utilitarian view of what it was the soldier needed to know.” 282 
     However, servicemen’s relative ignorance in regard to the situation in Malaya also had other 
causes. WWII severely interrupted education. Even after 1945 financial strains on families 
frequently led to an early end to the schooling producing a generation with often scant knowledge 
of international affairs. Trevor Royle has pointed out that four years after the end of WWII 84% of 
the National Service intake had an educational standard of elementary school to illiteracy. Six 
years later still only 10% of new recruits had made it to grammar school. Prior to the call-up the 
vast majority had ended up in secondary modern school where they dropped out at the minimum 
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age of 15.283 Dennis Ryan, a National Serviceman and wireless operator in Malaya, remembered 
his school years as follows: “We weren’t quite educated. We lived near a grammar school but I 
never went to one. […] We’d been through to war. We had a rough time. The family life was up 
and down. You know, we weren’t very rich. […] To me it [National Service] was just another job 
virtually. I just came and we […] went out to Malaya. I didn’t even know where Malaya was.” In 
light of such ignorance, offering Ryan a choice of posting proved pointless, as he himself indirectly 
admitted: 
 
I was with the Essex Regiment and they wanted volunteers to go… well, they named it 
volunteers… to the Betton Hearts or the Suffolk Regiment. At that time the Betton Hearts were 
going to Trieste and the Suffolk Regiment […] was in Malaya. And being educated like I was, 
I thought Trieste was in the desert. So I didn’t fancy that at all. I volunteered to go to the Suffolk 
Regiment with the first battalion who were then in Malaya.284 
 
     This educational deficiency also reduced the knowledge of empire. Porter has referred to polls 
conducted in 1948 in which few people questioned could name a single colony. Likewise, no-one 
could explain the difference between the latter and a dominion.285  
     Other than poor schooling and limited briefings there is also a traditional reason for soldiers’ 
complying stance: Ever since the English civil wars the British Army has deliberately abstained 
from politics – or so its representatives have claimed. Hugh Strachan has held that in exchange 
for sufficient funds, privileged access to civilian decision makers and protection from all-too 
curious public enquiries, the British military has largely left political decisions to civilians. Such 
battles have instead been confined to regimental issues, i.e. the defence of units when faced with 
amalgamation or outright dissolution.286 Commanders might privately have cast doubt on political 
strategies. If prompted, they might even have spelled out those thoughts in the presence of high 
ranking civilian administrators and politicians. Yet in public they have remained more or less silent, 
certainly in the case of Malaya.287 It is only logical that this attitude has permeated other ranks, 
too – at least until the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns. 
     So far, we can deduce that (ex-)servicemen have had little reason to deviate from the official 
line on the emergency and the insurgents. Studying some of the academic literature on the conflict 
and decolonisation in general though one wonders if the international context of the 1950s could 
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not have led to other military perceptions. Anthony Stockwell has indicated that evidence for a 
communist plot in Malaya was lacking at a time when Whitehall, convinced by MacDonald, made 
it official. The commissioner-general for Southeast Asia also pressed for a ban of the MCP despite 
the fact that general lawlessness had been prevalent in Malaya throughout the 1920s and 
resurfaced in 1945. Months after High-Commissioner Gent had declared an emergency staff 
members admitted in private that proof of a communist conspiracy was still wanting. This 
remained the case until the first communist directives were intercepted and captured rebels 
interrogated. The only aspects security officials could point to before these successes were 
publications of the Malayan Communist Party, the USSR’s overly large embassy in Bangkok and 
calls for armed rebellion at the Calcutta conference in 1948.288 
     Troubles could well have come from other sources. Various Muslim movements and parties, 
such as Hizbul Muslimin, the Malay Nationalist Party, the youth movement PETA, the Peasants 
Front and unions proved frequently more active and aggressive than the MCP, particularly in the 
months preceding the declaration of the emergency. Interestingly, members of these groups could 
have been defined either as radical Muslims or communists as their leaders attempted to make 
the two ideologies compatible. Furthermore, most of these movements interacted with and 
supported each other to some degree despite clashes in the past.289  
     Apart from these rumblings in Malaya, alert spectators could have noticed events elsewhere 
in the empire. Frank Furedi has highlighted the sense of despair within the British government in 
view of imperial pressures during the 1940s and 1950s. If they went unnoticed among the wider 
British population educated colonial subjects certainly took notice. Gloom had already started 
spreading with the fall of Singapore – widely described as the worst military disaster in British 
imperial history. 1948 proved a particularly bad year with the Accra Riots in February, upheavals 
in Baghdad, increasing pressure from the Zikist movement in Nigeria, labour unrest in the West 
Indies, the declaration of the Malayan Emergency and the hastened British departure from Burma 
and Palestine. All the while governors in the rest of the colonial empire reported tensions and 
violence on a weekly basis.  
     For the first time the Colonial Office and administration no longer held a monopoly on 
information. News of one hotspot frequently led to the outbreak of others. What’s worse, the length 
and costs of the various conflicts undermined the belief in Britain’s ability to get a grip. Officials 
often retorted to certain measures simply to catch breath and gain time.290  
     Why then were most servicemen at the time seemingly unaware of the issues Furedi and 
Stockwell have raised? Do government propaganda, the Cold War, inadequate schooling or 
military traditions suffice as explanations? Or did ordinary servicemen simply not care enough 
about the state of empire just as the majority of British might not have? If, according to Porter, 
empire had never mattered much for the majority of civilians (and soldiers) then perhaps 
decolonisation didn’t either. Alternatively, people accepted the latter as inevitable or even 
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desirable. Porter has argued that the British public largely supported Indian independence while 
the Suez campaign proved fairly unpopular. The majority of (interested) British accepted the 
official version that development and independence had always been the goal for Britain’s 
overseas territories and subjects. Part of the acceptance stemmed from the conviction that the 
Commonwealth would maintain the family ties.291 (One could counter that such acquiescence did 
not extend to all sections of politics, particularly not when white settler communities in Africa were 
concerned.292) If this is the case then why should British servicemen have differed in their attitudes 
from the rest of the ostensibly apathetic population? One might hold that fighting in a territory far 
away could have sensitised or even radicalised some, as happened in WWI or II. But how were 
soldiers posted to Malaya supposed to suddenly develop revolutionary thoughts if all they saw 
were dense jungle, a few scattered villages and maybe a dead or surrendered communist rebel? 
Locals, who could have initiated discussions, were often miles away. 
       Even if some soldiers showed an interest in empire before their spell in Malaya, they were 
likely to gain mixed impressions from developments. Those, especially regular soldiers, who had 
been posted to other colonies prior to their arrival in Malaya, would not have necessarily 
concluded that social and nationalist aspirations threatened to bring about the end of empire. 
Indeed, if stationed in Africa during the 1940s and 1950s they could easily have construed that 
Britain was actually tightening its imperial screws. That was certainly the case in Central and East 
Africa where the Labour government intensively experimented with agricultural and administrative 
projects in order to turn the areas into new dominions.293  
     With the emergency lasting throughout the 1950s Martin Lynn’s work on the decade needs to 
be considered, too. He has cautioned against perceiving decolonisation as a process with a clear 
beginning and a foreseeable end. According to him, British politicians certainly did not envision 
the rapid retreat in the 1960s. In fact, the situation ten years prior looked much more promising 
than it had at the end of WWII. The empire still offered lucrative markets and plentiful resources. 
It all encouraged British governments to hold on to as much as they could and to make their 
voices heard in world affairs. First unexpected cracks did not appear until the Suez crisis which 
lead to Macmillan’s ‘cost-benefit’ analysis.294 
     As it was though, the majority of British conscripts and even many regulars had neither 
travelled much within the empire nor had they read much about it prior to their tour in Malaya. 
Consequently, they could not necessarily fathom that Britain’s colonial record in Southeast Asia 
was not an entirely solid one. Little wonder then that few connected the emergency with the 
general British (and European) difficulty to protect and develop colonies before, during and after 
WWII. Equally few concluded from this that many colonial subjects had lost confidence in their 
masters. Asked about Britain’s standing in the world after 1945, most veterans consulted felt that 
their country still represented a major power at the time. The afore-mentioned E. G. Guest for 
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instance remarked: “It appeared to me that Britain was a major power striving to maintain the 
democratic system in Europe and the Far East.”295 
     Even decades later and following some very critical publications on the subject, only a handful 
of former servicemen have underlined Britain’s omissions and failures in Malaya as well as their 
possible impact. Several have acknowledged that Britain brought thousands of Chinese and 
Indians to the colony to work on plantations or mines but they have not always deduced that this 
created an explosive social landscape. Only one or two have pointed to the lack of land rights and 
citizenship or the psychological distance of the British administration, which so marked the lives of 
ordinary Chinese.296 A handful hinted at the reverberations of Singapore’s fall in 1942.297 Such 
findings should not serve as a late criticism. But they confirm the perpetuation of the Cold War theory 
on the one hand and a fairly positive image of the British Empire among veterans on the other hand. 
      This in turn raises the question of literature consumed by veterans. Likely (and cited) targets 
include colleagues’ memoirs or analyses by regimental historians.298 Both sets of authors are 
unlikely to have delved on the more problematic aspects of Britain’s rule in Malaya in great length 
because their interest have naturally lied in the military facets. One book mentioned and 
recommended in correspondence is Donald Mackay’s The Malayan Emergency, 1948-60. The 
author has stressed the shattering moral effect of Singapore’s fall on Southeast Asians and for 
British colonial prestige. In parallel, he has highlighted the problematic attitude of British military, 
administrative and business personnel returning to Malaya in 1945, many of whom were hell-bent 
on turning back the clock. Moreover, he has described the dire state of the Malayan infrastructure 
and economy at the time, the colonial crackdowns on industrial strikers and protesters, the failed 
Malayan Union and the glaring gap between ordinary Chinese and British officials.299 These are 
five crucial roots of the insurgency that have rarely emerged in military witness accounts then or now.   
     Richard Clutterbuck’s300 take on the emergency also features on many websites or memoirs 
and has undoubtedly influenced later writers and veterans alike. In this context it appears at times 
as if many authors have taken up the stances of their predecessors or colleagues, thus reinforcing 
the concept of a purely communist-inspired uprising. Anthony Short, himself a participant in the 
emergency,301 represents one of the first authors who took a more complex and ultimately 
inquisitive view. One has to ask why nobody has challenged, or at least supplemented, the 
governmental line until Short’s publication. Does this reflect a belated response to MacKenzie’s 
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notion of a third and decisive, imperial implosion?302 Or was Short simply the first to deal with the 
emergency after Britain’s decision to abandon its presence east of Suez? Timing could be 
important. It is worth highlighting that most of the Imperial War Museum’s interviews with veterans 
were conducted in the 1980s and 1990s. That said, many memoirs and internet testimonies have 
appeared in the past few years. Questionnaires or interviews prepared and conducted by myself 
are even more recent. Time appears to have altered little if one compares official sources at the 
time with recent declarations from ex-servicemen. The previously quoted Handbook to Malaya 
and the Emergency for instance described Britain’s role in Malaya (and indirectly the patterns of 
decolonisation) in another Q&A section as such:  
 
Question: What is the justification for the British remaining in Malaya? 
 
Answer: The Colony of Singapore and the Settlements of Penang and Malacca are British 
territories. Elsewhere in Malaya the British are there by agreement with the Rulers of the Malay 
States. The Malay States have voluntarily accepted British protection and advice, and it is the 
declared aim of the British Government to guide Malaya to responsible self-government within 
the Commonwealth and to ensure for the country freedom from oppression from any quarter. 
This freedom is not yet assured. A premature withdrawal would jeopardise the security, well-
being and liberty of these people for whom Britain has responsibilities.303 
 
     The tone is similar in news features from the 1940s and 1950s. One such film shows the last 
minutes of British rule in Malaya and the celebrations accompanying them. When hundreds 
shouted ‘Merdeka’ (independence) in Kuala Lumpur’s racing stadium the commentator asked: 
“Was ever independence achieved with such goodwill?” Meanwhile at the celebration, Malaya’s 
first prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman promised: “We shall always remember the assistance 
we have received from Great Britain down our long path to nationhood.”304  
 
 
Alternative takes on the emergency 
 
Assessments deviating from the official line have often carried a sense of inevitability and pride 
but also a shade of bitterness. Some have regarded the end of the British presence in Malaya as 
inescapable because of alleged earlier British promises and long-planned intentions. For others, 
the perceived lack of gratefulness on the part of (former) colonial subjects has left a sour taste in 
their mouths.  
     Not simply adhering to the east versus west concept does not necessarily insinuate that 
alternative explanations have centred on decolonisation. Some veterans have simply added 
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further facets when musing on the Malayan Emergency or hinted at its complexity. Some have 
also adopted the theory that the British did not withdraw from Malaya or from any other territory 
at the time. They had simply developed these areas to an extent that the locals could start 
governing themselves. Richard Clutterbuck for instance noted:  
 
When the Tunku took over UMNO, the British Government had begun preparing the country 
for independence on the model successfully developed in India between the wars: gradually 
bringing elected members into the federal executive and legislative councils and at the same 
time introducing fully elected municipal and village councils. […] It takes at least thirty years 
to prepare a colony for independence from the time that there is a serious intention to do so. 
This is the time that it takes to put a generation through school, select enough of the best for 
university training, and give the graduates practice in their professions before they take up the 
leadership. The British had been working for this in Malaya since the 1920’s and 1930’s. [...] 
Though the Japanese forced a break from 1942 to 1945, this had little effect, since most of 
the future leaders had already been through a university. […] Early in 1956 […] Tunku Abdul 
Rahman went to London to negotiate final independence. The British Government agreed to 
fix August 31, 1957, as Independence Day. In the happiest of celebrations […] power was 
handed over…305 
 
     Clutterbuck, perhaps unknowingly, ignored less altruistic deliberations. Among them figures 
the fact that Malaya eventually ceased to be the crucial dollar earner it had represented after 
WWII. As Stockwell has argued: “When Attlee formed his second administration after the general 
election of February 1950 it was clear that, if Malaya was too wealthy to lose, it was fast becoming 
too expensive to maintain.”306  
     To contemplate on the end of British rule in Malaya required perhaps that servicemen actively 
witnessed it. Peter Maule-Ffinch, an infantry officer who later joined the Malayan Police before 
turning plantation manager, decided to stay in Malaya after independence. His decision was made 
easier by the fact that the newly independent government actively encouraged men like him to 
remain in their jobs. Once self-government arrived, Maule-Ffinch barely noticed it. The only visible 
signs of a new area consisted in a different category of citizenship and altered colours on his 
identity card. When he finally departed for personal reasons he felt a profound sadness. “That’s 
home to me”, he remarked during an interview.307 Indeed, home it was in more than one way. His 
grandparents had moved to Malaya in the 1920s and his father had been educated in Singapore.  
      Noel Baptiste, a former dragoon guard, had similarly strong links with Malaya. Growing up 
there he had reason to reflect on the roots of the emergency and on decolonisation in general. 
Regarding the latter Baptiste judged: “Well, of course, it [independence] was inevitable. Malaya 
had been promised independence before the war.”308 He then added somewhat critically: 
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But even during the emergency there hadn’t been any formal request to the British government 
by the local rulers for independence. It seemed they were quite content to continue under 
British protection but naturally the British authorities considered that it would be a major 
propaganda victory to announce that the country was going to get independence because it 
would destroy the main plank of the Communist platform… 
 
     Baptiste’s side blow against Whitehall suggests that he, and probably many other expatriates, 
did not entirely approve of London’s political strategy. Whether self-government really hastened 
the end of the emergency and whether its proposition was entirely due to propaganda is a different 
question. What is not is that the ‘Tunku’ himself later admitted that he and his colleagues had not 
strongly pressed for self-government.309 
     Baptiste’s interviewer asked him at one point what he thought the emergency was all about.310 
To this the veteran replied: “… it was very clear to me that it was a question of whether once more 
we were going to be defeated in Malaya and forced out of the country as refugees – which already 
happened to my family once – or whether our military resistance was going to be properly 
organised and would prevent that [from] happening.” The emotional answer implies that the fall 
of Singapore, and the symbolic humiliation that came with it, marked him more than the wave of 
decolonisation after WWII.311 But contrary to many of his colleagues he could understand the 
reluctance of the Chinese to back the colonial power when the latter had been unable to defend 
them in WWII.  
      Baptiste also echoed Mackay by accusing the British administration of “effectively turning back 
the clock to 1942” upon re-entering Malaya. His interviewer did not ask him to elaborate on this 
statement so that we are left to guess what the veteran purported in detail and what an alternative 
approach would have looked like. Regardless of such a substitute, the former dragoon guard 
represents an exception in many ways. Not only had he grown up in Malaya as son of a scientist 
in the rubber industry. He had also obtained a solid public school education before doing his 
National Service.312 
     Other exceptions to the rule have proven as critical as Baptiste. John Cross,313 a former 
Gurkha officer, is another example. He had already witnessed the British departure from India 
and Burma. Shortly before being posted to Malaya he fought the Viet Minh – a “ruthless bunch” – 
during the British occupation of Indochina after WWII. After Malaya’s independence he continued 
to operate against the remaining communist guerrillas on the Thai border before assisting in the 
struggle against Indonesia. Cross could not hide his resentment vis-à-vis former colonial subjects 
when he remarked:  
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We’d seen nothing but our flag pulled down and we were spat at et cetera. And it was all very 
nasty. And we were delighted to get to somewhere where it was peaceful. Haha. […] We 
started off in 1948 and I remember with great joy on the 15th of August 1957 actually seeing 
a Malay sweat. It’s the last few yards that [are] most difficult. For them and in the propaganda 
they put out since we left, the British troops didn’t do anything but hinder. This is the 
sadness.314 
 
     Cross did not elaborate on the reasons the Union Jack was pulled down in all those territories 
or why people spat at them.315 At least though, he put the emergency in a wider regional context. 
     A handful of (ex)-servicemen have pondered on and questioned their involvement in the 
emergency as a result of injuries, diseases or the death of close friends. Once a soldier spent 
weeks lying in bed unable to sleep because of endless pain, fever or diarrhoea he had indeed 
ample time to do so.316 The same went for family members who learned of their son’s and 
brother’s death in a far away jungle. In this context it is worth quoting three incidents which echoed 
back home. In October 1951 twelve British soldiers of the Royal West Kents were ambushed and 
killed. In a similar attack the Gordon Highlanders suffered seven deaths in 1952. The Green 
Howards lost six of their men in as many days during the same year. Among those casualties 
were National Servicemen, which caused considerable alarm in Britain. Trevor Royle has 
maintained that while the death of regular soldiers might be viewed as a risk attached to their 
profession, things were different with conscripts.  
     Even if servicemen themselves survived enemy attacks, scars could remain. The above-
mentioned author has cited the example of William Skinner whose unit, the Seaforth Highlanders, 
fought the first battles in Malaya. Shortly before the end of his tour a bullet hit Skinner in the back. 
He subsequently went through eight operations just to end up still 50% disabled. Not surprisingly, 
the former National Serviceman has regretted his tour of duty, lamented the lack of state care, 
and probably wondered what exactly he had fought for.317 Those who have suffered from what 
later became known as post-traumatic stress disorder have had similar reactions. Unfortunately 
for them such a diagnosis did not exist then nor was any particular cure at hand upon their return. 
Former Private White remarked: “The medical profession now label it as ‘Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder’ – back then, it was, ‘get a grip, pull yourself together!’”318 Many have done so but it has 
not always proven easy – neither for them nor for their relatives. Former conscript Tony Hamilton 
recalled in an interview that he could barely sit still upon his return and spent the first nights in a 
shed.319  
     More than the physical and psychological scars it seems to have been the general lack of interest 
in their military contribution and later fate, which has angered some veterans. Cliff Holland for 
instance lamented: 
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I was a soldier. Very proud to be a soldier. And I did what I was told. […] But in retrospect… 
I’m nearly seventy now. I have this little flat. I have a little money in the bank. I’ve got a […] 
car. But I don’t have a lot. Now, what was going on in Malaya wouldn’t have made a great 
deal of difference for a seventeen year old in this country at the time. I didn’t have any share 
in a rubber company. It was rubber what we were there to protect. I didn’t have any shares in 
the tin mines. I only know that when I came back nobody was particularly interested in me. 
Oh no. Nobody has ever been.320 
 
     For others the economic background posed less of a problem. Neither Tony Rodgers nor his 
colleagues, whom I encountered during a regimental celebration,321 appear to have held any 
grudges. This is so despite learning from their superior that their task essentially consisted in 
keeping Malaya’s rubber flowing. 
      Some servicemen simply grabbed the opportunities presenting themselves at the time. 
George Saunders, a German Jew and WWII veteran, joined the SAS in Malaya and switched to 
the police before becoming the right hand of the sultan of Johore. When Governor McGillivray 
criticised Saunder’s less than traditional approach to colonial administration – demands for full 
control over the sultan’s finances, the right to hire and fire or interest-free loans – the latter replied: 
“Look, Sir, [after independence] you’re gone, I’m gone. Après nous le déluge. What do we 
care?”322  
      Another category of men with untypical reactions consisted of those who gained access to 
intelligence information on the emergency. They read reports about the composition of the 
communist movement, Malaya’s economic and social problems or Whitehall’s long-term plans. 
Based on this information they could draw more complex conclusions or ignore official 
propaganda. One obvious example is General Templer. The latter always insisted that the 
solution to the conflict lay in the hands of the civilian administration and that independence would 
be the inevitable (and perhaps desirable) outcome. When later recalling issues and goals at the 
time Templer stated: “As I saw it, the problems would be: Organisation for and timing of elections 
at the various levels; land settlement and ownership; citizenship; education. All of these leading 
up to a united nation whose only loyalty would be to an independent Malaya – as it was then – 
within the British Commonwealth.”323 Given his broad responsibilities it is logical that Templer 
reflected on the civilian aspects of the emergency. Yet the general had spent most of his life in 
the forces. It would have come as little surprise if he had seen the emergency from a mostly 
military perspective.  
      Still, the general and his men never forgot the precondition for the necessary calm and stability 
which could facilitate political developments: They had to defeat the insurgents. Accordingly, 
military aims were often very straightforward and the joy over success unrestrained. Adrian Evill, 
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a former KAR324 officer, gleefully remembered decades later: “To me it was tremendously 
satisfying that by the time we left we [had] completely broken the communist effort in the whole 
of the state. There were no senior communists out in the jungle of any note left. All people were 
getting back to normal life. It was a very happy thought to leave that particular part of Malaya.”325  
      Perhaps due to the ultimate success none of the ‘special cases’ listed above seriously 
questioned Britain’s capacities to impose its will. It appears as if it was in a separate theatre that 
servicemen and civilians alike woke up to the unpleasant reality of Britain’s fading influence.326 
Captain R. T. Booth did tours of duty both in Malaya and in the Middle East as a professional 
soldier and later remembered: “At Suez Britain passed through a gate […] to a new and harsher 
world of economic and political reality. We would never again be able to shrug off international 
reaction as in imperial days and send a gunboat to depose a wog we disliked.” The former captain 
added an intriguing passage in his recollections, in which he reflected on military-civilian relations, 
as well as on the silence and compliance surrounding the military establishment when it came to 
decolonisation: 
 
One or two civilians, contemporaries of mine, cavilled at my military professionalism [in 
connection with Suez]. They did not know that the web of loyalty and sinew that characterises 
any regiment and which in tradition subjugates it to civilian power. I challenged them to declare 
if they wanted their military to be politically articulate. The officer corps of the British army was 
then and I suspect is still overwhelmingly Conservative in its allegiance but has been 
impeccable in carrying out instructions from governments of any party. It’s taken for granted 
that it should be so. I was to remind these critics later of French army factional allegiance to 
their settlers in Algeria. Rumours persisted then that General Massu might drop his parachute 
brigade near Paris to influence his government’s policy. How would my English critics feel to 
learn perhaps that the parachute commander at Aldershot planned to drop his brigade on 
Parliament Fields to influence the House of Commons? Did they want military commanders 
for example to openly side with political parties or show allegiance to one faction or another 
in Northern Ireland? I think burnt into our psyche is a distrust of the military since our 
government by major generals under Cromwell. At the M.O.D. today in central London staff 
wear civilian clothes, following a long tradition. At the Pentagon and similar establishments in 
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Views on insurgents 
 
The categorisation of the insurgents has followed that of the insurgency itself. With a few 
exceptions, (former) servicemen have stuck to the official label, i.e. communist terrorists,328 with 
emphasis on the second term. Leonard Spicer went even further categorising the opposition as 
“ruthless and cold-blooded killers”. P. S. Leigh noted that he “did not think they had popular 
support, even amongst the Chinese, and certainly not with the Malays.”329  
     From this it followed that guerrillas were either extremists to be eliminated, or in some cases, 
naïve, young men who had to be wrestled away from the grip of their fanatic leaders. Only a 
minority within the former security forces have acknowledged that social, racial, political and 
economic issues could have driven young Chinese (or Malays and Indians) into the hands of the 
communist movement. Respect for former foes has remained limited. Despite that, senior military 
figures did not take the enemy lightly and had some grasp of their motivation. As Richard 
Clutterbuck explained:  
 
It is a common and dangerous error to underestimate the quality of Communist guerrillas. In 
Malaya, the[ir] education [...] was generally above the average. Although they grew up amid 
the administrative chaos of the Japanese occupation, many of them had spent six years in 
school. This was often one of the causes of the frustration that had driven them into becoming 
Communists. Most of them had lived in villages where the only work was tapping rubber. They 
wanted something better. Many of the younger generation in the towns were no less frustrated. 
Some had left their villages in the hope of a better life, but they could get only menial jobs. 
The Communists seemed to offer them the opportunity to get somewhere, to be someone. 
They took to the jungle with high hopes, which often remained high for two or three years. 
Lack of promotion usually set off the process of disillusion. […] They received little 
encouragement from the villagers, who greeted them not as liberators but as burdens on the 
backs of the people.330 
 
The author and veteran did not analyse why it was that those young men could get only tedious 
employment. There is no statement in his book implying that the colonial (and military) 
administrations might have been partly to blame. If chaos and stagnation reigned the Japanese 
were the culprits. The author further ruled out any sympathy among the non-combatant Chinese 
towards the guerrillas, even though many continued to supply the latter from the wired and 
guarded new villages.331 Clutterbuck also omitted any notion of family ties even though he must 
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have known that the guerrillas left behind large kin. Leaving these aspects out reinforced the 
theory that the communists represented something alien, disconnected and corrupted.332 
     Victor Purcell, principal advisor on Chinese affairs to the BMA, hit a similar tone. In a letter to 
the editor of The Times333 he commented: 
 
There is no ‘Malayan people’ and no Malayan national sentiment, let alone a national 
movement. This is probably a misfortune for Malaya but it is a fact. […] The impression I 
received of the AJA [Anti-Japanese Army] on the re-entry of the British Army in 1945 was that 
the rank and file were all of the labouring type. […] To the observer at a distance the scale 
and intensity of the present operations suggest that the Communist direction were not wasting 
their forces against the Japanese but reserving them for use against their then allies; it also 
suggest the intervention of a more efficient, more determined element from outside. The 
terrorists certainly do not represent the 2,500,000 Malays and other Malaysians; they do not 
represent the 600,000 Indians; and they represent but a tiny minority of the Chinese. 
 
     Even someone like Richard Broome suspected that international communist efforts spurred 
anti-British agitation in Malaya rather than nationalism or British blunders. Broome knew the 
opposition well. He had recruited and trained the MPAJA during WWII before joining first the BMA 
and then the Foreign Office. He claimed that only a minority of those, who took up arms against 
Britain, had been in the jungle with him and his colleague John Davies. According to him, the 
majority happily returned to mines and plantations while a hardcore hid until the resumption of 
hostilities.334  
     Purcell and Broome were right in that not all who had taken to the jungle after the Japanese 
invasion did so again in 1948. It is equally correct that the MPAJA rarely if ever fought the Imperial 
Army. And the rebels barely gained the support of Malays and Indians. This was the case despite 
the three stars, reflecting Malaya’s three main population groups, which prominently featured on 
the insurgents’ caps. But whether only a minority of the Chinese themselves backed the rebels is 
debatable. What is less arguable is Broome’s sense of bitterness in the face of an alleged betrayal 
by former allies. This is somewhat astonishing given that the MPAJA’s leaders made no particular 
secret of their after-war plans, i.e. ultimately ending the British presence in Malaya.335 
Nevertheless, the views (or motivations) of witnesses like Broome, Purcell or Clutterbuck have 
rarely come under fire. Few of their colleagues have pondered in depth on the reasons why 
anyone would endure great hardship in the jungle and rise up against the colonial power.  
     Yet some have voiced slightly differing views. One of them was Lemon Hart, a staff officer with 
the SAS and later employed by the military intelligence branch. In regard to his enemies he 
commented: “I think very personally they were all Chinese before they were communists. […] I 
think some of them probably were communists because that was a way to further the Chinese 
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future in Malaya rather than because they believed in communism…” Hart gained his insight not 
least from being present during an interrogation of a surrendered communist guerrilla. Such 
insights aside he, too, abstained from expressing any respect for the opposition.336   
     One who did was Derek Blake. He initially served in the military police before joining the Royal 
West Kent Regiment in Malaya as a private. Quizzed on the opposition he remarked: 
 
I have nothing but the highest admiration for them. They were very, very good soldiers in [...] 
jungle warfare – they were very, very efficient. I can’t fault them at all. They were [...] very, 
very brave people [...] I suppose their ideology kept them going. They obviously believed very, 
very deeply in what they were doing. They were totally committed to the movement, the 
Communist Party, or whatever – almost to the point of being fanatical… 
 
     The explanation for such an unusual statement probably lies less in Blake’s fairly ordinary 
background than in his curious, open-minded but also analytical character. Unlike the average 
testimony, his features various comments on military infighting, alcoholism, prostitution and race 
relations in Malaya.337  
     Neal Ascherson, a National Service officer with the Royal Marines, expressed similar thoughts. 
He was greatly impressed seeing an insurgent return from the jungle’s safety to rescue a wounded 
colleague thereby getting killed. After discovering and reading enemy correspondence Ascherson 
came to deem his opposition deeply “romantic” but also slightly naive. He, too, is not 
representative. He had joined a relatively egalitarian branch of the forces and was highly critical 
of the situation in Malaya. More importantly, Ascherson is an Eton and Cambridge graduate, who 
went on to become a prolific and highly respected journalist and writer.338 
     Thanks to American scholar Lucian Pye, the British authorities had quite a clear picture of their 
opponents’ experiences and motivations. But they do not appear to have made that information 
available to ordinary soldiers. Pye’s insights would have offered food for thought but did so only 
to a limited extent. He found that his Chinese study subjects had not necessarily been hostile to 
the colonial administration before joining the communists. Often their leaders instilled in them 
resentment during training. Few had actually had much previous contact with Europeans. But 
they had been advised to be prudent when having to deal with a seemingly unpredictable but 
essentially distant government. Many had come to regard the colonial establishment as weak, 
which led them to underestimate the governmental response to the insurgency.339 
     The security forces and administration also managed to intercept the MCP’s correspondence, 
pamphlets and journals. What the translations demonstrate, apart from communist rhetoric, is an 
acute awareness of international events. Among issues analysed in the various writings featured 
the Korean and Indochinese wars, Japanese re-arming, the Indian Congress Party, tax increases 
in Malaya, Templer’s arrival, Lyttelton’s plans for Malaya, the composition of the security forces, 
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the Queen’s coronation and power struggles between Bevan and Attlee. The content of the texts 
betray not only an avid study of papers but also a considerable local network of informants.340  
      Personal recollections of insurgents themselves have remained unheard until recently. Agnes 
Khoo has suggested that this owed in part to the efforts of the Malaysian and Singaporean 
governments. She interviewed several of the retired female guerrillas living in the ‘peace’ and 
‘friendship villages’ of southern Thailand.341 Apart from offering fascinating insights some of the 
testimonies contradict British government propaganda and veterans’ impressions. To begin with, 
the remaining communists are not exclusively Chinese but also Malayan and even Thai. Social 
backgrounds can widely diverge, keeping in mind that some of the interviewees joined the 
resistance after 1960. Some, like Lin Guan Ying, came from destitute families, others, like Xiao 
Hua, grew up in affluent settings. All however became radicalised through a combination of stifling 
conservative values in the community, economic hardship, governmental repression and the 
Japanese occupation. They saw little difference between British and Japanese rule although the 
latter stood out through particular brutality. None of the interviewees was coerced into the MCP, 
which appeared to them as the only alternative to imperial rule. One gains the impression that 
joining the former seemed a logical and natural step. As Khoo has summarised: 
 
Most of these women joined the movement primarily as a form of rebellion against the 
feudalistic, patriarchal oppression they experienced as young women. They were born into 
and were living in a period of turmoil and transition, of major socio-economic and political 
change. They were exposed to new possibilities, which their own mothers could not have 
dreamt of, such as going to school and choosing their own partners for marriage. […] On the 
other hand, their emerging freedoms were also being curtailed, disrupted or even robbed, 
sometimes violently, by the wars in the Malayan peninsula and the adjacent island of 
Singapore. […] It seems that, for most, ideology was not the primary motivation for joining the 
movement. Commitment to the cause or the belief in Marxism or socialism only came later as 
they became gradually aware of how these ideologies offered the possibility of a different 
society from the one which they knew.342  
 
     This echoes similar statements made by their former leader, Chin Peng. The latter argued in 
his memoirs: 
 
I had to be a liberation fighter. If you had lived in a Malayan rural population centre like 
Sitiawan and observed how dismissive the British colonials were of our lot in the 1930s, you 
would find it easier to understand how the attraction of a Communist Party of Malaya could 
take hold. My involvement was not born of a series of personal slights, rather it was the result 
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of objective scrutiny and years of intellectual introspection. And if you had gone through the 
ghastly period of the corrupt British Military Administration immediately after the Japanese 
capitulation and seen the wholesale poverty that pervaded after years of Japanese atrocities, 
if you had watched how this administration worked in Malayan towns and villages, you would 
not be quick to say that I should have been cool-headed and taken an easier road. I could not 
compromise with the Japanese; neither could I have worked within a system that perpetrated 
the continuance of British colonialism. […] To those who displayed anti-colonial sentiments, 
they dangled the horror of banishment to China which, pre-1949, meant death for the majority 
and prison for the rest. More thugs were brought in to silence the grievances of workers. … 
To contain the Emergency the British burned villages, cut rations and shot civilians. […] I 
make no apologies for seeking to replace such an odious system with a form of Marxist 
socialism. Colonial exploitation, irrespective of who were the masters, Japanese or British, 
was morally wrong. 
 
     Chin Peng’s condemnation would undoubtedly sound more credible if he had not downplayed 
the extent and frequency of his troops’ atrocities against civilians as troubling but isolated 
incidents or justified punishments.343 The reality was that attacks on installations and individuals 
became so widespread that it prompted the famous October resolutions. On the other hand, one 
has to wonder whether the official British response stood on higher moral ground. Huw Bennett 
has argued that the army initially and calculatingly used mass detention, deportation, forced 
relocations and the destruction of property to coerce the Chinese population into cooperation 
while turning a blind eye to indiscriminate shootings.344 However, such explicitly aggressive 
methods are not echoed in soldierly testimonies of the time, partly, perhaps, because such 
patterns would not necessarily have been evident for those on the spot. Few servicemen would 
have participated in all of above measures whose ultimate goal – ‘screwing down the people’, as 
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Chapter 4: “I did not join the resistance in order to give my life for colonialism” – 
French opinions on rebellion and rebels in Indochina 
 
Upon his arrival in Indochina, General Navarre summarised the war, the enemy and French goals 
as follows:  
 
Until the arrival of communism on the borders of Indochina, we envisioned the end of the war 
merely through the submission of the rebels. Little by little we had to revise that conception. 
The Viet Minh, now helped by China, became a more formidable adversary every day with 
whom we felt more and more we had to seek a compromise. On the other hand, the 
independence we progressively accorded to the associated states gave them a say in the 
matter: but their ideas of a peace would undoubtedly be different from ours. Finally, since 
America had given us her support, she had acquired the right to be consulted. The re-
establishment of peace had therefore become a complex problem with multiple factors. It had 
never been thoroughly studied […] France neither knew why she was waging war nor did she 
have an idea in what manner she wanted to terminate it.346 
 
     Anthony Clayton has corroborated French views on the changing circumstances during the 
Indochina War. According to him, the conflict could be divided into two distinct phases from a 
French point of view: a colonial one from 1945 to 1949 and an international one between 1950 
and 1954. In this scheme French troops initially sought to re-establish French suzerainty. 
Acknowledging growing nationalism, politicians accorded the status of associated states within 
the French Union347 to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Once China and the US got involved in the 
war between 1949 and 1950, the CEFEO’s role altered in that it now had to stem the advance of 
communist forces in Southeast Asia.348 
     It is at least conceivable that French (ex-)servicemen (have) based their recollections on this 
time structure. Yet testimonies reveal that the human reality looked at times more subtle and 
complex. In this chapter it is thus argued that (ex-)soldiers’ perceptions of the conflict, French 
objectives, their own motivations and views of the enemy have considerably varied and changed 
depending on personal circumstances. While the pondering has tended to centre on military 
prospects and outcomes, political, economic, social and even cultural aspects have frequently 
played into it. At the same time, the French Empire (or Union) and its demise have often played 
lesser roles than the Cold War, individual experiences or professional attitudes. Imperial soldiers 
in the mould of General Salan had become rarer. The latter mused in his memoirs: “It is with the 
                                                          
346  Navarre, Agonie de l´Indochine, 285.  
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loss of Indochina that the fundamentals of the French Empire were undermined. To lose an empire 
means losing oneself. It means to take away all sense from a man’s life...”349  
     Some cadres, blinded by notions of French grandeur, felt to the bitter end that France should 
have attempted to hold on to Indochina. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these tended to be senior 
commanders, at the time safely tucked away in headquarters. More realistic officers put their faith 
into US hands, doubting France’s ability and willingness to fight the war. Others greatly resented 
the fact that a former global power should enter into a coalition of American vassal states. Some 
advocated negotiations and gradual withdrawal as early as 1946, regarding as unfeasible the 
maintenance of old imperial structures in the face of growing nationalism. They fought with the 
goal in mind to acquire strong cards for future negotiations, whose ultimate goal it was to maintain 
Indochina within the French Union. Interestingly, the most able and successful commanders, the 
Generals Leclerc and de Lattre, fell into this category.350  
    Certain junior officers, frequently commanding elite airborne and legionnaire units, understood 
the conflict in purely professional terms. Such men, embodied by the likes of Marcel Bigeard, 
fought not least for their own reputation and for that of their units. To them warfare represented 
the most honourable and exciting way of life, regardless of the possible outcome.351 Like many 
British soldiers, they accepted their orders without much questioning. As the veterans’ current 
spokesperson, General Simon, wrote in a letter: “... the French soldier goes where his superior 
sends him in the name of France.”352      
     Further, there were servicemen who created strong bonds with local people, particularly ethnic 
and religious minorities. By commanding, for example, a Thai company, an officer often sought 
to protect the traditional regional base of this ethnicity more than anything else. Often they did not 
specifically oppose communism as such but any form of totalitarianism. Among them figured the 
young officer Hélie de Saint-Marc, who exclaimed in his memoirs: 
 
Spare me the ritual litanies regarding the traffic of the piastres [...] and the domination of the 
little whites. I had not joined the resistance in order to give my life for colonialism four years 
later. I had not gone through the rolling mill of deportation to protect the interest of the Bank 
of Indochina. Many very precious things existed in Vietnam [...] – the liberty to think, believe 
and live, the exchange (with) and the heritage of the West – that justified going through the 
horror to preserve them. In Vietnam we fought against totalitarianism. The war alongside 
Vietnamese nationalists seemed to us preferable to a peace with communists.353 
     Such loyalty could extend to the associated states in general. During an official dinner given 
by the Vietnamese government on March 1, 1951, General de Lattre emphasised that the French 
were fighting to preserve the newly gained independence of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.354 
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       Then there were protagonists like Ginette Dupont-Subirada, who worked as secretary at the 
Direction générale des études et recherches (DGER) and later at the headquarters in Laos. She 
had not got involved with the resistance during WWII for fear of reprisals against her family. 
Feeling guilty, she made up for it with enlisting in 1945 and ended up in Indochina.355  
     A few servicemen joined the CEFEO to revive their military careers after ‘failing’ to re-join the 
Allies or ending up in the wrong camp during WWII. Finally, a number of French soldiers served 
in Indochina with no particular aim in mind and without endorsing any political opinion but 
intending to get away from their surroundings. Veteran Jean Robert, for instance, admitted that 
he had been trying to escape difficult circumstances in France when he had signed up with the 
army.356  
     In some cases all of the above or a mixture of opinions held true and still does for the survivors. 
Realities on the ground, political developments but also unfamiliarity with Indochina changed 
initial motivations and perceptions. Location also played its part. The nature of the war in the 
southern swamps differed considerably from that along the Annamese coast or in the northern 
highlands. 
 Soldiers’ diverging assessments of the Indochinese situation has been echoed in one of 
Michel Bodin’s book. In it the author asked: “... Indochina saw a multitude of combatants with 
widely diverse occupations and origins. [...] Is it possible to speak of a soldier of Indochina to the 
extent that one reveals a similarity in reactions and ways of thinking?”357 
     Still, certain patterns are discernible. Feelings of impotence and disillusion regularly grew the 
more soldiers realised the true extent of the rebellion in Indochina, and France’s lack of 
preparation for the challenges. What soldiers initially perceived as routine tasks, i.e. the re-
establishment of colonial control in the face of sporadic local unrest and the Japanese presence, 
turned into a full-scale war in front of their eyes. The realisation set in over months and years that 
they no longer faced a few unruly colonial subjects but a regular army relying on popular support 
and aided by the communist block. At the same time their status and that of their allies changed. 
As Girard has implied: 
 
...the war waged by France continued until 1954, when for four years the principle of 
independence of its old possessions of Southeast Asia had been plainly acknowledged by 
her. [...] For the French troops it was no longer a matter of fighting to save the heritage of 
Francis Garnier or Jules Ferry. It was a matter of fighting to halt the communist penetration to 
preserve the values of the ‘Free World’.358 
 
The aim of this chapter is not only to illustrate the variety and transformation of thinking but also to 
explain the reasons behind them. It broadly consists of two parts. In the first I will outline the aspects 
that shaped soldierly outlooks. In the second I will analyse these often changing perceptions based 
on the war’s stages. 
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The slow coming to terms with the end of empire 
 
There are good reasons why decolonisation did not necessarily play a major role in soldierly takes 
on the Indochina War. It would have required a general interest in empire and an awareness of 
its gradual disintegration after the 1940s. Neither abounded among the population and even 
servicemen despite the effects of WWII. Few would have predicted what Martin Thomas has 
summed up: “The divided French empire of the Second World War never entirely recovered from 
the rifts that had opened up between rulers and ruled.”359 
     The relative ignorance is somewhat startling. After all, colonial troops contributed considerably 
to the French war effort between 1914 and 1918 – a contribution that did not go unnoticed in 
France. On the other hand, 44% of the French thought it better on the eve of WWII to rid 
themselves of overseas territories than having to defend them in case of a renewed global 
conflict.360 In view of such nonchalance it is ironic that colonial troops once more came to France’s 
rescue after the collapse of the metropolitan army in 1940. But the largely African composition of 
Generals Juin’s and de Lattre’s armies does not seem to have dramatically strengthened the 
imperial bonds from the point of view of ordinary French. Nor did it trigger great gratitude. Most 
French reserved such feelings for the allied forces (including Leclerc’s Demi-brigade) landing in 
Normandy and storming through Europe.361 
     Such attitudes might well have stemmed from official notions that control over other peoples 
had always meant to be temporary. Unfortunately, the criteria and timeframe for the phasing out 
had never been defined. That was unlikely to happen during WWII when both Pétain and de 
Gaulle stressed the importance and loyalty of the empire. Both knew that without it France would 
only represent a middle power.   
 Moreover, the patterns of decolonisation would have been difficult to discern. France 
withdrew from the Levant during the war under British pressure. The Sétif uprising in Algeria on 
D-Day was regarded even by French communists as a fascist-inspired plot.362 The insurgency in 
Madagascar appeared like a throwback into the dark ages or at least as an inter-ethnic issue. 
From a French point of view the Suez campaign was intrinsically linked with the Algerian War and 
fought in conjunction with Britain and Israel. As for Southeast Asia, General Simon, explained in 
another letter that: “The concept of decolonisation came after the Indochina War, which occurred 
in the context of the Cold War.”363 Others would have contested this notion given that Algeria was 
officially part of France. When that conflict was all over (or most of it) the trauma initially seems 
to have evaporated relatively quickly in France. In 1987 only 7% of the population saw the conflict 
as a major occurrence in French 20th century history.364  
 The Indochina War stirred public sentiments to an even lesser degree despite active lobbying 
pro and contra on the (far) left and right. This has been the conclusion of Alain Ruscio after 
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studying public surveys from the review Sondages, the official bulletin of the Institut français 
d’opinion publique (IFOP) during the 1940s and 1950s. The indifference to their fate angered 
servicemen in Indochina and contributed to their slow estrangement from metropolitan society. 
As General Raoul Salan wrote in his memoirs: “France was far away and little interested... She 
found this Indochinese affair – that’s what it was called – expensive and never ending.”365 
Referring to the government former sergeant-chef, Pierre Huteau, went even further exclaiming 
in a letter to his wife during the war: “They don’t care about us!”366  
 According to Ruscio’s findings, Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh were an unknown quantity in 
mainland France on the eve of the war. Even when major battles ensued one quarter of those 
quizzed struggled to comment on the situation. Other issues, such as the price of meat, mattered 
more. Two years later the fate of the French Union was still barely mentioned in the review. Ruscio 
has also maintained that his compatriots had traditionally showed little enthusiasm for events 
outside their home country. Indeed, in 1949 almost twenty percent of those consulted could not 
name a single overseas territory.367 Likewise, few believed that WWII had had an influence on 
the colonies. Equally few thought that Indochina could be lost. Even mounting casualty rates could 
not really move people. After all, the majority of the dead were not French, anyway.368 
 In view of such unconcern returning soldiers or those on leave felt like strangers and struggled 
to mingle with their compatriots. As Bigeard mused in his memoirs: “October 1947-February 1948: 
Four months of leave at home, in Toul, with Gaby and Marie-France [his wife and daughter]. [...] 
I’m far away from what is happening in Indochina. The newspapers barely mention it. It’s a 
forgotten war. This makes me sad when I think of the heroism of many of my comrades, of my 
killed lieutenants.”369 The growing estrangement undoubtedly contributed to Bigeard volunteering 
for a second tour of duty in the Far East, as it did in many other cases.  
 Among the few interested in the Indochina War, Ruscio has noted a seismic shift over the 
years. 37% considered it necessary and desirable to re-establish order and send reinforcements 
to Indochina in 1947. By 1954 (prior to Dien Bien Phu) that figure had slipped to 8%. Like the 
military, politicians and journalists had clearly underestimated the extent of the conflict. In 1948 
the minister for war, Paul Coste-Floret, declared the problems in Indochina as more or less 
solved. In August 1950 the French assured British observers that they were confident of regaining 
control of the entire territory, provided the aid demanded was forthcoming.370  
     The greatest shift in opinions occurred between 1953 and 1954, with violent manifestations 
on society’s fringes. At that point it became obvious that Dien Bien Phu would not hold out and 
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that the Plan Navarre371 had not achieved its goals. When the end came, 58% of those consulted 
regarded the results in Geneva as satisfactory “given the circumstances”.372  
 The explanation for such apathy partly lay in France’s political (and societal) structures. Paul 
Sorum has argued that a small elitist circle, composed of parliamentarians, ministers, writers, 
journalists, publishers and academics, dictated French politics in the Fourth Republic. Few far-
sighted solutions emanated from this group due to governments’ preoccupation with survival. 
Intellectuals, too, failed to come up with visionary imperial policies. That proved particularly 
problematic for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had turned into a fiefdom of the Mouvement 
Républican Populaire (MRP).373 Its staff had a habit of reading the same newspapers and, as a 
consequence, adopting the same imperial outlook. The majority opted for a continuing French 
presence overseas. They did so without spelling out feasible approaches so as not to endanger 
the government. In other political systems the population (including soldiers) might have 
interfered. Yet only five percent of French were registered party members. These contented 
themselves with selecting political candidates based on their ideological orientation. In the voters’ 
view the task of questioning and engaging politicians fell to the highly respected writers of 
L’Express, France-Observateur, Le Monde or Le Figaro. All of these publications had a relatively 
limited readership but, crucially, included the vast majority of the political elite. 
 Interested intellectuals had either an imperialist (and rightist) or an anti-colonial (and leftist) 
outlook. Importantly, neither group favoured complete decolonisation, struggling to distance 
themselves from the traditional concept of mission civilisatrice. (The only exceptions were the 
eventually discredited communists and rightist liberals.374) The dramatist and former Vichyist, 
Thierry Maulnier, and the anthropologist and later governor-general of Algeria, Jacques 
Soustelle, led the first camp. The more numerous second included Albert Camus, Jean-Jacques 
Servan-Schreiber375 and Jean-Paul Sartre. While the imperialists propagated paternalist and 
nationalist ideas, the anti-colonialists condemned exploitation and pressed for increased 
development. Yet even they were worried about the economic wellbeing of colonies and the civil 
liberties of its inhabitants in case of a French exit. Thus, to quote Sorum: “... to ask the intellectuals 
to support independence was to ask them to change their most fundamental values and beliefs.” 
Given the inability to envisage a more sovereign future for territories like Indochina and Algeria it 
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The impact of WWII 
 
The military failure to recognise the irreversible impact of WWII was partly due to the fairly 
heterogeneous experiences during the conflict. These inevitably shaped views of the Indochina 
War and the enemy fought there. Hélie de Saint-Marc, for example, joined the French resistance 
after the 1940 armistice, was caught by the Gestapo and sent to Buchenwald. Freed barely alive 
in 1945 he joined the Foreign Legion. He then served three tours in Indochina where he led forces 
composed of ethnic minorities, as well as elite parachute units of the Foreign Legion. The 
illustrious personality described in his memoirs the trauma, humiliation and confusion resulting 
from his imprisonment at Buchenwald. Likewise, he recounted how the Foreign Legion’s 
anonymity and strict discipline offered him an odd sense of comfort. More than imperial 
preservation in Indochina he wished to get away from war-torn Europe and to re-acquire a sense 
of self-esteem and aim in life. The views of his superiors, metropolitan politics and the war were 
to change drastically when he was instructed to pull out of the sector he was commanding. 
Leaving behind the people who had put their faith in him contributed to his decision to back the 
military putsch in Algeria.377 
 General Guy Mery for his part was demobbed after the 1940 armistice. He joined the Armée 
secrète in 1943, was arrested by the Feldgendarmerie and deported first to Strudthof and later to 
Dachau. Upon liberation and re-entry into the army he realised that the latter did not recognise 
the status of deportees, who had fought in the resistance. His career threatened to stall. To re-
start it he volunteered for Indochina. To Mery empire seems to have mattered very little. It was 
only when he joined the French delegation to the international control commission at the end of 
the war that he was compelled to reflect on the enemy, defeat and France’s standing in the 
world.378 
 This contrasts with the lives of men like the later General François Gérin-Roze who entered 
the army after WWII. He had experienced the latter through the eyes of a relatively uninvolved 
teenager and arrived in Indochina without much psychological baggage.379 The same applied to 
some degree to seasoned soldiers like the later General Bernard Saint-Hillier. An early member 
of the Free French he knew hardships and setbacks but ultimately found himself on the winning 
side. Even in Indochina he was spared the worst. He arrived in Saigon during July 1954. For 
Saint-Hillier French decolonisation did not become a personal reality until the Suez campaign and 
the Algerian War.380  
 To put these stories in a wider context we need to look at events during WWII and immediately 
after. As Alistair Horne has declared, it was during the global clash that the “dilemma of conflicting 
loyalties and legitimacy opened up” and where the army began to “withdraw within itself”. WWII 
also forced French soldiers to make personal decisions and take initiatives.381 What counted was 
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not so much discipline but critical analysis, personality and individualism. Applied to a people 
generally prone to division and turmoil, the result could only turn out to be considerable 
distinctiveness in perceptions of the Indochina War. WWII also served a major blow to French 
prestige triggering a fierce wish for rehabilitation. For many within the CEFEO then, WWII stood 
for defeat, occupation, resistance, betrayal, imprisonment, humiliation, mistrust, hatred and 
disillusionment. But for a minority it reflected pride, perseverance, heroism and final success.   
     The unfolding drama was not fully apparent in 1940. Technically, the armistice represented 
just that and not full-fledged defeat – as the Generals Weygand and Huntzinger stressed. The 
two men responsible for the negotiations and subsequent adjustments, also reminded everyone 
that France’s air force and the empire had remained largely unaffected. Unoccupied Vichy France 
was allowed to keep a metropolitan army of fewer than 100,000 servicemen, plus a 120,000-men 
strong force in Northern Africa. Significantly for the future, those most affected by the armistice 
were metropolitan officers and NCOs of whom only 4 or 16% respectively remained in the armed 
forces. But there were also large numbers of conscripts who had always been deemed inferior by 
imperial regulars. Most of them remained in German POW camps but some joined the Free 
French and the resistance.382 Previously imprisoned soldiers – if they later served in the CEFEO 
– thus carried with them an aura of resignation and humiliation, which would only intensify in 
Indochina. 
 Conversely, the myth surrounding de Gaulle has sometimes concealed the true extent of his 
rebellion against collaboration and that of those who joined him. As he acknowledged himself in 
his memoirs, the Free French of the early days barely counted 7,000 men, supported by little 
artillery, plus a handful of ships and submarines.383 The vast majority of French servicemen 
followed Marshal Pétain’s orders to return to their barracks. In the latter’s and Weygand’s eyes, 
de Gaulle should have been executed for his act of treason. However, it was the rebel and not 
the loyalists who carried the day in the end. This made for a controversial example. Disobedience 
did indeed become endemic in the French Army after 1940.384 It helps to elucidate why 
servicemen developed their own agendas in Indochina. 
 De Gaulle and his followers were well aware that the armies of North Africa, the Levant and 
Indochina (after General Catroux’s forced departure), plus the air force and fleet (surviving the 
British attack on Mers-el-Kébir), had stayed in the Vichy realm. The small band of Free French 
could only continue their struggle with British and later US support. Even so, Africa turned into a 
battleground between French, most notably in the Franco-British invasion of the Levant.385 Defeat 
by Vichy on that occasion left many loyal officers, NCOs and ordinary soldiers deeply resentful while 
inspiring the Free French. 
 Anthony Clayton has maintained that the French Army did not just split along unquestioned 
loyalty versus honour during this period. The physical location of its entities also proved crucial, 
as did traditions. On the one hand, the factions rallying to de Gaulle in 1940 included units 
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engaged in the almost successful Norway campaign. A large portion of the Free French also 
belonged to the Coloniale stationed in far-away French Equatorial Africa. This military arm 
provided twenty-five out of one hundred serving generals at the end of WWII.386 
 More crucial in the context of this chapter are events in Indochina during WWII, of which 
many in the CEFEO were unaware. After the 1940 armistice and the Japanese advance in East 
Asia France’s highest representative in Indochina, Admiral Decoux (replacing the Gaullist 
Catroux), faced increasing pressure from Nippon. Calculated Japanese attacks on French bases 
along the Tonkin-China border alternated with demands to grant transit rights and base facilities. 
Decoux signed a treaty in September 1940 to satisfy these demands. But more followed, coupled 
with the seizure of raw material. The Japanese impositions went hand in hand with local uprisings 
organised by Vietnamese nationalists and communists, all of which the French crushed with 
determination. Yet France’s position further weakened when Thai forces attacked French 
positions west of the Mekong River in the winter of 1940. Despite successful counter-attacks 
France had to cede valuable land in Laos and Cambodia, following a Japanese intervention. 
Things worsened with a special payment deal in December 1942 and a British maritime blockade. 
All the while, Japanese representatives openly and clandestinely fostered nationalist aspirations 
to offset the barely tolerated Vichy presence. France's frailty did not escape the local population 
and intelligentsia, including the communist-dominated Viet Minh. Its cadres managed to survive 
French and Japanese suppression thanks to a complex, clandestine network, which would serve 
it well after the war. 
 Finally, after refusing to accept a Japanese command of French forces, Decoux and his staff 
were arrested on March 9, 1945. Throughout Indochina Nippon’s troops attacked French 
garrisons, some of which fought courageously but ultimately in vain. Only in the Tonkin 6,000 
men under the Generals Sabattier and Alessandri managed to escape via Dien Bien Phu and 
Yunnan.387 Undoubtedly, the Japanese coup had a profound impact on these retreating troops 
and other survivors of the Armée d'Indochine, most of whom languished in prisons until the end 
of the war. For them the restoration and maintenance of French control in Indochina would take 
precedence over any other aspect. It is only logical for instance that General Alessandri would 
oppose a French withdrawal from exposed outposts along the Chinese border during the 
Indochina War. The French collapse also profoundly changed Vietnamese attitudes. As former 
Viet Minh prison commander, Phmong Van Nguyen, later remarked: "The French colonial regime 
in Vietnam betrayed us. [...] because they said that they had come to civilise us. They should 
have protected us. One called that a 'protectorate'. [...] But they [...] raised their hands in front of 
the Japanese fascists. All this disappointed us. And we realised that we had to do something 
ourselves."388  
 The French downfall prompted the Vietnamese, Laotians and Cambodians to declare 
independence, although the Japanese never transferred all powers. Bao Dai remained 
Vietnamese emperor while the nationalist Tran Trong Kim became head of a Vietnamese 
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government. In Laos, King Sisavang Vong assumed control of the country while Prince Sihanouk 
did so in Cambodia. Unluckily, famine and inflation accompanied independence, for which the 
population blamed the new administrations. It is obvious in retrospect that France's nationalist 
‘allies’, particularly Bao Dai, would never enjoy the respect and admiration the largely unscathed 
Viet Minh could build on. Vice versa, it is fitting that the French would have to rely on groups, 
such as the Cao Dai sect, that had openly collaborated with the Japanese.389 
 Despite the material difficulties, the Indochinese population experienced life unbothered by 
the French administration and expatriate community. The Japanese encouraged the re-discovery 
of pre-colonial traditions and handed over symbolically important government buildings. The 
ensuing nationalist mood prompted Bao Dai to send a telegram to France warning that the people 
would not tolerate a re-occupation. The French press ignored it. 
 Meanwhile, the Viet Minh remained somewhat in the background waiting for their chance. At 
the time it represented a relatively loose movement, dominated by communists but with only 
limited influence in the villages, particularly in Cochinchina. It was more solidly implanted in the 
Tonkin and to some degree in Annam. Their varying strength at that stage goes a long way to 
explain the final outcome of the Indochina War. 
 The situation took another dramatic turn between 14 and 25 August, following the Japanese 
surrender. Viet Minh forces now swept into the towns and cities taking over the administration. 
There, they harassed and often killed outright collaborators, competing nationalists, notables and 
French settlers. On 2 September the Viet Minh leader, Ho Chi Minh, declared independence in 
front of a frenetic crowd and in the presence of American and French authorities. David Marr has 
summarised the symbolic events as follows: 
 
There was a psychological aspect to the August insurrection(s) in which millions shared. It 
included a desire for moral purification, the readiness of young people to take initiative (and 
of older people to follow), a willingness to behave unorthodoxly, to speak directly, to ignore 
taboos, to refuse to worry about one's personal future or safety. [...] there was a longing to 
identify with something certain, to find new order in one's soul and throughout the universe. In 
this context, Viet Minh slogans, songs, and flags both prompted individuals to take 
unprecedented action and provided a new sense of belonging, which ICP [Indochinese 
Communist Party] leaders were quick to build upon in subsequent months. Youthful heroics 
and the wish for order came together in the rush to join self-defence (tu ve) units, where 
demonstrated initiative and discipline counted for more than social origin, schooling or 
wealth...390 
 
 After decades of colonialism, which had caused a widespread feeling of bereavement and 
desolation,391 the tables had finally turned. The formerly powerful colonial regime, which had 
appeared to stay forever, had suddenly vanished. Vice versa, French eye witnesses have kept 
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dark memories of these days. Yvonne Fontanne, who was a child at the time, deemed the 
Japanese coup "the beginning of hell".392 
 Meanwhile, the Free French struggled to obtain local information while lobbying London and 
Washington for intervention. Due to Decoux's crackdown on Gaullists during WWII, vital 
intelligence was sorely lacking. Martin Thomas has thus concluded that Gaullist policies in regard 
to Indochina remained unrealistic, improvised and confused. He has quoted the example of the 
declaration by the commissioner for colonies in the provisory metropolitan government, Paul 
Giaccobi, on March 14, 1945. In it the latter promised a seemingly new form of imperial French 
citizenship to the Indochinese. This was to be coupled with political and electoral rights in the 
future Council of State. Giaccobi also pledged unparalleled employment opportunities. 
Understandably, the bulk of Vietnamese nationalists rebuffed these overtures. 
 French veterans of the Indochina War have in some cases accused the US of failing to 
support France’s efforts to re-gain a foothold in Southeast Asia. Previously quoted Ginette 
Dupont-Subirada stated for example: “We suffered an anti-colonial propaganda stirred by the 
Americans who preferred the independent-minded terrorism.”393 In many French eyes, General 
Stillwell and his successor, General Wedemeyer, personified such anti-colonialism. The two led 
the Allied war effort in mainland East Asia. Neither they nor their superior, President Roosevelt, 
were prepared to allow the Free French any part in this theatre of war, backing instead Chiang 
Kai Shek’s regional aspirations.394 Churchill was less disinclined, sensing similar US opposition 
to British plans for Malaya and Singapore. From 1943 onwards SOE staff (some of which 
belonged to Force 136) began to cooperate with a newly created French Service d’action. The 
British also tolerated and supported the preparation of a Corps léger d’Intervention395 in India. 
Meanwhile, the provisional government in Paris dispatched Jean Sainteny to organise the 
remains of the French troops. Significantly, he was not given a mandate to negotiate with Ho Chi 
Minh, which he duly ignored.396  
 Like later administrators and generals, Sainteney could have based his talks on the 
Brazzaville Conference of January 1944 although Indochina was largely excluded from its 
deliberations. Intended as a review of governmental practices and principles in the empire, it 
should have produced a modern framework for interaction between Paris and the overseas 
territories. However, the mostly conservative participants prevented efforts to spell out equality 
between rulers and ruled, or to draw roadmaps for colonial self-government. The organisers did 
partly succeed in convincing fellow colonial powers and a highly critical America of France’s 
continuous commitment to its possessions. In reality, the only progressive tangibles were the 
abolition of forced labour and a future constituent assembly in Paris with seats for colonial 
representatives.397  
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It has been argued at the beginning of this chapter that perceptions of insurgents and the 
insurgency did not necessarily follow the by now traditional periodisation of the war, that is a 
colonial and an international era. It has further been held that opinions could change over time, 
depending on events on the ground and personal situations. Nevertheless, it can be helpful to 
analyse recollections based on those two habitual, historical periods in order to examine to what 
extent views have followed or differed from them. For simplification the demarcation line shall be 
drawn at the end of 1949. It marked the birth of the Peoples’ Republic of China and the beginning 
of the latter’s systematic support for the Viet Minh. 
  
 
Reasserting French control and the nationalist experiment, 1945-1949 
 
Jean-Michel Gaillard has referred to 1946 as the year of the “missed occasions”. Indeed, French 
troops re-conquered parts of Indochina with relative ease. In so doing they gave politicians and 
administrators considerable leverage in negotiations with the Viet Minh and other nationalist 
groups – which was ultimately squandered.398 In this context it should be borne in mind that 
between October 1945 and December 1946 the majority of clashes occurred in the south. In the 
north the Viet Minh’s solid implantation demanded a more cautious French approach. 
 In view of rapid advances in the south and ongoing negotiations in the north, one might expect 
soldiers to have been relatively optimistic about the military prospects and unsympathetic to 
negotiations. Indeed, in one of many reports on military morale General Morlière (or his right-hand 
respectively) declared in December 1946:  
 
It is undeniable that events at the end of November and then at the end of December have 
again given the troops the confidence, the prestige and the awareness of their important role. 
Many estimate that the future of the whole of the colonial empire is in their hands. [...] Any 
new policy vis-à-vis the Annamese [i.e., a strong-handed approach] will undoubtedly be very 
well received. In contrast, the return to the previous policy of accords would be considered an 
insult to our deaths whose sacrifice would prove useless if the government desired to continue 
the previous talks with the “criminals” [...] and accepted taking away from our troops their 
positions from November.399 
 
 The problem with this assessment, as with many other official sources, is that it was written 
(or at least signed) by a general. It is doubtful that soldiers throughout the expeditionary force 
wholeheartedly shared this view. In reality, first encounters often changed previously held 
convictions. Even General Leclerc eventually advocated negotiations with Ho Chi Minh.400 On the 
other hand, he made Admiral d’Argenlieu aware of the fact that the task at hand was primarily a 
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military one and that he as commander should therefore be given wide-ranging powers. 
D’Argenlieu refused to budge, quoting de Gaulle’s instructions.401 
 General Valluy, Leclerc’s successor, opposed concessions, convinced that complete victory 
was only a question of time. Not all his subordinates shared this opinion. General Jean Crepin, 
who at the time acted as Valluy’s adjutant, suggested that the French should offer Ho Chi Minh 
the government palace in Hanoi as a politically spectacular gesture. His superior refused to sign 
and pass on to d’Argenlieu a letter containing such a suggestion. Crepin sent it himself but the 
high-commissioner rejected the idea outright.402 
 Like d’Argenlieu, many stubbornly held on to the notion that French troops merely had to mop 
up local resistance so as to allow administrators to commence their traditional administrative 
work. Numerous generals and colonels ordered large-scale sweeps, oblivious to the fact that their 
enemies simply hid or retreated before returning.403 The deceptive little victories, achieved 
without much resistance, confirmed the view that France should not negotiate. Yet among those 
on the ground doubts began to creep in. Bigeard claimed to have realised the futility of such 
manoeuvres very quickly.404 Similar scepticism spread among the lowest levels, hinting at a 
generational and hierarchical gulf. Robert Dibon’s405 scepticism went beyond military operations. 
Pointless manoeuvres, brutality, enemy propaganda and pessimistic expatriates prompted him 
to question the wisdom of the French mission altogether.406 Even so, Dibon did not necessarily 
cast doubts on the goal of re-establishing a French presence in some way or another. But he 
suspected, at least in his memoirs, that this endeavour would turn out to be a very sensitive, 
complex and arduous affair.  
 Again, the explanation for these diverging opinions lies to some extent in military experiences 
prior to Indochina. It is only logical that Bigeard quickly saw through the cat and mouse game in 
Indochina. After all, he had played it with the Germans during his time in the resistance. On the 
other hand, officers switching to de Gaulle in 1943 and participating in the Italian and French 
campaigns can be excused for believing that their classic manoeuvres would inevitably yield 
results against lowly, colonial opposition. On balance, they had worked against the most 
fearsome enemy of all, the Germans. 
 If soldiers had mixed feelings about strategies, attitudes towards the Viet Minh were 
ambiguous, too, during the first half of the war. This partly owed to the fact that not all insurgents 
were communists. In the first months French troops also fought religious sects (in the south), 
other nationalist groups and ordinary pirates and criminals. Regardless of who was involved, 
either side took few prisoners, and if so only for interrogation. The relatively vicious French 
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treatment of insurgents implies contempt for an enemy, who did not yet possess the discipline, 
agility, braveness and perseverance that was to impress later on. But this deficiency is not the 
only reason for the condescension. During raids servicemen discovered on occasion bound, 
frightened, tortured and/or massacred men, women and even children, most of them abducted 
by communist groups. Among the victims figured notables, landowners, administrators and 
journalists regarded as exploiters and collaborators by the Viet Minh. Due to such scenes the 
rebels earned a reputation as weak and cowardly thugs. It was a small step from such perceptions 
to the notorious interrogations musclées,407 followed by swift executions. In turn, French soldiers 
could expect to endure the same and worse treatment if caught alive.408 
 One unit engaged in these early battles was the Commando Ponchardier, led by the captain 
of the same name. They carried out a series of raids against Viet Minh positions in southern 
Vietnam during the early stages of the war. If one can believe the writer Jean-Pierre Bernier,409 
the French group hardly suffered any casualties while killing scores of (perceived) Viet Minh.410 
Needless to say, the opposition did not impress the ‘tigers’. Bernier has described a successful 
surprise raid on a Viet Minh hideout and its aftermath as follows: 
 
The surprise is total [...] No organised defence is possible. [...] Some Viets try to resist. 
Grenade... burst of gunfire. Every time the affair is finished within three seconds. The other 
Viets prefer to surrender. A small group tries to flee into the rice fields. They run into Barla 
and his companions who pull the net. [...] Surprise! The runaways tried to take with them a 
French couple kept as hostages for weeks. Barla discovers that one of the Viets [...] tries to 
hide [...] the jewels of the female prisoner [...]. The couple, thinned from deprivation, are very 
emotional. [...] Half a dozen other prisoners are discovered in an infected hideout. Annamese, 
men, women mixed. In chains, eaten by vermin, they are reduced to the state of skeletons. 
[...] Every day their gaolers have beaten them for the crime of simply staying loyal to France. 
All knew they were condemned to a slow death. [...] Without hesitation they point at those who 
have tortured them day in, day out. The verdict of Ponch is taken. No appeal. ‘These here will 
not be taken with us.’411 
 
     Such descriptions of early raids and opposition are representative in so much as they have 
been echoed in Bodin’s studies.412 Yet not everyone gained the same derogatory impression of 
the enemy. General Massu (then a lieutenant-colonel) found the insurgents, he encountered in 
southern Vietnam during the first months, tenacious and courageous. He was even more 
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impressed when he landed in the north. When Massu attended a combined parade he 
apprehensively observed well-instructed Viet Minh units marching past him, cheered on by 
frenetic crowds.413 The leadership, too, swayed Massu as it did the eventual historian and 
journalist Jean Lacouture. The latter met Ho Chin Minh, Giap, Phan Van Dong and others in his 
role as chief-brigadier of the CEFEO’s press service in February 1946. In a later interview he 
admitted: 
 
I have never hidden the very favourable impression that they made on me. The ‘charm’ under 
whose spell I was, [also touched] before and after me, men as unreceptive to communism as 
Jean Sainteny and General Leclerc, men less young and naïve as me, much more 
responsible. It is easy today to accuse some and others to have been bewitched by these 
men and their theories on the eve of this revolution. Of course, we knew that they weren’t 
lambs, that they had blood on their hands: but they used a language if not of peace then at 
least of reason. And their worry seemed apparent to go towards independence in steps, 
limiting as much as possible a military confrontation that, besides, could only turn in their 
favour before long.414 
 
 While sensing that France would not win any protracted clash, Lacouture appears to have 
judged the situation as solvable, provided the French and Vietnamese could sort out their 
differences. Others were under no illusion and prepared for full-scale confrontation. Later General 
Hugo Geoffrey attributed his survival during the eventual clashes to his ignoring of official 
directives, which stipulated that soldiers should avoid visible preparations for war. Instead, 
Geoffrey ordered his position to be fortified, put his men on constant alert and installed heavy 
equipment. When the assault came, his unit was prepared.415  
 While Geoffrey did not trust the quietness and talks, others were simply bewildered and 
disappointed in view of the various rounds of talks, proclamations, ultimatums and political turmoil 
echoing from Saigon, Hanoi and Paris. The previously-cited Robert Dibon was appalled to hear 
of de Gaulle’s resignation in January 1946, believing that only the general would have achieved 
a solution to the Indochinese problems. Still, in May of the same year he and his colleagues 
watched hopefully and curiously as French and Vietnamese delegations boarded planes for 
France. Yet by November they waited anxiously as the ultimatum to the Viet Minh to lay down 
weapons passed.416 
 High-Commissioner d’Argenlieu for his part could never envision any status beyond internal 
autonomy for the three Indochinese territories. In parallel he somehow assumed that France 
could dictate terms. Apart from such Gaullist deliberations, he feared that the more dynamic and 
numerous Vietnamese would dominate and interfere with the fragile kingdoms of Laos and 
Cambodia. Cooper has reminded us that such worries were not new. French authorities had 
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justified the 19th century conquest of Indochina with the argument that it would pre-empt Siamese 
aspirations.417  
     D’Argenlieu and like-minded colleagues also felt that the Viet Minh did not possess a political 
and social monopoly on Vietnam’s future, particularly not in the south. Non-communists, notably 
highland minorities, would not readily accept communist tutelage but, owing to their weakness, 
they would be forced to do so if the French negotiated exclusively with Ho Chi Minh. D’Argenlieu 
was confirmed in his view when hundreds of headmen from the Annamese highland, mostly Moi, 
swore an oath of loyalty to France on June 29, 1946. In view of such support and anti-
communism, the French administrative and military authorities were still relaxed about the 
communist infiltration of the southern plateau as late as summer 1950.418 Part of that confidence 
stemmed from Viet Minh actions. In July 1946 they violently rid themselves of nationalist and 
more conservative competitors, the Dong Minh Hoi and Viet Nam Quoc Zan Dang, leaving other 
groups in little doubt as to their fate.419 
 Somewhat surprisingly given his influence, Admiral d’Argenlieu, has rarely found his way into 
the military testimonies exploited for this research. This comes as some surprise because his 
policy of faits accomplis proved crucial in torpedoing any diplomatic attempts to solve the swelling 
crisis. The declaration of an autonomous Republic of Cochinchina blatantly breached Parisian 
plans for a popular referendum for instance. D’Argenlieu appears to have been well aware that 
these steps could only antagonise the communists. Realising that the Viet Minh delegation to the 
Fontainebleau Conference used the latter to advertise its cause to the media, the public and a 
sympathetic left, d'Argenlieu also staged a separate conference at Dalat. Further, he instructed 
French troops to occupy the Moi plateaus of Southern Annam on June 21, 1946. Four days later 
the French also occupied the government-general in Hanoi. General Valluy, too, demonstrated 
little interest or faith in negotiations when he ordered French garrison commanders to prepare for 
military confrontation. Yet none of the witnesses in the research sample has mentioned these 
provocations. Viet Minh actions, such as an ambush on a French convoy at Lang Son on August 
3, seem to have cast a longer shadow.  
     Meanwhile in Fontainebleau, the Vietnamese delegation suddenly demanded independence 
not in five, but three years. As a result, the conference ended only with a shaky modus vivendi. 
Max André, who headed the French delegation due to his earlier spell in Indochina, blamed his 
interlocutors concluding: “Opposite us we never found partners who accepted the slightest 
concession even on the most minor details. [...] If by chance, under the pressure of our 
argumentation, our partners accepted whatever point, the next day they came back to what they 
had agreed with the previous day and everything re-commenced.”420 
 The other side of the coin, as Martin Shipway has argued, was that the Fourth Republic was 
too much embroiled in perpetual crisis, rivalry between administrative centre and periphery too 
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strong and the ideological framework too vague to offer the Vietnamese anything of coherence 
and substance.421 
 It was partly with this renewed in-fighting in mind that General Leclerc initially advocated the 
maintenance of the French Union. In August 1946, after his departure from Indochina, he 
addressed his old comrades of the 2e Demi-brigade, arguing: 
 
Two years ago we left this 2e DB taking with us above all the conviction that the French, even 
if they differ in origin, religion and profession could get on, even get on well. It is to safeguard 
this understanding that we created our house and its numerous branches in France and 
overseas. But it seems that all that is nothing but a mistake and fantasy. To live normally the 
French have to dispute, to tear apart, seek to demolish at all cost what constitutes the 
neighbour. [...] Our comrades did not die for this goal in yesterday's battles of Africa and 
France. Let's maintain this Union at all costs which constitutes the grandeur of France and 
let's fight today as yesterday in order not to sink into decadence. This objective, like the ones 
of yesterday, can be achieved. 
 
     In January 1947 the same man struck a more realistic tone, maintaining that: "The solution [in 
the Indochinese conflict] can only be political. France can no longer suppress a group of twenty-
four million inhabitants by [the use of] arms. We have to deal with an awakening xenophobic 
nationalism and to direct it in order to safeguard the rights of France."422 
 While Leclerc advocated military operations in order to enhance France’s position in future 
negotiations, his successor, General Valluy, pressed for the complete destruction of Viet Minh 
forces. In his view the traditionally passive and flexible population would quickly shift allegiances 
following inevitable French successes.423 Yet Émile Bollaert, who had replaced d'Argenlieu in 
March 1947, sensed the need for renewed discussions. Perhaps he already detected a 
dangerous, emerging pattern: French commanders could never agree on whether to concentrate 
forces in the heart of the insurgency, the Tonkin, or whether to fully pacify Cochinchina so as to 
have a basis for future incursions into the north.424 
 While historians have labelled 1945 to 1949 the colonial phase, the Cold War was already 
taking shape in France (and the world in general). This development had repercussions for 
soldiers on the spot and has coloured opinions. But interpretations varied depending on political 
leanings and individual situations. Conservative officers began to worry about the increasing 
influence of the French Communist Party (PCF) – with good reason. Contrary to other factions, 
the PCF had emerged from WWII with a heightened prestige due to the prevalence of its 
members in the resistance. A noticeable percentage of newly recruited soldiers thus harboured 
some sympathies for the movement. Having replaced the SFIO (socialists) as the party of the 
workers the PCF won 28% of votes in 1946. It eventually reached a basis of 300,000 registered 
                                                          
421   Bulk of information on negotiations taken from Shipway, The Road to War, 200-21 and 273-9.  
422  Voix du combattant (UNC), December 1947 and July 1954, UNC (Paris). 
423   Even Valluy came to realise the naivité of such assessments while contributing to the production of 
Radiodiffusion Française in February 1951. In it he highlighted the scarcity of French resources, the vast land 
to be controlled and the fluid nature of the war. See Chroniques d'outre-mer, no. 4,  April 1951. 
424   Brocheux & Hémery, Indochine, 351-5. 
101 
 
voters, making it the largest party in the political landscape. If one adds the considerable 
circulation of associated newspapers, Humanité and Ce Soir, as well as the 5.5 million members 
of the Confédération générale du travail (CGT) and those of the popular Jeunesse républicaine 
de France (UJRF), the influence appears even greater. The mass appeal of the party owed in 
part to the difficulties of life in France after the war, which also drove many young men into the military. 
 Yet on April 19, 1946 voters rejected the proposed constitution, which the left had strongly 
shaped. On June 2 the PCF also lost its parliamentary majority. In the context of the Indochina 
War the party suffered from the fact that its ministers were absent from the government during 
the decisive days in November and December 1946. When they took up ministries they became 
indirectly associated with France’s policies in Southeast Asia.425 To some extent this was justified 
because the party never disagreed with a French presence in Indochina per se. Furthermore, its 
five ministers occupied important roles in the government from January 1947 on. The party 
leader, Maurice Thorez, acted as vice-president while François Billoux took up the post of defence 
minister. The leadership argued that their governmental presence ensured France’s neutrality in 
an increasingly bipolar world. But this meant that they could only abstain from voting on military 
credits for the war rather than actively opposing it. Contrary to members of other parties, 
communist politicians regarded Ho Chi Minh as a representative of a legal government. 
Consequently, they pressed for negotiations, predicting that the alternative would result in a long 
and costly war. Sympathetic voters and activists, who tended to be most sensitive to the war, 
largely shared this attitude.  
 The communist balancing act was not to last. On April 16, 1947, communist ministers 
withdrew from a governmental council reunion in protest against French repression in 
Madagascar. Tensions heightened when General Salan publicly (and perhaps intentionally) 
stated that the military’s offensive in Indochina during October 1947 was in line with governmental 
orders. On May 5 Ramadier finally bowed to pressure from the right and dismissed the communist 
ministers from the government. Ironically, the issue was not Indochina but communist sympathy 
for strikers at the Renault factory. 
 Freed from governmental constraints the PCF could now openly attack the war and the 
CEFEO. Not that the communists were opposed to an army as such. But the expeditionary corps 
represented the contrary of what they had envisioned, namely a popular and neutral force firmly 
embedded in the republic. When the right accused the communists of backstabbing the army, the 
latter responded that they were actually standing up for the forces and their reputation. The PCF 
particularly objected to the dispatching of conscripts and may have contributed to the 
government’s decision not to involve the latter in the Indochina War. Claiming concern over the 
army’s prestige, communists pointed at the increasing cases of pillaging, torture and 
indiscriminate killings by the CEFEO (thereby ignoring that the Viet Minh did just the same). They 
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felt that their opposition would prevent ordinary soldiers from becoming ‘criminals’ and being 
implicated in what they now called the ‘sale guerre’.426  
     At times the party’s basis went further. In January 1947 dock workers in Marseille refused to 
load war material destined for Indochina. Activists also started to hold counter-demonstrations 
near recruitment offices, distributed leaflets in the barracks (via sympathetic soldiers) and 
organised meetings between returning and newly enlisted servicemen. In December 1948 the 
Mouvement des combattants de la liberté et de la paix was founded. Most controversially, mobs 
pelted returning servicemen, even wounded ones, with stones. In military factories communist 
employees intentionally damaged material earmarked for Indochina, particularly parachutes. 
Although actual cases of sabotage were less frequent than conservative circles have stated, such 
stories reverberated in Indochina, where they infuriated combating troops and administrators.427 
The latter were also much less impressed by the fate of Henry Martin than were large sections of 
French society.428  
 In defence of the party’s leadership it has to be stated that it did not lend active support to 
French soldiers harbouring communist sympathies. The official line dictated that they should 
depart for Indochina, learn the military trade and ‘behave like communists’ (i.e., spread the party’s 
ideas among the troops). While the Viet Minh accepted this stance French soldiers on the spot 
were left to fend for themselves, unable to establish networks. This held particularly true for those 
who lived in isolated posts. Many chose to avoid combat so as to spare lives on both sides. Some 
tried to get in contact with the official enemy – a practice violently condemned by the party’s 
leadership. About 300 French deserted becoming propagandists and translators in the Viet 
Minh’s service.429 One of the most famous cases involved the later historian Georges Boudarel. 
He was found out in 1991 when an Indochina veteran and former prisoner of war recognised the 
ex-political commissar during a lecture. The former serviceman accused Boudarel of ordering 
tortures of French POWs. Following this encounter the socialist minister of education, Lionel 
Jospin, declared Boudarel unworthy of being a professor. Subsequent lawsuits, though, came to 
nothing.430 
 Boudarel could still count himself lucky. Fellow soldiers liquidated some suspected or open 
communist sympathisers within the expeditionary corps. Some of those who survived the war 
joined the Association nationale des rapatriés d’Indochine et familles des victimes. It was founded 
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in 1949 to demand peace and the departure of the expeditionary corps. In addition its members 
attempted to convince young soldiers not to volunteer for the war.431  
 Despite the PCF’s relative influence and growing agitation, its impact on members of the 
CEFEO has probably been overblown. Many veterans only read about the political clashes in the 
newspapers,432 learned from newly-arrived colleagues, or experienced demonstrations upon their 
return. Neither the expulsion of communist ministers from the government nor Henri Martin’s case 
have surfaced much in testimonies. Reported cases of communist soldiers expressing their 
opinion, resisting orders, deserting or collaborating with the Viet Minh are equally rare. Among 
the veterans studied, only Robert Dibon recalled colleagues who openly expressed their 
sympathy for the Viet Minh or their anger at the war respectively.433  
 Much of this section has been concerned with the months between 1945 and 1946 when 
clashes in the south contrasted with the tension-ridden but relative calm in the north. The 
remaining years of the war’s first half were marked by open, if limited, war and the absence of 
negotiations with the Viet Minh. Thereafter, favourable (soldierly) feelings towards the 
communists, where they had existed, appear to have faded. This also had to do with the still 
relatively weak resistance. Despite the initial surprise attack by the Viet Minh in December 1946, 
the professional and technically superior French forces quickly gained the upper hand.434  
     During the ensuing operations interactions between auxiliaries and their French commanders 
often led to deep mutual respect. It reinforced the conviction that the communists did not 
represent a majority. Later Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Denis commanded such troops, which were 
stationed southwest of Lang Son, during this period. He felt that his men were “100% 
Francophile”. This faithfulness, knowledge of the area and military skill resulted, according to 
Denis, in the complete pacification of the area. For him and others in similar roles it was difficult 
to understand how the situation could worsen to the extent it did over the years.435  
 The question why the French quickly gained terrain but ultimately squandered their 
advantage also occupied the Americans, who were to take up the baton in Indochina. One military 
analyst found that the French gave up the pursuit of the Viet Minh once they reached the foothills 
of the north-western mountains. He gained the impression that they presumed that the rebels 
would die from hunger and fatigue. In reality, the insurgents regrouped while improving technical 
abilities, discipline and equipment.436 If true, one cannot help wondering if decade-old stereotypes 
played into this. As Aldrich has noted: “In most European views [...] Indochinese were physically 
weak, sickly and deficient in virility [...] lazy, inconstant, lacking in foresight, [...] addicted to 
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gambling and opium, vain, given to bragging and cruel.”437 At the same time, the apparently over-
confident attitudes betray an unfamiliarity with historical precedents. Knowledge of French 
setbacks in 1872/3, 1883 and 1885 might have made French commanders more cautious. 
Troubles during these occasions had led to the fall of the Parisian government, then headed by 
the imperial enthusiast Jules Ferry.438 History was to repeat itself when the Fourth Republic 
crumbled, following defeat in Indochina and the outbreak of the Algerian War. 
 In fairness, it needs to be added that the lack of resources played an important part. It was 
already obvious to the French military prompting various complaints. Sufficient troops would have 
allowed to chase the Viet Minh while clearing the territories conquered. As it was, the forces were 
too thinly spread for either task to be fully accomplished. It came as some consolation that the 
opposition at least appeared not to be faring much better. General Salan judged that the Viet 
Minh leadership was rudderless and that the movement’s structures had been broken after the 
CEFEO’s initial onslaught. As a consequence, many military and political personalities still 
hesitated to label the conflict a war – even less so as groups hitherto allied with the Viet Minh had 
broken ranks. This especially applied to the southern sects and their private armies. Equally, 
catholic communities began to turn away from the communists, following the pope’s 
encouragement to do so. The fact that, as a result, so many Indochinese fought on the French 
side has prompted Jacques Dalloz to label the conflict in Southeast Asia a civil war439 – an opinion 
shared by many French servicemen. 
     The period between 1947 and 1949 saw a number of other crucial, political and military 
developments. But one can ask whether they directly affected those on the spot. Most likely, 
health, climate, equipment, rations or encounters with the opposition weighed heavier. As regards 
the general, military situation, the French held on to the main axes of communication but suffered 
growing casualties through ambushes. On the whole, their control remained superficial even 
during the day, while the Viet Minh ruled during the night. The stalemate was accompanied by an 
increasingly vicious cycle of violence. Captured French soldiers suffered horrific tortures and 
deaths deemed “not from this century” by colleagues who found them. Resulting hatred led to 
indiscriminate killings, which pushed villagers into the arms of the revolutionaries.440 As in the 
case of Malaya, disturbing images eventually began to appear, showing French soldiers holding 
severed heads and executing prisoners.441 
 Over time it became evident that some kind of concessions were needed to satisfy local 
sentiments and gain more allies. As a consequence the French authorities sought a formula that 
would appease the non-communist nationalists but guarantee a strong French presence. 
Arduous negotiations eventually lead to the establishment of three nominally sovereign states 
within the French Union in 1949.442 Yet vital matters, i.e. military, diplomatic and economic 
domains, rested in French hands. Even the border and monetary union, merging Laos, Cambodia 
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and Vietnam, remained under French control. This might explain why the creation of the three 
states echoed little within the military’s lower strata. Even someone working for the propaganda 
services, like Jules Roy, did not refer to specific dates or events when briefly (and dismissively) 
alluding to the ‘Bao Dai solution’.443 Not without reason. It would take years to build up the national 
administrations and armies. Even so, their eventual naissance, or rather their failure to live up to 
expectations, would make itself felt on the ground. 
 Both French and Indochinese authorities were fully aware of the ambiguities involved in the 
new situation. The problem for the former was that the three states and their populations would 
not fully commit themselves to the struggle against the Viet Minh as long as France did not cede 
more power. The French in turn did not deem the Indochinese ready to fully take over. Still and 
significantly, French soldiers were now fighting for largely independent nations.  
 
 
Internationalisation, large-scale warfare and the end, 1950-1954 
 
More important to the French and the Indochinese than above nationalist window-dressing was 
the fact that Mao’s troops appeared on the frontier of the Tonkin in December 1949. From then 
on hitherto mostly moral support turned into massive material and logistical aid. Having been 
accused for long of old-style imperialism the French could not fail to see the irony in this. During 
a press conference on October 3, 1951 General de Lattre pointed out that even the US were 
beginning to see that there was now only one form of colonialism: communism.444 According to 
Bodin though, the Chinese arrival did initially not affect French morale to a great extent. But the 
realisation began to sink in that Indochina was part of a bigger clash, perhaps even a Third World 
War.445  
 The arrival of the Chinese meant, and most French servicemen were fully aware of it, that 
1,400 kilometres existed through which Viet Minh forces could retreat and re-enter at any time. 
In January 1950 China and the USSR even assumed diplomatic relations with the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam. In parallel, Chinese instructors began to train and organise their southern 
brethren,446 restructuring the latter down to the level of brigades. The new regular troops were 
issued with artillery, mortars and machine guns, putting them on par with French forces.447 In 
addition, training centres, rest camps and hospitals were set up out of reach of the French air 
force. In October 1951 a railway line from Nanning to Nam Quam (near Lang Son) was 
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completed.448 If the Viet Minh had previously been forced to hit and run they were now in a 
position to go on the offensive.  
 Even before the Chinese advent the northern border had become precarious by the end of 
the 1940s from a French point of view. The base of Cao Bang could only be supplied by air. 
General Blaizot planned on evacuating its garrison and others in the north as early as autumn 
1949 but was prevented from doing so by High-Commissioner Pignon. The latter felt that it would 
make a negative impression on the newly associated states. One year later Blaizot’s successor, 
General Carpentier, was given the green light. But “Thérèse”, as the plan was called, went badly 
wrong. In theory troops should leave Cao Bang and be joined by forces coming from the east. All 
the while, other French units would occupy part of the Thai Nguyen to divert enemy troops.449 In 
reality the columns approaching each other fell into ambushes by more numerous Viet Minh 
forces, resulting in 1,800 dead and wounded as well as 2,500 prisoners. Only 700 exhausted 
soldiers managed to reach French lines. Panicking, the commander of the northeast territory, 
Colonel Constans, ordered the evacuation of his headquarters at Lang Son leaving behind heavy 
artillery and ammunition. In Hanoi French women and children were flown out while French troops 
hastily cleared two smaller towns nearby. 
 These events had a profound impact on French soldiers of all ranks – more so than Dien 
Bien Phu. It was not so much the number of casualties that worried them. But for the first time 
since the start of the war Viet Minh regiments, backed by artillery and mortars, had overrun entire 
battalions of French elite troops (and not just indigenous or African ones) in well executed 
manoeuvres. As Louis Stien, a participant in the battles and subsequent POW, put it: “... it was 
evident that the war had now changed dimensions: the enemy was numerous, aggressive, well 
armed, well commanded and reacted rapidly. In addition the intelligence received allowed to 
measure the overwhelming disproportion of forces to our disadvantage...”450 While some may still 
have disputed the national character of the Viet Minh, nobody was left in any doubt as to its 
military capacity. Despite the debacle and ensuing panic, the French minister responsible for 
relations with the associated states, Letourneau, quoted a ‘witness’ who deemed morale 
“admirable”.451 
 After Cao Bang French troops largely lost the military initiative (at least in the north), despite 
various successful raids and defensive stands until 1954. Worse, roughly one year after the 
northern disasters they faced a more or less united front composed of the Viet Minh and their 
Laotian and Cambodian allies, the Pathet Lao and the Khmer Issarak. All the while, French 
metropolitan governments succeeded each other in rapid succession while engaging in what  
President Vincent Auriol termed a ‘politique des petit paquets’ in regard to Indochina. As 
Brocheux and Hémery summed up the situation: 
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In the course of the years it became obvious that the French Expeditionary Corps would not 
achieve victory. The French governments, which succeeded each other from 1950 to 1954 in 
a climate of repeated parliamentary crisis, all chose not to find solutions to the Indochinese 
problem, thus leaving a conflict to simmer [...] without giving the latter [French high command] 
the supplementary means in personnel and material.452 
 
 In military circles complaints about the lack of a clear stratagem, delays in shipments and the 
scarcity of resources multiplied. The cadres particularly resented the fashion in which a 
disinterested France treated the war – best symbolised in the maintenance of the peace-modus. 
As Jean Marcet wrote in 1951: 
 
Despite the numerous warnings given over several months, she [France] has led a collapsing 
campaign with a guilty imprudence, waged a war in an atmosphere of peace without wanting 
to commit the necessary effort to fight an enthusiastic and decided adversary, ready for all 
sacrifices and morally armed for total war. She has contented herself, in order not to alert a 
public opinion more preoccupied with its self-interest than with national problems, with a 
strategy of 'small packages' which has always been, despite its setbacks, that of our 
enterprises overseas.453 
 
      As Cooper has outlined, the author’s reference to practices in earlier colonial times was 
justified. France had lacked a coherent policy when regarding the conquest of Indochina. It had 
been individuals who had carried out the haphazard French take-over and who had suffered 
many setbacks due to the shortage of funds and equipment. Admiral Rigault de Genouilly for 
instance had taken Tourane as early as 1858 but had pulled out shortly after due to insufficient 
forces.454  
 The worsening French position also began to worry the Truman administration, which had 
come to view (South-)East Asia as a long front in the Cold War. In a report by the US ambassador 
to France, published by the Foreign Affairs Commission of the US Senate on 29 August 1951, 
the former stated: "... It is undeniable that if Indochina falls the fall of Burma and Thailand would 
be inevitable. Nobody could convince me that, shortly after, Malaya would not fall in turn…". 455 
The US thus preferred to temporarily prop up a once despised, colonial power, to losing Indochina 
to communism. Yet it delivered supplies under the condition that the French started setting up 
and training Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian forces in earnest. Most of all, the US pressed 
for real independence of the associated states. While the French administration and military 
welcomed the support, they strongly resented interference on a political level. Especially French 
officers not only disliked their role as cannon fodder for America but also accused the latter of 
hypocrisy. They gained the impression that after depicting France and Britain as abusive, colonial 
powers the Americans would simply attempt to replace the latter to pursue similar economic and 
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military goals – with potentially disastrous consequences for the free world. As General Jean 
Marchand warned: 
 
Despite their liberalism and their aid to the 'dependent' people in their attempt at national 
emancipation the United States have incurred on the Asians the same reprobation as the 
Europeans. The hatred triggered by the colonial regime [...] or by the exploitative economic 
system applied by the US are now finding other reasons to express themselves. The 
reshuffling of activities by the Americans in China, their enterprise in Korea, the aid they 
provide to the nationalists in Formosa and the right they have inscribed in the peace treaty 
with Japan in order to take under tutelage the islands of Ryou Kyou and Bonin, arouses new 
resentment. And that animosity is exploited by the frenetic propaganda and passionate 
denouncing of the eternal 'war-makers' and the 'colonial imperialists'. [...] The [Asian] masses, 
reduced forever to a precarious existence, flattered by the idea of independence [...] have not 
hesitated to abandon things in which they had nothing to lose and which, in their eyes, carried 
the responsibility for their poverty...456 
 
     Washington’s decision to chip in also owed to a new French commander-in-chief, whom many 
in the Pentagon remembered as an able, energetic and outgoing leader, as well as a colleague 
in WWII.457 This man, General de Lattre, used his prestige to successfully lobby Washington for 
more supplies.458  
 De Lattre astutely presented the French effort in Indochina as a defence of the free world.459 
Opportunities to explain this scheme presented themselves during a series of three (or five) power 
conferences involving the US, Britain, France and, at times, Australia and New Zealand. Initiated 
after the beginning of the Korean War, the main goal of these meetings consisted in exchanging 
intelligence information on Chinese military bases, capacities and movements so as to anticipate 
a second Maoist attack. For France and Britain these conferences also represented chances to 
advertise their counter-insurgency efforts in Southeast Asia – or to publicly question each other's 
campaigns and infrastructures.  
 One of the talks took place in Singapore between December 10 and 12, 1952. The protocol 
reveals that among the participants the French delegation was keenest on the exchanges. 
Perhaps sensing this, the conference's British president opened the conference by stating that: 
"The capital importance of these reunions results from the fact that the military problems in this 
theatre of operations constitutes a whole. The allies can combat separately in Korea, in Indochina, 
in Malaya but the enemy wages a single battle...." In retrospect one wonders though if such 
expressions went beyond mere diplomatic niceties. The French, headed by Colonel Gracieux, 
pressed for an intensified cooperation in view of an ever more costly war in Indochina. Gracieux 
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was particularly concerned about specific intelligence on Chinese air forces stationed near the 
Tonkin, pointing out that they could easily attack and destroy French installations. But the British 
participants seemed hesitant to commit themselves beyond intelligence sharing.460 (Vice versa, 
the French put a question mark behind the British ability to defend Hong Kong.461) They sensed 
that the picture presented by the French delegates was not entirely in sinc with the reality on the 
Indochinese ground. Past experiences played into this.462  
     It is doubtful that French combatants themselves would have endorsed their representatives’ 
sometimes rather glowing reports. To some extent the positive mood of the former stemmed from 
the partial reversion of fortunes after de Lattre’s arrival. Acting as high-commissioner and 
commander-in-chief he infused hope and even fervour into a cadre still traumatised by the horrific 
events of October 1950. The change in atmosphere appears to have been felt on every level and 
transformed opinions – if only temporarily.463 Suddenly it appeared as if French troops in the 
Tonkin might withstand further attacks and that there would be a French future in the area. Yet 
the general himself remained realistic. He did not believe in complete victory but merely aimed to 
obtain strong cards in the inevitable negotiations to follow.464 
 But what exactly did de Lattre do to change the picture? First, he stood in front of his men 
and told them that from now on they would “be commanded".465 Second, he stopped the general 
retreat in the north and ordered instead that the area be held.466 Third, he oversaw the 
construction of a long line of concrete blockhouses whose function it was to halt larger Viet Minh 
incursions. Fourth, he demanded and received important reinforcements from France. Fifth, de 
Lattre convinced Bao Dai to appoint a defence minister who could assist the general in forming 
and extending a Vietnamese Army – a task neglected by previous commanders.467 This step 
meant in essence a Vietnamisation of the war effort and thus hinted at an eventual French 
departure. The general made his beliefs and intentions clear during a now famous rally at the 
Saigonese Lycée Chasseloup-Laubat on July 11, 1951. On that occasion he sought to attract 
young Vietnamese for the new force by declaring: 
 
Be men! That is, if you are communists, join the Viet Minh. Over there, there are individuals 
who fight well for a bad cause. But if you are patriots, fight for your country because this war 
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is yours. It only concerns France within the limits of its promises to Vietnam and within the 
part which she intends to contribute to the defence of the free universe. There has not been 
an enterprise of lesser interest for France since the crusades. This war, whether you like it or 
not, is Vietnam's war for Vietnam. And France only wages it for you if you wage it for her.468  
 
     Officially to emphasise his earnestness, de Lattre persuaded his son to command Vietnamese 
troops.  When the latter died in battle the general did not cease to highlight the personal sacrifice 
– to the annoyance of other servicemen who had also lost relatives in the war. Graham Greene, 
reporting on the conflict, claimed in his memoirs that Bernard de Lattre had entertained a 
relationship with the emperor’s mistress. His posting in dangerous territory served to end the 
embarrassing liaison.469  
 In military terms de Lattre stabilised the situation and to some extent even reversed it. During 
the battles of Vinh Yen, Mao Khe, Ninh Binh, Nghia Lo and Hoa Binh French forces inflicted heavy 
casualties on the Viet Minh, sometimes with the help of napalm.470 These successes undoubtedly 
raised French spirits. Yet some men would later criticise de Lattre for immobilising French troops 
in ineffective fortifications.471  
 General Simon, at the time a young officer, witnessed the changing times and underlying 
problems of the French expeditionary force during his voyage to, and in his assignments in, 
Indochina. While passing through the Suez Canal he detected signs of local hostility towards the 
British garrison. A stopover in Djibouti led him to muse on the fruits of French colonialism without 
which, in his opinion, the territory would be void. In Ceylon he admired the British mansions but 
also sensed the restiveness of nationalism. Upon his arrival in Saigon he quickly realised the 
proximity of war while dining to the sound of guns. During his short stay in the city Simon watched 
a parade marking Vietnamese independence. To his consternation no one applauded. When he 
took up the command of a small post near Saigon he was soon forced to make room for an officer 
school of the Vietnamese army. The latter’s fragility became apparent when several of Simon’s 
Vietnamese soldiers/auxiliaries deserted the post. Other problems that beset his base included 
poor facilities and the difficulty of seizing a barely visible enemy.472 (Although Simon’s 
recollections entail interesting judgements on France’s role in Indochina and the wider world one 
can ask whether the young version of the same man was fully aware of all the issues raised in 
his writings. One suspects that the day-to-day running of his post and successive tasks occupied 
him to an extent that left little time for political pondering. At least part of the latter might in reality 
represent a product of later digestion.)  
     Despite the relatively successful année de Lattre, it remained roughly a year due to the 
general’s faltering health. His successors oversaw a steady deterioration of the military and 
political situation. It became abundantly clear to most involved that the CEFEO, even if assisted 
by auxiliaries, the national armies and the US, could not win the war.473 Yet even during its final 
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weeks individual servicemen felt that more resources and visionary leadership could keep the 
Viet Minh at bay and France in Indochina. Neither Dien Bien Phu nor other setbacks could implant 
the realisation in these minds that France's days in Indochina were numbered militarily, 
administratively and ideologically. As Cooper stated: "... even in defeat, belief in the French 
colonial doctrine remained strong".474 
 French servicemen, who took a closer look, apprehended that the Vietnamese, Laotian and 
Cambodian governments did not enjoy sufficient popular support to represent a genuine 
alternative to the Viet Minh. This was in no small part due to the ongoing French refusal to loosen 
the leash.475 That Paris had never really offered full sovereignty became evident following the 
metropolitan devaluation of the Indochinese piastre in May 1953. The measure was sensible from 
a purely monetary point of view and curbed to some extent the notorious trafic des piastres.476 
But it rudely reminded the three Southeast-Asian governments of the limits the French Union 
imposed on national sovereignty. For French soldiers it meant that they could buy even less with 
their already meagre pay – a fact that further alienated them from the metropolitan government. 
 Those French who commanded or trained Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian servicemen 
– and they became increasingly numerous – experienced the worsening situation on a daily basis. 
One of them was Jacques Britsch. Waiting for his battle orders throughout much of his spell he 
had ample time to reflect on the situation in Indochina, France and the wider world. He evoked 
the early months of his tour when it had felt safe to roam the streets despite the sound of gunfire. 
The feeling of relative safety might have contributed to his lambasting of Reynaud, Bidault and 
Mitterrand for wanting (in his view) to sell out and negotiate. In turn, he enthusiastically and in 
great detail described Christian celebrations in Hanoi (carried out by Vietnamese), which in his 
view were visible manifestations of France’s successful colonisation. This contrasted with the 
situation in France where, in his view, socialists and communists constantly advocated shorter 
working hours in exchange for higher wages. There as in the empire, Britsch clearly longed for a 
strong hand, as shown in the deposition of the sultan in Morocco. He further reflected on the 
rebellion in Madagascar between 1947 and 1949. All this brooding however never developed into 
a full understanding of gradual French decolonisation.  
 As regards Indochina, Britsch became increasingly concerned about attitudes and actions of 
nominal allies. In his diaries he described how the Muong minority had ceased to believe in 
French victory, prompting the author to fear desertions. By the same token he was more and 
more convinced that the new Vietnamese Army would not fight without French supervision. He 
even worried that Vietnamese soldiers would turn on their French officers, and that entire units 
would battle each other. His views were equally negative in regard to the political situation. The 
Vietnamese rejection of the French Union later in the war compounded his pessimism in regard 
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to France's future in the region. To reduce French exposure and to concentrate forces Britsch 
advocated a departure from Cambodia, even though he had little confidence in Prince Sihanouk. 
He showed more concern in the case of the relatively loyal Laos in light of Viet Minh reprisals 
against collaborators. In this context he learned about the case of a Vietnamese notable who had 
been condemned to death for taking up arms against the communists in 1946. Not satisfied with 
this, the Viet Minh had also turned his children into coolies. In view of such an enemy it was clear 
for Britsch why the French were holding out: "Munich plus Dunkirk! Thank you. 1940 is enough."  
     The officer indirectly criticised the US for not contributing troops but was somewhat pleased 
about the trump card this gave the French: through the threat of departure they could maintain 
the flow of equipment. This insight did not stop him from deploring the US failure to understand 
the true nature of the French presence, i.e. protection rather than mere exploitation. Did it not say 
everything that a Vietnamese customs officer could strip-search French soldiers? Such 
theoretical deliberations could not deflect from the steadily deteriorating news from Dien Bien 
Phu. Similarly upsetting for Britsch were rumours that the French and the Vietnamese authorities 
were contemplating separate negotiations with the enemy.477 
 Even before Dien Bien Phu, the war had begun to affect areas that had hitherto remained 
relatively calm – prompting corresponding French and Asian reactions. An official French résumé 
presented during the tripartite conference in Pearl Harbour in June 1953 drew listeners especially 
to the problem of Laos. After the setbacks in the Tonkin delta during de Lattre's reign the Viet 
Minh had turned their attention to the northwest, where the territory proved more favourable to 
their mobility. While northeast Laos had served as a sanctuary for the Pathet Lao, the centre 
continued to stay relatively loyal to the French. However, a determined Viet Minh invasion could 
easily topple the government. Likewise, the situation in Cambodia had worsened in that Prince 
Sihanouk was facing increasing pressure not only within parliament but also from the Khmer 
Issarak and its Viet Minh allies.478 What worried the French presenter at the conference even 
more was the fact that despite heavy casualties, the enemy always seemed to re-fill its ranks 
without much difficulties.479 
 Despite sharing this concern, General Henry Navarre envisioned a defence of the Tonkin 
delta, coupled with the mopping up of the south. The scheme took on the label Plan Navarre 
although some voices questioned even at the time whether such a well-defined plan had ever 
existed.480 Regardless of such doubts, Navarre could never implement all aspects as he was 
denied the necessary means.481 Faced with such constraints and the various parties involved in 
the war the general later highlighted France’s dilemmas in the area with a clarity that eluded him 
on the battlefield: 
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France, the associated states and the USA [...] formed a coalition against a common enemy 
[...] but none of the coalition partners considered this enemy and the goals of the war [...] from 
the same angle. For the US [...] the goal of the war was the same as in Korea: the 
‘containment’ of communism in Southeast Asia. [...] For the associated states the goal of the 
war was the elimination of the internal enemy [...]. But at the same time they wanted that out 
of the war resulted the ‘independence’, that is a more or less complete rupture of links which 
united them with France [...] As for France, she no longer knew why she was fighting. [...] It 
was no longer a matter of re-conquering a part of its colonial empire. So why was she 
continuing the struggle? Was this [...] ‘to liberate the associated states from the Viet Minh and 
to give them independence’? That was a good reason for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia but it 
could only be one for France if the independence of the three countries meant their 
maintenance within the French Union [...] Another perceivable goal of the war for France was 
to simply participate in the American policy of ‘containment’ [...]. She would have renounced 
all national advantage in Southeast Asia and accepted pulling out at the end of the war [...] 
Between these two possible war aims there was incompatibility as each corresponded to a 
different political line and even a different strategy.482 
 
 It does not seem to have occurred to the general that solutions could have flowed from the 
associated states, given that they knew the enemy better than the French. Yet, as Clayton has 
explained, such thinking would have gone against the traditional French conviction that initiatives 
had to originate from the centre, i.e. Paris, and then spread to the periphery. Those directives 
were not to be questioned. Compromise was not an option.483 
 On the other hand, Navarre was justified when he berated the metropolitan government for 
lacking a clear strategy. He had probably less reason, as he claimed, to bemoan the lack of 
directives. Jean Lacouture has maintained that the general had been ordered to seek a ‘politically 
honourable solution’. President Laniel reiterated in the French assembly on 27 October 1953 the 
goals set: 1) Develop the forces of the associated states to relieve the French; 2) aim for a “just 
equilibrium of efforts and sacrifices” by the free nations where their solidarity was demanded (i.e. 
increased US involvement); 3) achieve the defence and independence of the associated states 
within the French Union; and d) do everything by negotiation to achieve pacification in Asia.484 
While these points didn’t include orders to go into the offensive they didn’t offer guidance for the 
incessant Viet Minh attacks either. In effect, parliament left decisions to those on the ground – a 
practice with a long tradition in French colonialism.485  
     At the same time Viet Minh General Giap forced Navarre’s hand by threatening to once again 
invade Laos. Underlying Navarre’s decision to block an infiltration through a large air-supported 
base in Dien Bien Phu (inspired by the success of Na San) was a burning desire – widely shared 
– to ‘casser le Viet’486 and to force them to the negotiation table.487  
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     Numerous authors have described the ensuing battle and its consequences in great detail, 
most notably Bernard Fall.488 It therefore makes little sense to repeat the details. What interests 
us more at this point is the psychological impact of Dien Bien Phu on the French military. Many 
veterans and writers have claimed that the defenders, despite being routed, redeemed the army’s 
honour lost in 1940.489 In contrast to (some of) their predecessors, the encircled French, African 
and Indochinese, as well as Foreign Legionnaires,490 fought to the last – or at least until they ran 
out of ammunition. What is more, hundreds still volunteered to be parachuted into the valley at a 
time when the garrison’s fall became ever more likely. Such kamikaze-like attitudes suggest that 
these soldiers were no longer battling for lofty, political ideas but for their colleagues and the 
military’s honour – or because elite troops could not stomach defeat.491 In light of such heroism 
political moves were difficult to accept. General Salan later openly criticised the government for 
negotiating in Geneva while the battle was still raging.492 In his and other eyes France had lost a 
battle but still not the war despite the annihilation of many elite units.493 This connotes the 
assumption that France’s resources (and American support) were infinite. It also indirectly implied 
that something about Indochina was worth further sacrifices. 
 Back home French politicians and voters had had enough.494 By throwing in the towel the 
metropolitan government led many soldiers to believe that the battle offered the former a 
convenient excuse to pull the rug from under their feet. Among them was eventual Lieutenant-
Colonel Puga, who worked as staff officer in Paris during the battle of Dien Bien Phu.495 
 Yet as so often during the Indochina War, opinions and impressions fluctuated. What some 
regarded as political cowardice was deemed realistic and sensible by others. Bigeard, again, 
claimed in his memoirs: “We agreed with Mendès France. One evidently had to negotiate. It was 
useless if the whole expeditionary corps ended up behind barbed wire.”496  
     While Bigeard was eventually released from such containment, other POWS, intelligence 
officers, those running counter-resistance operations, including their local auxiliaries or members 
of the nationalist armies, were less lucky.497 The fate of POWS merits a closer examination, not 
least because it has relatively recently come to the forefront. Louis Stien attributed this to the 
downfall of communism, which has prompted a re-examination of events behind the Iron Curtain 
and the role of the western left. Based on various analyses and witness accounts, Stien estimated 
the death toll among European and African POWs languishing in Viet Minh camps at 60% over a 
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period between six months and one year. This compares with 72% over four months for those 
captured at Dien Bien Phu (less for Indochinese). Of 6,449 French presumed POWs by autumn 
1954 only 2,587 were released the same year. The corresponding and estimated numbers for 
autochtones are 15,759 and a mere 1,435. Stien accused his former enemies of using prisoners 
as propaganda tools to be indoctrinated and freed whenever it suited the captors. He might have 
a point. Between 1947 and 1953 only 595 French and 332 Vietnamese were liberated, compared 
to almost 2,000 Africans considered more receptive to propaganda. As late as 1953 85 civilians 
(presumably Europeans) were released, among them 34 children. Stien saw the causes for the 
high mortality rates in prisoner camps in the absence (or withholding) of medication and nutrition, 
the replacement of captured doctors with inexperienced Viet Minh nurses, lacking hygiene, social 
isolation, demoralising political indoctrination, the effects of ‘death marches’ (particularly from 
Dien Bien Phu) and a general disregard by the Viet Minh for (European) lives.498 Small wonder 
that the few survivors have guarded a highly negative image of their enemies, inactive 
governments and communist sympathisers at home. This is even more understandable if one 
gazes at images of released POWs. Most were extremely emaciated and many too weak to 
walk.499 
 If military figures judged chances during the late stages of the war differently, the same can 
be said of their views of the final outcome. Negative conclusions have prevailed but nuances 
exist. Most have deemed France’s departure from Indochina a defeat, as well as a complete and 
irreversible rupture. On the other hand, someone like Colonel Charles Lacheroy felt that the 
rebellion had actually diminished in southern Vietnam (thanks in no small part to his command in 
the area) and that France had thus won the war there. He divided the latter into a classical conflict 
in the north and a guerrilla campaign in the south.500 This statement has to be taken with a pinch 
of salt. Lacheroy also proudly recalled violating the Geneva Conventions in regard to POWs and 
would later advocate total war against nationalists.501  
 As regards the Viet Minh, perhaps a majority within the CEFEO came to acknowledge the 
opposition’s ultimate superiority. The eventual General Guy Mery took part in the French 
delegation to the international mission charged with overseeing the implementation of the Geneva 
Accords. Although he fully understood that the Viet Minh ignored most of the principles outlined, 
he was nevertheless impressed by their discipline and organisation. He witnessed how Hanoi 
completely changed within hours once the new masters had entered. Curiosity led him to speak 
to his Viet Minh counterpart, who conveyed to him that the French could never have won. 
Contrary to the latter his men had been fully focused on the war effort and were prepared to fight 
for many years.502  
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The Indochina War officially ended on July 20, 1954 but continued on many levels as no 
participant had made the desired gains. Ho Chi Minh did not attain Vietnam’s unification while 
Sihanouk and King Sisavang Vong struggled to retain their newly-found independence. The 
French lost to the US what little military and political influence they had held (and had fought for) 
until then. Among French survivors the war and all the resulting resentment lingered on, creating 
a dangerous mix of ideas. Yet again, servicemen of all ranks have come to different conclusions 
in regard to their roles during the war, the latter’s aims, strategies employed, the final outcome 
and the future. The only thing all have had in common have been physical and psychological 
scars. Another common denominator lies in the belief that Vietnam in particular fell into darkness 
after the French (and later the American) departure.503 
 A considerable number quit the army after the war and attempted to lead a civilian life. Among 
them was Pierre Huteau who took up work in Paris before accepting an offer from the Compagnie 
coloniale du Haut et Bas Congo.504 Unwilling to further risk their lives for a country which didn’t 
seem to care they reduced their allegiance to the surroundings of their families and (remaining) 
friends. Some faltered. They did so either because they could not forget the horrors of the war 
or, as Bodin has pointed out, because France had become unrecognisable and disappointed 
many.505 Others were more successful. Former paratrooper Pierre Brice, alias Pierre Louis le 
Bris, became an actor. Initially playing in a number of French B-movies he shot to stardom in 
Germany in the role of a native American in the film adaptions of Karl May’s novels.506 
 Numerous French servicemen remained in the army, which had become their emotional 
home. The experience of the Indochina War (often coupled with that of WWII) had strengthened 
the bonds between them. Many of these soldiers were immediately rushed to Algeria where they 
experienced a repetition of events in Southeast Asia, not least torture and indiscriminate killings. 
Whereas the problem had remained sporadic in Indochina, it became institutionalised in Algeria. 
It famously led the writer Jules Roy and General Jacques Paris de Bollardière to publish scathing 
criticisms of the military’s practices.507 The case of de la Bollardière is perhaps more intriguing 
because he commanded elite parachute troops in Indochina and became a general at the young 
age of 48. Despite his illustrious career, doubts about France’s colonial engagements entered de 
Bollardière’s mind during his Southeast Asian tour. He began to feel that the CEFEO had become 
entangled in an international conflict “without purpose that consumed our army, absorbed the 
energies indispensable for the reconstruction of France and compromised the role, which we had 
to take up in a re-forming Europe”. What worried him most were the first signs of blind fury in the 
face of an invisible enemy and the resulting misconduct. De Bollardière claimed that cases of 
torture and arbitrary killings among his troops were rare, and that those caught were immediately 
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sanctioned.508 Upon his return to France he overheard young officers, released from Viet Minh 
prisons, accusing the French press, intellectuals and leftist politicians of betrayal. He took notice 
of dangerous ideas propagating a stronger influence of the army in public life. In Algeria he 
observed professional troops obsessed with the communist threat, hell-bent on revenge for 
defeat in Indochina and referring to FLN fighters as ‘Viets’.509 One can question the sincerity of 
the general, who has claimed to have eventually sensed and understood the willingness of 
colonial subjects to rule themselves. But unlike others who witnessed the army’s brutal methods 
in Algeria, he refused to get involved and paid for his stance with sixty days in prison. After 
witnessing the generals’ putsch he quit the army in 1962. 
 The later General Georges Buis, too, felt that alternatives to the Indochinese killings and 
abuses would have existed. He bitterly regretted the complete rupture of relations following the 
Geneva conference in 1954. The acrimony in his case was even greater, as he had been born 
and had grown up in Saigon. Buis believed that the comportment of French soldiers, 
administrators and civilians had left a highly negative legacy. In his opinion negotiations would 
have resulted in a situation whereby “...one would have had a proper independence without Dien 
Bien Phu, without breaking off all relations with this Far East and without acting like swines, which 
is what we did”.510  
 For a considerable portion of veterans such behaviour was the logical consequence of a 
situation, in which the French Army had to battle an atrocious enemy with its arms tied behind its 
back. To win it would not only have required more resources but also the freedom to pay like with 
like. To such men effective propaganda, resettlements, torture and killings represented ugly but 
necessary means to win struggles against committed and fanatical insurgents while safeguarding 
French influence. One name in particular has stood for what became known as ‘revolutionary 
warfare’: Colonel Roger Trinquier. His experience of guerrilla war in Indochina, Algeria and 
Katanga led him to write several books. The most famous one, La guerre moderne, was published 
in 1961, probably with the partial aim of helping to prevent another French defeat in Algeria. In it 
Trinquier outlined his idea of modern war and counter-insurgency as follows: 
 
Sometimes called subversive war or revolutionary war, it essentially differs from past wars in 
the sense that victory is not achieved uniquely through the clash of two armies on a battlefield. 
[...] War is now a collection of various actions (political, social, economic, psychological, 
armed, etc.) which aims at the reversal of the established power in a country and its 
replacement by another regime. In order to succeed the attacker tries hard to exploit the 
internal tensions of the attacked country [...] Out of an originally localised conflict they will 
sooner or later always try to create a generalised conflict. [...] It is crucial to know that in a 
modern war we not only come up against some armed gangs dispersed over an entire territory 
but against an armed clandestine organisation whose essential role it is to impose its will on 
a population. Victory can therefore only be achieved through the complete destruction of this 
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organisation. [...] Any party which has supported, or which supports our adversaries, will be 
considered a part of the enemy’s party. [...] In modern war, as in otherwise classic war, it is 
an absolute necessity to employ all arms which our adversaries use [...] The army charged 
with waging war needs to receive from the nation an unreserved, affectionate and devoted 
support. Any propaganda that could affect its morale by making it doubt the necessity of 
sacrifices has to be suppressed mercilessly. [...]511 
 
     It is not too difficult to discern here the patterns of the French war effort in Algeria, the reasons 
for its escalation and France’s final exit. Evidently, the author ignored many parameters, among 
them the conflict’s metropolitan and international impact, which were instrumental in prompting 
de Gaulle to disentangle his country from North Africa. In a situation where the enemy was only 
vaguely defined, where the absolute support of the home country was required and where any 
means were acceptable, the outcome could only be a major human catastrophe – which it turned 
out to be. A democratic government and its electorate could not possibly sign up to total war – 
unless attacked in the way France was by Germany in 1940. Vice versa, a military convinced of 
Trinquier’s ideas would sooner or later clash with the realities of decolonisation, which it did in 
April 1961.  
     It is crucial to remember that these ideas were born out of Trinquier’s experiences in 
Indochina. There, he built a counter-resistance composed of highland communities, which he and 
his staff eventually had to leave at the mercy of the Viet Minh. It is also worth pointing out that the 
Algiers rebellion was not so much carried out by generals as by colonels like Trinquier – men who 
had served as junior officers in Indochina.512 The controversy surrounding these men has 
deflected attention from many others who would have agreed to some extent with Trinquier and 
his colleague, Colonel Charles Lacheroy. Most of these however would never have propagated 
total external and internal war to the bitter end. That said, a major criticism of these survivors has 
concerned the lack of French intelligence and propaganda. As General Hugo Geoffrey later 
remarked: “We needed fewer armed units and more political people who understood what it took 
to keep the sympathy of the population in a similar situation...The Viets exploited our mistakes.”513 
 Where such men existed they were at times stopped in their tracks. As a young officer Colonel 
André Perrin volunteered for the Services actions and a tour in Indochina after some training in 
intelligence gathering. Upon his arrival he realised that, despite General de Lattre’s openly 
expressed emphasis on intelligence and propaganda services, the existing staff was not 
producing anything of substance. Amazingly, Perrin was rejected by Salan on the basis that he 
had originally been an artillery officer. Perrin was bluntly told: “Here we need a Coloniale and not 
an artillerist.” As a consequence, a paratrooper filled the vacancy who, like his predecessor, had no 
experience in the work he was supposed to do.514 
 It appears at times as if those in charge had learned nothing from WWII. Captain Raymond 
Lagier helped to set up a secret service in Britain during WWII. He admitted that even the more 
                                                          
511   R. Trinquier, La guerre moderne (1961), pp. 15-6, 19 and 47-8. 
512  Masson, Histoire de l'armée française, 438-9. 
513   Interview, 14.5.1998, SHD/DITEEX 3K 37 – III – (12AV 249). 
514  Interview, 3.6.1998, SHD/DITEEX 3K 39 – II – (12AV 255). 
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qualified among his colleagues looked like amateurs in comparison to British MI6 agents. The 
captain pointed out that while the British had operated all over the empire, French specialists had 
always focused on Germany. He further stated that the British seemed much more open to new 
ideas than their French counterparts, who also faced deep suspicion from within the French 
military establishment.515 
 The authorities were also slow in recognising the need to win hearts and minds. The 
assumption appears to have been that the benefits of the French Union did not need advertising. 
If it happened at all, hearts and minds were won by chance and through individual initiatives. A 
British liaison officer noted for example that French troops had helped with the harvest in South 
Annam.516 The military doctor André Thabaut for his part recounted how he treated villagers for 
all kinds of conditions. He was realistic enough though to appreciate that his actions were a drop 
in the ocean rather than part of a large-scale effort. In his memoirs he wrote: “On dreams, of 
course, of the installation of village dispensaries and nurseries as they certainly existed during 
the colonial époque... But these times are past.”517 Thabaut would probably have been 
disappointed to learn how scarce such installations had actually been. His statement revealed, 
however, certain myths of French colonialism. 
 That said, these examples do not tell the whole truth. Over the years the French army 
collected a considerable amount of information on its enemy. Some of the details emerged from 
the (often brutal) interrogation of captured Viet Minh. Others stemmed from documents gathered 
after attacks. Many of the resulting reports can today be studied at the SHD. Among them are:  
 
- two short studies regarding the communist high command, the structure of units, tactics 
and equipment between 1949 and 1955; 
- a 22-page long index of regular units operating in the northern area (dated October 18, 
1950); 
- a complex organisational chart detailing these forces (dated September 15, 1951); 
- a further study outlining the Viet Minh high command, regular and irregular forces, 
recruitment, numbers, equipment, training and tactics (from the beginning of 1953); 
- a collection of captured documents describing French units, organisation, positions and 
equipment (dated August 11, 1953); 
- a history of various Viet Minh operations (dated January 13, 1954); and finally 
- a long study describing the evolution of Viet Minh forces (dated December 1954).518 
 
     The dates of these reports imply that at least from 1949 on intelligence was forthcoming. Of 
the above-listed documents it is worth having a closer look at the last one. Its most striking 
features lie in the specifics and the authors’ sense of awe. The study by the French high command 
outlines how the communist movement grew over the years, partly through American, Japanese 
                                                          
515   Interview, 27.1.1999, SHD/DITEEX 3K 47 – II – (12AV 334). 
516   ‘Weekly Intelligence Report’, no. 21, by the Military Liaison Officer Saigon, 14.10.1950, NA, FO 959/49. 
517   A. Thabaut, Médecin lieutenant au 1er Bataillon Muong: Indochine (1954-1955) (2004), p. 58. 
518   All documents issued by the Commandement des forces terrestres du Nord Vietnam, état-major, 2e Bureau, SHD, 
box 10H 2353.   
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and ultimately Chinese aid. The authors estimated communist troop strength by December 1946 
at about 60,000 regulars and 25,000 para-military elements. These figures are in line with newer 
estimates quoting 50,000 and 30-50,000 men and women, respectively, by 1947.519 The text 
further includes a relatively detailed depiction of the various military and administrative sections, 
as well as centres of instructions, whose locations were apparently well known. The report also 
stresses the adaptability, the realism and “objectiveness” of the Viet Minh leadership, which would 
regularly undergo severe auto-criticism after setbacks. The writers went so far as to describe the 
commanders of elite units, such as Division 308 or 316, as “brilliant”. They equally acknowledged 
that these units were composed of mountain tribes. In so doing they (unconsciously) refuted the 
traditional French claim that the Viet Minh represented a uniquely Annamese (or Vietnamese) 
movement. Apart from that, the authors understood that their enemy’s qualities owed to political 
indoctrination which turned individual soldiers into tools for the greater cause. The result was, in 
their words, fighters ranking “among the best soldiers in the world” demonstrating “endurance”, 
“aggressiveness”, “robustness” and “spirit of sacrifice”. The report concludes with the warning 
that the ceasefire in 1954 would not spell the end of the Indochinese saga as Ho’s ultimate goal 
remained the unification of Vietnam.  
 The French-Indochinese military and administrative apparatus did not systematically ignore 
hearts and minds, either. As George Kelly has outlined, a body for psychological warfare existed. 
It was founded in 1952, named Direction générale de la guerre psychologique, and was headed 
by Nguyen Huu Long. Its aims consisted of improving morale of the national army and of 
spreading propaganda among the population. Due to the high illiteracy rate in Indochina officers 
made ample use of whispering campaigns and loudspeakers. One target were Viet Minh 
prisoners, for whom the bureau established a rehabilitation camp twenty kilometres outside 
Hanoi.520 The officially independent Vietnamese government and its French advisors were well 
aware that such campaigns in themselves did not suffice. They knew that the Viet Minh’s success 
partly lay in the exploitation of unrest caused by poverty and lack of land. In 1953 the government 
thus started redistributing abandoned land and set limits to the terrain one person could own and 
cultivate. 
 The authorities also turned their attention to resettlement and self-defence schemes. 
Unfortunately, the first measure was not feasible in Vietnam due to the dense population, lack of 
land and intensive agriculture. But the authorities improved the protection of villages in 
Cochinchina. They also initiated relocations in lesser-developed and populated Cambodia. 
Particularly in the frontier province of Svay-Rieng successful projects were completed as early as 
1946. Similarly, the authorities chose several plots around Kompong Cham for the same purpose. 
After learning about major Viet Minh infiltrations they carved them up, made them habitable and 
strengthened their defence. The surrounding population was then encouraged to move in, which 
a large proportion ostensibly did.  
                                                          
519   The figures reached 125,000 regulars, 75,000 regional and 250,000 irregular forces by the spring of 1953. See 
M. Windrow & M. Chappell, Men-at-Arms series: The French Indochina War, 1946-1954 (1998), p. 23. 
520   It is an interesting detail that General de Lattre claimed that of the 8,000 Viet Minh captured during a six-month 
period, none apparently wanted to rejoin their comrades. He quoted this figure during a press conference on 
24 June 1951 in Hanoi. See Chroniques d’outre-mer, no. 7, July 1951. 
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 It was a small staff that planned and realised these early projects. By 1952 though the 
Cambodian government came to recognise the value of the measures. Its interior ministry duly 
created a Direction for the Self-defence of the Population charged with developing a nationwide 
plan. At its peak the new programme affected the lives of almost half a million people out of a 
total of 3,748,000.521 More importantly, it cost the Viet Minh vital civilian support, forcing it to 
withdraw to its core areas. As successful as such programmes proved, they remained exceptions 
to the rule. As Kelly has recalled: 
 
....these responses were largely isolated and empirical, spread out over a vast territory where 
the conditions of the battle fluctuated. They implemented no single viable strategy of counter-
subversive warfare. The political and propaganda measures were equally reactive. At no time 
during the Indochina War did the French Army really assign a paramount urgency to these 
tasks or pursue them as an inseparable part of the military program. Still, many could not help 
but observe that this was precisely one of the foundations for the enemy’s persistency and 
success.522 
 
     A further conclusion from the war has been the belief that the US let the French down, not 
only during Dien Bien Phu but throughout the conflict. The fact that the latter provided immense 
financial and material assistance appears to have been blanked out. In the same way ex-soldiers 
have resented the seemingly growing American overtures to the governments and military of the 
three associated states. Among other things later General Jean Le Chatelier oversaw the return 
of no-longer-needed war material and acted as liaison officer to the steadily growing US Military 
Assistance Advisory Group for Vietnam (MAAG-V). His accounts of the time echo a latent anti-
Americanism, which faded when he visited the US on an official mission. At the time he angrily 
noticed how his colleagues were gradually pushed out of the training missions to the nationalist 
armies. He found it difficult to accept that the French generally seemed to “give, tell, return, sign 
and give up everything and everywhere”. As for the Americans, he found them pretentious and 
clueless regarding the situation in Southeast Asia. To demonstrate his contempt he refused to 
speak English, pointing out that no hierarchy of languages existed.523 Such feelings have 
abounded among veterans who could not help sensing a certain Schadenfreude when the 
Americans eventually pulled out of Vietnam in most disorderly fashion. But such disdain has at 
times been mixed with admiration in view of the sheer material, financial and political power the 
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Chapter 5: “Pleasant, clever, businesslike but not really trustworthy” – 
British soldiers’ thoughts on Malayan land and people 
 
Testimonies of British (ex-)servicemen have customarily centred on equipment, operations, 
activities during rest and comical mishaps. Elongated statements on Malayan communities, 
population centres or the environment have been few or brief. Fairly representative references in 
questionnaires to ethnic groups, for instance, have amounted to the rather monosyllabic 
“primitive” or “quite friendly”.525 Most memoirs do not feature more extensive contemplation either. 
If written by a former officer, they resemble manuals for counter-insurgency campaigns. If the 
author is a former private or NCO, the book verges on a (military) comedy. Lengthier and more 
complex depictions have usually, but not exclusively, sprung from well educated (former) 
servicemen. They tended to command non-European units, operate in the deep jungle (where 
they came in contact with aborigines) or converted into civilian roles after the end of their military 
duties.526 
     One can, of course, ask whether this outcome surprises. Soldiers, particularly British ones, 
have traditionally not regarded it as their job to analyse social, political, economic and 
environmental issues during their (overseas) postings. But other attitudes have existed 
elsewhere. It suffices to compare the relatively technical British approach in Malaya with the more 
curious and reflective French stances on Indochina. (Cynics might argue that it helps to explain 
the dissimilar outcome of the conflicts.) 
 
Before we go into military reactions to Malaya it is worth exploring the various aspects, which help 
to explain the relative lack of inquisitiveness and pondering on the part of (former) British soldiers. 
 
 
Military constraints, WWII, education, age and interest 
 
Testimonies make it clear that the remoteness of military camps, meagre pay, out of bound areas 
in urban centres and the necessary secrecy severely restricted personal explorations in Malaya. 
In parallel, jungle training, drills, patrols, ambushes, guard duties, searches, resettlements, 
repairs, inspections, convoys and often changing postings left little time to ponder, write, 
photograph or draw. Even if soldiers had been given more time, the wearing climate would have 
                                                          
525  Answers taken from forms filled out during the first week of July 2007 by George Gibson (formerly Malayan 
Engineer Regiment) and a former infantryman preferring to remain anonymous. Questionnaires might not 
constitute the ideal form of communication but the same respondents would have filled entire pages to describe 
patrols or skirmishes. 
526  The exception to the exception is Frederick Hudson, a National Serviceman and eventually a corporal. He left 
the territory after his tour and became involved in the British building sector. His published memoirs – Loyal to 
the End: A Personal and Factional Account of National Service in Malaya (2006) and National Secret Service: 
Deception and Conspiracy in Malaya (2008/9) entail detailed descriptions of the environment. In an e-mail 
exchange on 15./16.12.2008 he admitted that this owes to his son and daughter-in-law encouraging him to add 
more depictions of his surroundings.  
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discouraged strenuous activities – be they physical or intellectual.527 Soldiers preferred to spend 
the little rest they were granted showering, relaxing and enjoying a chilled beer. Former National 
Servicemen and private, Tony Hamilton, remembered the typical routine of infantry units: “We 
went out [on patrol] for about five days, six maybe. Come back in. Get in [to the base] in the 
morning. Scrub your kit. And then have a night in bed. And then perhaps in the morning they’d 
say: ‘Well, briefing.’ And you’d be out again maybe three o’clock in the morning.”528 Afore-
mentioned George Tullis declared that he never took leave during his entire tour in Malaya.529 
While this does not seem to have bothered him too much, others were less happy with their 
schedules and tasks. Brigadier Michael Calvert, commander of the resurrected SAS, bitterly 
complained about the absence of a staff officer, to whom he could have delegated.530 Even the 
very energetic General Templer spent so much time touring the territory, meeting with various 
representatives and reading or writing reports that he confessed to the colonial secretary, Oliver 
Lyttelton: “When I’ve finished in Malaya, I simply must have some leave. I mean proper leave. So 
must Peggie [his wife]. Though I say it, we’ve never stopped since we came here and there’s a 
limit to what one has to give and to the pace at which one can live in this climate...”531   
     Besides pressing duties, the lower ranks did not usually possess the means to survey their 
surroundings and forcibly ended up at the local Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes (NAAFI)532 
instead. Around 1950 yearly pay for both a regular and conscript trooper, gunner, sapper, 
signaller, private, etc. was roughly £73/year, if he served at home. Initially a regular, single 
subaltern/2nd lieutenant earned about £500/year. Pay in differing branches varied with specialists 
earning more. Official tables of the time list additional pay for “work of an objectionable nature in 
the tropics” which amounted to 1 shilling and six pence a day. (Whether “objectionable” meant 
ordinary jungle patrols or more unpleasant work is not spelled out.)533 
     Duties and climate apart, a probing mind would probably have required a childhood and youth 
during which future soldiers were encouraged to question and to explore. In reality, often 
interrupted schooling, followed by early employment, eradicated intellectual thirst before it could 
potentially develop. Several veterans indicated that they took up jobs at an age as early as 
fourteen if they saw much of their local school at all.534 As a consequence, soldiers might not 
necessarily have lacked fascination and keenness but rather the tools to describe what they 
observed. The not infrequent illiteracy, or at least difficulty with reading and writing, undoubtedly 
hampered the flow of communication. 
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     Age, too, was undoubtedly an issue. The majority of National Servicemen (and regulars) were 
in their late teens and early twenties when they entered the services. Often, the higher ranks were 
not much older, particularly subalterns doing their mandatory and temporary tours. In fact, one 
struggles to differentiate between officers and other ranks on contemporary photographs, were it 
not for their pips/stripes and caps.535 Perhaps then these young men simply did not yet possess 
the maturity and curiosity (spurred at university for instance) to survey their exotic surroundings 
on the rare occasions they were offered the time to do so.  
     On the other hand, one can ask just how much of an interest one could expect mostly youthful 
soldiers to take in a new environment. It is probably fair to say that this age group generally tends 
to be less interested in ethnology and more in the company of their peers or the pursuit of the 
other sex. It is no coincidence that the veteran turned author, Leslie Thomas, titled his quasi-
memoirs The Virgin Soldiers.536 Even so, one might have expected men, who had never ventured 
beyond their village, town or county, to have been excited about the prospect of seeing far-away 
destinations. In fact, those who voluntarily joined up with the army have often cited the desire to 
leave behind their old surroundings.537 Yet it should be remembered that a large percentage of 
servicemen had not volunteered for military service in a distant land. Most would probably have 
preferred to enjoy their youth at home.538 Hence, it is at times difficult to discern much enthusiasm 
and curiosity in their accounts. Although the military tour in Malaya has profoundly marked 
veterans, one suspects that the imprint owes mostly to the comradeship and less to the tropical 
surroundings. Perhaps interest comes with age. A considerable number of veterans have re-
visited today’s Malaysia not only once but often several times. This time around, many have 
explored the jungle, mountains and beaches insomuch as their fragile bodies have allowed. 




Soldiers’ scant knowledge of Malaya made it difficult to place the territory and its conflict into a 
broader political and cultural context. Yet it does not necessarily follow from this insight that the 
same men were unconscious of British colonies, protectorates and dominions in general. While 
some aspects of the emergency might have been uniquely Malayan, such as its dependence on 
rubber, there were plenty of parallels to draw in other cases. Ethnic patchworks, for example, 
certainly existed elsewhere in the British world. Given these parallels, it is well worth looking into 
what has been labelled imperial culture in the context of this research. It can contribute to an 
                                                          
535  A former senior military figure consulted for this research (who prefered to remain anonymous) recounted his 
career in terms of age. He was eighteen when he was called up for National Service but soon signed up with 
the regular army. After nine months he was appointed lance corporal, becoming a full corporal after a further 
year. Following another four to five months service he was commissioned to Sandhurst and obtained the rank 
of lieutenant after two years. Four years on, he had reached the rank of major. The interviewee argued that the 
maximum age for a major was (and still is) thirty-two. He also held that the few successful ones who climb(ed) 
further up on the ladder reach(ed) the rank of brigadier around the age of forty – which appears rather young. 
Yet the interviewee pointed out that the current chief of staff of the army was probably in his fifties. Interview 
held on 6.5. 2007. 
536  The work was first published in 1966 and became a classic. 
537  George Tullis gave such a reason. 
538  Tony Hamilton certainly did. See interview 19.9.2006. 
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understanding of how far servicemen were ‘infused with empire’, or not, and whether this has 
influenced their impressions and memories of Malaya. 
     Ward has boldly held that “an imperial outlook had been an integral feature of British public 
life for several generations.”539 MacKenzie has particularly pointed to military-inspired 
entertainment, which formed an apparently fundamental part of British popular culture during the 
19th and 20th century. Given that the majority of Britain’s military conflicts between 1815 and 1914 
occurred outside Europe that martial amusement was therefore, at least indirectly, imperial.540 
Cathrine Hall has drawn attention to the early imperial historian J. R. Seely, who argued that 
empire and the nation could not be separated. Britain’s interests were strongly connected with 
the colonies and dominions especially during the interwar years. Hall has also suggested that the 
sum of experiences by travellers, merchants, soldiers, sailors, farmers, prostitutes, teachers, 
officials and missionaries point to a highly pervasive nature of imperial culture.541 Wendy Webster 
for her part has highlighted the noticeable, imperial outlook of the Victory Parade in June 1946 (at 
which a contingent of the MPAJA participated). As a counterweight to the often quoted Social 
Survey in Public Opinion on Colonial Affairs of 1948 Webster has emphasised that 67% of those 
quizzed had heard of the Groundnut Scheme in Tanganyika. The author has further cited the 
involvement of Commonwealth forces in the Korean War, which strengthened the bond between 
English-speaking people. (She could also have pointed her finger at the composition of British-
led forces in Malaya.) The sum of this evidence has led her to evoke “a people’s empire” and 
“global Britishness”.542 Webster further developed these ideas in a contribution to Philip Buckner’s 
and Douglas Francis’ Rediscovering the British World.543 Quoting radio programmes, 
documentary and feature films produced by the Ministry of Information and the Colonial Film Unit 
during WWII she has hinted at the unifying experience of WWII. Finally, Andrew Thompson has 
highlighted that the income of many Britons directly and indirectly derived from the empire, that 
the Daily Mail and Express devoted a considerable part of their content to the latter and that the 
population increasingly consumed products from the colonies and dominions by the end of the 
19th century. Admitting that empire entered peoples’ lives in “subtle and unobtrusive” ways he has 
concluded that the latter thus represented a “significant factor” but was by no means “all-
pervasive”.544 
     Instead of quoting various further arguments in an ongoing debate, I shall introduce my own 
evidence. It mostly confirms Thompson’s argument in that one should neither ignore nor overstate 
the impact of Britain’s overseas possessions on servicemen. Imperial facets regularly crop up in 
interviews and questionnaires (not least because I specifically asked) but less so in memoirs, 
while almost completely lacking in regimental journals and internet testimonials. Several of the 
participants in this research noted that they were shown the red-dotted map of the British Empire 
at school. Some remembered having to memorise names of territories, explorers, conquerors and 
                                                          
539  Ward, British Culture and the End of Empire, 4. 
540  MacKenzie, Popular Imperialism and the Military, 3 and 12. 
541  Hall, Cultures of Empire, 2, 9 and 16. 
542  Webster, Englishness and Empire, 55-8, 69 and 82. 
543  The article on pp. 321-339 is titled ‘The Empire Answers: Imperial Identity on Radio And Film, 1939-1945’.  
544  Thompson, The Empire Strikes Back?, 40, 44-8 and 241. 
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products.545 Yet the same men often conceded that colonies and dominions were seldom 
discussed in the family or at work – not least because many fathers were serving in WWII. Despite 
the lack of discourse, several professed feeling pride in the empire in their youth. But only a 
handful have been of the opinion that the latter mattered in their lives. Furthermore, only two 
veterans mentioned relatives living in dominions or colonies. Former infantry officer Archibald 
Elkington had one grandparent in Canada and one serving in the Indian Civil Service.546 Ex-
National Serviceman Terence Healy’s great uncles and aunts, too, moved to Canada at the 
beginning of the twentieth century.547 Every now and then interviewees and respondents, among 
them previously named Tony Rodgers, pointed out that the dominions and colonies had come to 
Britain’s rescue during WWII.548 But this, like so many other thoughts, could well represent a later 
insight. 
     In contrast, many veterans interviewed by Imperial War Museum staff lived and/or served in 
the empire prior to the Malayan Emergency (and even WWII). Often mentioned postings include 
the Indian Northwest frontier, Palestine and East Africa. Colonel Humphrey Williams for instance, 
whose mother was South African, saw service in East Africa prior to the emergency.549 Former 
officers William Tee and Michael Jones were both born in India.550 Lower ranked Harold Atkins 
grew up in Canada and later saw action in Palestine before being posted to Southeast Asia.551 
And as outlined in chapter two, much of Malaya’s high command was steeped in Indian traditions. 
This insinuates that South Asia rather than Southeast Asia represented the preferred destination 
for career soldiers. 
     The question is how lasting and intense that overseas impact was and whether any kind of 
attachment resulted from it. There, reservations seep in. George Tullis might have been surprised 
by the number of British he encountered in Malaya during his return trip.552 Yet within this research 
sample only Lieutenant-Colonel John Cross is known to have stayed behind, albeit in Nepal.553 
Generally, such deliberations on imperial bearings highlight the importance of age, posting, rank 
and class. In other words: the Malayan Emergency saw the arrival of seasoned officers and NCOs 
(subconsciously) influenced by empire but also rather untouched junior ranks. Even so, it seems 
as if even (former) professional officers have reserved their attachment to the army itself, a 
particular regiment and its regional origins. Colonel Richard Miers, for instance, devoted the first 
chapter of his memoirs to his regiment’s Welsh embedment rather than to a discussion of its 
imperial tours. His sigh of relief upon returning from another overseas posting is telling:  
 
                                                          
545  David Wright, previously a regular officer with the Royal Artillery, remembered learning about the empire in 
history and geography lessons. See questionnaire, 24.7.2007. 
546  Questionnaire, 12.7.2007. Ellkington served in Malaya as an RASC officer. 
547  Questionnaire, 5.6.2007 
548  Interview, 21.8.2006 
549  Interview, 15.10.1979, IWM, 6185. Williams commanded a KAR battalion in Malaya. 
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the Gurkha Rifles. 
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... I could enjoy to the full the matchless pleasure of those first few days at home after a long 
period spent overseas – days when one appreciates as never before the orderliness and 
cleanliness of our towns and villages; the rich, healthy greenness of our fields in contrast to 
the faded drabness of those left behind; the fact that [...] everywhere, one can speak English 
and be understood. It is good to be home...554 
  
     Apart from such respite, it is rather tricky to spot evidence of anyone consuming all those 
empire-related radio shows, newsreels, newspaper sections and novels quoted in literature on 
imperial culture. The most frequent answers by veterans in regard to their interests prior to their 
military tours involve football, rugby and cricket.555 Equally, no-one mentioned having eaten lamb 
from New Zealand or pineapples from Malaya. Most likely, their families lacked the funds to do 
so. Nor did any veterans consulted profess that their work depended on imperial markets although 
such reliance could have been very subtle or even unknown to them. All this underscores that 
imperial influences might well have existed in some cases but that they have proven difficult to 
assess for witnesses and researchers alike.  
 
Having explored possible reasons for the limited soldierly remembrance of and attachment to 
Malaya, let us now analyse reactions to specific aspects of that territory. 
 
 
Infrastructure, centres of population, work/living conditions and health 
 
Reading and listening to military recollections, one could be excused from deducing that the often 
rather primitive and fragile roads, tracks, buildings, bridges, villages and towns have left little 
traces in soldierly memories. The same goes for the not always strong health of the territory’s 
inhabitants. Where they cropped up, judgements of Britain’s imperial record have often been 
remarkably benevolent. But noting that “conditions were reasonable”556 does not necessarily 
portend obliviousness to the frequently deficient state of sanitation or infrastructure. It might 
simply reflect other priorities or certain assumptions as to what one could expect. Indeed, the 
average response offered by veterans in regard to Malaya’s infrastructure vary between citing 
lack of time to pay much attention and referring to Asian (or non-western) norms in the 1950s. 
Robert Hall, at the time a regular store-man and driver with REME,557 conceded that he never 
had much time to dwell on above subjects. David Wright, a regular officer with the Royal Artillery, 
held that one had to judge infrastructure and living conditions by the (general) standards of the 
territory. Geoff Parkes for his part, a driver, medic and air dispatcher during his army days, found 
the sanitation for non-Europeans “very poor” without adding specific reasons for his conclusion.558 
                                                          
554  Miers, Shoot to Kill, 19-25 (quote on p. 19). 
555  See for instance questionnaire completed on 9.9.2007 by former Royal Marine, Raymond Hill. 
556  Questionnaire filled out by P. S. Leigh on 26.9.2007. He acted as platoon commander and intelligence officer. 
557  Royal Engineering and Mechanical Engineers. 
558  Questionnaires, July 2007. 
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     A few former soldiers referred to WWII and indirectly to the Japanese occupation (but less to 
the succeeding BMA or the pre-war administration) when pondering on structural deficiencies in 
Malaya.559 These were considerable as a BMA report highlighted. Its authors lamented in 
particular the shortage of road transport, which hampered efforts to distribute food and help the 
Malayan economy back on its feet.560 Yet their complaints to some extent hid their own blunders. 
In analysing the BMA’s legacy Martin Rudner has principally criticised the former’s habit of 
outsourcing crucial supply services to questionable parties and the refusal to pay adequate wages 
to local labour.561 
     Nevertheless, the official, and it seems widely accepted, version has been that the Japanese 
occupation had caused all social and economic problems plaguing Malaya after the war.562 Owing 
to their initially rapid expansion and the allied counter-attacks the (new) invaders did indeed 
destroy or dismantle a considerable part of the infrastructure, some of which found its way to the 
Burma-Thailand railway. The effect of this plundering did not escape British soldiers serving 
during the Malayan Emergency – even if the realisation had to be forced on them. One RAF unit 
for example got lost in the jungle for six days due to its reliance on a 1936 ordnance survey map. 
The latter still featured railway tracks, which had been dismantled by the Japanese, while the 
jungle had overgrown what little remained.563  
     Yet Japanese interference could not in every case conceal the limited British development of 
Malaya and the latter’s almost purely economic interest. A look at contemporary maps564 reveals 
that western Malaya, home to the tin and rubber industry and targeted by the communist 
guerrillas,565 possessed a reasonable network of roads, as well as two major railway lines. In 
contrast, the eastern two-thirds of Malaya were almost completely devoid of such arteries.566 
Since British and Commonwealth troops were deployed in the west to counter the communist 
threat they can be excused for regarding the area as fairly developed. 
     Even seemingly solid infrastructure did not always withstand closer scrutiny. Called on by his 
shocked wife, General Templer at one point inspected a derelict tuberculosis hospital in Kuala 
Lumpur. The doctor in charge had informed his wife that the only way for the necessary repairs to 
be undertaken would be an accident by an important person. One strong kick by Templer produced 
a wide hole in the floor and prompted the arrival of the Public Works Department the next day.567 
                                                          
559  See for instance form filled out by anonymous on 7.7.2007. 
560  ‘Report on the British Military Administration of Malaya, September 1945 to March 1946’, by H. R. Hone,  
1946. Rhodes House/Oxford University, 915.13 s. 6 (1946:1). 
561  M. Rudner, ‘The Organisation of the British Military Administration in Malaya, 1945-46’, Journal of Southeast 
Asian History, vol. 9, no. 1, March 1968, pp. 95-106. Reprinted and held at Rhodes House/Oxford University, 
915.16r 21 (5) 
562  In an official documentary the commentator described how the Japanese had destroyed large parts of the 
infrastructure and neglected the needs of the population. In addition, they had left behind a legacy of theft and 
corruption. See: ‘Voices of Malaya’, IWM, COI 670. 
563  L. Rayner, Emergency Years: Malaya 1951-1954 (1991), pp. 47-9. 
564  The one consulted in this context is included in General Bower’s previously quoted report, NA, WO 106/5990. 
565  This targeting might also have had symbolic reasons. As James Walvin has pointed out, plantations represented 
“an obvious (and generally malignant) bastion of colonial interests”. See J. Walvin, Fruits of Empire. Exotic 
Produce and British Taste, 1660-1800 (1997), p. 151. 
566  A British woman engaged in social work in Malaya noticed in 1953 that the main route to the east coast was  
simply a mud road. See Sheenan, Out in the Midday Sun, 332. 
567  Cloake, Templer, 281.  
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But an ordinary serviceman would have had little reason to visit a public hospital in Malaya as the 
army ran its own facilities.  
     Where changes were initiated, they did not necessarily result in improvements, either. This held 
particularly true for the New Villages. Hailed as the solution to the problem of the emergency, 
sanitation in these communities left much to be desired, agricultural land was often poor and the 
villages’ administrations beset by corruption.568 While the British communication machinery largely 
overlooked these problems,569 Colonel Miers made the following observations when he visited a 
resettlement near Kluang: 
 
It was a dreary, depressing place surrounded as usual by a thick and rusty barbed-wire fence. 
[…] Living conditions in the villages and estate lines were still very primitive. In some cases long 
wooden huts were divided into cubicles and shared by several families, one cubicle for a small 
family, two for a large [one]. Each cubicle was again divided by the tenants into living and 
sleeping rooms, with a shelf a couple of feet above the floor on which the whole family slept. 
Except for electric light there were strictly no modern conveniences; water was carried from a 
tap outside.570 
 
      Dennis Leek, a RASC driver in Malaya, wrote: “... the accommodation [...] was bad. I know 
this because I worked on the resettlement programme.” Unsurprisingly, Peter Franklin, a National 
Serviceman and clerk, concluded that: “People didn’t like resettlements.”571 Given his unit, one 
can assume that he, too, was involved in forced relocations. Yet it appears as if few servicemen, 
who were in some way concerned with the New Villages, have found these experiences worthy of 
much contemplation. Earlier quoted Tony Hamilton suspected during a patrol along a village’s 
fences that insurgents had infiltrated to collect food. In the interview he elucidated in great detail the 
dubious demeanour of a Chinese family he encountered. But he remembered most vividly the 
mayhem he caused when he fired shots into a shack, which turned out to contain nothing but 
chicken. The probably rather cramped housing conditions and lack of sanitation appear to have left 
little impression.572 Perhaps with reason. In many cases these communities would probably have 
compared favourably with some of the camps soldiers had to content themselves with. In the May 
1954 issue of the Royal Hampshire Regimental Journal the authors described D Company’s camp 
near Kota Tinggi as “in a pretty poor condition”. Perhaps even this didn’t dent soldiers’ morale much, 
as many had witnessed the destruction brought about by German bombardments during WWII.  
     Some members of the higher military echelons recognised the potential for unrest in Malaya and 
the sympathy for communism triggered by poor infrastructure. Labourers’ accommodations were a 
particular concern. To deal with such issues Templer set up the Combined Emergency Planning 
                                                          
568  Harper, The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya, 176. 
569  One of the villages, Yong Peng, became the subject of a cheerful documentary. Its commentator began the 
latter by stating that: “Young Peng is certainly a place for happy families.” He then went on to describe how the 
villagers could buy wood from the local saw mill free of interest and grew vegetables on the spot. The village’s 
school was built largely through collected funds and attended by the villagers in the evening. The commentator 
admitted that not all villages were up to the same standards and that “some might never achieve it.” See: ‘Proudly 
Presenting Yong Peng’, Malayan Film Unit, 1954, IWM, COI 621.  
570  Miers, Shoot to Kill, 36-7. 
571  Questionnaires, July 2007. 
572  Interview, 19.9.2006. 
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Staff (CEPS). ‘Templer’s spies’, as they were jokingly and angrily referred to, toured the territory to 
look for and report on trouble spots while also attending State War Executive Committees (SWECs). 
One of them was Lieutenant-Colonel Napier Crookenden who felt that “… even in the best-run 
British plantations the labour lines where they [the tappers] lived were disgracefully primitive. No 
proper running water, no proper latrines – really extremely poor […] management.”573 Templer’s 
insistence on improvements prompted resistance from the United Planter’s Association (UPAN). 
Nonetheless, positive examples existed. One was an estate run by a Swedish manager, who had 
set up proper accommodation, including sanitation and even badminton courts for his workforce. 
The manager suggested to the visiting Major Halliday that such improvements could best quell 
communist sympathies. Halliday later found out that the man was widely disliked by his British 
colleagues who, according to the major, were “constantly trying to keep down the level of wages 
paid to their tappers”.574  
     As with labour and squatter accommodation, one notes a paucity of commentaries on ordinary 
villages, towns and cities. In the case of Singapore that is somewhat understandable as most 
servicemen merely passed through this bustling city – unless they were dispatched there again 
during the Maria Hertogh Riots.575 Only passing references have been made to places like Ipoh or 
Taiping, home to the vital tin industries, or Penang, eventually to become the “street-food capital of 
the world”.576 Part of the reason for skipping the topic undoubtedly lies in the fact that many areas 
were out-of-bounds for soldiers.577  
     Among the few commentators has figured former NCO Ron Stevens, who served in Malaya with 
the RASC.578 He mentioned that Singapore appeared “to be picking up with trade and businesses 
after the Japanese occupation”. Stevens also remembered that in 1949 many villages (kampongs) 
still consisted of shacks with little hygiene facilities.579 Lengthier observations of Singapore feature 
in the memoirs of earlier named Oliver Crawford. During a short taxi ride to an officers’ club he 
monitored the following scenes: 
 
We were driving down long straight streets, crammed with strange traffic, choked with harsh 
tangled noises, garish with colour – with white walls and dark shutters, with pavements always 
arcaded under an upper story, vanishing behind pillars, getting lost in shop-fronts and kitchens. 
Street after street followed, all the same, full of moving figures, wild traffic, and these strange 
shop-fronts, as artificial-looking and tawdry as theatre-sets. [...] All was confusion – shouting 
                                                          
573  Interview, 2.1.1996, IWM, 16395. Napier Crookenden acted as chairman of the CEPS in the director of  
operations’ HQ. 
574  Unpublished and undated memoirs by the former company commander. Record found at the Royal Hampshire 
regimental museum in Winchester. 
575  During these riots several Europeans were killed, among them British soldiers. The troubles originated in the 
decision of the local courts to hand back a young Dutch girl to her original parents. The latter had been forced 
to leave her behind after the Japanese attack. A Malay family had then adopted and raised her according to 
Muslim traditions. When her parents returned they found that she had been married to a Malay man through 
arrangement. They demanded her back which her new family refused. The Dutch couple then took the case to 
court, which ordered the young woman to be kept in a Catholic convent while the case was debated. News of 
this reached the wider population causing outrage among Malays. It took the police and the army several days 
to restore calm and order. See Harper, The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya, 335 and 337.  
576  W. Beinart & L. Hughes, Environment and Empire: The Oxford History of the British Empire Companion  
Series (2007), pp. 154 and 163. 
577  George Tullis recalled that large parts of Kuala Lumpur were off-limits for soldiers. See interview, 25.4.2007. 
578  Royal Army Service Corps. 
579  Questionnaire, 6.6.2007. 
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men, cavernous gutters full of garbage, black-eyed Chinese children, faces watching from upper 
windows. The streets had so many dimensions – their life continued sideways through open 
shop-fronts into kitchens with flickering orange fires, into bedrooms and storehouses; it 
continued out through alleyways where confused groups could be glimpsed between cracked 
walls and pavements where children and dogs crawled in the litter; it continued upwards, by 
staircases to second and third floors where wooden shutters were thrown back in the forlorn 
hope of letting coolness into dark cluttered rooms. From a taxi window one could see only the 
ceilings of these rooms, hung across with clothes-lines and poles, lanterns and bird-cages and 
bundles...580 
 
      Evidently, certain stereotypes of Chinese life – it was mostly them who have inhabited Singapore 
– surface in this commentary. One can read into it a sense of mysteriousness but also chaos, 
filthiness, misery and overpopulation. 
     Such hints are as close as it gets in regard to references to health, unless one presses veterans 
on the issue. There is an obvious, possible reason for this. Soldiers, usually not equipped with the 
eyes of experienced doctors, had little reason to suspect that Malay villagers, Chinese miners or 
Tamil rubber tappers were sick or undernourished – at least not any more than the servicemen 
themselves. The latter knew only too well what it meant to go hungry or to suffer from malaria, 
leptospirosis,581 ringworm and unidentified fevers. Few sources do not feature at least one accident 
or illness.582 
     On contemporary photographs many British soldiers also appear, if not emaciated, then at least 
very lean regardless of tasks, units, posting or period.583 Former National Serviceman Leslie Ives 
offered an explanation. During a short leave on the island of Penang resting, swimming and dancing 
with local women were only of secondary priority. To quote the author: “I daresay much of our 
spending was on food. We were still eternally hungry. Much to the surprise of many a waiter we 
would eat a substantial meal – and then ask for the same again! In those days I found it hard to put 
so much as a pound on.”584 Nobody has directly lamented the scarcity and monotony of military 
rations but it appears from such testimonies that the effect of war-time restrictions lingered on.  
     Britain saw the introduction of rationing by the Ministry of Food and the Board of Trade in 
January 1940. The regulations entailed limitations on food items, clothes, footwear and even 
furniture, with some exceptions for certain groups. For most of the population, including future 
soldiers, this meant dull meals, long queuing, low consumption and old clothes. After the war the 
government even extended the scheme, which did not fully disappear until 1954.585  
     In view of this, servicemen might have found the scenes in Malaya quite familiar. Ex-sapper 
George Gibson for example or the previously quoted Ron Stevens found the general health and 
                                                          
580  Crawford, The Door Marked Malaya, 16. 
581  Leptospirosis is caused by the accidental absorption of a bacteria that has been shed through animals’ urine.  
It triggers a number of troubles. See www.tropmedres.ac. 
582  As always there are exceptions to the rule: Robert Hall, a former REME driver, escaped without ailments. It  
undoubtedly helped that he didn’t have to go on patrols. 
583  See for instance the group pictures of the 1st Battalion the Royal Hampshire Regiment in the regimental journal,  
February 1955. 
584  Ives, A Musket for the King, 103. 




living conditions decent (despite the latter’s earlier comments on villages). The latter added that 
the children were “well dressed”. Others noticed slightly unhealthy looking locals but do not seem 
to have been overly concerned by it. Instead, several veterans cited the international context. 
Archibald Elkington commented: “For a developing nation I thought they [health and living 
conditions] were good.”586 Some former servicemen provided more pessimistic assessments 
without further elaborations. For David Sleeth for instance, a regular sapper, health and living 
conditions in the territory were simply “poor”. One veteran and ex-infantryman587 hinted at the 
impact of WWII when commenting: “Being only five years after the Second World War the non-
Europeans looked rather poor in health, especially children”.588 His comments fit the picture 
painted by members of the Division of Nutrition at the Institute for Medical Research of the 
Federation of Malaya. In their study589 the authors concentrated on Malay and Indian 
smallholders, fishermen and labourers. They found low levels of protein, vitamin, iron and calcium 
levels, which reached serious deficiencies among children. Infection with intestinal helminths590 
was widespread. What struck the authors most was that Malayan children “looked dejected and 
lifeless” while often showing “cracked lips, angular stomatitis591 and tongue changes”. The 
authors admitted that, besides economic problems, eating traditions, especially the over-use of 
rice, played their part.  
 
 
Climate, vegetation and wildlife  
 
Malaya’s exotic environment, too, has inspired few eulogies among (former) servicemen, let alone 
imperial references. Among these could have figured visits to zoos or botanic gardens (i.e. Kew 
Gardens) or paintings and literature. Most recollections have unwittingly echoed Somerset 
Maughan’s depiction of a green hell swallowing inexperienced intruders, and of a climate slowly 
draining men’s energies.592 Where veterans have made any allusions they have not gone to 
classic writers but to Spencer Chapman. The latter spent part of WWII in the jungle with the 
MPAJA and later turned his experiences into a book.593  
       The ambiguous memories are understandable. Jungle patrols in Malaya were gruelling 
affairs, especially for newly arrived recruits. Oliver Crawford depicted such a back-breaking 
march: 
 
                                                          
586  Questionnaires, June and July, 2007.  
587  He wished to remain anonymous. 
588  Questionnaires, 5 and 12.7.2007. 
589  R. C. Burgess and Laidin Bin Alang Musa, ‘Report on the state of health, the diet and the economic conditions 
of groups of people in the lower income levels in Malaya’, 1950, Rhodes House/Oxford University, 915.12 r. 58 (3).  
590  A parasitic worm. See www.medterms.com. 
591  Inflammation, often accompanied by infection at the edges of the mouth. See www.gpnotebook.co.uk. 
592  An experienced Malayan police officer tells the narrator in one short story of the Far Eastern Tales: “You haven’t 
lived out East all your life. It ages one before one’s time. One’s an elderly man at fifty and at fifty-five one’s good 
for nothing but the scrap-heap.” (p. 9) In another section a scientist’s wife gets lost in the jungle and is never 
found again after being left behind by the young assistant she had fallen in love with. (pp. 234-9). 
593  F. S. Chapman, The Jungle is Neutral (1949). 
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Our feet slipped in the mud, straining and squelching. My chest heaved like a bellows, and I 
gasped through lips salty with trickling sweat. One hand held my carbine – with the other I 
hauled at roots, wiped the sweat from my eyes in a shower of drops, pressed deep in the mud 
as I staggered. Soon I was desperate. […] I knew only that my world had contracted to a 
hillside of reddish clay, tangled with roots like rhododendrons, deluged with water that dripped 
off every leaf and soaked my clothes and ran down my sweating filthy body in rivulets, a 
hillside up which I now had to struggle, up and up and up.594 
 
     Returning after several days Crawford concluded that he hated ‘jungle bashing’. So did many 
other veterans.595 But a minority blossomed in the unusual surroundings. They liked the outdoors 
and maybe a degree of solitude. They managed to keep fitter than the rest and possessed a 
stoical character. Peter Maule-Ffinch claimed to have been one of them, recounting: “The jungle 
to me was a very pleasant place, really. Provided you were aware that you couldn’t force yourself 
through the occasionally very dense underground, you could move along reasonably well”, he 
commented. Like others, he pointed out that the jungle’s interior was less compact than its fringes. 
One only had to get used to the fact that large trees filtered out most of the daylight.596 Yet the 
darkness, a myriad of ghastly animal and insect sounds, as well as the constant fear of ambushes 
caused occasional breakdowns among troops.597 
     The British high command soon saw the need to better prepare soldiers for jungle patrols. 
Midway through the emergency a Jungle Warfare School was set up in Johore Baru, at the 
southern tip of Malaya. There, experienced personnel, often Australian, introduced newly arrived 
recruits into the jungle’s secrets. The training brought home the stark contrast to Britain’s 
environment. As former private Ryan recounted: “… it was an eye opener because we done our 
training originally in Friday Woods. I mean, there was no heat in Friday woods in May, June. [...] 
Suddenly we get a sweaty monsoon, rain and everything thrown at you.”598  
     The Malayan climate indeed produced daily and at times bucketing rain, which swept away 
entire army camps. Intense heat and moisture contributed to conditions whereby servicemen 
rarely wore dry clothes. Trousers and shirts seldom lasted for more than one jungle tour while 
skin problems abounded. Despite these difficulties most servicemen got used to the situation, as 
had earlier explorers, businessmen, administrators and missionaries.  
     Judging from sources, the sapping heat had probably the greatest impact. One IWM 
documentary shows engineers engaged in repair work for a helicopter. Most striking are the slow 
movements and the fact that the men wear only shoes and shorts. Given the many requests for 
the few available helicopters the slowness cannot have been due to idleness but must have been 
imposed by the extreme climate.599  
                                                          
594  Crawford, The Door Marked Malaya, 37. 
595  Frederick Hudson’s wish to opt out of office work to go into the jungle was met with bewilderment by his 
superiors. The latter were bombarded by requests to exempt soldiers from such incursions. See Loyal to the 
End, 75. 
596   Interview, 16.2.1988, IWM, 10120. 
597  Previously cited Tony Hamilton remembered:“… it was nerve-racking. Some blokes broke down and cried.  
Couldn’t cope with it. Just went berserk. Ran off.” Interview, 19.9.2006. 
598   Interview, 5.5.1998, IWM, 18006. 
599  Untitled film sponsored by the admiralty, January 1956, IWM, AMD 1570.  
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     Adaption knew its limits as problems befell soldiers quickly and easily. But all these ills have 
been recorded without much ado. Formerly conscripted telephone operator Brian Lloyd casually 
remarked that he must have contracted Malaria somewhere but figured that it could also have 
been on a later trip to Southeast Asia.600 The flippant attitude towards such problems raises 
questions about the perception of good or bad health. What soldiers regarded as a minor physical 
difficulty back then might today lead to immediate repatriation. In this context it is worth mentioning 
that practically no veteran has claimed to have suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. This 
doesn’t mean that it didn’t exist but rather that it was not recognised. As former private White put it: 
“…back then, it was, ‘get a grip, pull yourself together!’ ”601  
     In line with other environmental aspects, veterans’ recollections have not covered rubber 
plantations in great detail. One could put this down to the fact that even by the 1960s rubber only 
covered about six percent of the landscape or fifteen percent of the cultivable land respectively. 
But Malaya became Britain’s most profitable tropical possession from the middle of the 20th 
century, mostly because of rubber. These led to over one million hectares being under cultivation 
by 1922. Astonishingly, production doubled from 409,000 tonnes in 1946 to 915,000 tonnes in 
1966.602 Army units spent considerable time patrolling these areas. Even so, hardly any veterans 
have reminisced about the long rows of trees or tappers’ delicate but monotonous work, so artfully 
depicted in Wargnier’s Indochine. 
     Veterans have commented slightly more on animals and insects. Accounts of them had little 
to do with the colourful and friendly creatures depicted in Kippling’s Jungle Book of 1894, which 
some might have read during their childhood. Perhaps the lean and mean tiger Shere Khan found 
its way into soldiers imagination during patrols. Real encounters were extremely rare but not 
unheard of. Former member of the New Zealand Regiment, Frank Burdett, was attacked by a 
formidable beast while asleep in a jungle camp. Only the presence of his colleagues prompted 
the animal to give up its badly injured prey.603 
     The much more frequent snakes appear often in documents and interviews but usually without 
extensive contemplations on form, colours and habits. The norm for references are short, chilling 
but also often comical.604 The frequent anecdotes could give the impression that the reptiles 
crawled everywhere when in fact they avoided contact. But the few pythons sighted caused men 
to abandon their bath in a river or lake, even though no actual attacks have been reported. Only 
the king cobra demonstrated such aggression. One representative crossed a jungle camp causing 
havoc among soldiers.605  
     Elephants, too, have occasionally surfaced in sources, even though no-one actually ran into 
them. The real menace stemmed from insects. Mosquitoes turned many ambushes into 
nightmares while ants could force platoons to abandon their patrol. Hornets for their part caused 
                                                          
600  Interview, 8.8.2007. 
601  www.britains-smallwars.com/malaya/windo.htm. White did his National Service presumably as a private. 
602  Beinart & Hughes, Environment and Empire (OHBECS), 239 and 246. 
603  www.britains-smallwars.com/malaya/Frank/index.html. 
604  One exception to the rule is the rather talkative Philip Longbon who spent much of the interview conducted with 
him describing a huge snake. See interview by C. Allen for BBC Radio 4,1983, IWM, 8451. Longbon served in 
Malaya in an infantry regiment. 
605  Major Halliday’s memoirs. 
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potentially more physical damage than a guerrilla attack. Major Gibb evoked a swarm’s assault 
on a camp in an unusually vivid description. It left one soldier unconscious and several others out 
of action for days.606 
      
 
Local communities  
 
It is perhaps a measure of the limitations imposed on (peaceful) human interactions that the 
complexity of Malayan society has not been reflected in military memory. Only Malays, Chinese, 
Indians, Europeans and Eurasians have found their way into reminiscences. (Dayak trackers 
could technically be included but they were recruited in Borneo specifically for the emergency.) 
However, places along the west coast, such as Penang Island, boasted many other groups, such 
as Siamese, Burmese, Arabs and even Africans.607 
     Philosophical reflections even on the main, five groups have not been particularly plentiful 
despite opportunities for closer examination. Indian char- and dhobi-wallahs608 belonged to most 
camps for example. Tamils constituted a considerable part of the working force on estates,609 
which in turn were managed by Europeans. Malay drivers became increasingly numerous within 
the RASC and its successor, REME.610 Chinese staffed shops, cinemas or restaurants while 
dominating in the New Villages. Many Eurasians for their part worked in the military and civilian 
administration. Furthermore, British company and platoon selections competed in various sports 
games against each other or against local teams.611    
     Accounts of such games give a measure of the relative effortlessness with which soldiers of 
various backgrounds and locals mingled on such occasions. One match worth quoting stems from 
Major Arthur Campbell, who described it as follows: 
 
In the afternoon we went across the football ground to watch a game which had been 
organised against the local police. The opposition consisted of a mixture of Malays and 
Indians. […] The Dyaks and Sakai612 came streaming out of their bashas to join the fun. They 
made futile efforts to kick the ball [...] They spent most of the time flat on their backs but they, 
and the Sakai womenfolk who were lining the edge of the ground, thought the whole 
performance a huge joke. Needless to say, the soldiers thought so too, and gave them every 
encouragement. The game soon got under way with Tilley refereeing. He had to exert his iron 
                                                          
606  A Walk in the Forest, unpublished memoirs, 1945-1950, IWM (documents), 1884 (box 86/3/1). 
607  J. Nagata, Malaysian Mosaic: Perspectives from a Poly-Ethnic Society (1979), p. 21 (table originally taken from 
J. Low, The British Settlement of Penang (1836/1972), pp. 125-6. 
608  Char-wallahs were usually food and drink vendors while dhobi-wallahs engaged in laundry and tailoring 
services. Both had traditional connections with the British Army. See: 
www.bbc.co.uk/ww2peopleswar/stories/58/94427958.shtml. 
609  The majority of plantation workers were recruited among Tamil-speaking Hindus from South-India. See Beinart 
& Hughes, Environment and Empire (OHBECS), 242. 
610  In 1951 REME became the branch responsible for practically all of the army's equipments and engineering 
manpower, thereby absorbing technical units from other branches. See: 
www.rememuseum.org.uk/remeass/history.htm. 
611  See for instance: Major H. G. Parkin (ed.)The Rifle Brigade Chronicle for 1957, regimental Museum, Winchester. 
612  Early, derogatory term for aborigines. 
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discipline more and more as the game wore on. In the end the police won. The score was 2-
nil, though one of the goals was hotly disputed in four different languages.613  
 
     It is telling that three groups were absent in this encounter: British expatriates, Eurasians and 
Chinese. The ensuing analysis of relations between army personnel and these groups will offer 
some explanations. 
     The relaxed atmosphere described in the testimony above is a fairly evocative account of the 
few interactions recalled, except in cases when insurgents, their supporters and resettled 
squatters were involved. One can question such a rosy picture but there is simply not much 
evidence of open hatred and clashes between servicemen on the one hand and Malays, Indians 
or aborigines on the other. Only former National Serviceman, Roland Howes, felt, without further 
elaborating, that: “The population didn’t seem to like the Brits.”614  
     Generally, one gains the impression that British soldiers didn’t particularly take to or resent 
representatives of the various local communities (with the exception of the Chinese). They 
conversely put them in the context of their tours, tasks and the conflict in general.615 Servicemen 
judged not so much features and habits but attitudes and actions towards them and the 
belligerents. They appreciated the often delicious meals prepared and the efficient cleaning and 
ironing services provided by locals. But if Malay policemen failed to effectively support army units 
or if Indians demanded exorbitant interest rates, their communities on the whole could appear in 
a negative light. That said, it is difficult to ascertain what soldiers effectively witnessed themselves 
and what they gathered from colleagues. Either way, conclusions could be rather crude. Earlier 
quoted Tony Rodgers ironically but matter-of-factly stated: “The Chinese used to own everything. 
The Tamil population would be the workers and the Malays would sleep all day.”616 While such 
labels sound racist in today’s world, Rodgers did not seem to have guarded any hostile sentiments 
in regard to the three communities, particularly not the last two. 
     Even among the more tolerant and thoughtful observers one cannot help sensing a certain 
detachment. Relationships, in some cases upheld after the emergency through correspondence, 
appear to have been based mainly on mutual respect and shared experiences. What is somehow 
missing are strong and affectionate friendships embracing life beyond the military and the 
emergency. (Perhaps such intimate relationships have remained rare among veterans 
themselves.) These are admittedly the thoughts of a younger and foreign observer. But another 
non-British witness came to similar conclusions at the time. Earlier cited Robert Dibon observed 
the following scene during his stopover in Singapore: 
 
Young Chinese women dressed in tight silk dresses [...] split up to the thighs, are walking by, 
indifferent to their success with some French, whose eyes widen with coveted astonishment 
                                                          
613  Campbell, Jungle Green, 66-7. 
614  Questionnaire, June-July 2007 (undated). In the subsequent phone conversation Howes could not elaborate  
on this point. 
615  Again, there have been exceptions: One respondent, who preferred not to be named, cited the fascinating encounters 
with other ethnicities as a reason to later study social anthropology. He served in Malaya as an instructor with 
the Royal Army Educational Corps. 
616  Interview, 21.8.2006. 
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and admiration. They are not for sale but for conquest and we do not have the time to show 
to them that the French are otherwise less cold than the English who cleave through this crowd 
with the greatest indifference.617 
 
     One could object that the nature of Dibon’s and his colleagues’ interest was not so much 
sociological but rather sexual. Even so and as we will see, other French soldiers eagerly reached 
out to local communities in Indochina, even if their methods were not always appreciated by the 
population.  
     In contrast, Peter Maule-Ffinch’s categorisations of the multi-ethnic labour force employed on 
the plantation, where he worked as an assistant manager after his military tour, are rather 
business-like: 
 
Different races have different characteristics. They’re useful for different things […] If you want 
sheer, hard work […] force to bear then you weren’t gonna [get] a harder worker than a Tamil. 
If you want intelligent work done […] but not done too quickly you’d use a Malay because he’s 
a happy sort of guy, fairly intelligent. And they do things gently, stoically and got a light touch. 
If you got a job that doesn’t require too much care and attention but people actually do it on a 
task basis […] you get to a Chinese. […] The amount of problems you had depended on your 
labour force’s racial mix to that degree. [speaking of strikes] Tamils like that sort of thing. […] 
It’s racial. I’m not knocking on it. They’re great guys but we all have different characteristics 
[…] The Chinese can’t be bothered unless there’s a penny in it. […] He’d rather go out and 
work. He’s more of an individual where’s the Tamil is a guy for the mass. And the Malays can’t 
be bothered about anything anyway […] in broad brush terms.618 
 
     The statement exposes several typical aspects, which can often be found in the few, more 
multifarious recollections. To begin with, the author was relatively well spoken. He assumed a 
civilian task after the end of his military tour, which brought him into closer contact with locals. He 
judged based on his experiences at work and did not simply reproduce what he had gathered 
from others. Most importantly, above judgements were determined by the perceived contributions 
each of the ethnic group could make towards increasing production. Consequently, Maule-Ffinch 
refrained from protracted philosophical debates. He also appears to have ignored exceptions to 
the rule, as well as the possible roots of his workers’ behaviour. These might have had more to 
do with the prevailing, precarious conditions on the estates than with ethnic characteristics. What 
managers or soldiers regarded as troublesome might in reality have been a justified attempt to 
bargain for better conditions. What they deemed lazy might in truth have been a physical 
adjustment to a trying climate or even a result of physical illnesses.  
     Although Edward Said mostly referred to western perceptions of Islam and Arabs, his 
arguments regarding representations can be applied to British military opinions of Malays – 
not least because the latter have been overwhelmingly Muslim. Said held that:  
 
                                                          
617  SHD, box 1K 330. 
618  Interview, 16.2.1988 IWM, 10120. 
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… the real issue is whether indeed there can be a true representation of anything, or whether 
any and all representations, because they are representations, are embedded first in the 
language and then in the culture, institutions, and political ambience of the representer. If the 
latter alternative is the correct one […], then we must be prepared to accept the fact that a 
representation is eo ipso implicated, intertwined, embedded, interwoven with a great many 
other things besides the ‘truth’, which is itself a representation.619 
 
     Evidently, Maule-Ffinch borrowed from adjectives anchored in British traditions and classified 
ethnicities based on British standards. 
     That said, serving alongside Malays, Indians, Gurkhas, Africans or Fijians during WWII and 
the emergency often diminished potential feelings of superiority and difference vis-à-vis non-
Europeans.620 Racism may not have been absent among British troops – particularly in relations 
to Chinese – but interactions could potentially have been more strained. Still, formerly conscripted 
subaltern John Veys found that many ordinary soldiers and NCOs displayed a worrying degree 
of bigotry towards non-Europeans. He suspected that such racialism owed to general misgivings 
of having to serve so far away from home.621 Major Campbell quoted a soldier commenting on 
the troubled communal situation in Malaya and possible strategies as stating: “I’ll admit it it’s not 
our country but all these niggers who live here look to us to see that the place is decently run. 
You may say that we got ourselves into it – well, so we have, but now we’re in it we’ve got to send 
those Chinks back to where they came from.”622  
 
But let us now have a closer look at the labels attached to the various groups. They are grouped 





To understand the often rather fleeting comments on this group it needs to be recalled that the 
British administration and military focused their efforts not primarily on the most numerous ethnic 
group in Malaya but on the Chinese. The latter made up the bulk of the rebel movement and their 
support base, the Min Yuen. The fact that the average Malay often lived in small and remote 
villages, so called kampongs, near the coast and along rivers further reduced the chance of 
                                                          
619  Said, Orientalism, 272.  
620  Many senior officers, who had commanded non-European troops in WWII and after, were full of praise for their 
men. See for instance interview with Adrian Evill, formerly a KAR officer, on July 1.7.1987, IWM, 9854. 
621  Questionnaire, 1.6.2007 and subsequent phone conversation a few days later. 
622  Campbell, Jungle Green, 93 (as quoted in V. Purcell’s, Malaya: Communist or Free? (1954), p. 241). 
623  In 1952 the Colonial Office and the Central Office of Information published and distributed a booklet titled 
“Malaya – The Facts Behind the Fighting”. In it the authors estimated the figures for Malays, Chinese and Indians 
(South Asians) as follows: 2,631,000, 2,044,000 and 586,000. See Rhodes House/Oxford University, 915.17 
r.18 (6). 
624  The definition itself is rather ambiguous. Immigrants and their offspring from Indonesia (and other nearby 
islands) have often defined their origins depending on circumstances and official criteria (as have to some extent 
Indian Muslims or Arabs). If economic and political preferences required being Malay, as they increasingly have 
after independence, they have identified themselves as such while privately insisting on being Indonesian. See 
Nagata, Malaysian Mosaic, 43-9. 
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bumping into him or her. Moreover, Malays did not constitute the main part of the labour force on 
rubber plantations or tin mines.625 In fact, it had precisely been their seeming reluctance to work 
there, which had led to the influx of Chinese and Indian labour. Yet Nagata has offered an 
alternative view, namely that the British actively consigned the Malays to administration and 
agriculture, leaving other branches open to immigrants.626 A by-product of this development was 
a changing demographic landscape in Malaya over the decades, which explains the mostly hostile 
reaction by Malays to the Chinese-dominated insurgency.  
     The average serviceman encountered representatives of the main ethnic group in the form of 
usually junior policemen, drivers and mechanics at military bases. There the latter appears to 
have left an ambiguous impression. The definitions used for Malays vary between the more 
positive “always smiling and laughing” to the blunter “lazy”.627 It appears as if (ex-)soldiers (have) 
regarded this ethnic body as neither terribly helpful nor overly threatening.628  
      The more complex opinions on Malays have, again, sprung from somewhat untypical people. 
They were either in charge of Malay units, switched to the police or mingled with the highest 
military ranks. Of the sources consulted five testimonies offer relatively multifaceted insights. The 
first stems from Brigadier Michael ‘Mad Mike’ Calvert who had decidedly mixed feelings towards 
the Malays, particularly the sultans: 
 
The Malay sultans were a varied lot, some very good, others were absolute, shall we say, 
charlatans or knaves. They behaved as if Malaya belonged to them. And this goes back to the 
Federated and Unfederated Malay States when we took it over. But what wasn’t known by an 
awful lot of people was that [...] most of the Malay sultans were descendents from a 
conquering race from the Celebes islands now called Sulawesi. And they had conquered 
Malaya rather like the Normans conquered Britain and had imposed their rule on the native 
Malays. So they themselves were, just about 150 to 200 years ago, [...] a ruling race. Many of 
their antecedents hadn’t been in Malaya as long as many of the Chinese who traded and 
settled in Malaya from up to 500 to 600 years beforehand. Throughout all the history of Malaya 
is this rivalry between the very hard-working, clever Chinese and the Malays who were much 
more lethargic [...] The Malays were charming people, nice people, like the Burmese. [But] 
They hadn’t got the work ethic at all. They didn’t see the point of making profit...629 
 
     While the above statement represents a rare ethno-historic excursion, it remains slightly crude 
and not entirely correct. Migration to, from and within Malaya has been complex. The oldest 
known group, the Negritos/Semang, were pushed into the deep jungle by later arrivals. These 
originated from southern China and northern Vietnam (from 2000 B.C. on) but also from Malaya 
itself and Borneo. All newer arrivals were of Malayo/Polynesian/Mongoloid stock. From the first 
                                                          
625  Beinart & Hughes, Environment and Empire (OHBECS), 242. Beinart has indicated that Malays only engaged 
in forest cleaning on a seasonal level.  
626  Nagata, Malaysian Mosaic, 10. 
627  Questionnaires, 17.8.2007 and 1.6.2007. 
628  In view of the efforts by the Malay Regiment against the Japanese, armed Malay bands clashing with the MPAJA 
after WWII, at times violent opposition to the Malayan Union, Malay nationalism and Malay members of the MRLA 
that is not necessarily obvious. See Bayly & Harper, Forgotten Wars, 43-8, 134-6 and 209-17 as well as Ward, 
Miraflor and Ching Peng, My Side of History, 263-6. 
629  Interview, October 1987, IWM, 9989. 
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century A.D. Indian traders appeared, establishing strong religious and political traditions without 
settling in great numbers. They were followed by Arabs. Although sending ambassadors and 
increasingly traders, the Chinese exerted little influence in the first millennium A.D.. The Ming 
dynasty curbed a later wave. The following centuries also saw partial Khmer and full Thai 
incursions. Apart from Portuguese, Dutch and British colonisation, migration also occurred from 
Borneo, Sumatra, Java, Sulawesi and other Indonesian islands up until the 20th century. Large 
numbers of Chinese and Indians did not enter the territory until the 19th century, following the 
introduction of mines and plantations.630 
     Calvert’s statements would offer another opportunity to refer to Said. But the insight is obvious. 
The brigadier gave his verdict based on his social background, education and profession. He 
struggled to understand a community less focused on profit but perhaps more on family values 
and maintaining a subsistence economy. Until the arrival of the British and beyond, Malays 
habitually engaged in mixed farming and fishing while also collecting forest produce, holding 
livestock, manufacturing household items, clothes and, if time permitted, jewellery of often great 
beauty.631 One could therefore maintain that they had successfully adapted to a wearisome 
climate and vegetation. At the same time they had retained a charm and hospitality which, given 
the series of foreign invasions and widespread piracy, should not have been taken for granted.  
     Former quartermaster turned Lieutenant-Colonel Adams was more tolerant. He described 
Malay habits and customs as follows: “The Malays won’t leave their kampongs. They’re parochial 
people. And even today, the whole of Malaya is covered in compounds. And in the same way that 
medieval Britain was run on the parish, so Malaya is run on the kampong. [...] And [the Malay] 
he’s not going to stick in the jungle with Chinese.”632 Adams ignored that the Malays did indeed 
“stick in the jungle”, not only in police patrols but also within units of the Malay Regiment. 
     In the same way that he was critical of the sultans, Calvert had his reservations about that 
regiment. He believed to know the hidden reasons for the apparent lethargy of Malay soldiers: 
 
We used to call them the Hookworm Regiment. They were lethargic and lack[ed] [of] interest 
in doing anything. Looking back I’m probably being a bit unfair on them because they had only 
been sort of reformed after the war and their officers possibly weren’t the best officers from 
the British Army. There may have been some people who just wanted to have a nice pleasant 
rest but they weren’t good. Later they did become good but only to a certain extent after they’d 
been de-wormed.633 
 
     Whether the perceived sluggishness owed to infection by hookworm is difficult to verify but 
cannot be entirely excluded in view of the earlier-mentioned health report. The lack of enthusiasm 
could also have had to do with other issues. The bulk of Malays regarded the communist uprising 
in Malaya as a problem caused by British labour and immigration policies. Was it therefore not 
the task of the European masters to handle unrest caused by these groups? And who could 
                                                          
630  C. M. Turnbull, A Short History of Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei (1980), pp. 4-17. 
631  Beinart & Hughes, Environment and Empire (OHBECS), 242. 
632  Interview, 16.2.1987, IWM, 9707. 
633  Interview, October 1987, IWM, 9989. 
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guarantee that the British would win the emergency after they had collapsed under the Japanese 
onslaught? Calvert also left out any references to the abandoned Malayan Union experiment, 
which had done little to win over the Malayan majority. 
     Questioning the Malay effort is not entirely fair for further reasons. First, Malay troops had put 
up considerably more resistance to the Japanese than many British units during WWII. They had 
suffered accordingly at the hands of the new masters.634 Captain Arthur Banks, who fittingly 
served in the Malay Regiment in the early 1950s, corroborated these facts in an interview when 
he underlined that Malays “had fought very gallantly at Singapore”.635 Second, Malays constituted 
the bulk of the territory’s police, which bore the brunt of communist attacks. Third, there is 
evidence that Malay patrols performed well in the jungle during the emergency even if their British 
officers did not always constitute the crème de la crème.636 Again, it is Lieutenant-Colonel John 
Adams who emphasised this when he remarked:  
 
… They fought well. The kampong Malay, once he got into the Malay police and became part 
of the military organisation – trained by the British. […] The top police officers were all British. 
And some of the lower ranking ones as well – you had Malaya police lieutenants who were 
British, ex-British army sergeant majors and sergeants. But the chaps who did the actual 
jungle fighting, the ordinary Malay – they weren’t given the credit they deserve.”637 
 
     John Chynoweth would probably have agreed. As a young National Service officer he 
commanded a platoon of the Malayan Regiment. True, the kind of daily contact he had with 
Malays was likely to create a special bond and result in favourable impressions. Yet this was not 
a foregone conclusion. As it was, Chynoweth kept largely fond, if not particularly philosophical, 
memories of his Malay soldiers. One of them, the later General Tun Ibrahim bin Ismail, later chief 
of the Malaysian armed forces staff, wrote the foreword to his book.  
     In the course of many patrols the young officer came to admire the sturdy kampong-houses 
and fondly recalled the luscious meals he and his men were offered when they entered kampongs. 
At the same time marriage and divorce traditions, puzzled him.638 Apart from that, Chynoweth 
was greatly impressed by his men’s stamina. Stressing their contribution and that of their 
comrades, he made a point of stating that a quarter of all infantry battalions operating in Malaya 
between 1948 and 1953 belonged to the Malay Regiment. He conceded though that he could not 
find any figures on their killing and capturing rates. He also admitted that he had to restrain his 
men when Chinese villagers had evidently provided supplies for communist rebels or security 
                                                          
634  Bayly & Harper, Forgotten Armies, 137 and 144. 
635  However, the same man added that those he recruited during the emergency tended to be not “terribly effective 
in the jungle”. On the other hand, he found many Malays keen on government jobs, salaries, pensions, uniforms 
and prestige. See Interview, 14.5.1996, IWM, 16654. 
636  In a lengthy correspondence recruiting staff complained that not enough British officers volunteered for the 
Malaya Regiment because pay was not sufficiently higher than in the British Army. As a consequence, many 
postings remained compulsory. But the officers already seconded to the Regiment were not of the desired age 
and lacked fitness. See ‘Conditions of service of British Army personnel seconded to regular forces of the 
Federation of Malaya’, Colonial Office to the army, January 1952 to February 1953, NA, CO 968/385. 
637  Interview, IWM, 9707. 
638  One of Chynoweth’s men told him that he had bought his wife for 98 Malay dollars. To divorce any wife a  
husband only needed to utter “I divorce thee.” three times.   
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forces suffered casualties. Such stories serve as a reminder that communal relations bore the 
potential for serious troubles and do so to this day.639 Vice versa, the author found proof in rebel 
camps that Malays, too, took part in the insurgency against the colonial administration.640  
     Such references are as close as it gets in regard to (communal) politics, of which British army 
personnel largely stayed out. One who could not, was General Templer. In view of failed 
constitutional experiments and ethnic tensions, it speaks for him that he persuaded the sultans to 
open up the administrative services to non-Malays in November 1953. In so doing he 
demonstrated more skills then the Colonial Office in 1946. In some ways Templer did even better 
than some Malayan nationalists. Relations between Tunku Abdul Rahman and some sultans at 
times soured. This owed to the fact that the former posed a growing threat to the latter, who in 
turn enjoyed the sympathy and support of the wider Malay population.641 
     Soldierly opinions could also vary depending on which section of Malays they were dealing 
with. German-born George Saunders dismissively stated that: “The Malays are like the Austrians. 
If they should do something today, they do it tomorrow. If something should be eaten tomorrow, 
they eat it today.” The same man became an advisor to the Sultan of Pahang after his military 
tour ended. The work-relationship they established functioned smoothly, which Saunders 
attributed to the sultan’s forcefulness and steadiness. The former ended up liking his employer 
and terminated his Malayan spell with the conclusion that: “We Europeans make the mistake that 





When we speak about the Chinese in this context the allusion applies not to insurgents but to 
squatters, villagers, city-dwellers, businessmen as well as mine and plantation workers. The 
distinction is admittedly an artificial one because individuals could slip into differing roles. These 
transformations partly explain why the second-largest community in Malaya often remained an 
enigma for British servicemen and why suspicion and uneasiness have overshadowed veterans’ 
memories. They may also be the reason why elaborate reminiscences are hard to come by and 
why those that exist, remain somewhat trapped on the surface. It is particularly striking, if 
understandable, that (ex-)soldiers (have frequently) lumped together a multi-layered 
community.643 
     While (former) British soldiers might in many cases (have) condemned the unclear stand of 
the average Chinese, it should be borne in mind that the latter’s position was precarious during 
the emergency. In effect the community was squeezed between two enemies who both 
                                                          
639  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/8524353.stm. 
640  Chynoweth, Hunting Terrorists in the Jungle, 29, 58, 61, 64, 80 and 84. 
641  S. C. Smith, British Relations with the Malay Rulers: From Decentralization to Malayan Independence, 1930- 
1957 (1995), pp. 112 and 182-3.  
642  Interview, 4.1.1994, IWM, 13660. 
643  In comparison, the secretary for Chinese affairs in the Federation of Malaya guessed that the community could 
be divided into four groups: 1) “alien born” and “Malayan inclined”, 2) “Malayan born” and “alien minded” (i.e. 
attached to China), 3) “Malayan born Malayans” and 4) “wind blown”. See letter by R. P. Bingham to the Defence 
Secretary, 16.6.1951, NA, CO 1022/148. 
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demanded its loyalty and cooperation. Consequently, many opted for accommodating both 
factions. But leanings shifted over time. In the first years of the emergency most Chinese kept 
their distance to the police, army and administration while lending eyes, ears and provisions to the 
insurgents. Once the tide shifted, this flow of information and goods began to go the other way.  
     British reactions turned out accordingly. Afore-cited Major Campbell wrote about his encounter 
with a Chinese: “I did not trust the man. To begin with, he was a Chinaman. They were all two-
faced beggars, sitting on the fence, waiting to see who was going to get the upper-hand.”644 John 
Veys was more diplomatic when he characterised the Chinese as “pleasant, clever, businesslike 
but not really trustworthy”.645 The lack of trust did not just stem from the potential support of 
insurgents. The fact that some of the latter readily surrendered, offered essential information and 
even guided patrols back to their former camps and colleagues puzzled British soldiers, police 
officers and Special Branch staff. They concluded that the Chinese would do anything in 
exchange for financial rewards – a judgement lingering on to this day. As a consequence 
servicemen remained suspicious of Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEP). Former conscript 
William Harper remembered that: “The mistrust towards him [SEP] […] was pretty total. I think it 
was an accepted fact that […] if we bumped into trouble the first bullet from us would have been 
in their [his] direction.”646 
     Despite such misgivings, servicemen were instructed by their superiors to win hearts and 
minds – including and most importantly Chinese ones. Soldiers thus smiled, waved and 
distributed candies to children when passing by villages.647 Still, such attempts could hardly ever 
bridge the gap between a hitherto distant administration and a largely self-sufficient community 
that had been badly let down during WWII.648 Equally, the British return after the war could never 
really diminish the heightened if not wholly justified prestige of the MPAJA. Crucial questions were 
on Chinese minds: would Britain withstand the communist advance in (Southeast) Asia?649 If so, 
would it defend Chinese interests against the Malay majority?  
     Few ordinary British soldiers were aware of such considerations when they landed in 
Singapore. But gradually some learned about the recent history and the problems besetting 
Malaya. The result was an occasional understanding of the pressures bearing on the Chinese 
community and, consequently, its reluctance to take side with the colonial master. Yet not many 
soldiers actively attempted to get a better understanding of the Chinese either out of distrust, 
indifference or because none encouraged them to do so. A few took notice of the bustling 
communities where someone always seemed to be awake.650 They grudgingly recognised that 
many Chinese stood out through their intelligence and hard work. Still and significantly, none of 
the veterans has hinted at Sino-British friendships.  
                                                          
644  Campbell, Jungle Green, 33, as quoted in Purcell, Malaya: Communist or Free?, 129. 
645  Questionnaire, 1.6.2007. 
646  Interview, 4.1.1997, IWM, 17224. 
647  Ives, A Musket for the King, 120. 
648  Pye, Guerilla Communism in Malaya, 201. 
649  The leanings of Malayan Chinese after the Maoist takeover in China greatly occupied British minds. See ‘Extract 
from 10th meeting of the Malaya Borneo Defence Council, Chinese reactions in time of war’, 28.4.1952, NA, CO 
1022/148. 
650  Interview with T. Hamilton, 19.9.2006. 
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    It became fairly obvious during military tours that Chinese and Malays did not easily mix either 
and visibly lacked confidence in each other. As a consequence, the authorities saw their efforts 
to create a united territory hampered time and again. Not only did the Chinese hesitate to join the 
Federation Regiment and the police but they also tended to support their own political 
associations – if they threw in their lot with anyone at all. As Alexander Birks, a platoon 
commander in the RASC, remarked: “The Chinese didn’t join the Army and the police, generally. 
They were content to make money.”651 
     This situation worried General Templer in particular because he knew that cooperation would 
only happen if the Malays felt secure and the Chinese were offered a stake in the new country. 
(The Indians did not seem to be much on any official mind.) The general and high-commissioner 
was well aware that the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), initially under Dato Onn, 
and the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) under Tan Cheng Lock relied on almost exclusive 
support from the respective communities. Templer was partly to blame for this development. Like 
Malcom MacDonald he believed for too long that Dato Onn might succeed in bridging ethnic gaps 
while underestimating the shrewdness of the latter’s successor, Tunku Abdul Rahman. The 
general also alienated Tan Cheng Lock by banning Chinese-run welfare lotteries. Templer 
objected to the use of the resulting funds for political purposes, even though a considerable part 
of the money flowed into the maintenance and improvement of the New Villages. The MCA reacted 
to the closures by ending all welfare work.  
     Tan Cheng Lock’s growing disaffection was fostered in part by his British advisors, Victor 
Purcell and Francis Carnell. The former liked to regard himself as the ultimate expert on the 
community.652 He warned Tan Cheng Lock that Chinese interests would take a backseat in an 
independent Malaya. Templer was furious about this interference and told the two advisors so in 
no uncertain terms.653 Even so, it is somewhat symbolic that a traditionally apolitical but otherwise 
able British soldier failed to judge the ability of local politicians or fell out with them. Perhaps 
Templer himself had sensed his own weakness. Upon accepting dual responsibility for Malaya 
he had insisted on a time limit for his tasks. 
     The general’s difficulties with emerging politicians, communal leaders and sultans is practically 
the only military allusion to (peaceful) nationalist politics in Malaya. Apart from Templer, the only 
exception to the rule was an officer quoted by Margaret Sheenan. However, the latter spoke about 
fears among Singapore’s business elite of Lee Kuan Yew’s socialist People’s Action Party (PAP), 






                                                          
651  Questionnaire, 17.8.2006. 
652  Apart from lending his expertise to various newspapers, Purcell published about a dozen books on Malaya and 
on its Chinese community, among them The Chinese in Malaya (1948). 
653  Sections on Templer, the UMNO and MCA taken from Cloake, Templer, 247, 301, 309 and 313. 
654  Sheenan, Out in the Midday Sun, 341. 
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c) South Asians 
 
British servicemen encountered South Asians in the form of railway and postal staff (originating 
from Ceylon and Malabar), merchants (in most cases from Gujarat and Bengal),655 policemen 
(mostly Sikhs), char- and dhobi-wallahs as well as Tamil plantation workers. The rather technical 
aspect of these interactions influenced impressions in that few significant recollections of this 
group have survived, other than some minor anecdotes. George Tullis for instance noted that the 
tall and burly Sikh policemen tended to side with servicemen whenever brawls with locals broke 
out.656 Leslie Ives for his part recalled in rather technical fashion the benefits of having a char-
wallah in camp: 
 
These gentlemen were always Indians and they produced tea (served in glasses) and tasty 
snacks like egg and chips, egg sandwiches (called banjos) and the like. They allowed you to 
build up a tab […] Operating with very little in the way of cooking equipment they […] were 
undoubtedly an asset to the camp as a morale booster.657  
 
     Similarly, Major Richard Neve, then a young infantry lieutenant, was amazed to find that a Mr. 
Mohamed Ibrahim produced a tailored uniform and mess clothes within a mere three days.658 
      Besides these more trivial episodes, one can detect a handful of more profound observations, 
even if they were not necessarily intended as such. Above Ives also remembered a stern-looking 
civilian Pashtun (Pathan) sharing the firing range with soldiers of his battalion. The veteran 
learned that the former had once helped to defend a British convoy ambushed by guerrillas. This 
had earned him the right to practice his shooting skills.659 By his actions the man indirectly justified 
traditional British preferences in the recruitment for the Indian Army under the Raj.660  
     Relations with Tamils, if they can be called that, tended to be gloomier. Some of those who 
spotted them took pity on the desperately poor (and mostly illiterate) tappers and forest workers. 
Previously quoted Alexander Birks reminisced how he and his comrades gave their food rations 
to destitute-looking Southeast Asian inhabitants of a remote village, most likely Tamils.661 Given 
that soldiers themselves did not enjoy a life in culinary luxury, such gestures speak volumes. 
     Among the testimonies features one less sympathetic reference to wealthier South Asians. 
Peter Franklin, at the time a National Serviceman and trooper, commented that: “Some of the 
high-caste Indians were arrogant….” But he conceded that: “… there is bad and good in all 
races.”662 
                                                          
655  Nagata, Malaysian Mosaic, 17-8. 
656  Interview, 25.4.2007. 
657  Ives, A Musket for the King, 83. 
658  Journal of the Queen’s Own Buffs Regimental Association, autumn 2004 and spring 2005, regimental  
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     The relative scarceness of comments on South Asians does not necessarily mean that the 
latter entirely hid behind the scenes. Following the examples from their homeland many educated 
individuals became active in union matters. The most important one was perhaps Dr. P. P. 
Narayanan, general secretary of the Malayan Plantation Workers Union, president of the Trades 
Union Council and member of the legislative council. Narayanan advised Templer shortly after 
the latter’s arrival to visit the most problematic areas in terms of rebel activity. Incidentally, the 
district also featured some of the worst labour conditions. Templer followed the advice and swiftly 
pressured the estate mangers into improving conditions. At the same time he promised 
Narayanan to better protect the workers. The union leader in turn persuaded the Tamils to give 
up a strike and pledge their support for the economic well-being of the territory.  
     Templer also pushed for a Tamil Home Guard. Many managers regarded this plan as 
unfeasible due to the apparent un-soldierly nature of the ethnic group – again unconsciously 
echoing preferences under the Raj. They were proven wrong to some extent by one of their own. 
A Selangor planter and former naval officer enthusiastically raised and trained a small force, which 
was duly inspected by a satisfied Templer.663 
 
 
d) The expatriate community 
 
Relations between servicemen and the (British) expatriate community entail the most intriguing 
insights into inter-communal relations in Malaya. Although these rarely went beyond brief 
encounters on plantations or in bars and cafes, the resulting impressions turned out to be rather 
accentuated, if not necessarily lengthy. But before we analyse the various views it is necessary 
to define the expatriate community in the context of this research. In fact, the lines between what 
constituted long-standing inhabitants (and members of the colonial society) on the one hand and 
recent (military) arrivals on the other could be rather blurred. A planter or a district officer with a 
temporary contract did not necessarily spend more time in Malaya than a soldier – certainly not if 
the latter was a regular. George Booker for instance signed a contract with Dunlop Plantations 
Ltd. for four years to become a junior assistant in Malaya.664 On the other hand and as we have 
seen, many servicemen joined the Malayan police or took up jobs with British businesses once 
they had terminated their military tour. Vice versa, many planters served in voluntary forces or 
had joined regiments before WWII.665 Those arriving after 1945 were also likely to have served in 
the military elsewhere.  
     That said, the majority of servicemen spent anything from barely half a year to approximately 
three years in Malaya depending on the nature of their service and the length of their contract. To 
simplify things we therefore ignore the exceptions to the rule and consider soldiers newer and 
                                                          
663  Cloake, Templer, Tiger of Malaya, 250 and 265-6. The author has not spelled out whether Tamils actually  
joined the insurgents or simply sympathised with and supplied them. 
664  Interview, 5.11.1985, IWM, 9127. 




temporary arrivals. We thus separate them from tin and plantation managers, as well as from 
other businessmen, administrators and members of the police, plus their families.  
     Military reactions to this group largely depended on individual ranks and, with that, class. Both 
senior and junior officers approached planters and civil servants with relative ease and vice versa. 
It was not uncommon for them to be invited to social events organised by local planters. In return, 
the former returned the favour by hosting (non-Asian) civilians in their messes.666 Not so 
corporals, privates and some members of the high command. In the case of the former the 
seemingly haughty attitude and behaviour of managers and administrators appear to have 
reminded of the class-ridden society at home. Men from humble backgrounds might have 
grudgingly accepted the situation in Britain out of habit. But patrols in the jungle and camp life 
offered them a glimpse of an egalitarian society. In the forest not only badges (and pips) 
disappeared (so as not to offer insurgents a welcome target) but also social norms.667 From a 
soldier’s point of view everyone sat in the same boat and needed to work together.668 But once 
units entered plantations and came into contact with managers, the old divisions opened up again. 
In light of the harsh conditions and the economic reasoning behind the fighting, the lower cadres 
greatly resented being treated differently than officers. Harold Kirk, formerly a gunner, put it 
relatively politely when he expressed that: “They [planters] tended to be a bit above other 
people.”669 Former National Serviceman and later corporal, Derek Blake, put it more bluntly when 
he recounted:  
 
The relationship [with planters] wasn’t a good one at all. We held them in quite low regard. 
[…] I can recall one occasion when we’d been on quite a lengthy patrol in the jungle. And we 
came out […] We’d run out of food and stuff like this. […] And we walked through the rubber 
estate and we went to the estate house. […] There were, I guess, about twenty, thirty of us. 
And at the time we had a 2nd lieutenant. There was a platoon commander. And I was acting 
platoon sergeant. We went to the estate house and the manager, who was English, British, 
European, he invited us in. […] He got out a gin bottle […] and he started to pour us some 
drinks. And the platoon commander said: ‘Well, just a minute. What about the lads?’ or 
whatever. And the rest of the platoon were sitting with their legs in a monsoon drain. And he 
sent down jugs of water for them. And we refused to drink. […] I’ve got rather mixed feelings, 
I suppose, because there were a lot of rubber planters and Europeans who were living in very, 
very difficult and dangerous circumstances. But I don’t think they had a very high regard for 
us, other than at times they could call upon us to protect them…670 
 
                                                          
666  See for instance references in Major Parkin, The Rifle Brigade Chronicle for 1957. 
667  The equality in outlook had its comical side: Frederick Hudson recounted how, during a cordon and search 
operation around a New Village, he loudly told off a staff sergeant, who had intended to replace Hudson’s men 
with his own. The latter, not able to judge Hudson’s inferior rank (corporal), moved his men after some reflection. 
See Hudson, Loyal to the End, 403-4. 
668  Despite all the talk of comradeship throughout the ranks I did not see veteran soldiers and officers of the Suffolk 
Regiment mingle on Minden Day (August 1, 2006). The latter serves as a commemoration of the Battle of 
Minden (1759) where an isolated Suffolk Regiment withstood several attacks by French cavalry. It is annually 
celebrated at the Gibraltar Barracks in Bury St. Edmunds. See:  
www.suffolkregiment.org/Minden_Day.html. 
669  Questionnaire, 2.6.2007. 
670  Interview, 11.8.1985, IWM, 8943. 
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     By citing the gin Blake alluded to the widely held image of planters as heavy drinkers. In fact, 
former manager Robert Perkins himself admitted that “as a rule we had rather more whiskey than 
it was advised at first to have”.671 Other recollections suggest that hard drinking abounded among 
expatriates regardless of their profession. Earlier-cited Major Richard Neve was shocked by the 
fact that civilians he met up with at the popular Tanglin Club already ordered brandy in the 
morning.672  
     On the other hand, planters often gained the impression that particularly National Servicemen 
did not care about the territory, failed to understand its social complexity and simply longed for a 
return to ‘Blighty’. Or as George Booker put it: 
 
We used to meet them [the soldiers] in the towns. And if you were sort of sitting in a restaurant 
or a café having a cup of coffee or a beer [...] you could get into conversation with them. And 
the impression I got was that they didn’t care for it a great deal. They didn’t like the country. 
And of course, when they first arrived they couldn’t tell a Chinaman from a Malay from an 
Indian. They were all foreigners as it were.673 
 
     Veteran turned author Leslie Thomas partly agreed describing the young National Servicemen 
as “idle, homesick, afraid, uninterested, hot, sweating, bored, oversexed and undersatisfied”.674 
One could counter that not all servicemen had spent their tour in the safety (and seeming 
boredom) of Singapore – as he had.  
      Opinions may change over time, recollections tend to filter out negative aspects and caution 
rules in the presence of outsiders. Yet Booker’s and Thomas’ statements contrast with comments 
from former soldiers of whom few have made disparaging remarks about Malaya as a whole. 
Above quotes highlight though that neither side made much of an effort to get to know the other 
one and explain their respective situation.  
     Tensions between the high command and the local European community had more to do with 
early failures in the counter-insurgency campaign, civilian demands for improved protection and 
wrangling over control. Long standing members of the Malayan Civil Service, police officers, 
businessmen and managers675 resented the increasing dominance of the military, which 
culminated in Templer’s appointment. Yet previously many had been angered by the seemingly 
aloof and unconcerned attitude of the Colonial Office in the face of growing troubles. Ironically, 
the assassination of the most fervent opponent of military leadership in the campaign, Sir Henry 
Gurney, prompted the selection of a general as high-commissioner and commander-in-chief. 
Before his death Gurney regularly annoyed servicemen by pointedly distancing himself from any 
military entourage. On the day of his death he apparently ordered his chauffeur to overtake the 
armoured cars and trucks preceding him. Colonel and former hussar John Bell remembered his 
                                                          
671  Interview, 1983, IWM, 8462. 
672  Journal of the Queen’s Own Buffs Regimental Association, December 2003. 
673  Interview, 5.11.1985, IWM (sound), 9127. 
674  Thomas, The Virgin Soldiers, 13. 
675  Missionaries are never mentioned in any of the sources. 
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then group sergeant commenting on the ensuing ambush: “Well, I’m afraid the way he died served 
the bastard right.”676    
     Templer and some of his staff for their part took offence with some of the inherently racist 
traditions in Malaya. (The parallels to General Erskine’s collision with Kenyan settlers are difficult 
to ignore.) Upon the general’s arrival at King’s House, his official residence, he was informed that 
the British did not shake the hands of Asian servants. In reply the general grumbled that: “They 
do from this moment on.” He then proceeded to greet every member of the house staff. Later 
during his reign he threatened to close a club in Kuala Lumpur when he found out that 
membership was restricted to Europeans, even though the state’s sultan acted as patron of the 
society. Its committee immediately resigned and gave way to a multiracial one. Plantation 
managers, too, could not escape Templer’s wrath. If necessary, the latter would write to directors 
of rubber companies to report on perceived deficiencies on their plantations. These examples 
reflect a general drive to make the expatriate community realise that they had to do their bit in the 
fight against communists.677  
     The business community grudgingly complied in some measure, not least because they 
appreciated the improved security under Templer. Up to that time European demands for greater 
protection had been rejected time and again with the argument that security forces could be used 
in more efficient ways, i.e. in flexible and offensive roles. (In effect, the result appears to have 
been a bad compromise as army commanders complained in the early years that their units were 
used in too many static roles.) Often, estate and mine managers were in actual fact forced to take 
things into their own hands. A few opted for payments to the insurgents in order to live in relative peace.  
     Finances generally played an important role in Malaya. Under Templer’s reign a force of 
special constables was expanded and a home guard raised. Both branches were largely 
composed of Malays who usually guarded plantations. This costly extension was made possible 
by high commodity prices between 1950 and 1952, which in turn were spurred by the Korean 
War. However, once the latter came to an end the financial situation deteriorated, forcing a 
reduction of security forces and triggering renewed complaints from the business community. The 
relationship between the latter and the administration during the emergency years led Nicholas 
White to conclude that: “… it cannot be said that the colonial business elite was ever fully satisfied 
with the government’s counter-insurgency policies and activities. The attitude was that more could 
and should have been done.”678  
     As for the Malayan Civil Service (MCS), Templer did not hesitate from firing those who resisted 
him or failed to comply. In an ideal world the general would have dismissed most advisors to the 
Malayan sultans. Yet he knew that a mass sacking would hurt his efforts. Pragmatism also ruled 
his relations with MacDonald whom he considered too much of a talker and not enough of an 
enabler. Both avoided stepping on each other’s toes. Templer was less careful in his dealings 
with the press whose representatives he mostly detested. The general felt that they should put 
Malaya’s future over short-term sensationalism, which journalists seldom agreed with. If he opined 
                                                          
676  Interview, 16.9.1991, IWM, 12219. 
677  Cloake, Templer, 210 and 264-5. 
678  Both paragraphs based on White, Business, Government and the End of Empire, 110-6 (quote p. 112). 
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that one of them had presented administrative or military actions in a negative light he summoned 
and scolded the culprit.679  
     For the sake of simplicity I place the police into the expatriate camp. But this requires some 
specification. First and as previously explained, most junior members of the police were not 
European but Malay and Indian. Second, the British elements within the Malayan Police consisted 
of several groups that had arrived in the territory at different times. The highest ranks were the 
old Malayan hands. A second group was composed of officers, formerly stationed in India, who 
had been transferred to Malaya in 1947. A third faction – roughly 500 men strong and led by 
controversial Commissioner Nicol Gray – arrived from Palestine after 1948. Further, various 
officers were sent from Britain, among them Gray’s successor, Arthur Young, to model the force 
along metropolitan lines. Finally, many European estate and tin managers in Malaya served as 
part-time special constables. One cannot really count the officers coming from Britain, India and 
Palestine as part of the traditional colonial society in Malaya. In fact, the growing influence and 
rough interrogation methods of ex-Palestine officers caused great resentment among the old 
Malayan ranks.  
     Ordinary police officers were responsible for traffic, law and order. They also helped to impose 
curfews, restrict shop opening times and car circulation while also trying to intercept the 
movement of insurgents. The police also contributed to mixed units and set up a frontier force to 
guard the border. Further, it established up to 200 jungle squads (eventually called Police Field 
Forces), which assumed similar roles as army patrols. These long-range squads linked up with 
aborigines to cut vital supply and intelligence links communists maintained with the latter. 
Moreover, there was the immensely important Special Branch whose staff focused on gathering 
intelligence. They were mostly British and in part Chinese.680  
     The blurring line between classic police and paramilitary duties contributed to the sometimes 
frought relationship with the military. Soldierly attitudes towards the police oscillated between 
admiration, tolerance and denigration. Some doubted the loyalty and resilience of ordinary Malay 
policemen, pointing out that most weapons captured from insurgents had been taken from the 
police.681 On the other end of the spectrum stood British (intelligence) officers who closely 
cooperated with district police officers and Special Branch – a collaboration, which often resulted 
in spectacular successes. Major Campbell described the partnership with his counterpart from 
the police as follows: 
 
Jock was the district police officer. We worked very closely with the police. In theory, we were 
supposed to work to their orders, being legally ‘in aid of the civil power’, but so close was the 
co-operation between us that we had reached a stage where we were working hand-in-hand 
[…] The police could not take on the fighting against the bandits in the jungle, whereas we 
could not undertake the normal process of maintaining law and order in the villages and towns 
                                                          
679  Cloake, Templer,  267 and 292-4. 
680  Both paragraphs based on: Sinclair, At the End of the Line, 166-73. For insider views of the police see B. 
Stewart, Smashing Terrorism in the Malayan Emergency: The Vital Contribution of the Police (2004). 
681  Former National Serviceman and private William Hewlett declared that Malay policemen were hated because 
of this supply. See interview conducted by C. Allen, 1983, IWM, 8433.  
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and protected areas. There were, of course, many differences of opinion between us […] The 
police, who had no military training, were always full of good advice for the local military 
commanders. Sometimes, instead of offering advice, they took precipitous action. The 
soldiers, on the other hand, very often failed to understand the orderly way in which the police 
set about dealing with a situation which appeared to them to require really drastic action. I had 
many arguments with Jock. As a result we were beginning to see each other’s viewpoint more 
clearly. […] Their [police officers’] main value to the Army was the provision of intelligence, for 
in that country, only those with local knowledge of the people could get information.682 
 
     The statement entails characteristic traits in that it completely leaves out any personal details. 
Given the purely technical analysis, we can only guess what the author thought of his 
counterpart’s character.  
     The varying soldierly reactions to the expatriate community in general should perhaps be seen 
in the context of events in Britain at the time. While elements within the British administration, 
police and business circles evoked memories of old imperial days, Britain itself was rapidly 
changing after WWII – so much so that many returning soldiers struggled to adjust.683 Labour 
owed its post-war election victory largely to working and middle class voters, many of whom had 
fought in WWII. Due to the experienced dangers, sacrifices and comradeship on all levels, many 
of those demobilised in 1945 returned with a burning desire to change Britain’s stifling, social 
structure. In part encouraged by this mood, the new government introduced national insurance, 
national assistance, the NHS, the Butler Education Act and housing programmes. All were 
intended to address hitherto wide-spread poverty, low educational levels, poor housing and 
restricted access to health services. As a result the working and middle classes acquired unheard 
of prosperity and political influence in the 1940s, while the upper classes saw some of their 
advantages and influence fade. Despite the radical changes though much remained the same. 
Economic realities soon put a break on initiatives and focus shifted to clearing the foreign balance 
and to global policing duties.  
     Although figures and definitions have to be read with caution, some are worth considering. 
The 1974-9 Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth for instance estimated 
that in 1954 the top ten percent of the population over twenty-five still owned seventy-nine percent 
of the total national wealth. The earlier Rowntree Study for its part found that 4.6 percent of 
working class households in an average city like York were deemed to live in poverty. (These 
figures were later considerably scaled upwards because the authors’ definition of poverty was 
regarded as too conservative.) Other aspects of life in Britain, too, still looked fairly bleak. In 1951 
for example, over half of households lacked either piped water, a cooking stove, a flushing 
lavatory or a fixed bath. Working class children were still more likely to die in their early years 
                                                          
682  Campbell, Jungle Green, 25. 
683  Tony Rodgers lamented that Hemel Hampstead, where he had grown up, had changed from a sleepy country town 




than those of the upper classes. Those who survived tended to be shorter than the latter. These 
problems were even more accentuated in rural areas.684  
     It is possible then that military reactions to the Malayan expatriate community echoed the after-
war hopes, disappointment and anger of the British lower and middle classes. A seemingly 
arrogant attitude of a planter, his complaints about insufficient protection, the restrictive 
membership rules of local clubs (welcoming only officers) probably evoked the inequalities 
experienced at home. Equally, a tall, well-spoken and confident manager, perhaps married to an 
attractive woman, symbolised better health, education and higher income. Such scenes raised 
questions as to the aims and beneficiaries of the British effort in Malaya, of which, as we have 
seen, at least some servicemen were very much aware of. 
 
 
e) Eurasians  
 
It is remarkable that veterans have hardly alluded to the ethnic group one might expect them to 
have been reasonably close to. Precise figures are difficult to find. Nagata has cited a 1931 
census in which ‘others’ (i.e. non-Malays and -Chinese or southern Indians and thus mainly 
Europeans and Eurasians) accounted for 2.1 per cent of the population.685 In view of such vague 
definitions one cannot help suspecting that this, most likely small group, represented something 
of a taboo in Malaya and the British Empire in general. It certainly had done earlier. In his Far 
Eastern Tales Somerset Maughan described two British representatives who hold relationships 
with Asian women resulting in children of mixed-race. One manager of a rubber estate openly 
lives with a ‘native’ women and their two children and reaps condemnation from his colleagues. 
A district officer only admits to his newly arrived wife that he fathered children with a Malay woman 
when she presses him. Upon learning the truth his wife leaves him in disgust.686  
     Ronald Hyam has maintained that such inter-ethnic liaisons decreased following the 
distribution of the Crewe Circular in 1909. In part this was due to civil servants simply marrying 
their mistresses. This occurred despite the fact that the memorandum was not sent to British 
representatives in the Federated Malay States (and Sarawak) because these territories were not 
directly administered by the Crown. One has to conclude from Hyam’s text that civil servants in 
the Straits Settlements did receive it.687  
                                                          
684  R. Lowe, ‘Riches, Poverty and Progress’ in K. Robbins (ed.), The Short Oxford History of the British Isles: The 
British Isles, 1901-1951 (2002), pp. 197-226.  
685  Most Eurasians were oriented towards Europeans, spoke English and followed Christian faiths. They originated 
from offspring of either Portuguese or British and Asians. See Nagata, Malaysian Mosaic,  11 and 40-1. 
686  Maughan, Far Eastern Tales, 99 and 247-278. 
687  The circular represented an official reaction to a sexual scandal in Kenya the previous year involving an 
assistant district commissioner, an Askari and an African girl. Following the incident and bowing to growing 
political pressure the secretary of state for the colonies, Lord Crewe, issued an official note with two appendices. 
The first entailed a warning for future recruits of the Colonial Service highlighting the disgrace in case of 
concubinage with local women. The second, less explicit appendix was directed at those already present in the 
colonies. The Crewe Circular marked the advent of a more official and aloof British presence in the colonies, as 
opposed to the gung-ho attitude of more colourful agents in the 19th century. At the same time it reflected puritan 
and racist sentiments in Britain. According to Hyam, the step “remoralised the empire in a way which may in the 
long run have fatally undermined it.” See: R. Hyam, ‘Concubinage and the Colonial Service: The Crewe Circular 
(1909), Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 1986 (14/3), pp. 170-186. 
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     All that said, it may simply be that soldiers regarded Eurasians at the time as part of the major 
communities for lack of better knowledge. It may also be that Eurasians themselves did not stress 
their origins. Worries about stigmatisation, tax liability and even loss of property played into this.688 
     The only person, who has remembered dealing with Eurasians, is earlier-cited Brian Lloyd. He 
claimed that he and his colleagues worked with Eurasian (as well as with Chinese and Malay) 
women, some of whom he recollected as beautiful. He professed that the men often chatted up 
their female colleagues, whom they then took to the movies. Lloyd maintained that even without 
such advances Eurasians fairly easily mingled with the British. He added that relations between 
British men and Chinese and Malay women would also occur.689 Given that Lloyd’s tour in Malaya 
only lasted for a few months, it is possible that he was not always able to distinguish between the 
diverse communities.  
 
 
f) Aborigines  
 
The scarcity of consequential interactions between soldiers and local civilians surprises least in 
the case of Malaya’s aborigines.690 Primitive (for western standards), shy and superstitious the 
latter populated the remote parts of the Malayan jungle. They avoided contact with either side in 
the emergency and rarely spoke even a few words of English. The only members of the security 
forces, who came into contact with the original inhabitants of Malaya, were SAS soldiers or police 
officers engaged in deep jungle penetrations or manning jungle forts. 
     John Leary has cited a 1947 census putting the total of aborigines at 34,737 and dividing them 
into three main groups: the Semang (5%, populating northern and northeast Malaya), the 
(Negrito) Senoi (62%, living in the central north) and the Orang Melayu Asli (33%, in the centre 
and south). These groups engaged either in subsistence living, hunting, semi-nomadic ways or 
built rudimentary settlements. Due to the emergency’s dynamics two Senoi groups, the Semai 
and Temiar, became most entangled in the emergency. 
     Soon after the first communist wave of attack had faltered and the insurgents had been forced 
into the jungle, British authorities began to worry about a potential cooperation between the latter 
and aborigines – a collaboration which had already taken place during WWII. Not that the shy 
people directly posed a great threat to the security forces or the administration. Yet the aborigines 
could serve as eyes and ears for the rebels thus making the job of jungle patrols even more 
difficult. It is exactly what happened.  
     On the surface aboriginal services appeared coerced. However, those few who occupied 
themselves with tribal matters, among them staff of the Department of Aborigines in Kuala 
                                                          
688  The latter was more of an issue for indigenous partners of Europeans but could also have consequences for 
their offspring. For a more in-depth analysis of such issues see: A. L. Stoler, ‘Sexual Affronts and Racial 
Frontiers: European Identities and the Cultural Politics of Exclusion in Colonial Southeast Asia’, Cooper & Stoler, 
Tensions of Empire, pp. 198-237. 
689  Interview, 8.8.2007. 
690  Several terms have been used to label the aboriginal people of Malaya. These range from the colonial ‘proto-Malay’ 
to ‘Sakai’ (connoting ‘servant’ or ‘slave’), ‘aborigine’ (after 1955) and the final ‘Orang Asli’, made official in the 
1960s. (‘Asli’ stands for ‘original’ in Malay.) See J. D. Leary, Violence and the Dream People: The Orang Asli in 
the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960 (1995), p. 14.  
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Lumpur, eventually realised that the indigenous communities often had their own agendas, on 
occasion killing both insurgents and security forces. On the other hand, some supported the latter, 
for instance in so called Police Aboriginal Guards, or sided with the Malayan Communist Party’s 
aborigine organisation, the ASAL. Frequently they worked for both sides. They accepted food, 
medicine and household items from the security forces and sought promised communist 
protection. Unfortunately for the authorities, the insurgents initially possessed stronger links.691 
     In view of the very rare encounters between British army personnel and aborigines, we need 
to stretch the scale of groups considered for this study. Only one of the three men, who have 
passed on meaningful insights, falls into the categories of servicemen defined in the introduction. 
They have come from the afore-mentioned Lieutenant-Colonel John Cross, who operated along 
the Thai border. Other references can be found in the testimony of Arpad Bacskai, who served 
with the Royal Australian Regiment/SASR. The third contribution has been passed on by Roy 
Follows, then a police officer and jungle fort commander.  
     Due to the gradual communist retreat into the deep jungle it is no coincidence that the first two 
men were engaged towards the end of the emergency. SAS squadrons typically tried to flush out 
the guerrillas from the remoter parts of the jungle. Cross for his part even conducted cross-border 
operations, during which he and his men relied on the support of aborigines. Like others, it took 
him considerable time to win over the shy forest dwellers. The lieutenant-colonel pointed out that 
this also owed to the decision of the Malayan authorities during the emergency to resettle 
aborigines outside the forest. Exposed to an unknown environment many had quickly perished. 
Those who had fled back to their original environment had guarded a deep hatred of the 
administration.692  
     The title of Cross memoir’s – A Face like a Chicken’s Backside – not only echoes his hosts’ 
description of the author but also reveals a sound sense of humour and indigenous self-
confidence. Any services they provided depended on the actions and attitudes of intruders, who 
in turn could take nothing for granted. What counted often more than perceived strength were 
small gestures, such as the provision of medication or the willingness to listen and learn. Both the 
security forces and the communists ran the risk of being left on their own, or worse, being killed 
if they ignored behavioural imperatives. 
     Perhaps the most concise, fitting and insightful summary of aboriginal attitudes, habits and 
experiences features in Roy Follows’s memoirs. The latter’s description of the Temiar reads at 
times like earlier explorers’ accounts of the ‘noble savages’ encountered in Africa. To him they were: 
 
… people from a time I and my people had left behind thousands of years ago. They knew 
nothing of firearms or helicopters […] a pair of scissors was strange and wonderful in their 
eyes. They feared the spirits of the dead and put up with sickness and disease because they 
had no choice. Then the Communists came and told them that the white man was a devil who 
would kill and eat them, and they believed them. Now we, those same white men, had come 
and brought not death but medicines for their ailments, and told them that it was the 
                                                          
691  Ibid., pp. 2-3, 89, 183-9 and R. Follows, The Jungle Beat: Fighting Terrorists in Malaya (1999), p. 139. 
692  Interview, 1983 with Charles Allen for BBC Radio 4, IWM, 8487. 
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Communists who were devils. […] You couldn’t be surprised if the aborigines were in a muddle 
[…] Yet, in their own surroundings they survived. They built their longhouses, they had fire 
and cooked, and with their blowpipes and poisoned arrows they could pick off a bird in a tree 
[…] Their logic did not work like ours; they had no written language and a limited vocabulary. 
[…] As a people they are peaceable, and one tribe will rarely, if ever, fight another. All they 
really want is to be left alone. Finding themselves then, as they were then, under pressure 
from the Communists on one side and Government forces on the other, they followed the only 
course open to them; they tried to placate both.  
 
     Unusually for a British veteran, Follows devoted considerable space in his memoirs to complex 
issues, such as ethnic categorisations, areas of living, farming traditions and eating habits. For 
this he drew to some extent from information provided by the Department of Aborigines.693  
     Arpad Bacskai for his part came into contact with Negritos. And like Cross and Follows he 
remembered his encounters with fascination: 
 
They were a small, five foot two, brownish, curly-haired Negrito type […]. They read everything 
into everything. Like for instance, if you had a meeting […] whereas for you it was just another 
meeting with another group or person, for them they were already trying to interpret the 
spiritual side. As far as they were concerned, the spirits were in the trees, in the butterflies, in 
everywhere, in you. You could be … maybe not a person. You could be the manifestation of 
the devil. So if the person you met was acting strange […] it wasn’t perhaps because they 
didn’t like to see you or like the look of you. It was because they couldn’t work out exactly what 
you represented […] It took them a hell of a lot to be at ease with you. 
 
     The trooper admitted that the aborigines he met effectively served as shield for the few 
remaining communists in the forest. In so doing they made the job of Bacskai and his colleagues 
extremely knotty and exasperating. At one point the interviewee had to be restrained not to shoot 
the aborigines he was dealing with. Another unit did kill several Negritos thereby landing 
themselves in great troubles. Difficulties also beckoned for the interviewee and his colleagues 
because they contracted various diseases from the forest dwellers.694 
     Given these unusually insightful observations, one can assume that all three individuals had 
ample time to reflect on their encounters both during their missions and after. But Cross, Bacskai 
and Follows also differed from the average soldier (or veteran respectively) in that they accepted 
to live in dense jungle among people with uncertain loyalties. After their military tours the authors 
offered further proof of their unusual personalities. As mentioned earlier, Cross retired in Nepal. 
Bacskai also served in the Vietnam War before founding three companies in Australia. In the 
autumn of his life he has been very active in veterans’ circles. Follows bought a jeep with a 
colleague when his tour ended and drove all the way back to Britain.    
 
      
                                                          
693  Follows, The Jungle Beat, 126-7, 142-3 (quote) and 147-8. 
694  Interview, Australian Film Archive, June 2004, archive number 2029 (www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au). 
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g) (Non-European) Women and sexuality695 
 
Sexual attitudes and relations between colonisers and colonised have attracted considerable 
academic interest.696 Malaya is no exception in this. Ronald Hyam has held that in sexual terms 
“Things were fairly free and easy in Malaya, until the 1930s at least.” (At that point, the authorities 
began to curb the frivolous activities.) The scholar has drawn attention to the fact that numerous 
villages and towns throughout Malaya hosted brothels. As if this supply did not suffice an early 
governor of Upper Perak entertained a veritable harem. Meanwhile, up to ninety percent of his 
compatriots in out-stations held local mistresses in the 1890s, of which not all seem to have 
acquiesced voluntarily. In 1914 Tamils staged a strike to protest, among other aspects, against 
the sexual abuse of their wives, daughters and work colleagues by overseers and managers, 
most of them white. Possibly to avoid such reactions certain planters in Johore were said to swap 
their wives. The local Chinese were Europeans’ equals in (almost) every way when it came to 
sexuality. During the 1930s 6,000 Chinese prostitutes were reported to service their fellow male 
nationals (and probably other ethnicities, too).697 
     Even without that knowledge women held considerable fascination for British troops during the 
emergency. This is hardly surprising if one considers that the bulk were young National 
Servicemen and unmarried regulars. Few of the resulting interactions proved enduring though. 
Brief acquaintances with so called taxi dancers698 and prostitutes proved to be more common 
than serious long-term relationships with Asian or European women, although the latter occurred. 
Even rarer were sincere liaisons between Asian men and European women but they, too, did 
happen according to military witnesses.699 Hyam has cited allegations that some service wives 
repaid debts to Asian shopkeepers and landlords with sexual favours.700  
     Many affairs between service personnel and local women ended prematurely due to the 
interference of commanders and parents. Previously quoted Peter Franklin remembered a soldier 
in his squadron who fell in love with a Malayan nurse. Their affection proved in vain as both the 
commanding colonel and the woman’s father did not allow them to extend their liaison.701 Some 
Malay fathers allegedly threatened to publicly denounce their daughters if they dared marry non-
Muslims. They even followed up with newspaper ads, if their daughters persisted.702 It is doubtful 
that the military discouragement solely owed to the kind of racialism en vogue in Britain towards 
the end of the 19th century or to fears of native deviance, which Philippa Levine has described.703 
                                                          
695  It is obviously politically incorrect to automatically connect the two. Unfortunately, women in Malaya have  
often been quoted in connection with sexual services. 
696  Apart from Hyam’s and Levin’s recent contributions discussed in this section, one should also acknowledge 
earlier works on India and Africa, such as Kenneth Ballhatchet’s Race, Sex and Class Under the British Raj: 
Imperial Attitudes and Policies and their Critics, 1793-1905 (1980) and Luise White’s The Comforts of Home: 
Prostitution in Colonial Nairobi (1990). 
697  R. Hyam, Empire and Sexuality: The British Experience (1990), pp. 94, 109, 143 and 151. 
698  Women working at dance halls. 
699  Questionnaires filled out by anonymous and A. Elkington in July, 2007. 
700  Hyam, Empire and Sexuality, 109. 
701  Questionnaire, mid July 2007. 
702  One or two veterans have mentioned such incidents but none actually seems to have seen such ads. 
703  P. Levine (ed.), Gender and Empire (OHBECS) (2004), pp. 135 and 139. 
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In view of the short and busy military tours, the authorities probably wished to prevent soldiers 
from being side-tracked by or burdened with relationship problems. 
     The interference might have contributed to a preference for short-lived adventures, i.e. 
prostitution. The latter was common in towns and cities, especially Kuala Lumpur and 
Singapore,704 thus marking a reversion of the crackdowns in the 1920s. (In fact, those efforts had 
already been blunted immediately prior to and during the Japanese occupation.705) As a 
consequence, the authorities seem to have relapsed into the kind of ordinary regulation 
introduced in the middle of the 19th century.706 Derek Blake claimed that prostitutes were regularly 
rounded up to be tested for venereal diseases.707 The authorities did so with good reason. George 
Tullis estimated that up to 40% of British soldiers stationed in and around Kuala Lumpur 
contracted sexually transmitted diseases. He did not offer proof for this estimation but recollected 
several cases in his own unit. According to the NMBVA’s secretary, the situation grew so 
problematic that the authorities set up special facilities, where soldiers returning from night sprees 
could ‘clean themselves’. Condoms were also widely distributed among troops. Still, men became 
unavailable for patrols and convoys after sexual encounters, which, if proven, resulted in twenty-
eight days in prison for self-inflicted harm.708 Unsurprisingly, no veteran has freely admitted that 
he visited brothels in Malaya, fell ill or ended up in confinement.  
     However, above anecdotes may paint a slightly distorted picture. Many servicemen, 
particularly those stationed in small camps outside centres of population, were never tempted to 
stray into red-light districts either for lack of opportunities709 or fear. Due to the army going out of 
its way to warn of venereal diseases, many servicemen abandoned secretly held plans to loose 
their virginity in Malaya. One who preferred to be on the safe side was the afore-cited Leslie Ives, 
who recounted his activities during leave on the popular island of Penang: 
 
Evenings were mostly spent at the renowned City Lights Ballroom in Georgetown. […] It 
housed a gorgeous array of young pretty females known as ‘taxi dancers’ […] Many of these 
girls pursued other nocturnal activities of an intimate nature – and many assignations were 
made on the dance floor. […] My favourite lassie was called Shirley I think. […] My fellow 
leave mates dared me to take her out in the conventional sense. I was surprised when she 
accepted – so were they! […] She was probably surprised that I did not seek her professional 
favours overnight – but I resisted the temptations […]. However in my mind’s eye still lurked 
the images from the V.D. film we had seen en-route to the east. […]710 
 
     Contrary to the situation in Indochina, few veterans have alluded to European women in the 
services or among the local population. One who has is Captain Robert Bonner, at the time a 
                                                          
704  Questionnaire filled out by David Sleeth 12.7.2007, a former sapper and eventual NCO. 
705  Bayly & Harper, Forgotten Armies, 57-8 and 230. 
706  Levine, Gender and Empire, 144-5. See also her earlier Prostitution, Race and Politics: Policing Venereal  
Disease in the British Empire (2003). 
707  Interview 11.8.1985, IWM, 8943. 
708  Interview, 25.4.2007. 
709  Tony Hamilton for instance claimed that he and his colleagues were simply too tired or busy to visit towns and  
their various establishments. See interview 19.9.2006. 
710  Ives, A Musket for the King, 101. 
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young lieutenant. In the published accounts of his battalion’s tour he mentioned a Ms. Barbara 
Rigby of the Women’s Voluntary Service. Her main task consisted in looking after a collection of 
records, games, paperback thrillers, table tennis and pool equipment.711 Other than that, 
regimental journals often contain images featuring wives of NCOs and officers but not of their 
offspring.712 Scrutinizing the experience of soldiers’ families or servicewomen in Malaya would 
undoubtedly add a social, ethnic and cultural touch to an otherwise rather technical remembrance 
































                                                          
711  Bonner, Jungle Bashers, 70. 
712  See for instance The Royal Hampshire Regimental Journal, August 1955. 
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Chapter 6: “The Indochina War gave me a love for these people and this 
country.” – French soldiers’ stances on Indochinese land and people 
 
French veterans considered for this research appear to have taken a comparatively keen interest 
in Indochina and its people during their tours and beyond. The result has often been very vivid 
and detailed depictions of people, population centres, infrastructure, climate, vegetation and 
wildlife.  
     (Ex-)soldiers´ interest in Indochina and the Indochinese has habitually been coupled with 
affection on the one hand and melancholy on the other in view of the war´s result. The journalist 
Jean Lartéguy has termed this Le mal jaune,713 describing it as “a sort of nostalgia”. Pierre 
Schoendoerffer told an interviewer in the 1990s: “It is a place that still moves me deeply. The 
Indochina War gave me a love for these people and this country.”714 Even in 1950, when the 
balance tipped in favour of the Viet Minh, TIME reporter André Laguerre found morale among 
French forces remarkably high. He quoted a young military engineer as stating: “I like it out here. 
It’s adventure. I feel I’m useful, and I like the Vietnamese.”715 
     Servicemen’s fascination is somewhat startling given the conflict’s vicious nature and blurred 
battle lines. Officers and NCOs stationed in small outposts for instance lived in constant fear of 
being betrayed by their own, non-European men. Commander Vandenberghe, who formed and 
led a unit of former POWs, was assassinated by the latter. Villagers could claim not to have 
spotted guerrillas even though CEFEO troops had battled the latter in their location. In cinemas 
young men hurled grenades on soldiers sitting below them. As a result of such attacks, bar and 
restaurant owners had to fence in their establishments’ windows.716 Alain Delon remembered 
soldiers’ caution when accepting foodstuff from children.717 Similarly, soldiers suspected that 
many prostitutes acted as Viet Minh agents. Ordinary sightseeing tours, too, could involve high 
risks. Two colleagues of the former infantry sergeant and writer Roger Delpey were almost 
drowned by a sampan’s helmsman on a river near Saigon.718 All these dangers were coupled with 
a climate that featured everything from stiffening heat and humidity to cold, damp evenings. 
     If one believes veterans, such dangers could not alter the naturally cordial and outgoing French 
character. As later Commandant Léger argued in an interview: “… the [Frenchman] has always 
had the quality of blending in with the people he colonised.”719 General de Bollardière, too, 
observed at the time that his men easily and willingly mingled with the locals despite the risks 
involved.720 Yet prudence should rule when absorbing such statements. In view of communist 
propaganda in France at the time, which described French soldiers as murdering and pillaging 
Huns, veterans might have been keen on correcting their image. Generally, one needs to consider 
                                                          
713 It is also the title of one of his books, published in 1962. 
714 H. Faas & T. Page (eds.), Requiem: By the Photographers who Died in Vietnam and Indochina (1997), pp. 46-9. 
715 TIME, 28.8.1950 (www.time.com). 
716 Paris Match, no. 84, 28.10.1950 and no. 173, 5-12.7.1952. 
717 E. Haymann, Alain Delon: splendeurs et mystères d’une superstar (1998), p. 19. 
718 Delpey, Soldats de la boue, 91-2. 
719 Interview, 13.8.1998, SHD/DITEEX 3K 42 - V - (12AV 271). 
720 De Bollardière, Bataille d’Alger, 53-4. 
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the various possible aspects that could have influenced takes on Indochina and the Indochinese. 





A closer look reveals that opportunities to read or hear about the empire in general and Indochina 
in particular habitually depended on social, professional and regional circumstances. On the 
whole potential (Southeast Asian) influences for the average French, especially from rural areas, 
did not abound. As a consequence, imperial enthusiasm knew limits.  
     The pre-Indochina part of Claude Corniquet’s detailed online memoirs, for instance, hardly 
mentions imperial imprints. A corporal in Indochina, Corniquet came from humble origins but grew 
up in the river port city of Rouen.721 Equally, one has to search long and hard for Indochinese 
connections in the early careers of those military figures interviewed by SHD’s staff, most of them 
officers during the war.722 But several of these had African and Middle Eastern stints prior to their 
involvement in the Indochina War. This suggests that ignorance of Southeast Asia did not equal 
a general lack of imperial consciousness. As in the British case, it also hints at a generational 
change. It is telling that the young nurse Geneviève de Galard only cited her uncle's Arab pony 
and her crusading ancestors as non-European influences during her childhood. This is so despite 
the fact that she grew up in a strongly Catholic family of the haute bourgeoisie, which counted 
army and naval officers among its members. It is not until Galard attended a Dominican 
(secondary) school that she read books by Antoine de Saint-Exupéry and Marshall Lyautey. After 
her studies she travelled first to Italy, Spain and Norway before visiting Morocco. Galard's 
immersion into France's Southeast Asian empire did not happen until her service in the Indochina 
War. Even her motivation for the latter was not necessarily driven by imperial enthusiasm: 
 
I dreamt of new perspectives, generous adventures. In a more simple way I wanted to make 
myself useful and I didn't envision a life without devotion to others or pursuit of an ideal. In 
addition, having grown up surrounded by tenderness and solitude, but a bit too smothered by 
my often anxious mother, I aspired to discover more immense horizons.723 
 
     The wider population appears to have increasingly lacked such cravings after WWII. General 
Salan later complained in his memoirs: “France was far away and little interested... She found 
this Indochinese affair – that's what it was called – expensive and never ending.”724 Salan, called 
                                                          
721   http://ccorniquet.100webspace.net. 
722  Between 1997 and 2001 staff interviewed 57 veterans of France's 20th century wars. Of these 21 served in 
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Commandant Paul Léger and General George Buis were born in Morocco and Indochina respectively. It should 
be added that staff did not specifically ask veterans questions about colonies. However, one would expect the 
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Lemoine, S. Laurent, S. Simmonet and G. Zeller (Ministère de la défense, état-major de l'armée de terre, 
service historique), Histoire orale: inventaire analytique des sous-séries 3K et 4K, Tome I & II (1997 and 2001). 
723  G. de Galard, Une femme à Dien Bien Phu (2003), pp. 11-30 (quote p. 26). 
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‘the mandarin’ because of his long service in Asia, could have added that his own troops arrived 
largely ignorant and in some cases disinterested. One of the few exceptions was General de 
Bollardière whose grandfather, uncle and father had served in Indochina (under Gallieni). His 
ancestors had described in detail the territory’s rice fields, deltas, mountains and bays.725 
    Academic literature has largely corroborated the limits of imperial culture in France. Stuart 
Persell has pointed out that those engrossed by colonies during the early years of overseas 
expansion tended to be officers in provincial garrisons, the clergy, aristocrats, the petit 
bourgeoisie, intellectuals, humanitarians, journalists, civil servants, academics, economists and 
businessmen. To the more republican-minded colonies often evoked unfavourable images of the 
ancien régime and the Napoleonic Empire due to the latter’s involvement in empire-building. For 
the masses of French peasants and shopkeepers interaction with the colonies had little or only 
indirect relevance.726 That said, the Catholic Church, recognising the potential in conquered 
territories, spread the gospel early on, not least to raise funds. For that however, it rarely sought 
popular, metropolitan involvement, despite the considerable circulation of publications like L'Echo 
des missions africaines. 
      Critics struggled to understand why France should spend roughly eight billion francs for 
colonial expansion between 1850 and 1913.727 Taking up the colonial lobby’s argument of mise 
en valeur,728 they pushed for a law in 1900, requiring colonies to cover their expenses and to 
repay government loans. Economic gains from the colonies, usually flowing into uncompetitive 
French companies, remained actually small: imports to France amounted to only 12% and exports 
to 18.8% in 1929. 
     The press had mixed feelings towards colonial societies in particular. The racism and 
exploitation of black labourers in the Antilles provoked outcries in Paris as early as the 18th 
century. During the 1950s and 1960s journalists drew attention to the inherent injustice of French 
rule in Algeria. Such bad press did little to encourage emigration, which never reached British 
proportions. On the eve of WWII the number of colons stood at 1,475,000, most of which had 
settled in North Africa and New Caledonia. They included large numbers of Italians, Maltese, 
Spanish, Indians and individuals from La Réunion. 
     Imperial enthusiasts sought to change public perceptions but their numbers were small. Active 
members in the twelve major colonial associations stood at a meagre 5,000 in 1913. Only the 
biggest and earliest, such as the Comité de l'Asie française, reached a wider audience. Their 
members mostly originated from the mercantile middle classes of French port cities, such as 
Marseille, Bordeaux and Le Havre with Lyon being the exception. They offered scholarships, held 
speeches and wrote in newspapers or in their own publications, such as the Revue de l'Asie 
française.729 The problem was not least that the repeated discussions about mise en valeur 
                                                          
725 De Bollardière, Bataille d'Alger, bataille d'homme, 49. 
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versus further expansion, assimilation versus association or imperial tariffs versus colonial, 
economic sovereignty reflected inherent dilemmas rather than potential. 
     Still, colonial issues made inroads. Despite its name, the parti colonial represented not a party 
but a group of legislators in parliament, whose members shared an interest in overseas territories 
and shaped imperial policy. One of theirs served in the Ministry of Colonies after 1894. Yet the 
latter did not oversee the entire empire. Algeria was placed under the Interior Ministry, Tunisia 
and Morocco under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. By 1918 the core of the lobby's leadership had 
already disappeared while the ministries increasingly drove initiatives themselves. The Great 
Depression and growing tensions between settlers and indigenous populations in the colonies 
did their part in dampening imperial fervour. As a consequence, only about ten deputies referred 
to the colonies in the 1932 election. By the same token, the Ecole nationale de la France d'outre-
mer, which prepared administrators and judges for imperial service, attracted only 71 candidates 
for 28 places between 1908 and 1914.730 
     Some of them would later contribute to the small expatriate community in Indochina, most of 
it initially confined to Cochinchina. Not until the conquest of the Tonkin in the 1880s and 1890s 
did greater waves follow, among them roughly 30,000 soldiers. Particularly the north of Vietnam 
attracted some interest from poorer and overpopulated French provinces, such as Brittany, 
Corsica, the Alps and the Provence, as well as from the business communities of the coastal 
cities. Encouraged by the developmental initiatives of Governor-General Paul Doumer, young 
males took up jobs as civil servants, custom officers, engineers and foremen. Despite that, the 
expatriate community hardly ever went beyond the 1930 peak of 40,000.731 
     Odile Goerg has come to comparable conclusions when studying the impact on French 
provinces of industrial fairs with colonial elements, geographical societies, touring “black (i.e. 
African) villages”, colonial troops stationed in France, advertising, cinemas and (colonial) 
propaganda. She has admitted that not all messages conveyed were colonial and that the effect 
of these stimuli are difficult to measure: “These representations went beyond the world colonised 
by France: the frontiers of the continent were vague and spilled over into a mythical Orient, 
passing imperceptibly from Egypt to the Arabia of the thousand and one nights.”732 Goerg has 
also identified the dominance of African over Asian influences in these representations. 
     Martin Evans for his part remained equally ambivalent in regard to visitors’ motivation to the 
often cited 1931 Colonial Exhibition. On the other hand, he has reminded us that colonial facets 
were incorporated into the 1878, 1889 and 1900 world fairs, as well as into Marseille’s imperial 
exhibits of 1906 and 1920.733 Picasso's cubism in turn partly resulted from his analysis of African 
masks. Colonial images also found their way into stamps and music, most notably Verdi's 
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Aida.734 Even so, the broader public did not necessarily visit galleries, museums and opera 
venues. Even if they had, they would have struggled to recognise influences of France’s colonies 
there, least of all Indochinese ones.  
     As the next section will demonstrate, the territory did not feature high on military agendas either 
prior to the Indochina War. 
 
 
Preferred military destination? 
 
Aldrich, among others, has held that the French military was inherently linked to the empire 
through conquests and garrison duties.735 That implies some familiarity with Indochina. Yet only 
a small fraction, including the remnants of the Armée d’Indochine, could have staked such a claim 
in 1945, and that section was soon shipped back to France. Most former Free French, elements 
of the Armée d’Afrique and even the Coloniale had never set foot on Indochinese soil.  
 It is worth looking at the pre-Indochina careers of individuals involved in the conflict to 
measure their imperial (and Asian) ‘credentials’. African-born Commandant Paul Léger for 
example, an NCO during the war, picked up on the way to Southeast Asia that Japanese troops 
were still stationed in the territory and had to be disarmed. Léger admitted that he and his 
colleagues were not prepared either for communist opposition or for Chinese troops marching 
through the streets of Vientiane (Laos).736  
 General Hugo Geoffrey,737 then a second lieutenant in the Foreign Legion, didn’t know what 
to expect either upon entering Saigon in March 1946. What he learned, he gathered from veteran 
legionnaires, who described the territory “almost as a paradise” where one could get anything, 
marry and eat well. He had caught wind of the Japanese occupation and the presence of the Viet 
Minh, which he viewed as “something communist”.738 Similarly, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Denis, 
at the time a captain, confessed to knowing nothing of the Indochinese people and land when he 
arrived in the Tonkin during 1948.739 Such recollections undermine to some degree Bodin’s 
argument that Indochina represented the most desired destination for soldiers and administrators. 
Caution is also advised regarding his claim that many servicemen had learned of Southeast Asia 
at school, read imperial adventure stories, had family members with colonial connections or that 
some had visited the colonial exhibition. All this would sound more convincing if the author had 
cited more than two protagonists, one of them being General de Bollardière.740 
 The unfamiliarity of army personnel with Indochina had its reasons: In the absence of planes 
the first imperial force in line was often the navy, which was responsible for colonial administration 
well into the 1880s. Only later did businessmen and government officials replace them. Naval 
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officers also proved instrumental in establishing a foothold in Cochinchina, keeping in mind earlier 
missionary incursions.741 Coincidentally, it was also a former naval officer, Admiral Thierry 
d’Argenlieu, who became Indochina’s first high-commissioner upon the French return in 1945. 
 The army’s focus had always laid elsewhere. As Girardet has noted: “So many factors which, 
in what one could call the sentimental geography of the French Army, have contributed to give 
North Africa a privileged place....”742 That said, the two most famous figures of the French Empire, 
Gallieni and Lyautey, were originally army officers and enjoyed spells in Indochina. After 
‘pacifying’ the northern areas of the Tonkin, Lyautey headed the military office of the territory’s 
government-general in the 1890s. Then again, it was a vacation in Algeria during 1878, which 
had triggered his interest in the world beyond France. Moreover, he and his mentor Gallieni 
became best known for their pioneering roles in Madagascar and Morocco. 
 The army’s African tradition largely continued with the generals of the two world wars, Forre, 
Gamelin, Pétain and Weygand.743 None of these men ever toured Indochina. Forre served as 
military engineer throughout the rest of the empire before joining the French high command during 
WWI. Pétain, the defender of Verdun and future head of Vichy France, was responsible for 
crushing the Abd-el Krim rebellion in the Rif Mountains during the early 1920s. The least 
imperially-minded of all was de Gaulle, even though he had a short stint in Beirut during the early 
1930s.744 The exception to the rule is General Joffre, who operated in Indochina and Formosa 
between 1884 and 1888.745 
 Strangely, the senior cadres more familiar with Southeast Asia were often sidelined or passed 
over prior, during or after the Indochina War. General Marcel Alessandri was dispatched to 
Indochina in 1939, from where he orchestrated the retreat of French troops into China six years 
later. As commander for North Vietnam he was held accountable for the ill-fated retreat from Dong 
Khe, Cao Bang and Lang Son in 1950, and was recalled to France. His erstwhile superior, 
General Gabriel Sabattier, was stationed in Hanoi in 1923 and became military attaché to China 
between 1934-38. Despite that, he was placed into the army reserve after WWII. General Roger 
Blaizot passed a few months in Indochina during 1936 and prepared the CEFEO from India during 
WWII. Yet it was General Leclerc who led the French re-entry into Indochina in 1945. Blaizot did 
return to assume the role of commander-in-chief but only from 1948 to 1949. General Raoul Salan 
for his part could look back on three long tours in the Tonkin prior to the Indochina War. Although 
he twice commanded the expeditionary corps he was always regarded as a temporary stand-in 
for more experienced colleagues. Lieutenant-Colonel Langlais also counted several tours in 
Indochina prior to the war. He shot to fame during the battle of Dien Bien Phu but was 
overshadowed by the less accustomed Bigeard. The Generals Leclerc, Valluy, Carpentier, de 
Lattre, Navarre and Ely did not know the territory either prior to taking over as commanders-in-
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chief. Navarre was even appointed precisely because of his unfamiliarity with Southeast Asia. 
Paris hoped that he would introduce a new approach.746 
 By the same token, the many illustrious colonial regiments of the French Army habitually 
defended and patrolled Africa not Southeast Asia.747 They included the zouaves and chasseurs 
d’Afrique, as well as the spahis and tirailleurs sénégalais. The imperial force par excellence, the 
Foreign Legion, chose as its headquarters Siddi-bel-Abbès, despite campaigns in the Tonkin 
during the 1880s and 1890s.748 Significantly, these troops were numerous in the Indochina War. 
Particularly Africans were insufficiently prepared for the physical and psychological challenges 
thrown at them in Southeast Asia. The later General Le Chatelier initially commanded a battalion 
of Algerian tirailleurs in Indochina. When the war ended he observed French and African prisoners 
being released by the Viet Minh. While officers had remained largely unaffected by the 
brainwashing, some African troops passing by were singing the International. Le Chatelier 
pessimistically mused in his diary: “These people there will contaminate Africa and our years 
there are counted.”749 The Viet Minh, too, was unimpressed by the African soldiers. In captured 
documents – admittedly littered with racial stereotypes and derogatory remarks about the 
enemy’s capacity and morale – the authors took particular aim at non-Europeans. They 
highlighted that even the sturdy tabor were “quickly demoralised” if attacked in force. Algerians 
were deemed “superstitious”, West Africans “not intelligent”.750  
 The African influences also became evident during the two world wars and the years 
between. From 1914 to 1918 almost 500,000 African troops and workers contributed to the war 
effort in France. During the interwar years 40% of all ‘French’ troops originated from the 
Maghreb.751 In comparison, 43,430 Indochinese were sent to the European and Middle Eastern 
theatres between 1915 and 1918 after an initial refusal to raise any. There, they constituted four 
combat battalions and fifteen logistical units. In addition, 48,981 skilled and non-skilled workers 
served in France during the war.752 In view of the Viet Minh’s effectiveness during the Indochina 
War, it is ironic and telling that the French Army listed the Indochinese last in terms of combat 
effectiveness “against a civilised enemy” during the interwar years.753 
 The sixty-eight officers elected to parliament between 1945 and 1962 were more likely to 
have African than Asian traces in their CV, too. Colonel Pierre de Chevigné, who became 
secretary of state for war and minister for national defence in the Pfimlin government, had served 
as high-commissioner of Madagascar between 1947 and 1950. Marshal Pierre Koenig acted as 
minister for defence under Mendès-France. He had been the hero of Bir-Hakeim, commander of 
the French forces in the Libyan and Tunisian campaigns and general inspector of the French 
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Army in North Africa. Despite the Indochina War’s prominence after 1945 only seven of these 
men had actually served there, two of them prior to the outbreak of the conflict. In comparison, 
seventeen had at one point or another set foot on African soil (in some cases on top of a spell in 
Indochina).754 
 The lure of Indochina remained limited even during the conflict itself. André Thabaut, a former 
military doctor, pointed out that the best graduates of the École de service de santé opted for 
North African postings. Those with lesser grades were sent to Indochina. Despite claiming that 
many men of his generation were inspired by the desire to restore the empire, Thabaut opted for 
a tour in Germany out of convenience. Incidentally, he became part of the urgent reinforcements 
for Southeast Asia.755 
 
All these aspects need to be taken into account when studying military recollections of Indochina 
and the war, to which we shall now turn. 
 
 
Infrastructure, population centres, work/living conditions and health 
 
Several French servicemen considered for this study commented in considerable depth on 
Indochina’s man-made environment. Unsurprisingly, they reflected more on population centres 
than communications. The ‘preference’ for the former owed not only to potential entertainment 
and interaction with locals. The Viet Minh increasingly targeted streets, tracks and bridges, forcing 
soldiers on planes and boats. A railway line leading to the Chinese border, for instance, changed 
owners to the effect that it was the Viet Minh who used it and the French who attacked it.756 
     Allusions to roads often surface in connection with the route coloniale 4 (RC4) linking Cao 
Bang and Lang Son. The latter became known as the ‘road of death’ due to the frequent 
ambushes along its steep and winding course, which were flanked by dense vegetation. The 
road’s surprising narrowness mirrored perhaps the limit of French colonial development in the 
apparent ‘pearl of the empire’ without inviting such soldierly insinuations. The RC4 had been built 
in 1911 and had again come under French control in 1947. Its precarious state and course meant 
that it could take convoys up to fifteen days to reach Cao Bang (presumably from Hanoi). When 
insurgents annihilated 50 trucks killing 140 soldiers, the high command decided to abandon the 
road and provision the garrisons of Cao Bang and Dong Khe by air. By the same token, the train 
journey from Saigon to Nha Trang was frequently interrupted by attacks and could easily take four 
days.757 
     Former lieutenant with the Foreign Legion, Raymond Lescastreyres, alluded to another road, 
the equally famous RC1, aka route mandarine, along the Annamese coast.758 By 1953 the freely 
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roaming Viet Minh had mined this once busy road. The abandoned villages between the latter 
and the sea served as hideouts and storage places for the communist guerrilla. The danger 
associated with the RC1 earned the zone the name rue sans joie.759 
     In contrast, then Lieutenant-Colonel Massu, found the large Pont Doumer, which bridged the 
Red River on the way to Hanoi, still unscathed in 1945. Its solid construction prompted a proud 
description on his part. Named after Governor Paul Doumer, the bridge had been intended as a 
symbol of France’s power and had marked the advent of the industrialised age in Indochina.760 
     While the Japanese do not appear to have dismantled railway lines to the same extent as in 
Malaya, they destroyed other settings. In a lengthy article Médecin inspecteur Général Régis 
Forrisier described how returning French troops found a medical infrastructure completely 
pillaged and ravaged by the former invaders.761 
     Because of their size and their military headquarters Saigon/Cholon, Hanoi and Haiphong 
have surfaced fairly frequently in veterans’ accounts. The view usually taken was that the southern 
city stood for relative security and a bustling nightlife, including drugs and prostitution. In contrast, 
Hanoi and Haiphong seemed to emanate a stronger atmosphere of war. André Thabaut 
remembered: 
 
Although the battle rages in the north, in Dien Bien Phu (it’s April 24), here in Saigon the first 
impression is not that of a capital of a country at war. Of course, one crosses path with many 
military personnel dressed in various uniforms in the streets of the city in the course of this 
end of the week [...] But they wear ‘leisure uniforms’ and seem to calmly profit from their ‘time off’. 
 
     The picture changed markedly once the doctor flew north and passed through Haiphong, 
where he noticed that: “Few or no military personnel in city dresses and out for a good time in the 
streets but frequent passing-by of trucks crammed with soldiers in combat fatigue, helmets and 
arms. The curfew starts at nine in the evening. Here, it’s war!”762 Yet images could deceive. Then 
Lieutenant Simon, arriving in Saigon in 1951, sensed the lurking danger behind the beauty and 
bustle: 
 
… the whole is gigantic as Saigon-Cholon gathers three million inhabitants. One can’t imagine 
the beauty of the French houses. The architecture differs little from the one applied to the large 
villas on the Côte d’Azur […] But the layout is more grandiose as there is no scarcity of terrain. 
[…] The area of Cholon (half of the total surface, two-third of the population) is entirely populated 
by Chinese. It’s very curious to watch. Around ten in the evening, everybody is in the streets. 
Every family sets up its table […], sits down and dines by buying dishes from the rolling kitchen 
[…]. Smoke and aromas rise everywhere. There is not an inch of free pavement […] The 
‘rickshaws’ represent a national industry; they are so frequent that […] one half of the population 
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pushes the other one. […] Nevertheless, the war is close. Yesterday, I dined to the sound of 
guns. […] The areas of the centre are always calm. After six in the evening, all French stroll 
around in civilian clothes, run errands or drink lime juice on the terraces of the cafes. But the 
more one walks towards the countryside, the more dangerous the roads become. […] The 
suburban areas serve as major buffers. The terrorists show up there freely.763 
 
     Vice versa, Hanoi had its peaceful areas. Even in 1953/4 Geneviève de Galard enjoyed visiting 
the city’s Small and Large Lakes along which young lovers were promenading. She also 
discovered a circle of writers and journalists who regularly met in the city’s bars. It included Jean 
Lartéguy, Jules Roy, Graham Greene and Lucien Bodard. It prompted de Galard to proclaim in 
her memoirs: “How far one felt from the battles! Hanoi was the relaxation of the warrior.”764 Later 
General Guy Méry, too, found Hanoi “extremely lively” and “very nice” – until it passed into the 
hands of the Viet Minh. It struck him that within 48 hours bistros and shops were closed while 
individuals, previously allocated to certain blocks, began to dictate daily life. Hanoi became, in 
Méry’s words, “a dead city”.765 Such notions suggest that French rule had brought life and 
happiness while its end resulted in darkness. 
     As intriguing as some of the veterans’ descriptions of cities are, they leave out important 
aspects. In the case of Saigon it is the climate of division, racism and financial speculation 
Philippe Franchini has called to mind. The city was home to a deeply divided society consisting 
of 12,000 Europeans (by 1930) surrounded by, but largely separated from, various non-western 
communities.766 These included Vietnamese, Khmer, Cham, Malays, Yemenites, Indians and 
Chinese. At the centre of the multicultural city stood the symbol of speculation, the powerful 
Banque d’Indochine.767 Despite this and other large institutions, Saigon gave off a provincial whiff. 
This partly owed to the mostly middle-ranked French employees and functionaries, who enjoyed 
a higher status than they would have in France. Key to this was the exclusion of Asians from 
neighbourhoods, professions and entertainment as well as the use of tutoiment,768 particularly 
vis-à-vis the boys and boyesses looking after their household. They also treated Eurasians with 
contempt, as did Asians. The Cité Herault, populated by the former, saw the worst Viet Minh-led 
massacres in September 1945.769 
     Hanoi’s strategic position and special structure have not echoed in recollections either. One 
of the oldest Asian cities – founded in 1010 – it has absorbed a large number of rural escapees 
over the centuries. The immigrants have settled in specific neighbourhoods (phuong) according 
to their origins and professions. The influx led to Hanoi's division into the imperial city and the 
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over thirty boroughs, occupied by artisans and merchants. The city’s eventual name – it changed 
several times – signifies ‘between two waters’. These are the Red River and the To Lich, both of 
which have offered a natural protection in times of war but also posed threats. Building, 
maintaining and improving dykes, channels and lakes has been a major preoccupation of Hanoi’s 
inhabitants. The result is an interconnected water system, earning Hanoi the nickname ‘Asian 
Venice’. The city's magnetism, position and communications have made it a coveted price for 
potential invaders ─ but also difficult to hold on to. By making Hanoi the administrative capital of 
Indochina the French signalled their intention to stay.770 
     Accounts of Pnom Penh and Luang Prabang/Vientiane771 (the capitals of Cambodia and 
Laos), the old imperial city of Hué, Touranne (France’s first outpost in the territory), Dalat, Lang 
Son and other, smaller towns are rarer. One serviceman, quoted by Bodin, was struck by 
Tourane’s impressive colonial villas and well constructed avenues. Another former soldier fondly 
recalled the nice lawns, old monuments and beautiful alleys of Hué. Several men were surprised 
that none of the towns had been destroyed by war,772 an obvious contrast to their homeland.773 A 
handful of French officers also visited the old temples at Angkor Vat, among them the later writer 
Jules Roy who remarked laconically: “The wars which had hit its walls [...] had not succeeded in 
destroying them. We, at least, we protected it. The Americans were not there yet. Neither was Pol 
Pot. Gigantic, it had rested for more than a thousand years but crumbled. Stones and faces had 
broken up under the bullets and shells from the mortars of rebel factions.”774 The awareness of 
monuments and local history extended to others. General François Gérin-Roze remarked in an 
interview: “This country marked me profoundly because [...] there was a rather ancient civilisation 
which was very respectable.” The former lieutenant further hinted that the French comprehended 
the territory and its people better than their American successors who, in his words, “… 
understood nothing of the Vietnamese mentality.”775 
     Seeming French protectionism and understanding were not just rhetoric. In a report titled 
‘battle of the dykes’776 the authors highlighted the arduous work by engineers, soldiers and 
villagers of maintaining, repairing and guarding a network of 250 kilometres of dykes, which 
protected the north’s rich rice paddies. The military press service, attempting to demonstrate 
peasants' rejection of the Viet Minh, stressed that the former offered to guard the dykes 
themselves. The text exposed the communists as the main culprits stating that: “… contrary to 
the solemn declarations of a hostile radio, it is the detachments charged with the repair of the 
dykes which from now on the rebels will attack with the greatest of persistence and perfidy. A few 
of ours are gravely, even mortally wounded, and French blood runs for the defence of the Tonkin’s 
dykes.” 
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      More neutral testimonies hint at growing difficulties in the war and ongoing developmental 
deficiencies. A TIME reporter found an isolated post in the northern delta: 
 
… decayed and rotting. The signs of siege and uselessness were everywhere: overgrown 
paths, cracked-mud earthworks and rusting barbed wire. The two-platoon Vietnamese 
garrisons had long been immobilized, their mission – protecting the countryside from 
Communists and collecting rice – a bitter joke. The Communists – barefoot guerrillas, not 
even regulars – had even burrowed deep into the outer fort defences.777 
 
     References to villages exist but not in abundance, partly because many communities had been 
emptied and sometimes burned down. This often owed to inhabitants’ fear of being caught in the 
middle.778 In other instances the Viet Minh recruited all young males while forcibly evacuating the 
rest of the population.779 Those villages still inhabited were either located in French-controlled 
areas or left standing as small pockets of communist resistance. A mention of a ‘safe’ village features 
in the diaries of Commandant René Chauvin who led a Division navale d’assaut (Dinassaut). He 
commented favourably on a place held by loyal militia: “The village of the militia is magnificently 
maintained. The children’s friendliness and friendship is always touching. It’s one of the nicest 
things I have seen since my arrival.”780 Other judgements are less joyful. General Le Chatelier 
was stationed near Hai Duong, where he and his men regularly penetrated the surrounding 
villages to mark presence even after the ceasefire. He described one village in a letter to his family thus: 
 
… From time to time, a house of concrete, made of old stones, covered by a twisted roof with 
pointed angles […] Here and there little dykes of red brick lined with bamboo, crossing the 
enclosing walls under veritable stone arches covered by creepers. In the centre, a church of 
European style made of a very clear stone and with a square tower […] On the ground, in this 
climate, water everywhere […] It smells when it is warm because it is the spillway for 
everything in the absence of sewers. […] Chicken everywhere, but very small, of the barbaric 
sort; black and short pigs […] ugly dogs […] a few discrete buffalos […] Kids with paddles, 
often meagre and dirty except for the very small ones, naked arses or covered by tiny, dirty 
shorts, more often by a shirt reaching down to the navel; meagre women under their Chinese 
hats, or with a turban of white linen as a sign of mourning or in a black rags; a filthy blouse 
open over a meagre and not very appetising chest […] the teeth blackened from betel […] 
Few men, apart sometimes from a grand-father with a goatee, generally one-eyed; or still the 
chef of the village or a priest with a colonial helmet on his head and dressed in white.781 
 
     One wonders how the famous French mission civilisatrice fits into such medieval scenes, 
where the church and the notable’s helmet represented the only colonial influence. Unless the 
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Viet Minh dragged the village’s young men into its army, one can imagine that not a few voluntarily 
fled these rural surroundings – perhaps blaming the colonial power for not improving their lot.782 
Yet Delpey praised precisely that colonial record at the example of a southern town: “Tra Vinh is 
a small town perfectly illustrating the constructive French presence: schools, hospital, houses made 
of stone, public buildings, water and electricity services, etc.”783 Other French, too, never tired of 
stressing the (in their view) comparatively high living standards in Indochina. A commission under 
Christian Pineau observed with horror Calcutta's dirtiness, poverty and high mortality during a 
stop-over.784 
     Apart from General Le Chatelier’s quote, allusions to the health of non-Europeans do not 
abound. As in the case of their British counterparts, this could have had to do with soldiers’ own 
state and incurring, medical troubles. The latter were meticulously recorded. A report describing 
the situation around Saigon-Cholon cites only 4 cases of battle wounds but 79 accidents. Malaria 
affected not more than 4 men but venereal diseases put 88 out of action. Three hundred and eight 
suffered from respiratory problems (excluding tuberculosis) and 587 from digestion-related 
issues. The report further lists 324 cases of eye and ear problems. Skin troubles bothered 393 
soldiers. In contrast, only 2 cases of contagious diseases feature in the report while nobody fell 
victim to tuberculosis. Finally, neuro-psychiatric problems accounted for 55 cases.785 Some of 
these problems were man-made. A report covering troops stationed outside Saigon noted that 
Long Thanh, where the families of officers and NCOs lived, was notorious for its lack of 
“fundamental rules of hygiene”.786  
     The widespread consumption of alcohol, drugs and sex prompted Jules Roy later to draw 
parallels to American GIs in the Vietnam War: “In our case, the commander-in-chief and certain 
officers smoked opium more out of pleasure than need. The rest of the troops got drunk on the 
big red from the quartermaster’s store or on chewed coca leaves.”787 Commandant Chauvin 
quoted a member of the Dinassaut who needed a Martini almost every hour.788 Alcoholism 
became endemic especially in isolated posts.789 
     Food rations did little to improve soldiers' health. The men and women did not necessarily go 
hungry but eating rations were mediocre and monotone. When prices in Indochina rose in 1947 
desserts, wine, meat, fresh vegetables and snacks disappeared from some garrisons and areas 
of operation. Cases of scurvy surfaced while food bought from local vendors and peasants 
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frequently led to dysentery. The devaluation of the piastre in 1953 further aggravated the 
problems. Small wonder observers noted that many soldiers looked like “hungry wolves”.  
     In the absence of shops, soldiers fished with explosives, hunted for cattle in the fields, bought 
rice from peasants or simply pillaged villages – a practice commonly referred to as ‘opérations 
poulet’.790 The British Adrian Liddell Hart, Basil Liddell Hart’s son, witnessed such an operation 
during his service as a private in the Foreign Legion. Intended as a reconnaissance tour, it 
epitomised many of the inadequacies of the French war effort: 
 
We arrived at a row of thatched wooden huts perched on stilts beside a large stream and a 
couple of crabs (small boats) were detailed to reconnoitre. One of them fired a burst of 
machine-gun fire which was answered only by the clucking of hens. [...] The Annamites quickly 
stole round the sides of the primitive dwellings. The first – second – third huts were deserted. 
[…] We began rounding up the squealing pigs and chickens. Here and there we shot huge 
sable cattle [...] The Annamites fired the thatch of huts and in a few moments they were all 
ablaze, as we waded back to the crabs with our loot – for some of the cavaliers had also 
grabbed mirrors and gallipots and other gewgaws. […] I had been told to take back a small 
black pig which the Hungarian had captured while he went in search of another… [...] We 
indulged in the Indo-Chinese version of psychological warfare. Members of one or two crabs 
haphazardly chucked propaganda leaflets overboard. The leaflets showed a small chicken, 
presumably meant to represent the people of Viet-Nam, being swallowed by a large fierce 
snake which signified Viet-Minh or Red China. As we were the only people who were preying 
on chickens at the moment, the propaganda was not particularly apt.791 
 
     Soldiers’ comments on health and infrastructure were undoubtedly also coloured by 
experiences in France, which made the Indochinese experience look less dramatic than it does 
from a present perspective. Poverty, damaged infrastructure, poor hygiene and malnutrition were 
certainly not new to servicemen. In this context it is worth pointing out that the men fighting in 
Indochina did not grow up during the trente glorieuses792 but the preceding two world wars and 
the Great Depression. While France’s population, profiting from new health services and family 
allowances, grew dramatically between 1946 and 1968, it had decreased in the previous twenty 
years. WWII alone reduced the population by almost 1.5 million, excluding the direct casualties 
of war. The survivors lived in a country that was still overwhelmingly agricultural and backward. 
Much of France was thinly populated and underdeveloped, contrasting with an ever-growing 
capital. The west and the massif central showed an up to 35% lower per capita income than the 
national average.793 Roads, where they existed, were often poor. Such conditions drove 
thousands into small towns and on to the large cities in the 20th century. There, they laboured 
under dangerous conditions, joined by disenfranchised immigrants.794 
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     WWII, particularly captivity and occupation, left especially deep scars. 1,800,000 French 
soldiers were captured by the Germans in the summer of 1940. Apart from 200,000, who escaped 
before being taken to Germany, and others who were released early, a large proportion spent the 
entire war in Oflags, Stalags and Kommandos. Life there was particularly harsh during the first 
winter due to lack of basic sanitary installations and overcrowding, as well as insufficient cloth 
and food rations. While conditions improved over time those selected to do industrial work still 
endured severe circumstances, including eventual allied bombing raids. Others, helping out in 
agriculture and forestry, enjoyed more freedom but risked accidents and brutal treatment by their 
employers. (It should be added that captured NCOs and officers were not forced to work.) Overall, 
30,000 detained French never returned to France.  
     Furthermore, 66,000 Jews (90% being foreign) and 63,000 (other) French, mostly implicated 
in the resistance, were deported to concentration camps where 95% of the former and 40% of the 
latter perished. Collaborating authorities also targeted gypsies, freemasons, communists, as well 
as German and Spanish refugees.  
     In addition, 650,000 young men of military age were forced to labour in Germany for the 
Service du travail obligatoire. Sixty thousand caught tuberculosis of which 35,000 died. 
Challenging circumstances, including abuse, also forced many young girls to volunteer for work 
in Germany. For numerous men (and women) staying behind, hard and dangerous times in the 
maquis of the Savoie and Corrèze or work in unhygienic and unsafe French factories beckoned. 
Meanwhile, the rationing imposed by the Vichy government failed to meet families’ requirements 
by roughly 1,000 calories a day. A black market quickly developed.795 
     Even after liberation the overall situation did not improve until 1949. Until then, transport routes 
remained either destroyed or largely reserved for the continuing war effort. Badly coordinated 
production and hesitant farmers led to acute shortages of milk, fat and meat. By 1945 65% of the 
non-farming population could only satisfy 50-70% of its vital needs. Bordeaux's inhabitants 
officially suffered famine. Children, adolescents (some of them future servicemen), pregnant 
women, workers and elderly people were worst off. Premature death and diseases had already 
spread during the war but by 1945 child mortality stood at 110%. All the while families continued 




Climate, vegetation and wildlife 
 
If one examines travel images of the Bay of Ha Long (Along),797 the temples at Angkor Vat or parts 
of the Mekong798 one easily understands why many French servicemen fell in love with 
                                                          
795 Both paragraphs based on R. Vinen, France, 1934-1970 (1996), pp. 57-68 and The Unfree French: Life Under  
the Occupation (2006), pp. 183-213 and 367-376. 
796 Veillon, Vivre et survivre en France, 289-316. 
797 E. Brisbois, G. Rovillé, Vo Thi Cam Nhung, Vietnam, Cambodge, Laos (1993), pp. 161-8 and photography  
section between pages 320 and 321. 
798 J. Népote, Indochine: Laos, Cambodge, Vietnam (1993), photography section between pages 198 and 201 
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Indochina’s countryside and have engaged in melancholic contemplation. But gazing at war 
images of that same landscape799 – much more variable than that of Malaya – one also 
appreciates the inherent challenges and dangers. On his return roughly forty years later General 
Bigeard mused in regard to the north-western highlands: “A spectacle still as magnificent, a 
dotting of hills, of mountains…. And this forest so majestic, so impressive, and nevertheless so 
ungrateful. I loved this country.”800 Commandant Paul Léger for his part was in awe of the coral 
belts surrounding an island near Touranne, which he was in charge of.801 Robert Bidon on the 
other hand highlighted how the at times dense forests could completely demoralise units. In his 
memoirs he recalled a group of soldiers stumbling out of the jungle: 
 
The operation, started several days ago, spits out of the jungle an exhausted unit, which those 
who arrive for the relief observe with uneasiness. Auguste Bouin [synonym for Bidot] dazedly 
watches ‘those’ who come out of the jungle. Dreary looks, stiff lips, scratched faces, bodies 
and arms, bitten by leeches, mosquitoes […] and ants, cut by giant plants with thousands of 
soaring branches, interwoven, inextricable human traps and veritable octopi. The colour of the 
combat uniforms is that of mud, mould, sweat… blood too… the urine of fear and sudden 
surprises. The bodies are feverish, harassed at the brink of exhaustion. A lieutenant of ‘those’ 
who escape this hell, approaches Granert. ‘We wish you much joy, friends… what a mess!802 
 
     Likewise, heat, cold, humidity,803 torrential rain, insects, leeches and reptiles could dampen 
enthusiasm. Commandant Chauvin complained about the sometimes ghastly conditions in the 
Tonkin delta. Staying in Haiphong on one occasion he jotted down the following comment: “I had 
spent the day soaked in my sweat. What a dirty country!” One day later he noted: “In France it’s 
spring… here it’s complete shit!” And after a further few months he added: “Sunday. Dark Sunday. 
It rains like a shower. It smells like destruction and the end.”804 Liddell Hart, too, felt somewhat 
ambivalent upon arriving in South Vietnam: 
 
At Cap Saint Jacques I saw for the first time the country in which I had come to fight. Here at 
this south-eastern point of Asia the dark green foreland, thickly carpeted with jungle growth, 
rose steeply towards the overcast sky. [...] Dark bushes and dens scrub stretched to the 
muddy banks, spilling into oozy shallows. [...] Soon it began to rain. Land and river and sky 
became one element. 
 
     The former legionnaire also recalled searching for and ridding his body of innumerable leeches 
populating the swamps he patrolled. The sight of snakes and various mosquito bites did little to 
appease his mind.805 
                                                          
799 Héduy, La guerre d’Indochine, 24, 25, 27 and 47. 
800 Bigeard, Ma guerre d’Indochine. 
801 Interview, 18.8.1998, SHD/DITEEX 3K 42 - V - (12AV 271). 
802 SHD 1KT 330. 
803 Claude Corniquet and his colleagues were astonished by the humidity, fog and freshness they encountered on 
the Annamese coast. Suprise turned into frustration when they spent the night in tropical rain. See 
http://ccorniquet.100webspace.net. 
804 Chauvin, Carnets du Tonkin, 44 and 101. 
805 Liddell Hart, Strange Company, 134 and 140. (Quote on p. 110). 
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     Given their importance for transport, waterways emerge fairly frequently in testimonies. Roger 
Delpey and his colleagues for instance moved up the Mekong in Chinese-style junks. The river 
appeared surprisingly large and disappointingly dirty to the author, who was evidently unfamiliar 
with the sight.806 Ginette Dupont-Subirada realised that further north the same Mekong “... was 
not a long, calm river and frequently carried corpses.”807 Raymond Lescastreyres for his part 
described the famous Plaine des Joncs as a “vast, insalubrious, half-flooded zone that extends 
west of Saigon to the edge of the Cambodian border over several kilometres where only junks 
sail. Hence it's name.” The lieutenant noticed that some of the artificial channels still bore the 
names of early French engineers.808 
     Accounts of Indochina’s wildlife are more difficult to come by, implying that soldiers rarely 
encountered any spectacular species.809 This could have been a reflection of the dense human 
population (at least in the deltas) pushing animals to the fringes.810 At the same time it suggests 
that much of the war was played out in cultivated and populated areas.811 
     Importantly in the context of this project, one searches in vain for references to the many 
Frenchmen, who had explored Indochina’s wild environment in earlier times. None of the texts 
and interviews used for this project has featured references to the books of Pierre Loti, André 
Malraux or Marshal Lyautey. 
 






Depictions of Indochina’s population and interactions with the latter are more frequent in French 
testimonies than British recollections of Malayan communities. This could well have to do with 
the fact that the French relied to a greater extent on local troops. 
     The selection of the different communities analysed here is based on the frequency of 
references. Various groups, such as the Chinese, Japanese and South Asians812 have not been 
                                                          
806 Delpey, Soldats de la boue, 100. 
807 www.anac-fr.com/f_2gm.htm. 
808 www.duhamel.bz/indochine/1952.htm. 
809 Bodin, Les soldats français face à la guerre d’Indochine, 39. 
810 This in turn might explain why a tiger would attack a boy on an Annamese plateau. Claude Corniquet 
accompanied a group of villagers to collect the remnants. See http://ccorniquet.100webspace.net.    
811  This was only logical. Rice was Indochina's main (export) product and has predominantly been produced in the 
Tonkin and Mekong deltas. Particularly the Viet Minh depended on rice rations. See The Economist, 8.5.1954. 
812 The lack of reference to all three ethnicities is intriguing in that they assumed important roles in Indochina, 
despite their limited numbers. The Chinese dominated various sectors of the economy. They were categorised 
by the French expatriate community as venal, secretive, filthy, chaotic, potentially criminal and profit-hungry. 
The case was similar with the Jetty, who originated from India's port-cities and France's old territories, such as 
Pondicherry. Often adhering to the civaïte sect many were French citizens, which allowed for freedom not 
enjoyed by other Asian groups. But their prominence in the usury trade coupled with their often exorbitant 
interest rates made them objects of hate. In contrast and prior to WWII, the Japanese were treated as 
assimilated Europeans based on treaties signed in 1896 and 1907. The image of hyper-sensual individuals 
largely owed to the numerous prostitutes – lumped together as the famous geishas. See M. G. Vann, 'The 
Good, the Bad and the Ugly. Variation and Difference in French Racism in colonial Indochine', in S. Peabody 
and T. Stovall (eds.), The Colour of Liberty: Histories of Race in France (2003), pp. 193-9. 
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included because veterans have mentioned them only fleetingly, if at all. The same goes for 
Buddhist monks despite their involvement in the conflict.813 
     Of all ethnic groups soldiers encountered they formed the strongest bonds with minorities. 
Representatives of those lesser developed communities rallied to France fairly eagerly due to 
their historic aversions to the Viet814 majority, which constituted the bulk of the anti-colonial 
guerrillas. The prominence of highland minorities in the sources has probably also been due to 
the fact that they proved to be more efficient fighters than affiliates of the national armies. 
     In many cases, particularly in North Vietnam, ethnic divisions have coincided with those 
between town and countryside, fertile plains and remote uplands, coast and interior. The Viet 
majority have habitually dominated the larger population centres (together with pockets of 
Chinese), the deltas and the coastline. The higher altitudes, remote valleys, forests and islands 
have largely hosted other ethnicities. This also reflects population movements over the centuries 
whereby the dominant and further developed Viet gradually squeezed out smaller and more 
primitive groups, some of which arrived later. As a result of this setup, Massu’s men faced a hostile 
reception in Phu Lang Tuong upon its occupation in 1947 but were welcomed in the 
countryside.815 
     Minorities of any colour made up 14% in Vietnam during the 20th century, at least 40% in Laos 
but only a tiny percentage in Cambodia. Those in the north often feature(d) long, richly 
ornamented dresses and particular hair styles. Garbs tend(ed) to be simpler among southern 
ethnicities, leading to the term ‘Moi’ (savages). In the north-east the Thai have dominated. Along 
the upper Mekong down to the border with Cambodia the Lao have represented the principal 
ethnicity. The Khmer have prevailed in Cambodia, marginalising the Cham. ‘Proto-Indochinese’ 
peoples have populated much of Laos and Annam while Meo have been scattered along the 
Chinese and Vietnamese-Laotian borders.816 
     Since much of the war took place in Vietnam it is worth taking a closer look at its ethnic 
composition. One of the few books available on this subject has been written by three regional 
authors. To the extent that French veterans have emphasised the distinctiveness of minorities 
those three writers have stressed parallels. Even so, they have quoted official lists and statistics, 
which put the number of ethnic groups at 54 at the turn of the millenium. Of these the Viet (or 
Kinh) make up 87%. Others, like the Thai, Muong, Hoa and Khmer total about one million each. 
Others amount to no more than a few hundred. Admitting that the official categorisation and 
figures require an update, the authors have nevertheless grouped the communities in three major 
language categories: an Austro-Asiatic, an Austronesian and a Sino-Tibetan family. 
     Population streams, resulting from Chinese persecution, Siamese invasions, famine, 
epidemics and revolts, have led to a situation where almost all Southeast Asian language families 
                                                          
813 One representative pointed out in Rousselier’s documentary that his fellow disciples would not only shelter  
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814 See explanations of ethnic definitions later on. 
815 Massu, Sept ans avec Leclerc, 285. 
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are represented. At the same time, a considerable mixing has occurred so that bi- and multi-
lingual tendencies are widespread, as are traditions like matrilineal family structures.817 
     Group names can be confusing. The same communities have often been labelled differently 
or distinct ones have been lumped together. The term ‘Moi’ for instance has served as a summary 
definition for a number of ethnicities, some of which French veterans are likely to have confused. 
The following passages thus echo soldiers’ categorisations, even if these might have been based 
on wrong assumptions. 
    In general, (former) French soldiers have been acutely aware of cultural differences between 
Europeans and Asians, as well as of the latter’s unfathomable nature. General Massu for instance 
reflected: “The mentality of the yellow, so difficult to define by a white, certainly if he has never 
lived before in the Far East, adds to my difficulty in understanding.” He admitted jumping to 
conclusions when judging the caution and ambiguity he detected among locals: “… our western 
nature is perhaps to quick to call it hypocrisy”. But an evening with communist officers during the 
temporary ceasefire in 1946 still led him to conclude: “… in this country Penelope would have 
been queen.”818 Similarly, Raymond Lescastreyres remembered spotting a peasant observing the 
passing troops with a smile that was “enigmatic and impenetrable, so particular to Asians.”819 But 
as touched on before, such seemingly Asian attitudes and behaviour were not necessarily 
embedded in conventions. They owed much to the fact that the Viet Minh had to make up for 
technical inferiority with secrecy. The wider population for its part found itself caught between 
feuding factions.       




Before going into soldiers' impressions of this group its terminology needs to be clarified. Up to 
this point, the western term ‘Vietnamese’ has been applied to the group, which technically includes 
all ethnicities. In view of an earlier Annamese empire, many (former) French servicemen have 
employed the idiom ‘Annamites’ instead. It is not entirely correct either stemming from the 
derogatory, Chinese term ‘pacified south’. The modern reference book used in this section 
employs the term ‘Viet’, which shall be respected in the following paragraphs. If the more general 
term resurfaces later on in the text, it owes to the difficulty of judging the true ethnicity of the 
people referred to. Vice versa, it is impossible to state in all certainty that the protagonists 
described below were ethnic Viet. Bu their geographical location offers some clues. 
     Soldierly views have tended to be less racist than those of civilian expatriates, not least 
because their lives depended on amicable relations, where possible. Both groups encountered 
the main ethnic group in the person of the mandarin, the boy(esse), the con gai (mistress) and 
the nha que (peasant). Among French settlers the first carried the stigmas of being vain, 
mischievous, brutal, corrupt and decadent. ‘Boys’ were deemed perfidious, dumb, indiscreet but 
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keen to please. Con gai for their part were reputed to be amenable but detached. The supposedly 
virtuous, wise and stoic but childlike and superstitious peasant has also echoed in military 
recollections. The same goes for the perception of the Viet in general as inept businessmen but 
obsessive gamblers.820 
     As in Malaya, military relations with the local majority suffered from wartime pressures.821 
Ordinary Viet might not always have felt much sympathy towards the dogmatic and demanding 
communists. But they were not necessarily more sympathetic towards the French.822 When it 
came to concrete actions, they frequently remained neutral or simply accommodated both sides. 
De Bollardière suspected at the time that the same people helped de-mine roads, who had 
probably implanted the deadly explosives in the first place. He also noticed that relations with 
communities worsened the more the guerrillas infiltrated contested areas.823 
     In light of this the modest French attempts to win hearts and minds had had little effect on a 
population essentially wishing to be left alone and struggling for survival after WWII. The last thing 
peasants, craftsmen and shopkeepers needed was another lengthy conflict.824 A Paris Match 
correspondent for example encountered a (probably) Viet peasant whose family had become the 
target of the Japanese, the Viet Minh and the French within only a few months. As a result, he 
had lost two sons to the communists while the last one served in a pro-French militia. Graham 
Greene wrote in the same weekly that a courageous CEFEO fought well but lacked the backing 
of a largely antagonistic population. It also had to rely on a negligent and corrupt regime. Even 
those who faced possible communist retributions, such as a priest in Phat Diem, did not welcome 
the French.825 This should have come as little surprise as loyalty to the colonial power could have 
disastrous consequences. Catholics,826 notables and minorities bore the brunt of Viet Minh 
retaliations and fled rather than awaiting the communist arrival.827 A TIME reporter, who witnessed 
the French withdrawal from Nam Dinh and Phat Diem, compared the frantic scenes with similar 
ones he had observed in China and Korea. What for the French constituted a tactical retreat meant 
in effect abandoning 1,600 square miles and 570,000 Catholics within three days. Only 11,000 
managed to follow the French, usually after bribing officials. A few young Catholic teenagers 
armed themselves with grenades to wage guerrilla war on the advancing Viet Minh.828 
                                                          
820 Vann in Peabody & Stovall, The Colour of Liberty, 188-93. 
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     Despite their possible loyalty to the communists or unwillingness to commit to the French 
cause, the Viet impressed many servicemen through their hard-work and modesty. Hélie de Saint 
Marc asked for instance: “Has one ever known a farmer who had a more intimate contact with the 
land than that of Vietnam?” In his admiration the young officer “…sought the contact with the 
Vietnamese who fascinated me […] I loved their grace, their courage and their analytical sense. 
I sensed the richness of these thousand year old civilisations of Asia, of which every farmer, 
without knowing it, carried a piece.”829 The statement undoubtedly betrays a generalised 
romanticism towards the Viet. But, having commanded men from highland communities, de Saint 
Marc was in a fairly good position to distinguish between the ethnic majority and minorities.   
     In contrast, especially officers and NCOs, who trained members of Vietnam’s nationalist army, 
regarded few of their recruits as reliable. General Le Chatelier maintained in his diaries that he 
ultimately gave up on the Viet(namese) believing that they would “join the Viet Minh tomorrow” if 
left unattended.830 Fellow veteran, General Hugo Geoffrey, recalled that many had simply 
appeared to make sure they had been on the winning side.831 New trainees, habitually recruited 
by ‘little mandarins’,832 followed financial incentives or represented natural enemies of the Viet 
Minh by religion, class or profession. Among them were men (and women) who had lost family 
members at communist hands. Colonel Jacques Britsch recognised the pressures bearing on 
individuals upon encountering the daughter of a notable in the region of Yen Bay. Her father had 
been tried and condemned to death by a ‘peoples’ tribunal’ for fighting the Viet Minh in 1946. 
Following his execution, his wife had committed suicide while their sons had been enlisted as 
coolies or guerrillas.833 
     To the annoyance of men like General Navarre, nationalist Viet(namese) never demonstrated 
the fervour necessary for a supposedly independent nation-state. Too many young, bourgeois 
men evaded conscription through payments while the government failed to impede the 
clandestine aid to the Viet Minh. Furthermore, southern Viet(namese), suspicious of their northern 
counterparts, were not overly concerned about a potential division between north and south.834 
Encounters between the French military and Vietnam’s elite did little to dispel doubts. The 
empress (Bao Dai’s mother) informed General Salan that the Viet Minh instilled fear in Hué. It 
also appeared to her that the French were “fighting a phantom”. Yet she could not lend the general 
active support because her family enjoyed very little itself.835 For a reason. Deputy André Bidet 
regarded it as “unhelpful” that her son went hunting instead of marking presence among troops 
and the population.836 Commandant Paul Léger felt that Bao Dai had generally been ill-suited to 
lead Vietnam with focus and energy.837 Colonel Jacques Britsch for his part even heard rumours 
of republican moves to oust Bao Dai as early as 1953.838 One could counter such assessments 
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by pointing out that the French themselves had earlier weakened the monarchy by robbing it of 
any real power.839 Mindful of these moves, Bao Dai later portrayed himself as a sharp, far-sighted 
and subtle negotiator standing up to scheming high-commissioners, ill-informed presidents, 
squabbling parties and a hostile French press for the future good of ‘his’ people.840 
     In their defence, many of his subjects demonstrated administrative skills, loyalty and 
combative fervour. Nationalist soldiers for example volunteered to be parachuted into Dien Bien 
Phu during the fortress’ last days.841 Genviève de Galard recalled how Viet(namese) paratroopers 
had sung the Marseillaise in its trenches for want of their own national song.842 And a proud Viet 
battalion commander explained to a TIME reporter that his men had jumped into the water to hunt 
down and kill guerrillas.843 Some examples also show that men and women, not necessarily 
communist-leaning but keen on ending French domination, drifted towards the Viet Minh to 
achieve their goals. It is testament to a strong nationalist undercurrent often underestimated and 
denied by many French. Jacques Raphaël-Leygues quoted in the parliament of the French Union 
the example of his friend, the Professor Bun Hoi. The latter, a descendant of the royal family, was 
a well-respected leprosy and cancer specialist. He had originally participated in negotiations at 
Fontainebleau as a member of the Viet Minh delegation but later sided with the French.844 Another 
interesting example is Hoang Xuan Binh. In 1945 the latter served as aide-de-camp to Bao Dai 
until the latter (temporarily) abdicated. He then became an advisor to Ho Chin Minh before joining 
a combat group. In January 1947 he was arrested in a governmental ambush, imprisoned and 
interrogated by a French officer. While stressing his admiration for France, the young man cited 
disgust of French colonialism and the corrupt Vietnamese government as main reasons for his 





The sects' central role in southern Vietnam and the Indochina War makes it expedient to highlight 
them. However, only the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao can really be considered spiritual while the Binh 
Xuen resembled more Chinese triads. The writer Jean Lartéguy has probably best described the 
nature of these groups, their origins and regional context: 
 
Here lived the people who combined the taste of the supernatural and profit, the love of their 
large rice fields [...] the fear of living alone, an instinctive defiance of all forms of authority, the 
confusion of ideas and sentiments, a primitive xenophobia which manifested itself against the 
white man and all those, Vietnamese or Chinese who [...] wore a uniform or claimed to represent 
a far-away power for incomprehensible justifications. From these beliefs, these fears, these 
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superstitions, from the necessity for the individuals, who had lost their traditional structures of 
regrouping in troubled times, the sects were born. [...] they would control several million people 
in the valuable South Vietnam […] The South Vietnamese or Cochinchinese were physically, 
morally, intellectually different from the man of the centre and even more from that of the north, 
the hard and robust Tonkinese. He was born from a mixture of races and cultures: Chams 
pushed away from the Annamese coasts, Khmer, ancient inhabitants of the land, Malays, and 
also Chinese who had refused the regime of the foreign invaders. To this would be added an 
Annamese mixture of vagabonds, political exiles, deserters and adventurers...846 
 
     Despite early French crackdowns, wartime collaboration with the Japanese and, initially, the 
Viet Minh, all three sects were provided with French weapons, money, advisors, honours and 
presents during the Indochina War. Even so, questions were raised in administrative circles. 
Jacques Raphaël-Leygues wondered in his (published) diaries if the Hoa Hao were worthy allies 
after a Viet friend had stressed the cultural difference between the sects and the French.847 The 
Cao Dai, Hoa Hao and Binh Xuen grew so powerful that the French felt compelled to set up a 
counter-movement – the Unités mobiles pour la défense des chrétientés (UMDC) under the 
Eurasian Colonel Leroy.  
     The sect most often quoted has been the Cao Dai. Its founder was a minor Viet(namese) 
bureaucrat named Ngo Van Chieu. The latter became convinced that he had witnessed the 
presence of the Supreme Being (Cao Dai) who charged him with the task of spreading a new and 
universal religion. Ngo Van Chieu’s growing following included many other minor bureaucrats. 
During a large celebration in 1926 the movement made an official entrance into Cochinchina’s 
political and cultural life. Its leaders declared that Cao Dai relied on a pyramid of saints, which 
included Buddha, Confucius, Jesus, Sun Yat Sen, Victor Hugo and the Vietnamese Nostradamus 
Trang Trinh. The adherents of the new religion believed in reincarnation, the posthumous 
consequences of human actions, Karma and the arrival of an enlightened king who would re-
establish the lost golden age. Similar to the Catholic Church the Cao Dai featured cardinals, 
arch(bishops), priests and a parallel hierarchy for women. Its centre was a magnificent 
temple/cathedral in the province of Tay Ninh, which turned into a nationalist centre. One of Ngo 
Van Chieu’s close associates and successors aimed to restore the old empire of Annam, topple 
Emperor Bao Dai and replace him with Prince Cong De. He also set up a secret society, which 
would later be suspected of assassinating, among others, French servicemen. Despite such 
activities the Cao Dai counted several hundred thousand followers by 1945. In an article – aptly 
titled “Is Cao Dai a religion?” - Georges Anthony nevertheless explained that the movement was 
characterised by internal divisions, defections and corruption.848 
     Hoa Hao surpassed Cao Dai by amassing up to 800,000 followers and controlling much of 
western Cochinchina. Its founder, Huynh Phu So, grew up in a farming village whose name the 
sect would bear. After being cured from languidness he began to preach Buddhism, declaring 
himself the new Phat. Huynh Phu So attracted people from the surrounding villages who longed 
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for a simple and cheap religion. Followers of Hoa Hao were required to respect Buddhist laws, to 
be honest and charitable, as well as to bow in the direction of four cardinal points. They were also 
expected to defend the country against foreign invaders. Keeping their hair long and wearing 
sombre clothes they abstained from opium, drinking and gambling. 
     The name of Binh Xuen derived from a cluster of villages south of Cholon, home to small 
gangs. From this shadowy environment emerged a certain Le Van Vien, son of a Sino-Vietnamese 
gangster boss and the daughter of a local councillor. He was eventually initiated into the Binh 
Xuen whose laws he vowed to respect: to stay loyal to the group, to keep his word, never to touch 
other members’ wives, concubines and sisters, never to offer any information to the police, to 
demonstrate courage and to obey his bosses. Like other members he also had himself tattooed. 
And similarly to his eventual friend, Bao Dai, Le Van Vien discovered the joy of gambling, money 
and women while becoming involved in the racketeering and protection business. His activities 
landed him in prison in 1927, followed by twelve years of forced labour. After several failed 
attempts he escaped in 1940. But Le Van Vien’s hesitation to collaborate with the Kempeitai left 
him without protection and resulted in another prison spell, during which he encountered political 
inmates. These connections were to serve him well upon his release and rise to Binh Xuen’s 
leadership. 
     After WWII the Corsican Commandant Savani, head of the 2me bureau in South Vietnam, was 
handed the task of establishing relations with the sects. Being married to a Vietnamese and 
speaking her tongue contributed to his understanding of the sect phenomenon.849 In the course 
of his collaboration he came to the following conclusion: 
 
How does one explain the success of the sects if not by the immense faithfulness of the 
masses, still impregnated by Taoism and its spiritual practices, of witchcraft and magic […]? 
Almost always founded for a religious or mystical reason by an enlightened one, a half-crazy 
or an adventurer, these sects quickly offer opportunities to those guided by a political interest 
to turn them away from their initial aim in order to put it at the disposal of a cause which such 
a fanatic support reinforces considerably…850 
 
     Other references to sects stem from an intriguing private collection by Commandant (and later 
Colonel) Henri Esquilat, who liaisoned with the Cao Dai militia. The author included a detailed 
(but un-authored and undated) report explaining the origins, practices and spread of the Cao Dai 
cult, personal letters and photographs. The rapport appears relatively naïve and complacent but 
largely aligns itself with Lartéguy’s descriptions. It is accompanied by a short document signed by 
a Captain Tran Van Trang in September 1948, who identified himself as Cao Dai commander in 
the Can Tho area. It features the three insignias worn by the movement’s troops, i.e. a fan 
composed of 36 swan feathers (standing for the ability to extinguish the fire of passion), a purifying 
brush (to cleanse the soul) and the sword of renovation (symbolising the good). Esquilat further 
enclosed two letters from what appear to have been Cao Dai officers. One of them, Trang Quang 
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Vinh reported to him about the progress of his forces. According to the author, Cao Dai troops 
had extended their zone of action, thereby littering much of Cochinchina with auto-defence posts. 
They had also raised the number of forces and engaged the Viet Minh in frequent skirmishes. The 
writer claimed that (contrary to most of the CEFEO) they were harassing their enemy particularly 
during the night. Esquilat's former Vietnamese ‘student’ rued the departure of his ‘mentor’ but 
praised the commitment of the latter's successor. He also assured the former of their allegiance 
to Emperor Bao Dai and expressed his sincere desire for peace and eventual independence. 
     The photographs attest to the Asian and European influences of the movement, as well as to 
its rather chequered historic record from a French point of view. One of them is showing proud 
Cao Dai officers (one of them being the author of the letter) wearing French uniforms. Another 
image features a second group of officers, who are all wearing hats similar to those used by the 
Japanese in WWII. The commander is even holding a Samurai sword. Further prints present units 
with British and Japanese helmets standing to attention or exercising in the forest. Several other 
photographs, probably taken by Esquilat himself or his staff, feature a beautiful temple, dignitary 
women resembling nuns, as well as a banquet with high-ranking French officers. The latter’s 
presence underlies the sect’s importance to the French.851 
 
c) Inhabitants of Cambodia and Laos: 
 
Given that the main battles of the war were fought in Vietnam, the people of Laos and Cambodia 
have figured comparatively less prominently in recollections. Yet the two territories held strategic 
and political importance. If the Viet Minh had been permitted to infiltrate Laos and Cambodia in 
strength (which they attempted in the case of the former) France’s standing would have been 
further shattered. Dien Bien Phu’s purpose consisted not least in preventing the invasion of 
Laos.852 Nevertheless, Laos and north-eastern Cambodia especially served as supply arteries for 
the Viet Minh, thanks to the assistance of more or less allied communist movements. General 
Guillot remembered how, as a young captain, he and his troops attempted to intercept the ‘ligne 
des trams’, which would turn into the ‘Ho Chi Minh trail’ during the (second) Vietnam War.853 
     In the early 1960s Laos’ population density stood at merely six people per km2. The Lao and 
Thai have constituted the largest proportion, living mostly along the Mekong. The northern 
mountains have been home to the Miao, Yao and Hmong (Meo) as well as to Sino-Tibetan groups. 
The south has been the realm of the Kha. As in the case of Cambodia though, ethnicities have 
frequently been lumped together in the few soldierly testimonies. 
     For much of the Indochina War, and even beyond, Laos was split between the royalist 
government, neutrals and the communist-leaning Pathet Lao, situated in the north-east. The 
division was as much political as family-based: Prince Souvanna Phouma headed the government 
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while his half-brother, the ‘Red Prince’ Souphanouvong, directed the communist opposition.854 
Among those reflecting on Laos figured General Navarre who, focused on the royal family: 
 
The Laotians always manifested a great, good willingness for collaboration. Among the political 
men a few would have been rather tempted to play a double game between us and the Viet 
Minh but the influence of the royal family kept them on the right path. The old king Sisavong 
Vong was loved and respected by his people whose estimation he won by his courageous 
attitude when, in April 1953, Luang Prapang had been directly threatened. His son, the 
hereditary Prince […], although firmly defending the principle of independence of his country, 
was too intelligent and fine not to comprehend that Laos was far from having achieved the 
degree of desired evolution to act, in practice, like an independent state. [...] It was certainly 
thanks to him that the Laotian effort was more sincere and, proportional to the resources of the 
country, more important than that of the other states. Unfortunately, the means of Laos were the 
most feeble ones and their limit quickly reached.855 
 
     One can easily spot a certain paternalism in the quote above. Politicians trying to gain room 
for manoeuvre and distancing themselves from the French were accused of playing a double 
game. The king and his son, on the other hand, were described as intelligent and well-respected 
because they resisted the Viet Minh and stood by the French. But Navarre judged Laos’ means 
correctly: during a presentation in the assembly of the French Union a Laotian member of an 
economic commission drew a picture of an under-populated and impoverished territory, where 
peasants lacked capital and equipment while children died early.856   
       Laotian loyalty also surfaces in Pierre Schoendoerffer's La 317e section. There, villagers 
welcome an exhausted column of French and Laotian soldiers offering them tea, food and opium. 
Even so, the same villagers and some auxiliaries flee advancing Viet Minh. Throughout the book 
the Laotian auxiliaries are portrayed as kind but naïve and childish men, prone to mishaps and 
speaking only a pidgin French. 
     Cambodia and its Khmer majority have to some extent been personified by King/Prince857 
Norodom Sihanouk to this day. Schooled in Saigon and France, the latter took over the country’s 
throne at the age of eighteen when the Japanese forced his father to resign. After WWII Sihanouk 
underwent training at French military academies where he attained the rank of a major. Back in 
Cambodia the prince soon began to play his own fiddle thereby exasperating his French mentors. 
More than once he threatened to go communist if his country was not offered independence.858 
Unlike his Vietnamese neighbours, he eventually succeeded in ridding the country of the French 
without firing a shot. Partly because of this success he was adored by large parts of the population 
but regarded as mentally deranged by his enemies.859 The prince’s seemingly irrational behaviour 
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coloured notably General Navarre's memories. He commented on the prince, the country and its 
people: 
 
... Cambodia had lived in relative quietness until the beginning of 1953, which however troubled 
internal dissidents of whom certain were not without more or less acknowledged links to the 
Vietminh. The illusion of not being at risk, its position a bit out of the way from the rest of 
Indochina, its contacts with Siam, the interest it raised with the Americans and British [...] all that 
prompted it to take against us a very independent attitude and to seek to lean on others than us 
[...] with the result that Cambodia became a closed field of British, Siamese and American 
intrigue more or less directed against France. The character of the young King Norodom 
Sihanouk was not made to overcome the difficulties. Of a pronounced personality, intelligent, 
very friendly towards France and the French but versatile and exalted he was full of the mystical 
conviction that the high mission had been accorded to him to lead his country to complete 
independence. Although he very well saw the dangers, he regarded it as his duty to go towards 
the end of this mission […]. The uncertainty of our politics, coupled with a certain number of 
blunders […] lead him in June 1953 to take an openly hostile attitude towards us […] They [the 
relations] were restored with difficulty towards the end of 1953 and a fragile modus vivendi set 
in militarily and politically. In fact, Cambodia acted henceforth like an independent state towards 
us, receiving our aid like an acquired right but not accepting any orders. The effort of the 
Cambodian war, despite spectacular manifestations was more or less nil. Cambodia became for 
us a heavy weight much more than an auxiliary until the end of the war.860 
 
     The irony of Navarre’s assessment would not have been lost on American military observers, 
who would have recognised in Sihanouk’s actions those of their French counterparts. With his 
enigmatic style the king/prince did however highlight that his subjects differed from their 
neighbours. Earlier cited Raymond Lescastreyres felt indeed that Cambodians/Khmer had little in 
common with their Viet neighbours.861 In view of the limited contacts though, the ‘Cambodian 
character’ seems to have eluded the French leading to some slightly odd pondering. Jacques 
Raphaël-Leygues witnessed water celebrations in Pnom Penh while flying across the territory. 
Although enchanted by the sight, he feared that the calmly toiling peasants further in the 
countryside would kill them if the crew was forced to land.862 
      Or maybe he had a point. In the middle of the war Marguarite Duras published Un barrage 
contre le Pacifique, based on her early life near the Cambodian town of Prey Nop during the 
1920s.863 The book paints a depressing picture of French colonial rule based on corruption and 
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Given their large number, not all ethnic groups have been covered in interviews, memoirs and 
official records. The various societies have often been lumped together in the term montagnards. 
A military study conducted in 1951 for instance sought to evaluate the requirements and difficulties 
of setting up a southern Vietnamese division comprising mostly minorities. Throughout the text 
the author(s) referred to them simply as montagnards.864 
     We content ourselves here with four groups that have prompted (ex-)soldiers to muse in some 
length on characters, appearances and customs. Most comments have in common that their 
authors have put great emphasis on a) the minorities’ relative backwardness, b) their distinctive 
outlook, c) the antagonism towards the Viet majority, d) their loyalty to the French, e) their need 
for protection and f) their bleak fate after the French retreat from the north. Perhaps this 
(unintentionally) echoed classic divide-and-rule tactics. Nguyen Man Ha, a former Viet Minh 
representative negotiating with Admiral d'Argenlieu, maintained that his French counterpart 
admitted to having been instructed by de Gaulle to pursue a policy of division. General Giap on 
the other hand claimed to speak three minority languages in order to reach out to a wider 
audience.865 The communist accusations are partly based on historic precedents: Cooper has 
explained that the French had justified their presence in Indochina by their defence of local 
interests against Siamese and Chinese aspirations.866 It was a logical step from such a position 
to maintain that smaller groups needed to be protected against the biggest one in Vietnam itself. 
Yet this fails to incorporate the fact that minorities cannily collaborated with both sides depending 
on the tide. In so doing these communities enjoyed considerable leverage in their decisions. 
Remembering this, let us now have a look at the first group.  
     Keeping in mind the problematic generalisations associated with terminology, the Moi are 
today spread over a wide area reaching as far north as Hue and as far south as Saigon.867 Massu 
and his men came into contact with this particular ethnicity in the early months of the war and 
during operations in the south. To him the Moi represented friendly, little people whose primitive 
lifestyle and relative fragility made them potential targets of the Viet Minh. In his memoirs the later 
General reminisced:   
 
The curious race of the Moi [...] gains the sympathy of all my men straightaway. It is evident 
at first sight that they are not Annamites. Their bronze, powerful corps [...] is covered by a 
simple loincloth. Being the former occupiers of the plains they are [...] suspicious because 
these primitives were driven into the bushes of central Indochina by the yellows […] Very 
determined not to let themselves be “colonised” nor chased any more they oppose the Viet-
Minh with a wild resistance [...] Our soldiers have […] to seriously show their good intentions 
to be admitted into their forest villages, strongly defended by palisades […] But with us, who 
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fight the same enemy, the entente will be total and we will allow ourselves to admire the 
delicateness, the generous hospitality and the dignity of this little people. They will agree to 
join us in our efforts and will be precious partisans.868 
 
     One cannot contest that many Moi, like other minorities, fought the Viet Minh. What one can 
question is their motivation and seeming dependency. General Salan held that the Moi actually 
used the French to reassert themselves in Indochina. Little is known about their fate following the 
fall of the south in 1975 during the (second) Vietnam War. Perhaps contesting the term Moi, as 
earlier-cited ethnologists have done, and referring instead to a multitude of smaller groups 
represents an official attempt to negate their existence. That could have been preceded by 
prosecution under the ultimate rulers. Nevertheless, the Moi have survived as an entity. 
     Compared to Massu, the writer André Malraux painted a less positive image of the community 
in his novel La voie royale. Set at the beginning of the 20th century it follows the journey of a 
young French and an older Dane into the wild triangle between Cambodia, Siam and Laos, which 
is inhabited by the ferocious Stieng, a sub-group of the Moi. The encounter with the latter 
ultimately leads to the Dane’s death. The underlying message seems to have conveyed that 
Europeans ventured into the Indochinese wilderness at their own peril. 
     Hélie de Saint Marc seemed not overly concerned about such risks when ordered to recruit 
men in the north-Vietnamese highlands. The task brought him into close contact with the Tho. 
Despite his regional and linguistic ignorance, the 25-year old legionnaire apparently succeeded 
in putting together a force, which harassed the Viet Minh and denied it access to the area for 
almost two years. But by 1950 their situation became untenable. Ordered to evacuate the area 
with only a few trucks, the young lieutenant and fellow legionnaires were forced to push away 
most of their erstwhile allies and their families. After the evacuation de Saint Marc and his men 
learned from a few escaped survivors that the Viet Minh had burned down the villages and 
massacred the population. Even so, he later gathered from boat people that men from the area 
had been incorporated into the famous Viet Minh division 308. Looking back, the veteran offered 
an interesting description of the Tho, who were: 
 
... an ethnic minority and an arm of the Thai people (the languages are very close) who 
differed from the Annamites. Less fine, better built, more muscled, they wore indigo clothes 
which they produced themselves on wooden machines. They marched bare-footed [...] 
Eventually peasants, often smugglers, always hunters, they were a nice rebel race. In the 
tenth century, a Tho kingdom existed whose capital was Cao Bang. Later, the region was 
disputed between China and the Empire of Annam. The struggle was uncertain, anarchy 
spread. […] This long period of troubles had very much influenced the personality of the 
inhabitants who had kept a hostility towards the established power […] and an irony for the 
slightest thing. The women and children were always at work. The men decided, walked 
about and fought. Under a superficial Buddhism animism dominated the spirits. The Tho 
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loved rice alcohol and smoked opium in moderation. The daily life, embedded in a plentiful 
and exuberant nature [...] was marked by a great moral liberty.869 
 
     Not all military views of minorities have been so positive. The Thai’s reputation has suffered 
from the fact that some of them deserted their positions during the battle of Dien Bien Phu. Some 
protagonists, like Colonel Langlais, were quick to blame them for the ultimate defeat.870 Raymond 
Legoubé, who commanded a Thai unit during the battle, endeavoured to set the record straight. 
He freely admitted that some of his men had left their positions against orders. But he also pointed 
out that they had been ill-suited for the classic, defensive role in which they had been employed 
during the battle. Equally, they lacked proper instruction, a sufficient number of officers and NCOs 
and, as a result, the necessary cohesion. Worse in the veteran’s view, many legionnaires and 
paratroopers looked down on them. But more interesting for our purpose is Legoubé’s depiction 
of the Thai’s character, their original, military value and their reason for abandoning Dien Bien Phu: 
 
Montagnard, used to the jungle, the Thai is a hardy and frugal runner of tracks. An observer, 
he has the instinct of the hunter: He knows how to read signs […] Fighter at home, he knows 
how to profit from his knowledge of the land […] In this context, the battalion shows its 
advantages in deep reconnaissance across the half-empty zones of the Thai country [….] 
He is more at ease acting subtly rather than forcibly: defending a position without being able 
to retreat is not his strength. […] Surprised and in inferior position, the Thai will not hesitate 
to ‘explode’ in order to re-assemble later and further away. […] The Thai who abandoned 
their combat site in front of the enemy are effectively deserters. Yet they did not join the Viet 
Minh […] It is probable that in their minds they were not aware of committing a crime: They 
left behind their weapons, ammunition, equipment, often even their uniforms. Some even 
asked their lower European cadres permission to leave.  […] If they heartily detest the 
Vietnamese in general and the Viet Minh in particular the sense of nation is alien to them: their 
land is their village, at most their ‘chau’ - their district. Now, the Thai of the BT3 originate for 
the most part from the region of Sonla and Moc Chau. Without being alien this earth of DPB 
[Dien Bien Phu] is not theirs. In addition, the war which took place since March 13 is not the 
one they are used to. […]  So the Thai left […] [in] a sort of […] unilateral termination of their 
contract. 
 
     Legoubé further highlighted that up to 500 Thai had remained in the trenches to the bitter end 
and had endured captivity. They suffered worse retributions than their French counterparts due to 
the Viet Minh’s view of them as traitors. Still, the Thai as a whole survived the war and still populate 
the north-west of today’s Vietnam.871 
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     Legoubé also defended the French cadres commanding the Thai. The fact that the BT3 was 
the only one not considered worthy of citation has traumatised, in his opinion, these officers and 
NCOs.872 
     Alfred McCoy873 has hinted at an intriguing detail in connection with the Thai and the battle: 
Dien Bien Phu was populated by Black Thai. They opposed the White Thai minority, whose leader 
had been entrusted by the French with the administration of the semi-autonomous Thai highlands. 
It was White Thai battalions that sat in Dien Bien Phu’s trenches while Black Thai enthusiastically 
supported the Viet Minh.874 
     Relations with the Meo showed similar patterns. Originally from south-western China, many of 
this group had fled from Manchu persecution and Viet pressure into north-eastern Laos and the 
Tonkin highlands. When the French arrived in the 1890s colonial officers began to purchase opium 
cultivated by the Meo. After the Japanese interregnum the returning colonial administrators 
established contact with a loyal Meo leader. The latter had previously helped to change local 
subsistence into large-scale cash crop farming through use of an excessive opium tax. The levy 
drove many impoverished Meo into the arms of an opposing clan leader, who linked up with the 
Pathet Lao and the Viet Minh. Meo from north-western Tonkin, who had been cheated in the drug 
trade by Thai middlemen, also rallied to the Viet Minh during the battle of Dien Bien Phu. 
     The French administration began to wind down the official opium trade and then curb its use 
in 1946. But French intelligence services and paramilitary agencies, led by Colonel Grall (replaced 
by Commandant/Colonel Trinquier in 1953) and earlier cited Captain Savani, clandestinely took 
the administration’s place to swell their hitherto meagre war coffers. Under ‘Operation X’, 
sanctioned by General Salan, opium was bought from Meo and Thai cultivators and transported 
to Saigon. There, it was processed and sold by the Binh Xuen under Savani’s eyes. The proceeds 
were divided among all participants and largely used to finance sectarian militia in Cochinchina 
and the mixed airborne units in the highlands. In his memoirs General Salan defended his 
involvement by stating: “The montagnards [...] are the friends of those who buy opium.” He also 
rightly pointed out that such deals had often been struck in earlier colonial times with the consent 
of the French gouverneurs-généraux. 
      André Thabaut for his part devoted much of his memoirs to the men he had spent months with 
and with whom he had established close relations. The military doctor initially held a few 
stereotypes of the Muong: 
 
My first contact with the Muong made them look different from how my imagination, 
according to ‘gossip’, had presented them to me: they are not the wild mountain warriors, 
capable of eating the livers of their beaten opponents. Physically, I think it is not easy to 
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distinguish them from the Vietnamese in the delta, in which, after all, they have now lived 
for several years. They are physically very fine, seem quick, intelligent and skilful. 
 
     He also observed that, like the Viet, the Muong were fond of staying up late, singing, playing 
cards and debating. These activities might explain why younger French officers got along fairly 
well with their supplétifs and earned their respect, while their older colleagues struggled with the 
Muong’s partisan-like style. With the gradual shifting of responsibilities to local forces and 
authorities, some Muong also became NCOs and officers. Thabaut gained the impression that 
due to the Muong’s feudal social structure, their commanders were regarded as chiefs by their men. 
     Toward the end of the Indochinese conflict, the authorities offered the Muong the choice of 
either staying in the north (and being demobbed with advance pay) or moving south with their 
families. While a small faction decided to remain, especially seasoned soldiers opted for 
departure. Many, who contemplated this step though, worried about their family’s future in a 
‘foreign land’. The authorities themselves were unclear about where to resettle the soldiers and 
their families. One possibility was the high plateaux of South Vietnam. The French based their 
consideration on the original habitat of the minority, ignoring the fact that the Muong had long 
evacuated the northern highlands under pressure from the Viet Minh. 
     Thabaut added various, scientific details to his personal memoirs, assisted by Marc 
Lemaire.875 Of the aspects Thabaut unearthed were the Sino-Vietnamese origins of the Muong 
and their original homeland around Hoa Binh and the Black River. Thabaut concluded that, due 
to historic antagonism, they had barely been tempted by communism embodied by the Viet 
majority. In this context he applauded the French authorities’ offer for evacuation while remaining 
pessimistic about those staying behind. His mood was based on a French fact-finding mission 
that had been unable to find any remaining Muong after the war. In view of Dang Nghiem Van, 
Chu Thai Son and Luu Hung estimating their number at over 900,000876 such pessimism might 
have been unjustified. 
     Lemaire inserted various details on Muong culture and lifestyle, which need not be repeated. 
But it is worth pointing out that, contrary to other ethnicities, Muong women rarely agreed to 
become mistresses of French personnel. Further, the group was granted limited autonomy in 
return for their cooperation. Lemaire also conceded that not all Muong had rallied to the French 
and that some had deserted after being recruited.877 
 
 
e) French expatriates 
 
The enthusiasm and relief of expatriates greeting the first French troops to embark in Saigon and 
Haiphong did not last. As in Malaya, the meeting of local European civilians and new military 
arrivals came to be marked by mutual uneasiness and misunderstanding. While a sentence, 
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gesture or outlook often sufficed to trigger long-held resentment among British servicemen, 
members of the CEFEO usually reacted in a particular way as a result of longer conversations or 
interactions with civilians. If class played a dominant role in Malaya, encounters in Indochina 
reflected a growing rift between the French military and society in general, particularly back in 
France. 
     That said, reactions depended on specific factions. According to Bodin, soldiers categorised 
their compatriots broadly into six, somewhat overlapping and therefore slightly confusing, 
categories: ‘old colonial hands’, petits blancs,878 plantation managers and other businessmen, 
administrators, missionaries and prostitutes. The ‘old hands’ had lived in Indochina for decades, 
having often served in the army or navy themselves.879 Newly-arriving soldiers could identify with 
them to some degree. However, the prevalence of alcoholism in this group often elicited more pity 
than friendship. Relations with the petits blancs on the other hand could be cordial but delicate. 
Planters, although admired for their courage, were deemed to put themselves at a needless risk 
in their isolated plots. Vice versa, the latter and expatriates in general censured the CEFEO for 
its failure to provide security. (Small) businessmen, such as owners of restaurants, bars and 
dance halls, appeared to be merely interested in servicemen’s meagre pay. When it came to the 
colonial administration, servicemen felt that customs officers particularly were sheltered, better 
paid and corrupt. As for missionaries, they were widely suspected of sympathising with the Viet 
Minh. They were also resented for their refusal to provide valuable information on their Asian 
flock. The clergy for its part dared to criticise the increasingly brutal methods employed by some 
elements of the armed forces. Lastly, servicemen made ample use of prostitutes’ services. To 
some the latter evoked happy memories of France. 
      Stereotypes shaped opinions. Soldiers regarded many expatriates as wartime collaborators, 
colonial reactionaries and racists. Furthermore, many gained the impression that they were not 
so much fighting for peace and stability in Indochina but for the interests and protection of a few 
civilians. The latter in turn held against the troops that they lacked knowledge of their situation 
and the territory.880 
     Before we look into individual reactions it is necessary to further sketch the composition of the 
expatriate community. In this context, the reader should recall the somewhat artificial distinction 
between newer and older arrivals. 
     By and large, French civilians arriving in Indochina preferred towns and cities to rural areas. 
By the turn of the century 3,000 lived in Saigon and 1,088 in Hanoi, as opposed to 825 in 
Cambodia and 50 in Laos. Their background and professions varied greatly. (Ex-)soldiers, 
manufacturers, butchers, bakers, watch-makers, jewellers, booksellers, hairdressers, 
pharmacists, tailors, cobblers, plumbers, café owners, teachers, postal clerks, lawyers, judges, 
missionaries, planters, engineers and merchants made Indochina their home.  
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     Of all these groups, missionaries represented one of the largest and most influential. As early 
as 1904 roughly 500 bishops, priests and nuns spread the gospel in Vietnam and Cambodia.881 
Spurred and supported by the French navy, diplomats and the papacy, missionary activity initially 
developed in close cooperation with mercantile institutions. The drive came to a temporary halt 
during the 1789 revolution and the Napoleonic wars but was renewed under the Bourbon dynasty. 
Led by the Société des missions étrangères, to which most clerical institutions in Indochina were 
affiliated,882 missions spread rapidly, in particular under the Guizot premiership (1840-8). The 
latter supported the idea of French points d’appui883 in Asia. However, the Catholic intrusion into 
Indochina triggered angry responses of local dynasties who disliked missionary support of rival 
factions to the throne(s). Moreover, the fast growing and often rebellious Christian community in 
Indochina (totalling 300,000 in the 19th century) attached a subversive stigma to Catholicism. It 
resulted in official persecution, which in turn prompted French naval interventions. 
     Although conversion of the local population helped pacification, administrators and officers 
took offence at the Christian missionary zeal, too. Relations considerably improved with the end 
of official anti-clericalism in France (1848). It worsened again after Pope Benedict XV’s order to 
abandon secular loyalties in 1919 and to transfer responsibilities to Asians. Still, the church's local 
representatives remained largely neutral during the nationalist agitation of the early 1930s. 
Individual priests did however criticise the heavy taxation on the population. While still requiring 
official approval, missionary dispensaries, maternity ‘hospitals’, nurseries, leper colonies and 
municipalities contributed to France’s mission civilisatrice. The cooperation continued throughout 
WWII as the local clergy welcomed Vichy's idea of a state based on religious ideals. By that time 
roughly 340 European missionaries, assisted by 1,400 Vietnamese priests, oversaw just under 
two million baptised. Most of the latter were to be found among the poor in the Tonkin and among 
minorities of the northern highlands. Those converted often found themselves ostracised by their 
neighbours. Significantly, the church failed to attract much following among the Vietnamese 
middle class and elite. Perhaps as a result, the clergy did not ordain a Vietnamese bishop until 
1933.884        
     Ironically, Vietnamese Catholics were among the most vocal and aggressive agitators 
following the Japanese collapse. Only during the French re-conquest could missionaries return to 
their often burnt down and pillaged communities. The military's eventual retreat from the northern 
areas led to a renewed flight of European and, in part, Asian clergy. The remaining Vietnamese 
Catholics initially welcomed Ho Chi Minh, having campaigned for an end to European tutelage 
within the church. But many changed their mind when increasing taxes, mandatory Marxist 
courses and the control of religious services ensued after 1952. When the communist grip 
hardened in 1955 up to 700,000 Catholics fled the north. A little later the last French priests were 
ordered to leave.885 
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     Available recollections attest to ambivalent military-clerical relations. The army doctor André 
Thabaut for instance received a priest and a bishop after the end of hostilities. The latter directed 
a school in Hanoi and revealed that many of his students had joined the Viet Minh where they 
had reached cadre positions. To Thabaut’s annoyance the priest admitted holding some 
admiration for the ideological fervour of the guerrillas. The doctor mused in his memoirs whether 
his visitor had belonged to the so called ‘christo-marxists’ advocating liberation theories. He 
suspected that the thousands of Catholic refugees had not shared the priest’s admiration.886 
     General Le Chatelier saw a different picture when he toured southern Vietnam in 1955. 
Stopping during a drive from Dalat to Saigon, he was invited by a nun to visit her leper colony. 
There the young officer was impressed by the joyfulness of both the sick and their carers, who 
operated with very limited funds and relied on spare military supplies. Le Chatelier parted satisfied 
by the thought of how much the nuns and others had done for Indochina.887 
     Military views of colonial administrators were more homogenous and negative. Bigeard 
commented in his memoirs: 
 
I’m sickened by their behaviour. No sense of duty and one worry only, to enrich themselves 
to the maximum thanks to the opium and piastre traffic. I don’t support that my men die as 
veritable heroes while others fill their pockets. I send a report to Hanoi. The effect is 
immediate. The [local] administrator is relieved of his functions. 
 
     Unfortunately, Bigeard lost his command, too, a few weeks later. General Valluy admitted that 
the authorities had not appreciated his report.888 Roger Delpey was equally dismissive after an 
encounter with an administrator but for a different reason: 
 
The interests of this village are served by an administrative delegate, a young Frenchman, 
freshly graduated from Paris’ Ecole coloniale. The legionnaires rudely respond on every 
occasion [...] to this little delegate, whose head is filled with philanthropic theories acquired 
in a school, which should have re-considered its programmes long ago. For this civil servant 
there is no Viet Minh, no enemy, no rebel; there are only misled people who can be led back 
on the right path with evangelical gentleness. He believes in the soundness of his school’s 
theories and – faithfully – goes about applying them. He still believes in pacification without 
rifles! Tieucan [the village] was to witness tragic events and its pacifist delegate could revisit 
his theories…889 
 
     Robert Dibon for his part was told by expatriates that there was little point in re-asserting 
sovereignty, in view of the widespread hatred of the French among the Vietnamese. At one point 
he encountered two civilians who had apparently fought in the resistance against the Japanese 
– alongside the Viet Minh. They blamed extremists for the worsening security situation. Dibon 
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also heard that European and Eurasian policemen frequently tortured Viet Minh suspects. Yet a 
member of the force, he encountered, insisted that the police strongly disapproved of such 
methods. Further north Dibon and his colleagues were frenetically welcomed by their compatriots 
upon entering Haiphong in 1946. The contrasting insights prompted him to reflect on cultural 
differences, colonialism, the French presence and re-conquest: “Suddenly, I thought that in 
comparison [to the Vietnamese] the Europeans are brutes and childish at the same time… One 
can force the respect and love of these people only by natural dignity, not with fanfares… [...] Has 
one ever tried to understand them… to love them?890 
     Misunderstanding and miscommunication certainly played into inter-French relations.  
General de Bollardière lamented in his memoirs: 
 
In Saigon I was […] struck and deeply disappointed by the misunderstanding, which 
appeared between the new arrivals and the French of Indochina. The latter expected us as 
liberators. They encountered only a slightly scornful condescension, a wholly unjustified 
contempt: many [expatriates] had cruelly suffered and had sacrificed themselves in a 
combat without hope [against the Japanese]. Their often heroic acts […] were ignored and 
disregarded. Admiral Decoux, governor-general relieved of his functions without honour, 
was brutally thrown in prison after his return to France.891 
 
     It is debatable whether the entire expatriate community resisted the Japanese coup in March 
1945. And Decoux's loyalty to Vichy France and his prosecution of Free French in Indochina did 
not endear him to liberated France. 
     General Hinterlang for his part quoted the example of the planter Lalanne whom he described 
as an “impressive person” but also a “tyrant”. The latter had arrived in Indochina in 1918 after 
having chased ‘pirates’ on the Mekong. Together with an agricultural expert he had taken over a 
small plantation, gradually extending control over an entire sector. Assisted by numerous 
engineers and assistants the two men cultivated tea and fruits in a region also featuring Michelin’s 
rubber estates. Hinterlang was charged with taking command of local partisans who had been 
organised to protect the area. Upon his arrival Lalanne had already recruited some NCOs of the 
Groupement Massu. He had also bought arms and transport equipment, including small planes 
from German and American stocks. Connections with the highest military and administrative 
circles had proven helpful in this. The manager unsuccessfully tried to involve fellow planters but 
most relied on official protection. This prompted Hinterlang to suspect that some had secretly paid 
the Viet Minh in exchange for being left alone.892 Other images of planters showed them as lonely 
but persistent and brave men, working side by side with their staff and sharing the constant worry 
of communist attacks. The only respite came during evenings in restaurants and bars in nearby 
cities and towns.893 
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     To complement such views it might be worth quoting former members of the expatriate 
community themselves.  Among them was Yvonne Fontane, who recalled a happy childhood in a 
beautiful Hanoi full of gardens. She fittingly commented: “We [the children] were really kings.” 
Fontane belonged to a family of colonial administrators, of which she was not ashamed because, 
in her view, they “… contributed to creating many interesting and nice things in the country.” She 
conceded that administrators had been well paid and that their families had enjoyed a rich social 
life. This world fell apart with the Japanese coup after which the family merely tried to survive. 
When Ho Chi Minh declared independence in front of a frenetic crowd they did not dare venture 
outside. According to Fontane, even the Vietnamese house-staff was frightened but felt compelled 
to stand in front of the house and greet the crowds. Her father urged the apparently reluctant boys 
and boyesses to leave if their presence in the house became too dangerous. Fontane concluded 
somewhat naively that: “We were very detached from this. […] historically speaking we were not 
part of the problem.”894 
     Given the heterogeneous composition of the CEFEO and the expatriate community, it is 
relatively difficult to connect military reactions with class or regional schisms. In fact, the two 
groups probably had more in common than either would have had with the metropolitan 
population. The army of the 1940s and 1950s, like the colonial societies, represented a relatively 
outmoded group, embodying values at odds with the growing consumerism at home. Many men 
(had) joined the army precisely because they did not want to be “at the mercy of their clients”.895 
Ironically, the aversion towards business and materialism had carried them into a region where 
resources were extracted to fuel the former. The military and settlers were also more attached to 
empire than a largely uninterested population in France. Still, certain metropolitan facets could 
have played a role in inter-French relations, albeit on a subconscious level. 
     French society continued to be divided into the bourgeoisie, the middle class (petite 
bourgeoisie, artisans, small shopkeepers, teachers and cadres moyens), peasants and the urban 
working class during the 20th century. Despite revolutionary rhetoric, status in France depended 
very much on class, occupation and education. Consequently, the industrial and commercial elite 
managed to keep its hold on the political process. In view of the fact that the Armée coloniale 
counted many officers from the lower middle-classes, encounters with senior colonial 
administrators or managers of the Banque de l’Indochine were frought with potential friction. 
Given on the other hand that 27% of the active metropolitan population still worked the land by 
1954, soldiers from farming background possibly struggled to identify with an expatriate 
community made up largely of urban artisans. Younger soldiers and officers had also witnessed 
massive industrialisation, large-scale flight from rural areas, population growth and mass 
education, from which Indochina had remained sheltered. Back home, the number of salaried 
workers increased at the expense of farmers and miners, who swelled the ranks of unskilled 
industrial workers in urban factories, construction, transport and service. In parallel, technicians, 
engineers, cadres supérieurs, teachers and scientists assumed a new importance, even if their 
                                                          
894  Rousselier, Vietnam – la première guerre. 
895  Quote by General Georges Buis, interview, 6.11.1997, SHD/DITEEX, 3K 27 – I – (12AV 156). 
196 
 
overall percentage remained low.896 Yet these professions remained rare in Southeast Asia or had 
long returned home. 




Emanuelle Saada has stated that within the French empire métissage897 had been most intensely 
debated and experimented with in Indochina. Specific passages in the 1954 Geneva Accords 
even resulted in thousands of Eurasian children being taken away from their Asian mothers and 
sent to France. Nevertheless, historians have been unable to determine the exact number of 
métis in the French Empire/Union. This partly owes to the reluctance of indigenous populations 
to be counted so as to avoid taxation. Categorisations (Europeans, métis, assimilés or indigènes) 
were also notoriously wobbly. Officially, Eurasians counted as résidus898 but fatherless Eurasian 
children were categorised as indigènes. According to the Société des métis de l'Indochine and 
the Fédération eurasiènne 500 Eurasians lived in Indochina by 1904, swelling to 300,000 by 1952, 
with 50,000 considered French nationals. Yet these estimations were based on counts in 
individual cities and provinces in the absence of territory-wide registrations.899 
     It appears as if French servicemen saw Eurasians as a natural ingredient of the Indochinese 
population without entirely ignoring their delicate situation. Prominent or cooperative métis 
heightened the profile of the racially mixed community. Former lieutenant Henri Denis would have 
struggled to command partisans without his Eurasian interpreter, although he eventually learned 
the local tongue.900 Graham Greene visited the previously-mentioned Colonel Leroy. The barely 
32 years old métis appeared to him the “most assured and happiest” of all seigneurs in 
Cochinchina. The writer was greeted by a band playing the film tune to The Third Man while 
dancers performed in front of an artificial lake. The colonel offered his visitor cognac while citing 
Proudhon and Montesquieu. The “curious but imposing personality” boldly advocated the partition 
of large estates and their distribution to small farmers. He also organised local elections for a 
consultative assembly. Further, he ordered the construction of almost 100 security posts in 
Cochinchina.901 One could hold that such bold measures might have been more difficult to take 
for someone more embedded in a community and its customs, i.e. for ‘pure Viet’. 
     The fact that many Eurasians staffed the police, including the notorious securité, bars, dance 
halls and brothels902 hinted at the métis’ problematic situation. A pensive Robert Dibon wrote in 
his memoirs: 
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It is the half-castes on whom we can count the most. They are very numerous in the police, 
either as auxiliaries or actives. Yet, their white masculine parents have abandoned them to 
their fate as half-castes for which they cannot be envied. But the colleagues […] tell us horrific 
stories concerning these people. About the interrogations in their localities: real sadists, they 
tell us.903 
 
     Such statements are difficult to verify. Likewise, the perpetrators’ motivations, if they did indeed 
commit those acts, invites tricky speculation. How does one explain, to quote another example, 
the incentive of someone like the French-Vietnamese Captain Parel, who hunted Viet Minh on his 
own in the region of Tay Ninh?904 What seems obvious is that many Eurasians chose to side with 
the French. 
     Kim Lefèvre, himself a métis has analysed the circumstances and resulting attitudes of this 
group. He has paid particular attention to relations between settlers and young Vietnamese 
women, the con gai, between 1925 and 1945. The former habitually offered material benefits, i.e. 
pay and accommodation, in exchange for the company of the latter. Many con gai were orphans, 
widows or simply peasants fleeing poverty in the countryside. Often infused with strong Confucian 
morals and sexually ignorant, they were preyed on by human traffickers. These provided even 
the lowliest and ugliest Frenchman with a young mistress. 
     Most con gai knew that their ‘partners’ would eventually leave the territory and abandon them. 
They were equally aware that they had dishonoured themselves in Vietnamese eyes and stood 
little chance of marrying men from their ethnic community. To spare their families problems they 
frequently cut all links with them. To make matters worse, the consolidation of French power 
brought the arrival of metropolitan wives and families. The latter despised the con gai and their 
mixed offspring. Despite that, French men, women and children frequently turned to them in 
troubled times. 
     Treated like servants in French homes while despised by Asians, young métis lacked their 
parents' social links and religious foundations. Angered by their situation and status, they felt 
nevertheless superior to their mothers while hating their fathers for their lack of affection and 
respect. Not rarely, daughters of mixed race became con gai themselves, albeit more demanding 
and troubled ones. In rare cases French men married their mistress, looked after their children 
and thereby accepted social isolation. Where the latter was too much to bear, institutions like the 
Société de protection or the Taberd School offered asylum to Eurasian offspring.905 
     Afro-Asian relations and offspring proved even more delicate. André Thabaut recounted how 
his wife had tried to arbitrate and help tirailleurs sénégalais and their Asian lovers trying to decide 
what to do with their children at the end of the war. She told him at the time that many soldiers 
wished to take the children with them but ran up against the opposition of their Asian 
mistresses.906 
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     Servicemen of any colour, who lived with their con gai (and children), could become more 
attached to Indochina but more detached from France (or Africa). In parallel, they turned more 
sedentary thereby complicating changes of posts. In some cases they also lost some of their 
combativeness although the case for the opposite could easily be made.907 
 
 
g) Women and sexuality 
 
Although women obviously made up a large percentage of all groups previously treated they merit 
a separate analysis. Bernard Fall once remarked that: “This would have been a very un-French 
war if women had not played an important role in it.” Soldiers stationed in Indochina did indeed 
keenly observe and interact with the other sex. Much of that occurred within the military itself to 
the effect that French servicewomen appear to have caused greater sensation and sympathy than 
female civilians of either race. This was in part due to the fact that they belonged to a French 
minority that cared about the CEFEO’s fate.  
     Female ambulance drivers and pilots caught many military eyes. One of them was Paule 
Dupont d’Isigny. An accomplished pilot and paratrooper, she served with the Infirmières pilotes 
secouristes de l’air (IPSA). Her thirty combat missions earned her a Croix de guerre. Others, such 
as parachute riggers, performed less dangerous but equally important tasks. Then there were the 
civilian reporters of the French information service like Brigitte Friang. She accompanied troops 
on various missions, at times parachuting into combat zones.908 Her colleague, Anne de 
Buchepot, one day showed up in front of then Captain Aussaresses shortly before they were 
ambushed. The latter was stunned to see the photographer calmly taking pictures during the 
ensuing clash. Her courage ultimately caused her death when she was killed during a street battle 
in Saigon.909 
     The motivations of these women were undoubtedly manifold. Two of Delpard's female 
interviewees cited adventure and a desire to be of use as their main motivations. Both could 
satisfy these wishes during tours of four and a half and six years respectively.910  
     Compared to these metropolitan women their Vietnamese colleagues (serving in the military 
or related services) have fared less well in soldierly memory – if they have been mentioned at all. 
This has probably to do with the fact that many were suspected (often rightly so) of serving as 
spies for the Viet Minh.911 Similarly anonymous in recollections have been female representatives 
of the expatriate community, which unquestionably owed to the problematical civilian-military 
relations. This diverges from the cinematic treatment of this group. Panivong Norindr has been 
critical of the fact that Catherine Deneuve's character in Indochine seems to embody the ‘colonial 
Marianne’ looking after her local flock. In the same context, he has suspected that director Annaud 
was considerably motivated by the sensuality portrayed in Duras’ novel, on which l'Amant is 
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based. In Norindr’s view it is no coincidence that the main characters in both movies are women. 
It re-affirmed the common notion of Indochina as something feminine and France’s presence as 
a “stormy love affair”.912 
     Speaking of such, Fall maintained that the prevalence of heterosexual relationships was in 
part due to the fact that polygamy was not banned in Indochina until 1958. Until then: “The 
existence of easy-to-get sex is treated matter-of-factly by everyone...” So common was the 
practice that the author once detected a sign outside the women’s pagoda on Hanoi’s Great Lake 
forbidding sex in the building. British liaison officer Henry Hill was clearly taken aback by such 
customs. Yet he could not bring himself to refuse his hosts’ invitation to the regimental brothel 
despite worrying about the reputation of the British Army. He was even more shocked by the sight 
of the brothel mother and her very young employees whom Hill regarded as “clearly unsuitable 
for such a place.” He managed to save his face by showing his French colleagues a few drink 
games. The evening proved a success and all got on “awfully well” thereafter.913 
     In order not to neglect less centrally stationed troops the army sent out BMCs to posts 
scattered over the Indochinese landscape. The French authorities argued that controlled 
establishments and workers reduced rape and the spread of venereal diseases. Prostitutes not 
only contributed to soldiers’ morale but often ended up looking after the wounded as auxiliary 
nurses. A BMC was even stationed in Dien Bien Phu. Fall also cited 73 French prostitutes who 
serviced a large clientele of rich merchants, senior administrators and military personnel in 
Saigon. When General de Lattre put an end to their activities a distressed chief of intelligence 
informed him that the women had been on the army’s payroll.914 
     Asian females competed with their European and North African counterparts. A Laotian 
entertained Jules Roy, who had been invited to a noble establishment by a rich métis merchant. 
Roy duly covered his nightly experiences in Les belles croisades (1959). Years later he mused 
on the local population, describing it as “silent, cunning [preferring] to put the occupier to sleep 
with opium and girls before cutting his throat”.915 Roger Delpey on the other hand recounted how 
the men in his post rejected the offers of company made by elderly villagers in exchange for 300 
piastres. More than potential danger or moral doubts weighed the men’s conviction that the 
women had already been sold to others.916 
     Yet some Asian mistresses saved lives. General Aussaresses recollected how a Chinese 
woman had achieved the release of her captured French lover by paying a ransom to the Viet 
Minh.917 But such loyalty had its risks. Local lovers, wives and families were easy and preferred 
targets for the insurgents, regardless of whether they lived in protected camps de mariés, in the 
garrisons or in villages. Fall quoted several examples, particularly of women belonging to ethnic 
minorities, who had been killed after the departure of their French partners. Their mixed offspring 
suffered ostracism if left to live.918 
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     The lot of soldiers’ wives and families was generally not an easy one, either. Those, who 
accompanied their husbands and fathers to Indochina, did not see them often. Aussaresses 
married locally between two operations.919 General Simon noted in his diary on October 7, 1951 
the arrival of a truck filled with his Cambodian men’s wives. The post’s limited size only allowed 
for a few days of reunion.920 
     The varying female roles described above run counter to the often ambivalent connection 
between colonialism, war and women in literature. Alexander Soucy has analysed the role of 
women in modern Vietnamese society, including allusions to the past. He has maintained that 
they have initiated reform in their society over the centuries. Similarly, they have also played an 
important part in the struggle against invaders. Despite that, patriarchal, Confucian values have 
impacted on their lives to this day.921 
     Undeniably, women played a crucial role in the Indochina War, particularly among the Viet 
Minh. Several of the interviewees in the documentary Indochine – La première guerre are women. 
But their involvement went along with a strong rejection of feudal, Confucian values. The con gai, 
too, ignored at least some of these norms due to the difficult situation they found themselves in. 
     Penny Edwards for her part has looked into written documentation of the early French 
administration in Cambodia. Although administrators' situation slightly differed from that of 
soldiers, the attitude towards the territory and its women shows parallels. Edwards has identified 
a habit of portraying Cambodia and colonies in general as something female to be conquered, 
ruled and protected by strong and adventurous men. But she has not necessarily attributed these 
images to the intermediary role of con gai, Cambodia's status as the oldest and ‘easiest’ 
Indochinese protectorate, or a general, imperial desire for domination. The latter notion would 
overlook that Marianne represented France itself. Edwards has regarded the myths of male power 
and female subordination more as a reaction to the gradual emancipation in Europe and the 
arrival of French women in Indochina. Male colonisers deemed it necessary to protect oriental 
females from modern developments.922 
     Some of this can be found in veterans’ recollections. But, as we have seen, the view of French 
women has been more positive, certainly in the case of metropolitan servicewomen. Asian 
counterparts represented not just passive victims of chauvinism either. Females in soldierly 
memory might come closer, if a bit unfairly, to the century-old stereotype of either being saints or 
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Scholars, such as Hall, Porter, Ward, Ageron, Blanchard or Girard, cited in this thesis923 have 
presented differing takes on the impact of empire and its end on Britain and France. Most seem 
to agree though that the armed forces represented a special case because of their heavy 
involvement in empire-building and -defence. Yet few have had a closer look at what members of 
those institutions actually saw and lived through in colonies and protectorates. Even John 
MacKenzie has not so much analysed individual circumstances but rather the military’s image in 
Britain.924  
     Andrew Thompson has not concentrated on the military either but his cautious reasoning is 
corroborated by the results of this thesis. I largely agree with his argument that the nuanced 
strands regarding imperial culture are down to differing understandings of the diverse evidence. 
‘Enthusiasm’ and ‘popular’ are indeed problematical terms because they are too comprehensive, 
conceptual and vague. The impact of literature, film, art and entertainment on the metropolitan 
populace(s), including (future) servicemen does only reveal part of the picture. Thompson has 
rightly urged for a closer look at family life and work environments – in our case barracks and 
jungles – so as to understand the subtle and changing influence of empire on different groups.925  
     This project has shone some light on the British and French’s armies’ familiarity with empire 
as well as on their responses to Southeast Asia and its wars. Its findings are not necessarily clear-
cut. While individual reactions could be rather pronounced, the sum of soldierly testimonies 
neither implies strong imperial awareness and affinity nor complete ignorance and indifference 
across the board. What they do illustrate are differing commemorative (and social) conventions 
in the British and French Army. They also highlight the importance of individual age, periods of 
service, circumstances and background when trying to understand military stances on empire and 
decolonisation. 
     Chapters one and two, complemented by appendices A to D, have therefore sketched the 
origins and make up of the anti-communist forces engaged in Southeast Asia, as far as that is 
feasible. In the British case demobilisation after WWII and National Service resulted in a force 
that had to adjust to new political realities in Malaya, i.e. the Cold War and decolonisation, as well 
as to a hitherto largely unknown environment. Habitually, young and imperially less conscious 
privates and subalterns were commanded and assisted by seasoned NCOs, many of whom had 
experienced other overseas postings, most notably in the Indian northwest. All that said, even 
among these old imperial soldiers very few were familiar with Malaya’s pre-emergency history, its 
complex ethnic make-up or its testing climate and compact jungles. Over time various troops from 
colonies, including Malaya and Singapore, and the Dominions reinforced a force hitherto 
composed of British and Gurkha units.  
     The CEFEO, too, mostly consisted of men who had never set foot in Indochina prior to the 
conflict, with the majority originating from the Armée Coloniale and d’Afrique. They were assisted 
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by Foreign Legionnaires, (North) Africans, local irregulars and eventually the national armies of 
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. As a result, the French themselves became a minority among 
those fighting the Vietnamese communists. Metropolitan officers more familiar with Southeast 
Asia were often either ignored or sent back to France, as was the case with someone like General 
Sabattier. The army also brought in a limited number of younger and less travelled servicemen 
who could not add much local knowledge. But the majority of the men quoted in this thesis were 
officers (and a handful of NCOs926), whose well-written accounts betray educational levels well 
above those of ordinary French (and British).  
     Chapters three and four contain soldiers’ views on insurgency and insurgents. In an attempt 
to explain those, the sections also lists possible influences on these opinions, such as the 
Japanese (quasi-) occupation of Southeast Asia and other, far-reaching developments during 
WWII. Other aspects include the general difficulty to recognise the dawn of empire, lack of proper 
briefings, coupled with official and often misleading propaganda, apolitical army education, public 
apathy, political elitism, the onset of the Cold War, the opposition faced in Southeast Asia and the 
eventual outcomes of the wars. These aspects help to explain why British soldiers focused on 
their task and largely accepted the official categorisation of the Malayan Emergency as a counter-
insurgency effort against communist rebels. 
     Apart from that, the British military success in Malaya has led to fairly positive views on the 
counter-insurgency effort on the one hand and to dim views of the opposition on the other. A bi-
product of these stances is that most (ex-)soldiers (have) found little reason to reflect on the 
potential economic, political and social pulls exerted on the MNLA’s recruits, as outlined by 
Mackay. These included the traumatic events during WWII, the problematic rule of the BMA, 
infrastructural deficiencies, economic upheavals, political blunders and an aloof, colonial 
administration.927 Among those more critical participants one notes particular functions, colonial 
ties preceding or outlasting the emergency or physical and emotional scars.   
     Vice versa, the experience of combating and ultimately being defeated by increasingly well-
armed, disciplined and effective insurgents has undoubtedly shaped judgements of (former) 
French soldiers. In many cases initial contempt for and underestimation of the enemy gave way 
to a degree of admiration. As regards the conflict itself, military opinions have not in all cases 
followed the classic division of the war into an initially localised, colonial conflict turning into a 
Cold War theatre. In reality, French understandings of the clash and motivations to fight the Viet 
Minh ranged from a simple desire to do one’s duty, attempts to revive careers, escape from 
difficult personal circumstances, rejection of totalitarianism and solidarity with local communities 
(opposed to communism) to a belief in a continued French role in Indochina, regardless of the 
conflict’s stages.  
     In chapter five I have argued that British military recollections of Malayan land and people have 
not been overly plentiful and weighty. Instead, servicemen took a business-like approach to their 
                                                          
926  One must obviously draw a distinction between NCOs and officers. While NCOs have usually risen through the 
ranks, officers have tended to receive their commission after officer training. The promotion through the ranks 
up to fairly senior levels has been more common in France than in Britain.  
927  Mackay, The Malayan Emergency, pp. 11-7 (thesis chapter 3). 
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presence in Southeast Asia. One also searches largely in vain for connections between colonial 
representations gathered in Britain and reconnected with in Southeast Asia. Pronouncements on 
Britain’s imperial record in Malaya have been similarly rare and where they surfaced, mainly 
positive. Recollections of local communities have been more frequent but often infused with 
stereotypes. Soldiers did not necessarily gather those labels in Britain but developed or accepted 
them from colleagues during their tours. On the other hand, the fraught relations with the 
expatriate community often resulted from sometimes very subtle demeanour on the latter’s part. 
Failure to offer exhausted servicemen drinks was enough to tarnish planter’s image to this day. 
Tensions had little to do with empire but much to do with domestic class divisions, which 
circuitously echoes Porter’s claims.928 All this leads one to suspect that there are limits as to the 
extent to which (former) servicemen (have) identified with the territory and its communities. 
Veterans would argue that their erstwhile attitudes cannot really surprise given their arduous 
chores, the frequently short tours, meagre pay and the need to guard a distance to communities. 
I have added to this the importance of age, lack of schooling and the limits of imperial culture in Britain.  
     In comparison, French (ex-)servicemen have passed on fairly complex testimonies, despite 
similar, and often greater, pressures and general unfamiliarity with Indochina. It is noticeable that 
at least a few of these contain evaluations of France’s developmental performance. Recollections 
of human interactions particularly abound. They show clear preferences for the usually loyal 
minorities but reservations in regard to the Viet majority and expatriates. Soldiers’ (newly) 
awakened interest in Indochina, the often fairly dynamic interactions with locals and the resulting 
attachment are remarkable, given the army’s traditional preference for Africa and the limits of 
imperial stimuli in France. There are various reasons for the differing output, among them 
educational refinements, a larger and more heterogeneous, Indochinese environment, greater 
reliance on local troops and longer military tours in Indochina. It should also be acknowledged 
that the greater use of memoirs and official papers for the ‘French’ part of the research allowed 
for lengthier and more complex soldierly comments. Even so, they have still turned out to be more 
philosophical than comparable and more technical British accounts.  
     A distinct difference in perceptions of land and people lies in the interactions with women. The 
British military set a rather clear demarcation line when it came to such relations, thus indirectly 
encouraging prostitution. The French largely let nature take its course, even providing controlled 
environments. Perhaps this represents the most significant colonial legacy, both in Southeast 
Asia and France itself, where many children of mixed ethnicity have ended up.  
     In these last two chapters especially I have hinted that differing ideas have existed in the British 
and French military as regards politics, warfare, human interactions and individual responsibilities. 
At the risk of falling into stereotypes, it is my view that the British penchant for empiricism, 
pragmatism, specialisation, social restraint,929 and humour accounts for the comparatively 
                                                          
928  Porter, The Absent-minded Imperialists, 309 and 318. 
929  The anthropologist Kate Fox has humorously described this restraint as: “… our embarrassment, insularity, 
awkwardness, perverse obliqueness, emotional constipation, fear of intimacy and general inability to engage in 
a normal and straightforward fashion with other human beings.” See K. Fox, Watching the English: The Hidden 
Rules of English Behaviour (2004). P. 401. Note though that the author has not included the Welsh, Irish and 
Scots in her study. One also suspects that her assessment mostly applies to the English (upper) middle classes. 
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technical, unemotional yet often comical recollections. It explains why (ex-)soldiers have not 
described protagonists’ character traits but their suitability for certain tasks or their political 
leanings. Equally, the appearance of cities, landscapes or wildlife have not shaped reminisces. It 
has mattered more that certain sections were out of bounds, required particular approaches, and 
posed potential risks. Jokes at times appear to have concealed potentially sad and even shocking 
images.  
     To some degree one senses here a flickering of traditional British attitudes in regard to the 
colonised. Porter has held that little evidence existed “of any very profound acculturation” between 
the British and their subjects. Contrary to other colonising powers, they “exerted themselves to 
make sure they were not contaminated by other cultures [...] It was part of the style of British 
imperialism that it kept its distance from its subjects and very much disapproved [of those] who 
did not. Acculturation in this direction was called ‘going native’.”930 This explains why men like 
Lieutenant-Colonel John Cross or Roy Follows, who immersed themselves in aboriginal life, 
appear today as the odd men out. And it also illuminates why someone like Henry Hill strongly 
censured his French hosts’ leisure activities in Indochina.931    
     Then again, soldiers’ attitudes in Malaya might simply reflect the military’s (re-gained) allergy 
to anything smacking of politics, as outlined by Strachan and MacKenzie.932 Regardless of the 
underlying reasons, the focus on the task, hesitation to engage too much with locals and the 
disinclination to ponder unnecessarily on non-military aspects certainly helped to swallow the pill 
of decolonisation – provided the latter was actually seen as such. If it was all just about crushing 
a vicious opponent and/or guaranteeing the flow of tin and rubber, there was evidently little need 
for any emotional attachment. 
      These tendencies have contrasted with French traditions that might well be down to national 
characteristics. Pulitzer-price winning journalist, historian and biographer, Sanche de Gramont, 
has argued that the French possessed an “acquired reflex to think for oneself” and “a Cartesian 
attitude of systematic doubt [and] intellectual curiosity”.933 The Guardian’s French Columnist 
Agnès Poirier for her part has highlighted the discrepancy between the British preference for 
compartmentalisation and expediency on the one hand and French insistence on the need for 
general knowledge and idealism on the other.934 French veterans themselves have stressed that 
they actively sought interaction with locals, regardless of the inherent danger. The problem for 
them was that friendships with irregulars, liaisons with con gai and excursions to Angkor Vat 
impeded to some degree a focus on a knotty military situation. More importantly, it made the final 
rupture and abandonment of allies very painful.  
                                                          
930  Porter, The Lion’s Share, 356-7. For an in-depth analysis of these aspects see again Cooper and Stoler,  
Tensions of Empire. 
931  Thesis chapter 6. 
932  Chapter 3. 
933  S. de Gramont, The French: Portrait of a People (1969), p. 42. The author’s real name was Comte St. Charles 
Armand Gabriel de Gramont who later became US citizen Ted Morgan. Son of a resistance hero, de 
Gramont/Morgan served as a subaltern in the Algerian War and has recently published Valley of Death: The 
Tragedy of Dien Bien Phu that Led America into the Vietnam War (2010). 
934  A. C. Poirier, Le modèle anglais, une illusion française (2006), pp. 37-44 and 87-93. 
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     To some extent, the reflections above raise the question whether a more thorough examination 
and stronger memory of conflicts, territories and communities (have) resulted in a more profound 
imperial culture within the involved forces and their countries of origin during and after 
decolonisation. Solid answers would require a distinct study based on, among other things, 
interviews with soldiers’ families and friends. Nevertheless, this thesis has emitted some indices 
worth contemplating. The films and documentaries cited in the introduction suggest that the 
experience of war has reverberated beyond military circles in France. In fact, former protagonists 
turned writers like Pierre Schoendoerffer, Jean Lacouture or Jules Roy have made sure that it 
has. Children of former servicemen (and opponents) have also played a role, as the examples of 
Régis Wargnier and Fleur Albert prove. The corresponding films/documentaries have done their 
bit in perpetuating and awakening a fascination with French Indochina that has touched younger 
generations. During my research I have also come across two websites created by veterans’ 
offspring (or in-laws), one of them in reaction to a grand-daughter’s school assignment. A quick 
survey among British and French friends of varying ages revealed in turn that the former had not 
picked up much about Britain’s empire and wars of decolonisation in school or at home, despite 
relatives having lived and served in former colonies. The French asked are in most cases familiar 
with ‘Greater France’ or the Indochina and Algerian War to a varying degree. In one instance this 
owed to the person having been asked by her grandfather to type his memoirs.935 In this context, 
I have also found it intriguing that curious French veterans approached me on several occasions 
while I was studying sources at archives and associations – something that never occurred in 
Britain. This at least implies that veterans (of the Indochina War) have in many cases willingly 
shared their experiences with their environment and that schools have incorporated these 
experiences into their curriculum. The ANAI for instance insisted that the Fréjus memorial include 
educational facets (which school classes have subsequently examined). Equally, its 
staff/members have eagerly responded to inquiries from students, researchers and teachers. By 
the same token, ANAI’s website features lengthy background information on Indochina. That said, 
it needs to be remembered that many of these activities have emerged late and have contributed 
more to a post- than contemporary, imperial culture. Earlier voices were more isolated but they 
were voices nevertheless. 
     While the NMBVA has demonstrated a similarly cooperative spirit when dealing with 
researchers’ requests, its outreach has never matched that of its French counterpart(s). To my 
knowledge, its board has not pressed for a memorial or a public place named after fallen 
comrades. Some veterans have sent their collected memorabilia to the not-very-aptly named 
Imperial War Museum but the latter has still devoted very little space to post-1945 conflicts. 
Regimental museums have generally done a better job. Yet they serve a smaller clientele, often 
consisting of soldiers’ families. These tend to show up on special, regimental celebrations.       
     One could maintain that British veterans’ fondness for recollecting patrols, skirmishes, 
ambushes, accidents, mess activities, sports and pranks within closed circles has unwittingly 
excluded a wider audience. Similarly, the rather technical testimonies, book lists and other 
                                                          
935  E-mail correspondences in May 2010. 
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features on the NMBVA’s website have done little to attract ordinary civilians. Family members in 
particular might have been very interested in the political, social and economic backdrop of the 
emergency. Yet during my research I gathered that my interviewees’ spouses and children had 
usually not learned as much about their husbands’ and fathers’ tours as I did. As a matter of fact, 
ex-soldiers themselves have admitted that they have largely guarded their silence over the 
decades. In so doing they have unconsciously limited the amount of historic information on the 
empire their families and friends, as well as the wider population, could gather.  
      All that said, there are important parallels between the two sets of soldierly memories and 
experiences during the emergency and the Indochina War. To begin with, British and French 
troops fought alongside non-European forces against communist movements in the same region. 
This added an international touch to the conflicts and could have strengthened links not only 
within the two forces but also between them. In reality, only Australian and British veterans seem 
to have actively kept in touch, much of it owing to the very active Paddy Bacskai. Links between 
both sides of the Channel appear non-existent. 
     Moreover, the general lack of acquaintance with Southeast Asia made it difficult for most 
European soldiers to recognise local ethnicities, buildings or landscapes from photographs, films, 
paintings, picture books, exhibits or stories recounted by (emigrating or serving) relatives – 
provided it happened at all. Among newly gained impressions, humans exerted a stronger pull 
than nature and infrastructure with a clear preference for loyal collaborators. In this context one 
senses a certain paternalism – clothed in traditional protectionism – towards less developed 
groups, i.e. Malayan aborigines and Indochinese minorities. Relations with the most advanced 
group, expatriates, were often burdened. It underpinned the gap between colonies and mother 
countries, as well as professional soldiers’ re-occurring dislike of modern societies.      
     Despite the departure of most European troops after the end of hostilities, the bulk of soldiers 
involved did not necessarily grasp that this constituted the end of empire in the area and soon in 
other parts, too. The accordance of independence to Malaya in 1957 probably concealed the 
fissure. Equally, the fact that Southern Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos (retaining a French garrison) 
remained communist-free in 1954 might have obscured the true extent of the war’s outcome for 
France. Scholars still disagree over the exact point at which the British and French recognised 
that the imperial days were coming to an end. Undoubtedly though, Suez, not Malaya, highlighted 
both Britain’s political and military limits, with the latter being partly imposed by old-fashioned 
colonial policing. As General Farrar-Hockley has pointed out: “It demonstrated the limitations of 
Britain’s military capacity [and] was undertaken on the margin of capability.”936 In the case of 
France, Anthony Clayton has remarked that it took the Algerian War “before the lesson was finally 
learnt that social and nationalist challenges cannot be crushed by technical solutions.”937 
     In regard to categorisations, even the interrogation of captured enemies at the time and the 
publication of memoirs by (former) communist insurgents after the wars do not appear to have 
impinged on soldierly recollections to a great degree. In part this has owed to the fact that most 
                                                          
936  Farrar-Hockley in Chandler & Beckett, The Oxford History of the British Army, 336-7. 
937  Clayton, The Wars of French Decolonization, 76. 
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(former) European servicemen have wholeheartedly rejected communism, despite individual 
recognitions of colonial discrimination. The rejection and disregard has also been due to the often 
horrendous means employed by the rebels.  
     In view of such parallels, this thesis has indirectly made a humble case for more comparisons 
in (imperial) history. It has hopefully also demonstrated that it is well worth drawing on increasingly 
numerous online memoirs and media archives, as well as on oral testimonies. Most likely it will 
wield more results to engage with the decreasing number of witnesses, instead of studying media 
that might have possibly awakened their imperial senses. This is not to say that we should not 
pay attention to exhibits, paintings and music inspired by the colonies, as Martin Evans has.938 
But as he himself and like-minded scholars have admitted, the effect on the metropolitan 
population of such influences is rather difficult to gauge and tells only part of the story. An interview 
can fill many gaps – keeping in mind that recorded statements need to be compared with other 
sources. Put differently: we might as well ask surviving dock workers if they remember unloading 
African pineapples and pondering on their origins. The unsatisfactory alternative consists in 
assuming that they did on the basis of shipment lists at the time.   
     By the same token, it is worth exploring the frequently well-maintained but smaller collections 
held in local archives outside London. In view of veterans’ strong attachments to their former 
units, personal diaries or unpublished memoirs habitually end up at regimental museums rather 
than the larger, urban archives. Further, it makes sense to continue the current trend of including 
more cultural, gender and social aspects into (imperial) history. Bayly’s and Harper’s Forgotten 
Armies and Wars represent excellent examples of how various angles can be interwoven to 
produce a very multi-faceted narrative. After all, sex, class, education and regional origins can 
heavily impact on how events are experienced. Such takes need to be contrasted with the 
traditional top-down approach of political history. Finally, I hope to have demonstrated that one 
can study military history without endlessly debating strategies, weaponry, logistics and battles.  
     This research has addressed questions of tradition, categorisation, identification, cross-
cultural exchange, parallels and recollection that can be further explored. There are for instance 
the various Anglo-French-(American) conferences as well as mutual inspections and visits during 
the 1950s, which highlighted diverging assumptions and practices. The differing outcomes of the 
British and French counter-insurgency efforts also beg the question whether forces were/are 
better off focusing solely on the military task at hand and keeping a relative distance to civilians 
and politics. In other words: where does a soldier’s job begin and where does it end? Many British 
veterans would probably maintain that their erstwhile detachment and single-mindedness 
accounted for the success in Malaya. Former French servicemen on the other hand might claim 
that their often close collaboration with and immersion into local communities kept them in the 
war for longer than might otherwise have been feasible. These takes should be further 
investigated based on other wars of decolonisation. British and French forces conducted more of 
these, few of which have been analysed in great depth from a soldier’s perspective. The Suez 
campaign represents a logical continuation from this project as the Franco-British collaboration 
                                                          
938  Thesis introduction. 
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highlighted differing attitudes towards empires, conflicts, politics and international law. The 
insurgencies in Palestine and Madagascar for their part contain various aspects that feed into and 
push the boundaries of imperial and military history.  
     Shifting away from purely military matters, climate and vegetation in Southeast Asia resulted 
in a multitude of medical problems among troops. At least one article exists in the French case, 
which deals with these issues. It contains intriguing comparisons between French and British 
traditions in regard to military-tropical medicine.939 Australian researchers, too, have looked into 
this subject.940 In comparison, little seems to have been done on the British armed forces during 
the final, imperial days.941 In fact, staff at the Royal Army Medical Corp’s regimental archive 
claimed not even to possess any records covering the Malayan Emergency. Yet when I asked 
veterans, almost all replied that they had suffered from some ailment or another. A study of their 
troubles could add interesting facets to the literature on colonial medicine942 and the military 
during the imperial expansion and contraction.943 
     These directions illustrate that the role, outlook, conduct of and problems facing the military – 
whether British, French or other – during the imperial days still offer scope for research. Armed 
forces have always been more than just fighting machines. They have employed thousands of 
men and women from often very diverse backgrounds and equipped with specific thinking and 
behavioural patterns. Such personnel has been programmed for particular purposes based on 
certain national values. This has been especially pronounced in conscript armies, whose 
members have by definition been both soldiers and citizens. Whether conscript or regular, 
servicemen’s and –women’s stances, actions and the conflicts they have been involved in tell us 
much about shifting (national) conditions and conventions. For instance, large-scale battles 
pitching modern, European troops against medieval African armies, as occurring at Omdurman, 
would probably have made many more among the winners uneasy in the 20th century than it did 
at the time. Vice versa, some of the more grizzly and controversial practices employed by 
Commonwealth and French Union troops during the Malayan Emergency and the Indochina War 
– i.e. cutting off heads for identification, torture and summary executions – were often accepted 
as necessary some decades earlier, as the Boxer Rebellion proved. Such cases can thus tell us 
more about the circumstances for instance, under which European powers were, or were no 






                                                          
939  SHD 1K 665. 
940  B. G. O’Keefe, Medicine at War: Medical Aspects of Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asia, 1950-1972 (1994). 
941  The political realm has been better served, for instance by S. S. Amrith’s Decolonizing International Health:  
India and Southeast Asia, 1930-65 (2006). 
942  One of the latest contribution in this field is A. Crozier’s Practicing Colonial Medicine: The Colonial Medical  
Service in British East Africa (2007).  




                                                          
944  The list includes one representative from Australia/Hungary and one from New Zealand.  
945  Transit camp many servicemen passed through. 
946  Most infantrymen and their commanders, up to the rank of captain, went through jungle training from the early 1950s on. The  
location and training rarely crop up in sources though. 








Background information on British944 soldiers/veterans quoted in the thesis 
 
Note that this list does not include men who wished to remain anonymous. Equally, if too little could be found about 
a person's background he was also left out. It also needs to be kept in mind that available sources, particularly in 
regard to affiliations and postings in Malaya, can be vague and incomplete. 
 












Life/career prior to emergency  
Adams, John Quartermaster 
(former signals 
officer) 
1st Bn South 
Wales Borderers 




Kluang, plus a 
short spell in 
Sandakan 
(Borneo) 
Served with Parachute Regiment in 










1948 Based at KL but 
inspections and 
meetings all 
over the territory 
Born in Saffron Walden in 1898. 
Commissioned into the Royal Artillery 
in 1916 following officer training. 
Seconded to the Royal Engineers from 
1918 to 1921. Wounded at Ypres. 
Served out war in Italian Campaign 
and in Russia. Entered Cambridge in 
1920 earning a first in engineering. 
Moved to Catterick Camp, base of the 
new Royal Signallers, to instruct 
officers. Worked for Royal Engineer 
and Signals Board before joining the 
Staff College in 1934. Staff 
appointments followed at GHQ India. 
Returned to Britain in 1940, then 
posted to France from where he was 
evacuated. Returned to India as 
administrative officer. Appointed 
major-general. Helped to prepare 
invasion of Malaya from 1944 on. After 
V-Day involved in the accommodation 
of returning POWs and internees. 
Served on the Indian Armed Forces 











151-2 Ipoh and 
Selangor 
Father947 had served in the navy. NA 
went through Royal Marine Volunteer 








1st Bn Queen's 
Royal West 
Surrey Regiment 
1954-6 Behau, KL (HQ 
Malaya 
Command) 
Born 1919 in Halifax (Canada). Father 
unknown. Stepfather served in the 
Royal Canadian Navy. Family 
eventually moved to England. HA grew 
up in Aldershot. Left school at 14. 
Started working as a milk boy. Spells 
in employment at Charterhouse and as 
a butcher boy. Joined Territorial Army 
in 1936 before enlisting with Queen's 
Royal West Surrey Regt. in 1937. 
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Served in Palestine, N. Africa, Syria, 
Ceylon, India and Burma during WWII. 
Stationed in Berlin during the blokade 
(1948 and 1950). Attended Sandhurst 
between 1950 and 1953. Returned to 




Private but at 
times acting as 
section 
commander 
1st Bn (28th 
Commonwealth 




(seconded to 1/3rd 
East Anglia Rgt., 
42 Cdo, 
Federation Army 
& 17th Gurkha) 
1959-1961 Kuala Kangsar 
and Perak 
Born 1940 in Szekesfehervar 
(Hungary). Father was a teacher 
serving as an officer in WWII until 
wounded. AB had to flee advancing 
Soviet troops in 1944 but ended up in 
Austrian work camp. Held as a 
displaced person in Austria and 
Germany. But eventually sent to 
Australia by UN agencies after the 
war. Arrived in Australia in 1950 
becoming a citizen seven years later. 
Attended convent school. Became a 
shop assistant and later a store clerk 
in Perth before entering the army in 
1957. Joined the Royal Australian 








1st Bn Malay 
Regiment 
1952-3 Port Dickson, 
Triang (Pahang) 
Born 1913 in Seaford (Sussex). 
Served with Royal Engineers in 
France in 1940 before evacuation. 
Took over from the Japanese in Java 
with the Indian Corps Provost Unit 
between 1945-6. 




Born 1924 in Scotland. Father was a 
sailor in the Royal Navy. Attended 
secondary school. Joined army at 18 
in 1942, volunteering for Young 
Soldier Regiment. Also attended 
Winchester College and Sandhurst. 
Commissioned into Lothian and 
Border Horse Yeomanry. Service in 











Born 1939 in Manchester. Father was 
a textile merchant. Attended grammar 
school before being called up in 1960. 
Trained as officer cadet and 
commissioned into the Royal Army 
Service Corps. 







Police and 1st Bn 
Royal West Kent 
Regiment 
1950-2 Singapore and 
Kuala Kubu 
Bahru/Selangor 
Born 1932 in Peckham (London). 
Father was a carpenter. DB attended 
a grammar school which he left at 16. 
Began to work at the accounting 
department of a builder's merchant. 
Called up for National Service in 
October 1950.  
Bonner, 
Robert  









Commissioned into the Manchester 
Regiment in 1948 after attending 
Sandhurst. Served in Germany prior to 
emergency. 
Booth, R.  Captain/ 
platoon 
commander 
















Major-general/ HQ KL 1948-50 Based at KL (but 
inspections and 
meetings all 
Born 1898 near Canterbury as son of 
a lieutenant-colonel. Attended 








commissioned into Gurkha Rifles. 
Served in WWI. Fought Northwestern 
campaigns before turning instructor at 
the Staff College (both in India). 
Served in Iraq, Libya (where he was 
captured), Italy and Greece. Became 
commander of the 2nd Indian Airborne 














and later based 
in KL  
Born 1903. Educated at Repton 
Preparatory (public) School and 
Sandhurst. Served in India and Hong 
Kong with Staff College in between. 
Saw action in Norway and Palestine 
during WWII. Commander of 
Hamburg, followed by appointments at 
the War Office and as director of 
training before becoming director of 








HQ KL 1950-1 Based at KL  Born in Broadstone (Dorset) in 1894. 
(No military background in family.) 
Attended Bedford College and 
Sandhurst. Commissioned into King's 
Regiment. Served in Punjab before 
being engaged in France, 
Mesopotamia (Iraq) and Palestine 
during WWI. Spell on Indian Northwest 
Border (Waziristan) followed. Served 
in Eritrea, the Western Desert, Iraq 
and Burma during WWII. Assumed 







Admin. & Foreign 
Office 
1945-58 Singapore and 
Ipoh 
Worked in Malayan Civil Service 
before Japanese attack. Joined Force 
136 in Malaya but forced to leave 
peninsula. Escaped to Ceylon via 
Sumatra. Trained in India. Secret 
return to Malaya in 1943. Met up with 
Spencer Chapman and cooperated 
with MPAJA. Returned to Ceylon 
before the end of the war.  
Burdett, 
Frank  
Private 1st Bn New 
Zealand Regiment 
1957-9 Perak to 
Kelantan 
Born 1931 in Aukland (New Zealand). 
Did an apprenticeship as a linotype 
operator after schooling. Signed up 
with the army voluntarily. 
Campbell, 
Arthur  
Major 1st Bn the Suffolk 
Regiment 
1950-2 Kajang, Broga, 
Port Dickson 








1950-1 Johore, Dusun 
Tua and Perak 
a.o. 
Born 1913 in Rohtak (India) as the son 
of the ev. governor of Punjab. 
Educated at Bradfield. Entered Royal 
Military Academy at Woolwich in 1931. 
Commissioned into Royal Engineers in 
1933. Read mechanical sciences at 
Cambridge for one year. Posted to 
Hong Kong, then Shanghai where he 
witnessed the Japanese attack and 
occupation in 1937. At the outbreak of 
WWII he volunteered for the Scots 
Guards preparing to assists the Finns. 
Later became a member of the 
commando training schools in the 
highlands and in Australia to prepare 
stay-behind parties. There he met 
Chapman. Set up a bush warfare 
school in Burma where he was 
surprised by the Japanese attack. 
After meeting Wingate he articipated in 
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the Chindit expeditions during 1943-4. 
Became commander of the SAS 
Brigade operating in NW Europe. 
Served with Royal Engineers in India 
in 1947. Attended Staff College in 
Camberley (GB) between 1947 and 
1948. Cooperated as staff officer with 
Italo-Yougoslav Boundary 
Commission in Trieste from 1948 to 
1949. Served as staff officer (GI Air) in 







6th Bn the Malay 
Regiment 
1953-4 Port Dickson, 










Born 1931. Finished his studies at LSE 
before starting his National Service in 
1952. Commissioned into the Malay 
Regiment due to an overcapacity of 








but also on patrols 
1956-8 Mainly KL Born 1917. Father was a colonel. RC 
graduated from the Royal Military 
Academy (Woolwich) and Cambridge 
where he had studied mechanical 
sciences. Commissioned into the 
Royal Engineers in 1937. Served in 
France, Sudan, Ethiopia, the Western 
Desert and Italy during WWII. Captain 
after the war when he was posted to 








1st Bn Somerset 
Light Infantry (but 
also commanding 



























Called up for National Service. Went 
through Officer Cadet Training School 





1/7th Bn Gurkha 
Rifles (Border 
Scouts) 




Deputy recruiting officer in Nepal in 
1944. Was stationed in Laos after 
Japanese surrender in 1945. 
Experienced decolonisation in India 
and Burma. Also had a short spell in 














and Saba (latter 
two in Borneo) 
Born 1929 in Bruton (Somerset) as 
son of doctor. Attended Malvern 
College until 17 before going through 
officer training from 1946 to 1949. Also 
took Russian language course. 
Evill, Adrian  Officer/ 
company 
commander 
3rd Bn King's 
African Rifles 
(KAR) 














North, south and 
coastal area of 
Johore and Fort 
Born 1929 in North Staffordshire. Left 
school at 14 to begin an 
apprenticeship as a fitter at the 





National Service with REME. Joined 
Ellerman Lines as a junior engineer to 
see the world. Quit engineering 
college in Liverpool upon discovering 











Born 1933 in Bishop Auckland 
(Durham) as son of a coal miner. 
Attended secondary school. Called up 
in 1955 and trained as a clerk. 
Gibbs, I. Lieutenant/ 
platoon 
commander 











Joined the army in 1944. Selected for 
Officer Cadet Training Unit after basic 
training. Commissioned in 1945. 

















Batu caves and 
KL 
Born in 1929 in Hendon (Sunderland) 
as son of a shipyard worker and 
printer. Attended Hendon Boys' 
School. Called up in 1947. Assigned to 
4th Field Squadron RE in Germany 
















Born 1932. Father was a thatcher. 
Attended grammar school and was 








1st West Yorkshire 
Regiment 




Born 1932 in Leeds to a foreman 
engineer and a weaver/housewive. TH 
attended a council school but left at 14 
to begin an apprenticeship as painter 
and decorator. Well over twenty when 
he was called up. 









Born in 1935 as son of a miner. (Latter 
was killed  during the Norway 
campaign in 1940.) RH attened 
primary and grammar school until 






































Kubu Baru and 
Kluang (Johore) 
Born 1936 in Southhampton. Father 
was a smallholder and had 
gardening/green grocer business. TH 
left Church of England school at 15 to 















Kubu Baru and 
Kluang (Johore) 
Born 1936 in Southhampton. Father 
was a smallholder and had a 
gardening/green grocer business. TH 
left Church of England school at 15 to 








HQ 1949-51 Singapore, KL, 
(Borneo and 
Sarawak as well 
as Hong Kong, 
Saigon and 
Hanoi) 
Born 1896 in South Petherton 
(Somerset). Attended Ilminster 
Grammar School and King's College 
London. Left university to join 
Territorial Army in 1914. Got 
commissioned into the London 
Regiment in 1914. Served in Gallipoli, 
Egypt, Palestine and India from 1914-
21 with London Regiment and 
Machine Gun Corps/Bn/Coys. 
Switched to Somerset Light Infantry 
touring India, Sudan and GB until 
1928. Attended Staff College 
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(Camberley) until 1931. Staff officer in 
headquarters of 13th Brigade in GB 
and Germany from 1933-5. Switched 
to the War Office where he stayed until 
1938. Took up command of 1st Bn 
Somerset Light Infantry in India 
between 1939 and 1940. Staff officer, 
Deputy Chief of Staff, Director of 
Military Training and commander of 7th 
Armoured Division North Africa & ME 
from 1941-3. Commanded VIII Corps 
in GB in 1943. Chief of Staff to General 
Alexander with 15th Army in Italy, 
1943-5. Commanded XIII Corps in 
Italy and Central Mediterranean Force 
in 1945-6. Oversaw Southern 







1st Bn Royal West 
Kent Regiment 




Born 1933 in Deptford. Called up in 
1951. Trained originally with the Royal 
Army Pay Corps. 










border but also 
visiting various 
locations 
Born in Dormansland (Surrey). Father 
was a solicitor in London. LH attended 
a preparatory school. Became a 
solicitor himself in father's firm in the 
1930s. Joined the military when WWII 
started. Served as staff officer in the 
SAS Brigade in GB, NW Europe and 
Norway in 1944-5. Also liaisoned with 
SOE. Re-joined SAS in 1947. 
Henniker, Sir 
Mark 







Educated at Marlborough College, the 
Royal Military Academy (Woolwich) 
and Cambridge. Commissioned into 
the Royal Artillery Corps in 1926. 
Distinguished himself on the Indian 
NW frontier during the 1930s. Served 
in France with the British 
Expeditionary Force narrowly 
escaping from Dunkirk. Later carried 
out raids on Norway and Italy with 1st 
Airborne Division, which he helped to 
evacuate from Arnhem. Commanded 
an Anglo-Indian engineer regiment in 
India during partition. 
Hewlett, 
William 
Private 1st Bn Queen's 
Royal West 
Surrey Regiment 











Batu Gajah and 
Jelepang 
(Perak) 
Born 1932 in Melton (East Yorkshire) 
as son of a coach driver and a house 
maid. Attended council school before 
becoming a farm worker. Joined Royal 
Marines in 1949 as a regular.  
Horner, 
Edward  
NCO/marine 42 Commando 
Royal Marines 
1948-50 Penang, Ipoh 
and Batu Gajah 
Born 1920 in Battersea. Father was a 
steel worker. EH left school at 14 to 
work as an errand boy. Went into 
glazing between 1937 and 1938. 
Enlisted with Royal Marines in 1938. 
On HMS Calypso in British coastal 
waters and Mediterranean in 1939-40. 
Shore duties in Egypt and Ceylon 
followed. As NCO in Royal Marine 
Boom Detachment in GB from 1942 to 
1943. Posting to ME and raids on 







545 Signals Troop 







Born 1937. Grew up in Walsall 
(Staffordshire). Father served in WWII 
while the rest of the family ran a pub. 
NH enlisted at Army Apprentice 
School at 15 until becoming a regular 
soldier at 18. Had a posting in Hong 












Kedah and Ipoh Born 1930 in Stockton-on-Tees 
(Durham). Father was a labourer. RH 
left school at 14 to work as a fireman 


















base) and Perak 
valley 
Born 1936 in Kirkham (Lancashire). 
Father owned a construction business. 
On leaving grammar school FH began 
an apprenticeship in his father's 
company until the age of 21 when he 
was called up. Shortly before starting 
his National Service he got married.  




1st Bn The Green 
Howard Regiment 







Born in London but brought up by his 
grandparents in Sheffield. Left school 
at 14 to work as a trainee at a large 























School), KL and 
Seremban 
Born 1919 in India. Father was an 
officer with the Gurkha Rifles. Moved 
to South Africa after re-organisation of 
Indian Army to a farm. Returned to 
Britain when MJ was 10. Latter 
attended preparatory school in 
Staffordshire. Entered Sandhurst in 
1938. Commissioned into same 
regiment as father. Served in India 
between 1939-40. With the Gurkha 
Rilfes in India, Middle East and North 
Africa until 1943. Returned to India 









HQ KL 1954-6 Based at KL Born in 1902. Father was a colonel. JKB 
was educated at Rugby. Attended Royal 
Military Academy at Woolwich and was 
commissioned into the Royal Artillery. 
Postings in Hong Kong and Gibraltar 
before entering Staff College. Joined 
the War Office. Commanded 5th Indian 
Division during WWII. Had postings in 
Java and India after the war before 
becoming Head of the British Mission to 
Burma. General Officer in Command in 
Berlin, then of Airborne Division and 
Eastern Command. 




8th K.R.I. Hussars 
and 4th Q. O. 
Hussars 
1948-1951 Ipoh Born 1926 in Lincolnshire. Came from 
a farming background. Finished 
elementary school. Joined army in 
1947. 







1950-1952 Sungie Patani, 




Born 1929 in Penkridge 
(Staffordshire). Father worked in 
railway sector as a plate layer. DL 
attended Penkridge Boys School. 
















Soon and Fraser 
Hill (leave) 
Born 1915. Father was a colonel. KL 
atended Ampleforth College before 
entering Sandhurst in 1934. Served 
with Suffolk Regiment in GB and India 
1936-1940. Stationed in GB between 
1940 and 1944. Switched to RASC to 
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serve in North West Europe until the 
end of WWII. Stationed in Germany 
after the war. 
Leigh, Peter  2nd lieutenant 






1st Bn Queen's 











Born in Bury (Lancashire) in 1930 as 
son of an officer. Attended a public 
school. Called up in 1948 eventually 
receiving a commission. Signed up for 
regular service and joined a tank 
regiment. Got regular commission. 
Went to Aldershot and later to 
Sandhurst.  
















Born 1935 in Hayes (Middlesex). 
Father was a toolmaker. BL attended 
a private, secondary school until 15 
when he began working as an office 
boy for Lloyd's. Entered RAF for 





























police), KL and 
Perak (as 
manager) 
Father educated in Singapore and 
Malaya. Grandparents had lived in 








Headquarters KL 1952 Based at KL  Born 1893. Served in India throughout 
WWII rising to commander-in-chief of 






1st Bn the South 
Wales Borderers 







Joined the 2nd Bn South Wales 
Borderers, which his father had 
already commanded, in Catterick, 
directly after graduating as a 2nd 
lieutenant from Sandhurst in 1933.  
Posted with the 1st Bn to Hong Kong in 
1934 and from there to India. Left in 
1936 to join the KAR in East Africa. 
Various staff and command jobs 
following the outbreak of WWII. 
Campaigns included Abyssinia and 
Burma. Accepted several staff 











HQ Kuala Lumpur 
 




Born 1915 in Upton (Cheshire). Father 
was a major serving in WWI. CN 
attended Wellington College. 
Operated as a subaltern with the 
Cheshire Regiment in Palestine 1936-
7. Served as staff officer with Air-
landing Brigade in the Normandy. 
Commanded Parachute Regiment in 
Northwest Europe in 1944-5 and in 







HQ KL 1953-4 Based at KL but 
inspections and 
meetings all 
over the territory 
Born 1901 to a navy captain and a 
general's daughter. Educated at 
Radley College and Sandhurst. 
Served as chief of general staff at 
GHQ Middle East between 1945 and 
1946. Became a major-general in 
1949. Acted as chief army instructor at 
the Imperial Defence College until 
1950. Served as chief of staff Eastern 
















KL, Ipoh, Batu 
Pahat and 
Kuanton 
Born 1934 in Birmingham as son of a 
bus driver. Finished secondary school. 
Entered army in 1951. 
Pullen, 
Harrold  
Officer 1911 Flight, Army 
Air Corps 




Born 1928 in Broome (Norfolk). Family 
owned a small brewery. HP attended a 
grammar school. Participated in the 
Home Guard in Bungay (GB) between 
1940 and 1944. Joined army in 1946 
with the goal to go to India. But given 
latter's independence commissioned 
into Royal Norfolk Regiment in 1948. 
Stationed in Germany between 1949 
and 1950. Fought in Korea from 1951 















Born 1932 in Kentish Town (London). 
Father was a house painter. Forced to 
move out of the city during the Blitz. 
Settled down in Hemel Hempstead. 
Left school at 14 to work at a local 
paper and printing factory. Switched to 
local cinema where he worked as a 





1st Bn Suffolk 
Regiment 
1950-2 Penang Island, 
KL & Kajang 
(Selangor), 
Sapang, Broga, 
Banting and Port 
Dickson (rest) 
Born 1932 in Harlow (Essex). Called 










advisor to the 
sultan of 
Pahang 
21st SAS 1951 


















Of German origin but fought on allied 
side during WWII. Demobbed as a 
sergeant. Worked in commerce in 
Hong Kong and later as a 
schoolmaster at Gordonstown 
between 1945 and 1950. Re-joined 
SAS after its rebirth, initially organising 







Johore Born in Singapore around 1930. Was 
doing his National Service when the 






for two years. 
R. E. Works 
Squadron 
1950-3 KL (main base) 
but worked in 
other areas 
Born 1928. Father worked as coal 
miner. DS stopped education after 
elementary school. Joined the army in 









1st Bn Suffolk 
Regiment, 1/7 











Broga and KL 
Born 1931 in Hackney. Father was a 
ships purser and master butcher. LS 
left school at 14 to work in the research 
laboratory of a large paint company. 
Attended evening classes to obtain 
job-specific qualifications. Called up in 












Hill to Thai 
border) 
Born early 1920s. Entered the army in 
1939 for an army apprenticeship. 
Served in France during WWII and in 
Germany from 1944-7. Spell in Hong 








1953 Based at KL 
 
Born 1903 in Jersey to a lieutenant-
colonel. Childhood in India but 
education at Marlborough College and 
Sandhurst. Commissioned into Royal 
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Welsh Fusiliers. Garrisons in England 
and Germany before joining the Royal 
West African Frontier Force. Served in 
Norway, Madagascar, Arakan and 
Burma and as commander of Special 
Forces Training during WWII. Became 
commander of 82nd West Africa 
Division in Burma and Palestine before 
being appointed head of Sandhurst. 



















also in Borneo) 
Born 1920 in Indian Central Provinces. 
Father was an officer in the Royal Irish 
Rifles/Machine Gun Corps. WT 
attended Stonehurst College, leaving 
at 16 to work with WH Smith. Entered 
Sandhurst at the outbreak of WWII. 
Served with Gurkha Rifles in India 
from 1939-44 and until 1945 in Burma. 








1952-4 Based at KL  
 
Born 1898 in Colchester (Essex) as 
son of a lieutenant-colonel. Went 
through private schools in Edinburgh & 
Weymouth before entering Wellington 
College and later Sandhurst. 
Commissioned into the Royal Irish 
Fusiliers. After service in France 
during WWI postings in Persia, Iraq 
and Egypt. Attended Staff College. 
Participated in the submission of the 
Arab revolt in Palestine. Spell at the 
War Office (military intelligence). 
Participated in the French, North 
African and the Italian campaigns 
during WWII. Entered SOE after 
recuperation from wounds sustained. 
Served as director of civil affairs in 












Singapore Born 1931 in Newport 
(Monmouthshire). Father was a sailor 
who died at sea in 1943. LT was 
educated at St. Bernardo's, Kingston-
Upon-Thames, Kingston Technical 
School and SW Essex Technical 
College, Walthamstow. Worked for 
local newspapers in the London area 
between 1948 and 1949 before doing 
his National Service. 
Thompson, 
Sir Robert  
Staff officer 



















1950-61 Mainly KL 
 
Born 1916. Educated at Marlborough 
College and Cambridge. Worked in the 
Malayan Civil Service from 1938 until 
the start of WWII. Served with the RAF 
from 1941-6. Returned to Malaya to 
become assistant commissioner of 








Sources: Questionnaires, interviews (own and Imperial War Museum), memoirs, biographies, private papers of Colonel Halliday, Captain Robert 
Bonner, Liz Grant, Celia Green (all three working at regimental museums and providing information by e-mail), obituaries in the online archives of 
The Times, The Independent and The Daily Telegraph, H. Matthew & B. Harrison, Oxford Dictionnary of National Biography, Vol. 52 (2004), pp. 
836-7 and vol. 54 (2004), pp. 99-100, Who Was Who, vol. V, 1951-60 (1964), pp. 120-1, 135-6, vol. VIII, 1981-90 (1991), pp. 80, 82, 567 and 772 
and vol. IX, 1991-5 (1996), p. 550, Short, In Pursuit of Mountain Rats, inside cover, Walker, Six Campaigns, 1-7 and 35-40, www.britains-















transport trips to 
various camps &  
bases 
 
Born 1927 in Kirkcaldy (Scotland) as 
son of a linoleum worker. Taken out of 
school at 14 to work in a local garage. 
Began an apprenticeship as a fitter in 
a public service vehicle company. But 
didn't finish and enlisted in 1945 
instead. Started army training in 1946 
becoming a vehicle mechanic in the 






HQ 1952 Based at KL Born 1901. Father was a doctor. RU 
attended Sandhurst and the Staff 
College before being posted to India 
and North Africa. Stations during WWII 
included Malta, Sicily and Italy. 
Commanded the Airborne Division 
landing in the ill-fated Arnheim 
offensive. Became director of the 
Territorial Army and Army Cadet Force 
after the war. 













and Ipoh (HQ) 
Born 1932 in Antwerp (Belgium). 
Father, an engineer, helped to start up 
a wire mill in Sheffield in 1935. JV 
attended a public school and a Jesuit 
Order for eight years before studying 













1/6 Gurkhas and 
99 Gurkha 
Brigade 
1948-1959 Kota Tinggi and 
Singapore a.o. 
Born 1912 in India as son of a tea 
planter and soldier. Attended 
Blundell's School (Somerset) and later 
Sandhurst. Commissioned into a 
Gurkha unit his grandfather had 
already commanded. Operated in 
Waziristan in the late 1930s and early 
1940s. Distinguished himself during 
the Burma campaign. Ended the war 
with a short spell at GHQ Delhi. 
Williams, 
Humphrey 
Colonel 1st Bn KAR 1952-63 Kota Tinggi 
(training) and 
Bentong 
Drawn towards Africa from an early 
age, partly because his mother was 
South African. Seconded to 1st Bn 
KAR in Nyasaland in 1931. Served in 
Tanganyika during 1933-44. Posted to 
India until independence. Returned to 
Britain before new posting with 1st Bn 
KAR in N. Rhodesia in 1952.  
White, Josh Private/ 
National 
Serviceman 




























Born 1928 in Bottesford 
(Leicestershire). Father was a regular 
soldier and farmer. DW attended Trent 
College from 1941 to 1946. Entered 
the army shortly after graduation. 
Went through infantry and artillery 
training before receiving a 
commission. Originally assigned to 
25th Field Regiment Royal Artillery.  
220 
 
Appendix B  
 
 
Background information on (former) members of the CEFEO948 cited in the thesis 
 
Note: This list does not cover all French (and related) protagonists quoted in this thesis. It is practically impossible to gather 
background information on the various lesser known people featuring in the documentaries, printed collections and articles. Equally, 




























land forces and 













based in Hanoi 
Born 1895. Graduated from St. Cyr. 
949 Served in WWI, finishing as 
captain. Sent to Indochina in 1939 as 
officer of the Coloniale where he 
stayed during the war. Promoted to 
general in 1943. Succeeded with his 
superior, General Sabatier, in 
evacuating approximately 6,000 










choc, 1er RCP, 
















Duong, Viet Tri, 
Hoa Binh, Fuk 
Yen, Mong Cai, 
Tien Yen and 
route coloniale 
4/Cao Bang 
Born 1918 in Saint-Paul-Cap-de-
Joux (Tarn). Served as officer cadet 
at the military academy of Cherchell 
(Algeria) in 1941. Volunteered for 
secret services during WWII. Helped 
to set up the service actions. 
Founded the 11e Bataillon 
parachutiste de choc after the war.  


























(BCCP) and 6e 
Bataillon de 
parachutistes 













and delta of 
Tonkin,  Luang 
Prabang and 
Central Laos, 
Lang Son, Nghia 
Lo and Dien 
Bien Phu 
Born 1916. Originally a bank 
employee. Participated in the battle 
of France. Escaped after capture to 
join the Free French. Finished war 
with the rank of captain. 
                                                          
948  The list includes one British liaison officer. 
949  Saint-Cyr has been the officer training institution primarily of the French infantry but to some extent also of the cavalry. Until 1935 and 
from 1939-40 it also trained officers of the air force. Saint-Maixent specialised in the training of sous-officiers between 1948 and 1951. 
Saumur has trained members of the cavalry/armoured units. The Ecole polytéchnique has been an academic institution but came 
under the auspices of the French Ministry of Defence. French undergraduate students have been cadets in the French Army and worn 
uniforms on certain occasions. 
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in Saigon but 
inspecting 
troops and 






Born 1891. Was a graduate of St. 
Cyr and member of the (Armée) 
Coloniale. Spent a short period in 
Indochina in 1936. Served as 
general under Vichy before being 
designated by the Comité française 
de la libération nationale (CFLN) in 
Algiers in September 1943 as chief 
of the military mission in India and 
commander of the expeditionary 
force for the Far East (future 
CEFEO). 












Born 1895. Graduated from St. Cyr. 
Named général de brigade in 1944 
and général de division in 1950. 
Boyer de Latour 
du Moulin, 
Pierre 





1947-1950 Cochinchina and 
northern 
Vietnam 
Born 1896. Joined army in 1914 
serving throughout WWI. Attended 
St. Maixent before going to Morocco. 
Wounded in 1940. Fought in Tunisia, 
France and Germany from 1943 on. 
Became a general in 1946. 
Brice, Pierre  
(Pierre-Louis le 
Bris) 
Marine Commandos de 
Penfentenyo 
and Jaubert 
1947-51 n/a Born 1929 in Brest into an 
aristocratic family. Father was a 
marine officer. PB joined the 
resistance during WWII. Entered the 
navy and was trained as combat 
diver in Algeria. Volunteered for 
Indochina at the age of 19. 





(GM) 3 and 
centre d’études 







d by a 
short spell 
in Japan) 
Based in Hanoi. 
Visits to Bac 
Ninh (Tonkin). 
Last days in 
Pnom Penh and 
Saigon 
n/a 










Mainly Saigon Born 1912 in Saigon. Graduated 
from St. Cyr and the Ecole de chars 
de combat. Served with the 509e 
Régiment de chars de combat from 
1935 on. Held various posts in the 
Levant before WWII. Joined the Free 
French in Palestine in 1941. 
Participated in the Syria campaign. 
Served under Catroux in Damascus. 
Joined Leclerc’s 2e DB in 1943. Took 
part in the liberation of France and 











Based in Saigon  Born 1895. Went through St. Cyr. 
Excelled during WWII, rising rapidly 
from colonel in 1942 to général de 
brigade (1943) and to général de 
division (1944). Acted as General 
Juin’s chief-of-staff during the Italian 
campaign. Served as chief-of-staff of 
the Ière Armée. Became commander-











of the Republic 
HQ/ 
French forces in 
Central 
Cochinchina and 







Based in Saigon 
with inspections 
and meetings all 
over South 
Vietnam 
Born 1902 in Nice. Attended the 
Ecole polytechnique and the Ecole 
d’application de Fontainebleau. 
Opted for a career in the artillery. 
Various posts and operations in 
Morocco during the late 1920s and 
early 1930s. Promoted to captain he 
became inspecteur des études at the 
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in S. Indochina 
(later S. 
Vietnam) 
Polytéchnique in 1937. Attended the 
Ecole de guerre during 1939-40. 
Assigned to the VIe Armée he was 
sent to North Africa in 1942. 
Promoted to Lieutenant-colonel in 
1943. Rallied to the Free French. 
Attached to the headquarters of the 
land forces in Britain.  










Hoa, Dong Lam, 
Song Giem Ho, 
Hai Duong, 
Song Thai Binh, 




Born 1910 in La Rochelle. Did his 
mandatory military service in the 
navy ending up in the reserve. 
Decided to sign up for regular 
service taking the necessary exams. 
But did not attend the Ecole navale. 
Served in the Mediterranean and 
North Africa in the early years of 
WWII until the allied landings. 
Refused to leave for Vichy France. 
Instead, signed up for the battleship 
Richelieu in New York. Finished the 
war with the Eastern Fleet in the 
Indian Ocean. When he volunteered 
for Indochina he was 42 years old. 

















Born 1902. Employed at the stock 
market. Attended and graduated 
from the Ecole polytéchnique. 
Embarked on a career in the artillery. 
Escaped imprisonment after the 
armistice. Entered the resistance. 
Arrested and deported to a 
concentration camp but liberated in 




Corporal 1er Bataillon de 





1947-9 Cam Lo, Dong 
Ha/Cua Viet, 
Quang Tri, and 
Dong Hoi (all 
Annam) 
Born 1928 in Rouen. Father left 
when CC was 5. Latter was raised by 
his mother, a weaver, and 
grandparents. CC suffered early 
bout of polio. Forced to leave school 
at the age of 12/13 for economic 
reasons and lack of better grades. 
Began apprenticeship as a fitter in 
Petit-Quevilly. But due to the wide-
spread allied bombing his mother 
decided to send him to a Vichyiste 
Centre de jeunesse where he 
received logis, food and training. 
Joined the army in June 1945 at the 
age of 17 (and 4 months) to escape 
uncle’s business. First stage of 
training occurred with a regiment of 
chasseurs in Auch. Postings in 
Limoges and Germany (with a unit of 
Zuaves) followed. Was found 
unsuitable to become a chasseur 
alpin during a short spell in the 
Hautes-Pyrénées between these 
postings. Moved to Morocco in 1947 
where he was allocated to a 
tirailleurs regiment. 




for the Tonkin 
and North 
Annam 





Born 1908 in Bernaville (Somme). 
Graduated from the Ecole 
polytechnique. Entered the Artillerie 
coloniale. Had tours in China and 
Cameroon where he rallied to the 
Free French in 1940. Participated in 
the Libyan campaign. Made a 
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Hanoi, Lai Chau, 
Na San, Dien 




Born 1925. Father was an officer. 
Attended all-female and Catholic 
boarding school. Studied languages at 
university. Then trained as auxiliary 




















Born 1902 into an old aristocratic 
family. Graduated first from St. Cyr, 
then from the Ecole de guerre in 1939. 
The young captain escaped captivity 
and joined de Gaulle in 1940. Took 
pseudonym of Leclerc. Succeeded in 
rallying Cameroun and Equatorial 
Africa to the Free French. 
Commanded French troops in the 
Sahara against the Italians. 
Participated in the re-conquest of 
Tunisia in 1943. Made general, he set 
up the 2e Division blindée (DB). 
Participated in the D-Day landings and 
the liberation of Paris. Led division 
through France and towards 
Germany. Chosen to lead 
expeditionary corps against Japan 
before the latter’s capitulation. 
Represented France during the 
capitulation ceremonies in Tokyo in 
September 1945. 
De la Croix de 
Castries, 




brigade in the 
middle of the 
battle of Dien 
Bien Phu 
Groupe mobile 2 
and garrison of 








Dien Bien Phu 
(among other 
locations) 
Born 1902 as son of a duke. Came 
from an old family of the Languedoc. 
(One ancestor served Louis XVI as 
marshal and minister.) Graduated 
from the military school of Saumur 
and became a member of the 
cavalry. Was injured and captured in 
1940. Escaped and participated in 
the campaigns in Italy, France and 
southern Germany. Became a 
protégé of de Lattre. Attended the 




Head of civil 
cabinet under 
de Lattre 
HQ 1951 Saigon Born 1921 in Niort (Deux-Sèvres). 
Received a law degree from the 
University of Poitiers. Worked as an 
auditor in the Conseil d’état in 1946 
and as a lecturer at the Institut 
d’études politiques in 1949. 
De Lattre de 
Tassigny, 
Bernard 
Lieutenant Vietnamese unit Unknown-
1951 
Tonkin Only son of General de Lattre 





in-chief & high 
commissioner 





in Saigon  
Born 1889 in Mouilleron-en-Pareds 
(Vendée). Early schooling at St. 
Joseph de Poitiers before entering St. 
Cyr. Specialised in cavalry. Finished 
WWI as a captain. Served in Morocco 
in the 1920s. Became staff member of 
General Weygand in 1932, then in 
Metz under Giraud. After completing a 
training at the Centre des hautes 
études militaires eventually appointed 
chief of staff of the Ve Armée. 
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Promoted to general in 1939. Named 
commander of the 14e Division 
d’infanterie at the outbreak of WWII. 
Appointed commander of troops in 
Tunisia after the armistice. Later in 
charge of the Montpellier region where 
he attempted to resist full German 
occupation in 1943. Imprisoned but 
fled and joined allies in September 
1943. Commanded Ière Armée landing 
in southern France. Led it from the 
Provence all the way into Bavaria. At 
the end of the war in charge of French- 
occupied sector in Germany. Followed 
by appointment as inspecteur-général 
of the army and chief-of-general-staff. 
Then named vice-president of the 
Conseil supérieur de la guerre after 
being relieved of c-g-s job in 1947. 
Struggled to collaborate with 
Montgomery in the European 
Defensive Alliance after the Bruxelles 
Treaty in 1948.  































Born 1922 in Bordeaux. Father was a 
lawyer and anti-republican by choice. 
HSM’s youth was strongly influenced by 
religion. Joined the resistance at the 
age of 19 as a courier. Was arrested on 
the Spanish border in 1943 and 
deported to Buchenwald and 
Langenstein. Was liberated in 1945. 
Went through St. Cyr between 1946 
and 1947. Chose the Foreign Legion 
upon graduation. 







Born 1935 in Seaux. Father was the 
director of a cinema. Spent youth in 
a Catholic institution but was 
expelled on several occasions. 
Trained as a butcher before joining 
the navy at the age of 17. 




de la Bataillon 














Luong, Tra Vinh, 
Vinh Long and 
Tieu Can (all 
Cochinchina), 
Binh Phu and 
Tan My (Tonkin) 
(Hanoi, 
Haiphong, Hoa 
Binh, Cao Bang, 






Binh (all Tonkin) 
and Hue-Dong 





Denis, Henry  Captain 10e Compagnie 



























Born 1920 in Vitry-le-François 
(Marne). Father was a general. 
Graduated from the Ecole spéciale 
militaire. Was demobilised in 1943. 
Joined the Organisation de 
résistance de l’armée (ORA). 
Arrested by the Gestapo and 
deported to Mathausen. Liberated at 
the end of the war and put on leave 
























Lam, Lang Son, 
Bac Ninh, Luc 
Nam and Hon 
Gay (all Tonkin) 
Served with 3e Bataillon 43e 
Régiment d’infanterie coloniale 
(RIC) in Tunisia between 1942 and 
1943. Joined the allies with the 
battalion after the landings in North 
Africa. Changed to the 4e Régiment 
de tirailleurs sénégalais (9e DIC) in 
April 1943 up to September 1944 
while participating in the Doubs 
campaign. Was part of the 21e 
Régiment d’infanterie coloniale from 
October 1944. Entered Germany 
with French troops. Was 21 years old 










n/a n/a Former member of the resistance 



















d on health 
grounds) 
Saigon and 




Was a 20-year-old secretary in the 
accountancy office of the Banque de 
France when WWII broke out. 
Although helping to transport 
documents and cheques for the 
resistance she never belonged to a 
resistance network. Held back by 
worries for her younger sisters and 
her widowed mother. Feeling of guilt 
prompted her to sign up with the 
DGER in May 1945. First 
assignments in Paris involved 
allocation of military pay to soldiers‘ 
families and censorship work. 











Born 1897 in Saloniki (Greece). Was 
the son of an administrator charged 
with overseeing western interests in 
the crumbling Ottoman Empire. 
Studied in Crete and later at a Lycée in 
Brest. Training at St. Cyr was 
interrupted by WWI where he was 
wounded. After resuming training 
posted to the Armée d’Orient in the 
early 1920s. Attended Ecole 
supérieure de guerre in 1928. 
Appointed chef de bataillon in the 4e 
Bureau of the grand quartier général in 
1939. Seriously wounded in his arm in 
                                                          
950  Probably misspelled. There is, however, a Tan Hiep. 
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June 1940. Took over 10e Bataillon de 
chasseurs à pieds in 1941. Became 
important figure in the ORA 
(Organisation de résistance de 
l’armée) from November 1942 on. Wife 
was arrested by the Gestapo and 
deported to Ravensbrück in 1943. Ely 
fled to London in 1944 and from there 
to Algiers. Promoted to colonel he 
represented the allied high command 
to the resistance. Upon liberation he 
became Directeur adjoint of the Forces 
françaises de l’Intérieur (FFI). As 
général de brigade he integrated the 
latter into the allied armies in March 
1945.  From May 1946 on and as 
général de division he directed the 
military cabinet of the Ministère des 
armées. In 1947 he commanded the 
7th military region (Dijon). Became 
chief-of-staff under de Lattre in 
January 1948, followed by a job as 
inspecteur de l’armée de terre. In 
August 1949 he became général de 
corps d’armée representing France at 
the Western European Union in 
London and from 1952 on at the 
Permanent Group in Washington. In 
August 1953 he became chief of 
general staff of the armed forces. 
Vainly tried to persuade the US to 
intervene during the battle of Dien Bien 
Phu. 




French mission  

































Ban Me Thuot, 
Play Cu and 
Dong Nai (all 
southern 
Vietnam)  
Born 1923 in Angoulême. Educated 
at St. Paul. Graduated from St. Cyr. 
Entered resistance in the Jura in 
1943. Founded network in the 
Vienne.  
Geoffrey, Hugo  Captain  4e and 5e 
Compagnie de 
la  13e DBLE, 
French 












Born 1919 in Vienna. Family was 
forced to flee Austria in the 1930s 
because of its leftist orientation. HG 
joined the Foreign Legion in 1938 
and was allocated to the 1er 
Régiment étranger d’infanterie 
(REI). Had tours in Syria and 
Lebanon. Participated in the battle of 
Bir Hakeim and El Alamein. Stayed 
in Tunisia until 1944. Served in 
campaigns of Italy as well as in 
eastern and southern France. 




Lieutenant  5e Cuirassiers July 1952-
October 
1954 
Thu Dau Mot, 
plateaux 
montagnards 
and Saigon (all 
South Vietnam) 
Born 1928 in Rouen. Father was a 
lawyer. FGR graduated from St. Cyr. 
Joined 152e Bataillon d’Infanterie in 
Mutzig after WWII. Went through 
training for sous-officiers in 
Strasbourg in 1948. Joined 99e 
Bataillon d’infanterie alpine the same 
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year. Switched to cavalry/armoured 
units attending the Ecole 
d’application de l’armée blindée et 
cavalerie de Saumur in 1949. Tours 







Land forces in 
Cambodia 
1952-4 Cambodia Born 1894. Joined the 3e Régiment 
de chasseurs à cheval in 1913. 
Switched to the infantry, becoming 
sous-lieutenant shortly after. 
Severely wounded. Switched again, 
this time to the air force. Finished the 
war as captain, commander of a 
bomber squadron and a Chevalier 
de la légion d’honneur. Re-joined the 
cavalry in 1923. Departed for 
Morocco four years later to 
participate in the pacification 
campaigns. Promoted to chef 
d’escadrons in 1936. Stationed in 
Tunisia during the fall of France. 
Assumed command of a Groupe 
autonome de chasseurs d’Afrique in 
1941. Promoted lieutenant-colonel 
one year later. Joined Free French 
and participated in the battles of 
Tunisia. Accepted Leclerc’s offer to 
join his 2e DB assuming command of 
a tactical group and fighting all the 
way to Germany. By then a general, 
he became governor of Strasbourg 
after the war. Took command of the 
newly re-opened cavalry school at 
Saumur. Returned to Morocco taking 
over the Division de Casablanca 
while being promoted général de 
division. 
Hill, Henry  Major/liaison 
officer 







1953-4 Hanoi, Da Nang 
and Saigon, plus 
field trips 
Attended Ecole de guerre in his early 
career. Served with SOE in Sumatra 
and Dutch East Indies in 1945.  

























An Khe (Tonkin)  
Born 1925 in Menton. Father was 
and officer. GH entered the Ecole de 
la garde in 1944. Rallied to the FFI. 
Arrested and deported to 
Buchenwald. Joined the 2e Légion 
de garde républicaine mobile after 
the liberation. Went through the 
Ecole spéciale militaire interarmée 
between 1946 and 1947. Chose 
artillery. Trained for air observation 
in Germany. 















and Lang Bian 
(hunting) (both 
Annam) 
Born 1923. Father was an 
entrepreneur in public works before 
dying from the effects of his war 
wounds in 1932. PH was largely raised 
by his grandparents. Attended school 
in Tours finishing his baccalauréat. 
Studied law at the Sorbonne for 2 
years. But abandoned his studies to 
avoid the Service de travail obligatoire. 
Fled via Spain where he was briefly 
imprisoned. Joined army in North 
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Africa in 1943, choosing the Régiment 
d’infanterie coloniale de Maroc where 
his grandfather had already served. 
Landed with reinforcements in the 
Provence in October 1944. Saw action 
in south-western France, the Rhone 
Valley, the Vosges and southern 
Germany. Disappointed by what he 
regarded as a selfish and business-like 
attitude of civilian France he did not 
resist being put forward as a ‘volunteer’ 

















Bien Hoa and Thu 
Duc 
(Cochinchina) 
Born 1906 in Chalon-sur-Saône. 
Attended the Prytanée militaire de la 
Flèche and the Ecole spéciale 
militaire. Served in the 22e Régiment 
d’infanterie coloniale (RIC) and later 
the 6e Bataillon des tirailleurs 
sénégalais. Had tours in the 
Lebanon, Syria and Morocco. 
Posted to staff headquarters of the 
2e Corps d’armée in Dakar in 1943. 
Held various roles with the infanterie 
coloniale until 1945. Had short stint 
in the Ivory Coast as commander of 
the Bataillon autonome. Employed at 
the Section d’études et d’information 
des troupes coloniales in 1950. 
















Hanoi and Hue 
Born 1921 into a bourgeois family of 
Bordeaux. Joined the resistance 
relatively late in WWII. Later 
transferred to Leclerc’s 2e DB. 













Dien Bien Phu Born 1914 in Pontarlier (Doubs). 
Graduated from the Ecole 
supérieure de commerce de Paris. 
Served as sous-officier with the 20e 
Bataillon des chasseurs alpines. 
Became director of Floquet in 
London before mobilisation on the 
eve of WWII. 
Langlais, Pierre  Lieutenant-
colonel 
Headquarters 








Dien Bien Phu 
(among others) 
















Hanoi, Phu Lo, 
Phuc Yen, Nam 
Dinh, Nim Binh, 
Haiphong, Vinh 
Yen/Huong 
Canh, Dong Do, 
Phu Lo, Sept 
Pagodes, Hai 
Duong, Do Son, 
Thai Binh, Ninh 
Binh, Phu Ly, 
Kien An, Dong 
Ha, Ha Dong 
and Cat Bi (all 
Tonkin), 
Tourane/Da 
Nang, Dien An 







Seno (Laos) as 
well as Saigon, 
Pnom Penh and 
Angkor Vat (last 
two Cambodia) 






























and Island of Cu 
Lao Re (off 
Annam) 
Born 1922 in Azemmour (Morocco). 
Volunteered for the 1er Régiment de 
zouaves in 1942. Travelled to Britain 
to train as paratrooper in 1943. 
Parachuted behind enemy lines in 




















Dien Bien Phu 






operations in Na 
San, Thuan 
Chau, Muong 




Vinh Yen (all 
Tonkin) and 
border to Annam 








Parachute unit 1954-5 n/a Born 1928 in Trinité-sur-Mer. 
Attended Science Po and studied 
law in Paris. Became controversial 
leader of the student union UNEF. 
Leroy, Jean  Colonel Unités mobiles 




out the war 
Ben Tre  Born 1920 as son of a French soldier 
and a Vietnamese peasant woman. 
Entered (Armée) coloniale in 1940 
eventually becoming an officer. 
Lescastreyres, 
Raymond  










des Joncs (all 
Cochinchina), 
Nam Dinh, Dong 
Ha/Tonkin, 
Tourane and 
Rue sans Joie 
(Annam) 
Served as a clandestine courier 
between Mont and Marzan during 
the German occupation. But forced 
to flee to Vichy France after being 
denunciated. Entered French Army 
eventually ending up in North Africa. 
After two years of training embarked 
in France in September 1944. 
Participated in the liberation of the 
Alsace pushing all the way to Lake 
Constance. Elevated to the rank of 
maréchal de logis after the armistice. 
Stationed in Wurzach, Neustadt and 
Spire. Underwent further training in 
Coëtquidan and Saumur attaining 











1946-8 NW Tonkin 
(Thai area),  
Born and grew up in Indochina as 
son of a colonel in the Coloniale. 
Learned Vietnamese before he could 















My Tho, Sadek 
camp and Plaine 
des Joncs (all 
Cochinchina) 
Born 1922 as son of Sir Basil Liddell 
Hart. Educated at St. Andrews 
School in Berkshire, Eton College 
and King’s College, Cambridge. 
Commissioned into the Royal Naval 
Volunteer Reserve in 1941. Saw 
service in the Atlantic, the 
Mediterranean, in London and with 
Combined Operations Command, 
British North African Forces. 
Finished war as flag lieutenant to the 
admiral commanding Iceland in 
1945. Became the Liberal Party’s 
candidate for Blackpool in the 
General Election in 1945. Worked at 
the UN until 1947. Served in 
administrative roles with the British 
Army of the Rhine (BAOR) from 
1947 to 1948. Had stints with 
Westminster Press Provincial 
Newspapers Ltd., The Yorkshire 
Observer and as Lobby 
Correspondent at the House of 
Commons between 1949 and 1950. 
Stood again as Liberal Party 
candidate, this time for Sowerby 
(Yorkshire) during the general 
election in 1950. 












My Tho, Tai 
Ninh, Plaine des 




Born 1908 in Châlons-sur-Marne. 
Father was an artillery officer. 
Educated in Paris, the Collège libre 
de Gien and at the Prytanée militaire 
between 1919 and 1928 before 
entering St. Cyr. Graduated from the 
latter in 1930 as sous-lieutenant 
choosing the infanterie coloniale. 
First served in a regiment of 
tirailleurs sénégalais before 
participating in operations in 
Morocco and the High Atlas in the 
early 1930s. Military and civilian 
postings in France, Togo and Chad 
followed. In the latter territory he 
rallied to de Gaulle after the 
armistice in 1940. Under Leclerc he 
participated in the raids on Mourzouk 
and Fezzan where he became 
adjoint to the governor. Later served 
under Leclerc again in the Tunisian 
campaign before moving to Britain to 
prepare for D-Day. Landed and 
fought all the way through the 
Vosges, Strasbourg, Colmar and 
Germany. Reached the rank of 
lieutenant-colonel at the end of the 
war.  
Méry, Guy  Captain/chef 




















Born 1920 in Buzançais (Indres). 
Father was a farmer. Graduated 
from St. Cyr and completed cavalry 
training in 1939. Was demobbed in 
1943. Joined FFI. Arrested in 1944 
and deported to Struthof, then 
Dachau. Re-joined officer corps of 
cavalry/armoured troops after the 
war. Underwent further military 
                                                          





training, Entered the combined 
headquarters of the armed forces in 
1950.  
Morlière, Louis General/ 
commander/  
commissioner 
of the Republic 
HQ Hanoi/ 









Tonkin Born in 1897. Attended Saint-
Maixent. Several tours in Indochina 
during the interwar years. 
Participated in the Tunisian, Italian 
and French campaigns during WWII. 
Appointed général de brigade in 
1946, then général de division. 
Navarre, Henri General/ 
commander-
in-chief 
HQ May 1953- 
June 1954 
Based in Saigon  Born 1898 in Villefranche de 
Rouergue. Entered St.-Cyr in 1916. 
Served in WWI from 1917 on as 
aspirant and sous-lieutenant. 
Participated in the Syria campaign in 
1919 with the spahis. Posted to 
Germany during the 1920s before 
entering the Ecole supérieure de 
guerre. Participated in the 
pacification of the Atlas and Morocco 
from 1930 to 1934. Took on several 
posts within the intelligence services 
until being recalled by Darlan in 1942 
for his alleged anti-German 
activities. Entered ORA. In 
November 1944 he took over 
command of a tank unit of the Ière 
Armée, participating in the war until 
armistice. Chosen director of 
General Koenig’s cabinet in 
Germany where he stayed except for 
a brief command in Algeria (1948-9). 
His last post was that of chief- of-
staff to Maréchal Juin at NATO. In 
1952 he became général de corps 
d’armée. 






Born 1895. Graduated from St. Cyr 
and entered the Coloniale. 
Participated in the pacification of 
Annnam during the 1930s. Went to 
Northern Africa in 1943 after being 
part of the armistice army. Finished 



















Born 1907. Father had served under 
Gallieni in the Tonkin. (Uncle and 
grandfather had already seen action 
in Indochina, too.) JPdB graduated 
from St. Cyr in 1930. Became a 
lieutenant in the Foreign Legion in 
1939 and served in Morocco. 
Involved in the Norway campaign 
before rallying to the Free French in 
1940. Participated in the campaigns 
of Dakar, Eritrea, Syria, Libya, 
Tunisia, France and Germany.  




1949 Saigon Born 1913 in Courbevoie. Father 
was killed in WWI. Mother remarried. 
AP attended artillery school in 
Orléans. Served with 163e Régiment 
d’artillerie in Metz in 1936. Posted to 
the Maginot Line at the outbreak of 
WWII. Captured and sent to the 
Oflags of Colditz and Lübeck. 
Escaped in 1943. Attached to 
intelligence services in 1944. 
Collaborated with the Office of 
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Strategic Services (OSS). Served 
with artillery regiments after the war. 
Posted to staff headquarters, Forces 
armées, 2e division in 1950. 
Liaisoned with CIA during the 
Korean War. 
Piroth, Charles Colonel In charge of 


















Tay Ninh, An 
Son, Thu Dau 
Mot, Bien Hoa, 
Nha Be, My 
Tho, Can Tho, 
Tan Chau, Ca 
Mau and area 
between Vinh 
Long and Tra 
Cu (all 
Cochinchina 
during first tour, 
1945-6) 
Born 1909. Entered the navy in 
1927. Was actively involved in the 
resistance. At the beginning of 1945 
he took over the command of the 
parachute commandos, which were 
sent to Ceylon in July 1945.  






n/a n/a Born 1915 in Honfleur (Calvados). 
Graduated from the Ecole spéciale 
militaire. Posted to the 508e 
Regiment des chars de combat in 
1938. Served with various other 
regiments until demobilised in 1943. 
Joined allies in North Africa and 
participated in the campaigns of 
Italy, France and Germany. Held 
various staff positions at 
headquarters of the cavalry and 
troops in Tunisia. Attended Ecole de 
guerre in 1952. Attended Centre 
d’instruction pour les opérations 
amphibies (CIOA) in 1953. Posted to 

































and Bay of Ha 
Long (Tonkin), 
Angkor Vat and  
Pnom Penh 
(Cambodia)  
Born 1913. Grandson of Georges 
Leygues, former president and 
Minister of the Navy during the Third 
Republic.  






Saigon, Na San, 
Tourane and  
Angkor Vat  
Born 1907 in Rovigo (Algeria). 
Adopted by a gendarme. Real father 
was a teacher. JR studied in a 
seminary in Algiers before call-up. 
Served with the tirailleurs algériens. 
Attended Saint-Maixent graduating 
as sous-lieutenant. Entered the air 
force eventually commanding a 
squadron during WWII. Joined RAF 







Salan, Raoul General/ 
military 



























Based in Hanoi 







Nam Dinh, Ha 
Dong, Hon Gay, 
Lang Son, Vinh 
Yen, Hoa Binh, 
Nghia Lo, Tu Vu 
and Na San (all 
Tonkin), Dalat, 
Qui Nhon and 




Born 1899 in Roquecourbe (Tarn). 
Father worked as a minor local 
government official. RS graduated 
from St. Cyr. Served in WWI from 
1917 on. Participated in the Levant 
campaign between 1920 and 1921, 
where he was gravely wounded. 
Three long tours in northern 
Indochina between 1924 and 1937 
followed. Back in France, appointed 
chief of intelligence services to the 
Ministry of Colonies. In command of a 
battalion of tirailleurs sénégalais in 
June 1940 in France. Posts at the 2e 
bureaux for the colonies, Afrique 
Occidental Française (AOF) and in 
Algiers followed until 1943. Directed 
as colonel again a regiment of 
tirailleurs sénégalais during landings 
on Elba and in the Provence in 1944 
and during the campaign in the 
Alsace. Promoted to general he 
commanded the 14e Division 
d’infanterie (DI) (composed of the 
former resistance) all the way to 
Konstanz.  
Savani, Antoine  Captain, 
commandant 
then colonel 
Post of Long 
Xuen, eventually 





Long Xuyen and 
Saigon/Cochinc
hina 
Was originally from Corsica. Served 
in a Regiment de tirailleurs 
annamites. First commander of the 
Ecole d’enfants de troupe eurasiens 
de Dalat between 1939 and 1943. 
Married a Vietnamese woman and 



















Born 1907. Worked for the Banque 
de l’Indochine between 1929 and 
1931. Started his own business in 
France and married ex-governor 
Albert Sarraut’s daughter. Actively 
participated in the resistance during 











Na San and 
Dien Bien Phu 
(among other 
locations) 
Born 1928 in Chamalières (Puy-de-
Dôme). Worked on a boat of the 
Swedish merchant fleet at the age of 
19 before signing up with the army. 







du 3e Bataillon 
22e RIC,  







cadres du Sud 
Vietnam 
1950-1956 Saigon, An Loc, 
Trang Bom, Cap 
Saint-Jacques, 
Tan Nhon, Bien 
Hoa, Binh Thui 
(training centre), 
Xa Bang and 
Xuan Loc and 
Da Lat (hospital) 
(all Cochinchina) 
Simon’s grandfather, a general, 
chased Chinese pirates in the Tonkin 
from 1892 to 1894. Simon himself 
was born in 1926 in Châtillon-sur-
Seine (Côte d’Or). His father was a 
colonel. His schooling/training led 
him from the Ecole St.-Sigisberg 
(Nancy), St. Jean de Béthune and 
St. Geneviève (Versailles) to St. Cyr 
where he graduated with a brevet 
d’études militaries supérieures. 
From 1948 on he served as sous-
lieutenant. 
Thabaut, André  Médecin 
lieutenant 
1er Bataillon 








Lac Dao, Ke 
Sat, Hanoi, 
Dong Ly, Gia 
Lam (all Tonkin), 
Saigon, Pleiku, 
Ban Me Thuot 
Born 1928 in the Lauragais 
(Cathare) as son of an officer. 
Admitted to the second year of the 
Ecole du service de santé militaire in 
Lyon in 1947. Initially stationed in 
Germany after graduation but sent to 
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and Baria (all 
Cochinchina) 
Indochina, like the majority of his 
year. 









and 5e Régiment 
d’infanterie 
(among others) 
1946-53 Tonkin and 
highlands as 
well as Bau952 
Me Thuot 
(among others) 
Born 1904 into a family of 
landowners and doctors in the 
Landes. Graduated from St. Cyr. 
Participated in the Rif Campaign 
from 1926 to 1927. Escaped from 
German occupation via Spain in 
1942. Participated in the Italian 
campaign where he was seriously 
wounded.  
















Lao Cay, Lang 
Son, Lai Chau, 
Dien Bien Phu 
and Na San (all 
Tonkin), central 
Laos, That Ke 
and Pak Se 
(southern Laos), 
Island of Cu Lao 
Re (off Annam), 
Lai Thieu, Plaine 
des Joncs, Cap 
Saint Jacques 




Born 1908 in La Baume (Hautes 
Alpes) into a family of farmers. 
Attended Ecole normale in Aix-en-
Provence and Saint-Maixent (1928). 
Served as sous-lieutenant in the 
border area of the Tonkin in 1932. 
Posted to the Maginot Line in 1937-
8. Became a guard at the French 
embassy in Peking, followed by a 
stint as adjoint to the commander of 
the French troops in Shanghai in 
1938. Directed the Centre 
d’instruction des troupes coloniales 
in Frejus, then the Ecole de saut de 
Vannes-Meucon in 1950-2 when not 
in Indochina during the Indochina 
War. 
Vaillant, Albéric  Captain, then 
chef de 
bataillon 
3e Bataillon de 
la 3e demi-







des Joncs and 
Vinh Loc (all 
Cochinchina) 
Born 1915 in Paris. Came from a 
military background. Graduated from 
St. Cyr. Served with 146e Regiment 
d’infanterie de forteresse. Interned in 
an Oflag after armistice. Reached 
Oran and the Foreign Legion after 
second escape in 1942. Participated in 
the Italian and French campaigns. 



















based in Saigon  
Born 1899. After graduating from St. 
Cyr entered the Coloniale at the end 
of WWI. Stationed in China in 1937. 
Captured in 1940 in France but 
released shortly after. Promoted to 
general in 1944. Served under de 
Lattre in southern France and 
Germany. 













Yen and Nam 
Dinh 
Born 1904. Studied philosophy and 
taught for some time. Eventually 
entered Saint-Maixent. Finished 





Sources: Lemoine, Simonnet, Laurent, Zeller, Emery et N’Guyen, Histoire orale, inventaire analytique des sous-séries 3K et 4K, tomme I, 33-62, 
100-12, 147-68, 201-12 and 223-6,  and tomme II, 61-6, 155-8, 173-68, 269-78, 303-44 and 359-63, Dalloz, Dictionnaire de la guerre d’Indochine, 
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British/Commonwealth units engaged in the emergency 
 
Introductory note: The list includes training centres, depots, workshops and detachments, which 
were, strictly speaking, not units per se but bodies set up in Malaya and staffed by representatives 
from different units. The list also features mixed regiments made up of various infantry and service 
units. Further, there are various smaller units attached to larger ones. This goes particularly for 





3rd Grenadier Guards 
2nd Coldstream Guards 
1st Battalion (Bn) the Queen’s Royal Regiment (West Surrey, 2nd of Foot) 
1st Bn the Royal Lincolnshire Regiment 
1st Bn the Devonshire Regiment 
1st Bn the Suffolk Regiment 
1st Bn the Somerset Light Infantry (Prince Albert’s) 
1st Bn the West Yorkshire Regiment (The Prince of Wales’ Own) 
1st Bn the East Yorkshire Regiment (The Duke of York’s Own) 
1st Bn the Green Howards (Alexandra, Princess of Wales’ Own Yorkshire Regiment) 
1st Bn the Cheshire Regiment 
1st Bn the Worcestershire Regiment 
1st Bn the Royal Hampshire Regiment 
1st Bn the Sherwood Foresters (Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regiment) 
1st Bn the Loyal Regiment (North Lancashire) 
1st Bn 3rd East Anglian Regiment (16th/44th Foot) 
1st Bn the Queen’s Own Royal West Kent Regiment 
1st Bn the King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (KOYLI) 
2nd Bn the King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry  
1st Bn the Wiltshire Regiment (Duke of Edinburgh’s) 
1st Bn the Manchester Regiment 
1st Bn the Rifle Brigade (Prince Consort’s Own) 
The Royal Sussex Regiment  
 
2nd Scots Guards 
1st Bn the Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) 
1st Bn the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 
1st Bn the Royal Scots Fusiliers 
1st Bn the Seaforth Highlanders (Ross-Shire Buffs, the Duke of Albany’s) 
1st Bn the Gordon Highlanders 
1st Bn the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (Prince Louise’s) 
1st Bn The King’s Own Scottish Borderers 
 
2nd Bn the Royal Welsh Fusiliers 
1st Bn the South Wales Borderers  
 
17th Gurkha Brigade (incl. 1st Bn KOYLI and 1st Bn Gordon Highlanders) 
26th Gurkha Infantry Brigade 
63th Gurkha Infantry Brigade 
1st/2nd King Edward VII’s Own Gurkha Rifles (The Sirmoor Rifles) 
2nd/2nd Kind Edward VII’s Own Gurkha Rifles (The Sirmoor Rifles) 
1st/6th Queen Elizabeth’s Own Gurkha Rifles 
2nd/6th Queen Elizabeth’s Own Gurkha Rifles  
1st/7th Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Gurkha Rifles 
2nd/7th Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Gurkha Rifles 
1st/10th Princess Mary’s Own Gurkha Rifles 
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2nd/10th Princess Mary’s Own Gurkha Rifles 
 
28th Commonwealth Independent Infantry Brigade (comprised of British, Australian & NZ units) 
 
1st Bn the Royal Australian Regiment 
2nd Bn the Royal Australian Regiment 
3rd Bn the Royal Australian Regiment 
1st Bn The New Zealand Regiment 
2nd Bn the New Zealand Regiment 
 
1st Bn the King’s African Rifles (KAR) 
2nd Bn KAR 
3rd Bn KAR 
1st Bn the Northern Rhodesia Regiment 
1st Bn the Rhodesian African Rifles 
1st Bn the Fiji Infantry Regiment 
The Sarawak Rangers 
1st Bn the Malay Regiment 
2nd Bn the Malay Regiment 
3rd Bn the Malay Regiment 
4th Bn the Malay Regiment 
5th Bn the Malay Regiment 
6th Bn the Malay Regiment 
7th Bn the Malay Regiment 
The Royal Air Force Regiment (Malaya) 
1st Singapore Infantry Regiment 
1st Singapore Guard Regiment 
 
Staff, Federation Military College (Port Dickson) 
 
Headquarters (HQ) 3 Commando Brigade 
40 Commando Royal Marines953 
42 Commando Royal Marines 
45 Commando Royal Marines 
HMS Centaur, Royal Marines Detachment 
The Independent Parachute Squadron954 
22nd Special Air Service Regiment (SAS) (Malayan Scouts)955 
The Rhodesia Squadron SAS 





1st King’s Dragoon Guards 
1st Royal Dragoons 
4th Queen’s Own Hussars 
11th Hussars (Prince Albert’s Own) 
12th Royal Lancers (Prince of Wales) 
13th/18th Royal Hussars (Queen Mary’s Own) 





                                                          
953  As the name suggests, Royal Marines are part of the Royal Navy. But in the second half of the 20th century their 
roles have largely been that of infantry units employed in difficult terrain and equipped with special arms. In modern 
times fewer and fewer ships have employed RM detachments. 
954  Paratroopers have represented the airborne infantry element of the army, not the Royal Air Force.  
955  The SAS, too, has been incorporated into the army but has fulfilled special roles, among them long-range  





2nd Field Regiment Royal Artillery (RA) 
25th Field Regiment RA 
26th (formerly 4th) Field Regiment RA 
39th Field Regiment RA 
48th Field Regiment RA 
1st Singapore Regiment Royal Artillery (RA) 
100 Field Battery Royal Australian Artillery (RAA) 
101 Field Battery RAA 
103 Field Battery RAA 
105 Field Battery RAA 
A Battery Royal Australian Artillery (serving with 28 Commonwealth Infantry Brigade) 
11th Independent Searchlight Troop 
18th Battery 6th Anti-Aircraft Regiment 
34th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment 
93 (Le Cateau) Field Battery 
95 Independent Field Battery 
11th Independent Mortar Troop RA 






1 (formerly 561) Independent Field Squadron, Royal Engineers (RE) 
11 Independent Field Squadron, RE 
50 Gurkha Field Regiment, RE 
51 Field Engineer Regiment, RE 
74 Field Park Squadron, RE 
410 Independent Plant Troop, RE 
501 Field Squadron (A), RE 
554 Field Squadron, RE 
570 Map Reproduction Troop, RE 
890 E&M Squadron, RE 
890 Plant Troop (Batu Caves 48) (later HQ Works Squadron) 
11 Independent Field Squadron, Royal Australian Engineers (with 4 Troop) 
2 Troop Royal Australian Engineers (attached to 11 Independent Field Squadron, RE) 
 
Light Aid Detachment (LAD), REME Headquarters (17th Gurkha Division) 
1 Infantry Workshops, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME) 
2 Infantry Workshops, REME  
10 Infantry Workshop, REME 
12 Infantry Workshop, REME 
13 Infantry Workshop, REME 
14 Infantry Workshop, REME 
21 Malay Infantry Workshop, REME 
22 Malay Infantry Workshop, REME 
26 Gurkha Infantry Brigade LAD 
75 Aircraft Workshop, REME 
REME District Workshop, Singapore 
District Workshop Singapore 
Base Workshops REME/FARELF 
10 Transportation Squadron, RE 
305 Engineer Stores Depot, RE 
3 Base Ordnance Depot (BOD), Royal Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC), Light Aid 
Attachment (LAD), REME 
 
                                                          
956  Many of these service units were attached to infantry and armoured units. Some of them were also based in  
Singapore from where they went out on missions. 
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General Survey Section 
2 Air Survey Liaison Section 
55 Field Survey Squadron 
74 Field Park Squadron 
84 Field Survey Squadron 
 
Malay Engineer Squadron (later 75 Field Squadron of 17th Gurkha Division) 
22 Malay Infantry Workshop 
75 Malayan Field Engineer Squadron, RE 
78 Malayan Field Park Squadron, RE 
76 Federal Field Squadron, Federation Engineers 
 





2 Squadrons, Royal Corps of Signals 
17th (Gurkha) Signal Regiment 
18th Infantry Signal Squadron (formerly Signal Squadron, 2nd Guards Brigade) 
18th Independent Infantry Brigade Signals Squadron 
28 Commonwealth Infantry Brigade Signal Squadron 
40 Division Signal Troop 
65 Gurkha Infantry Brigade Group Signals Troop 
201 Signal Squadron 
208 (Commonwealth) Signal Squadron 
230 Signal Squadron 
237 Signal Squadron (COMCAN) 
Malaya Command Signals Squadron 
18th Independent Infantry Brigade Signals Squadron 
19th Air Formation Signal Regiment 
24th Independent Group, Signals WRAC 
40 Division Signal Troop 
2 Squadrons Royal Corps of Signals 
Air Support Signals Troop 
GHQ Signal Regiment 
 
Malaya Signal Regiment 
Malaya District Signals Regiment 
Singapore District Signal Regiment 
 
1 Australian Observer Unit (attached to GHQ Signal Regiment) 
 
 
Royal Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC): 
 
6 Central Ordnance Depot (COD) 
21 Air Maintenance Platoon 
22 Air Maintenance Platoon 
30 Bn 
28 Commonwealth Independent Infantry Brigade Group, Ordnance Field Park 
99 Ordnance Field Park 
103 Army Photographic Intelligence Service 
221 Vehicle Bn 
221 BVD957  
443 Base Ammunition Depot 
Printing Division, C Company, 30 Bn 
Gurkha Records Office, GHQ 2nd Echelon, FARELF 
                                                          





Royal Army Service Corps (RASC): 
 
General Headquarters, 2nd Echelon 
No. 1 Supply Depot (Batu Caves, KL) 
No. 2 Supply Depot (Taiping) 
3 Company (Coy) 
3 Coy, General Transport (GT) 
6 Coy (incl. LAD REME) 
17th Gurkha Division (RASC) 
30 Coy Gurkha (RASC) 
30 Gurkha Transport Regiment (GTR) Workshops, REME 
37 Coy (water transport) 
24 Coy  
27 Coy  
27th Independent Infantry Coy (RASC) 
29 Coy 
55 Coy, Air Dispatch (AD) 
61 Coy (Locally Enlisted Personnel (LEP)) 
74 Coy  
436 Transport Coy 
986 Coy, Water Transport 
126 Transport Platoon, Royal Australian Army Service Corps 
 
 
Royal Corps of Transport (RCT): 
 





Royal Army Medical Corps: 
 
8 Field Dressing Station (formerly 16 Field Ambulance) (incl. 21st Field Surgical Team) 
16 Commonwealth Field Ambulance 
19 Field Ambulance 
39 Field Ambulance (incl. 8th Brigade Group Medical Coy) 
Staff, British Military Hospital Kinrara (incl. 34 Coy as well as no. 1 & 2 Mass Miniature 
Radiography) 
Staff, British Military Hospital Kamunting  
Staff, British Military Hospital, Terendak 
Staff, British Military Hospital Kluang 
 
3rd Field Ambulance, Federated Malaya States Volunteer Force 
 
Queen Alexandria’s Royal Army Nursing Corps 
Royal Army Dental Corps 
Royal Army Veterinary Corps 
 
 
Army Air Corps (AAC): 
 
7 Flight AAC 
11 Flight AAC (656 Army Air Corps Sqadron (Sqn)) 
14 Liaison Flight (656 Light Aircraft Sqn) 
1914 Air Observation Post (AOP) Flight 
656 AOP Sqn 





17 Gurkha Divison Provost Coy 
 
Corps of Royal Military Police 
Malaya Regiment Military Police 
Gurkha Military Police 
 
Intelligence Corps 
Field Security Wing Malaya Intelligence Corps 
 
Royal Army Pay Corps 
Army Catering Corps 
Royal Army Chaplains Department 
Royal Army Educational Corps 
 















































Appendix D  
 
 
Main units from of the French Union engaged in the Indochina War958  
 
Introductory notes: Due to the fact that none of the many books on the Indochina War consulted 
features a comprehensive (French) order of battle the list below is not complete. In particular, 
service units are under-represented for want of sources. The same goes for units of the 
Cambodian Armée royale khmère set up in 1950/1. 
     It should also be noted that specific infantry units were often formed ad-hoc from various 
elements of parent units or simply dissolved. Others were attached to newly formed groups. At 
the same time, names and compositions of many divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions and 
companies changed over time.  
     From 1951 on many of the regionally raised units were incorporated into the three national 
armies of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The newly established regiments and battalions, too, 
were given different names over time. 
 
 
First CEFEO units (1945-6)959: 
 
Groupe mobile/2e Demi-brigade (Groupement Massu) 
9e Division d’infanterie coloniale (DIC) (elements) 
Eléments organiques de corps d’armée 
 
 




1er-4e  Division de marche du Tonkin 
1ère Brigade d’Extrême-Orient 
 
 
Metropolitan infantry:   
 
• 1er and 3e Bataillon d’infanterie légère d’Afrique (BILA); Bataillon de marche 
(BM)/35e Régiment d’Infanterie (RI), BM/43e RI, BM/49e RI, BM/110e RI and 
BM/151e RI 
• 3e Bataillon de marche d’Extrême-Orient 
 
 
Colonial infantry:  
 
• BM/1er Régiment d’infanterie coloniale (RIC), 1er BM/2e RIC; 5e RIC, BM/5e RIC; 6e 
RIC; 1er and 2e BM/11e RIC; 21e RIC, BM/21e RIC; 23e RIC, BM/23e RIC; 43e RIC, 
BM/43e RIC; 110e RIC; I&II/Régiment de Corée 
 
 
Foreign Legion infantry: 
 







                                                          
958  Plus allied forces, such as sects and irregular troops. 





• Metropolitan: 1er Bataillon parachutiste de choc (1er BPC) (1947-8); I/1er Régiment 
des chasseurs parachutistes (1947-9); II/1er RCP (1953-4); III/1er RCP (1947-8); 2e 
RCP; 10e Bataillon parachutiste de chasseurs à pied (10e BPCP) (1950-2) 
• Colonial: Demi-brigade parachutiste SAS (re-named 2e Demi-brigade coloniale de 
commandos parachutistes (DBCCP).960 (1948) 
• Foreign Legion: 1er Bataillon étranger de parachutistes (BEP), 2e BEP (1949-54) 




1er Régiment parachutiste d’infanterie de marine 
17e Compagnie parachutiste du génie 
60e, 75e and 342e Compagnie de transmission parachutiste (CTP) 
1er Régiment de hussards parachutistes (after 1948 attached to the II/1er RCP) 
35e Régiment d’artillerie lourde parachutiste (RALP) 
1ère Compagnie étrangère de mortier lourde parachutiste (CEMLP) 
Etat-major groupement léger aéroporté (EM GLAP) 
États-majors opérationnels des bases aéroportés (EMO BAP) 
Poste de commandement base aéroporté nord (PC BAPN) 
Troupes aéroportées Indochine du nord (PC TAPN) 
Groupement de commandos parachutistes (GCP) 
Base aéroporté sud (BAPS) 
Groupement aéroporté (GAP) 2 
Groupement aérien tactique (GATAC) 
Détachement de liaison et d’observation (DLO) 
Various units of Défense contre aéronefs (DCA) 
Escadrille des liaisons aériennes (ELA) 





Commandos Fonde, Dronne, Ponchardier, Jaubert, Montfort, Ouragan, Tempête, Sénée 









(North) African units: 
 
• Algerian & Tunisian Rifles: 1er, 2e and 3e BM/1er Régiment de tirailleurs algériens; 1er, 
2e, 3e BM/2e RTA; 1er, 2e and 3e BM/3e RTA; BM/6e RTA; BM, 4e, 5e BM/7e RTA; 21e, 
23e, 25e and 27e Bataillon de tirailleurs algériens (BTA); 1er, 2e and 3e BM/4e/Régiment 
des tirailleurs tunesiens (RTT) 
 
• Moroccan Rifles: 1er, 2e and 3e BM/1er Régiment de tirailleurs marocains; 1er, 3e and 
4e BM/2e RTM; BM, I, II/3e RTM; 1er, 2e and 3e BM/4e RTM; I, II, III, IV/& BM/5e RTM; 
II, III & BM/6e RTM; BM/7e RTM; BM/8e RTM; 10e Bataillon de marche marocain 
(BMM)  
 
                                                          
960   Successor battalions were termed: 1er, 2e, 3e, 5e, 6e, 7e & 8e (BCCP). From March 1951 they were re-named 
Bataillons de parachutistes coloniaux (BCP). 
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• Moroccan Goumiers961: Local auxiliaries were at times attached for reconnaissance 
tasks; Main units: 1er, 2e, 3e, 5e, 8e, 9e, 10e, 11e and 17e Tabors.962 
 
• Senegalese/African Rifles963: 24e Régiment de marche de tirailleurs sénégalais (2 
battalions); 13e & 26e-32e BMTS incl. 1er & 3e BM d’Afrique occidentale française and 
2e BM d’Afrique centrale française 
 
 
Armée nationale de Vietnam (ANV): 
 
Tieu Doan (battalions) 62, 63, 64, 65, 68, 75 and 76 (formerly attached to Foreign Legion 
and Coloniale regiments); 1er, 3e, 5e and 7e Bataillons parachutistes vietnamiennes 
nationales (BPVN). In theory, 145 battalion-sized formations were in service or under 
training by 1954 but the real figure was lower. Of the total, 45 were light battalions, so 
called Tieu Doan Kinh Quan (TDKQ).  
 
At the end of 1951 the ANV comprised: 
 
1ère Division (Sud Vietnam):964 
 
1er Bon965 vietnamien (composed of former éléments of the Garde nationale du 
Vietnam Sud (GVNS), supplétifs and sects) 
3e Bon vietnamien (from GVNS) 
5e Bon vietnamien (from GVNS and supplétifs) 
11e Bon vietnamien (from GVNS, 1er and 3e Bataillon (probably GVNS) as well 
as supplétifs) 
13e Bon vietnamien (from BM du 151e RI) 
15e Bon vietnamien (from supplétifs Cao Dai) 
17e Bon vietnamien (from Catholic supplétifs) 
19e Bon vietnamien (from 1/43e RIC) 
21e Bon vietnamien (from 1er, 3e, 5e ,11e Bataillon (GVNS) and supplétifs) 
1er Escadron de reconnaissance (vietnamien) (from GVNS) 
 
2e Division (Centre Vietnam): 
 
7e Bon vietnamien (composed of former éléments of the Garde nationale du 
Vietnam centre (GVNC)) 
8e Bon vietnamien (from GVNC) 
12e Bon vietnamien (GVNC) 
23e Bon vietnamien (GVNC) 
25e Bon vietnamien (GVNC) 
 
3e Division (Nord Vietnam): 
 
2e Bon vietnamien (composed of former éléments of Garde nationale du 
Vietnam nord (GVNN)) 
4e Bon vietnamien (from GVNN) 
6e Bon vietnamien (from GVNN) 
9e Bon vietnamien (from GVNN) 
10e Bon vietnamien (from GVNN and new recruits) 
14e Bon vietnamien (from 7e Bataillon de marche d’Extrême-Orient (BMEO)) 
16e Bon vietnamien (from Catholic supplétifs) 
18e Bon vietnamien (from Catholic supplétifs) 
20e Bon vietnamien (from trained units and supplétifs) 
22e Bon vietnamien (from 1er Bataillon ‘Méduse’) 
                                                          
961  Irregulars from North Africa. 
962  Tabors (battalions) consisted of three Goums each (companies) plus HQ. 
963  West & central African volunteers and conscripts normally commanded by French officers and NCOs. 
964  Status at the end of 1951 for all four divisions listed here. 
965  The term isn’t explained in the source but most likely stands for battalion. 
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26e Bon vietnamien (from 2e Bataillon ‘Méduse’) 
 
4e Division (Plateaux montagnards du sud): 
 
1er Bataillon montagnard (composed of elements of the former Groupe de 
commandos montagnards des plateaux (GMCGM))966 
2e Bataillon montagnard (from GMCGM/Brigade mobile de la garde 
montagnarde) 
3e Bataillon montagnard (from 3e Bataillon de marche d’Extrême-Orient 
(BMEO) 
4e Bataillon montagnard (from 4e BMEO) 
5e Bataillon montagnard (from 3e BMEO) 
6e Bataillon montagnard (from 3e BMEO) 
7e Bataillon montagnard (from Dalat garrison and supplétifs) 
 
Etat-major des forces armées vietnamiennes  (EM/FAVN) 
 
Further units mentioned in the sources: 
 
5ère-7e Division d’infanterie vietnamienne containing: 
 
24e, 27e, 29e, 30e, 31e, 53e, 55e, 56e, 58e, 59e, 83e, 252e (later becoming Tieu Doan 42) 
and 302e (later 32e before constituting the Groupement Nung) and 503e Bataillon 
d’infanterie vietnamien 
 
255e Bataillon de la garde (becoming Tieu Doan 45) 
2e, 4e, 6e, 7e, 8e, 10e and 11e Escadron de reconnaissance vietnamien 
3e and 5e Escadron blindé de reconnaissance vietnamien (the 5e later becoming the 
2e Escadron du 3e Régiment de reconnaissance) 
1ère Groupe d’escadrons d’escorte vietnamien 
3e Régiment de reconnaissance vietnamien 
2e Groupe d’artillerie vietnamienne (later incorporated into Groupe mobile 21) 
4e Groupe d’artillerie vietnamienne (later incorporated into Groupe mobile 41, then 42) 
5e Groupe d’artillerie vietnamienne (later incorporated into Groupe mobile 31) 
7e Compagnie de transmission  
3e, 4e, 6e and 7e 967 Compagnie de transport  
Compagnie de quartier général régionale 1 and 2 
La Garde de Sa Majesté l’Empereur Bao Dai 
Garde républicaine cochinchoise 
Garde du Vietnam Sud (GVNS) (until 1951) 
Garde des provinces méridionales du Centre Vietnam (with elements of the former Garde 
indochinoise du Sud Annam) 
Garde frontalière de l’Ouest tonkinois (later Bataillon de garde Thaï) 
1er Groupe autonome d’escadrons d’honneur (part of the Garde républicaine de 
Cochinchine) 
1ère Groupe d’escadron d’escorte vietnamienne (becoming the 1er  Régiment de dragons 
vietnamiens) 
3e Régiment de reconnaissance vietnamien (becoming the 3e Régiment de dragons viet.) 
44e Détachement chirurgicale mobile de l’ANV968 
1er Bataillon de marche indochinois (BMI)969 






                                                          
966  The letters probably stand for Groupe mobile des commandos de la garde montagnarde. 
967  Latter forming part of Groupe de transport 7. 
968  My translation from the English term. 
969  This was an early unit of the CEFEO which was later incorporated into the ANV. 
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Armée royale de Laos:  
 
2e 970, 3e 971,5e, 6e 972, 7e and 8e Bataillons de chasseurs laotiens973 
2e Commando de chasseurs laotiens  
4e, 5e and 6e Commandos laotiens974 (12 commandos by the end of the war) 
1er-6e Bataillon d’infanterie lao (BIL) (from 1950 on)975 
1er and 5e Bataillon de parachutistes laotiens (BPL) 
Garde nationale (later to become the Gendarmerie laotienne with 3 Compagnies de 
gendarmerie) featuring 25 commandos de garde nationale and 62 Comp. de garde nat. 
Groupements mixtes d’intervention (GMI) (300 men in total) 
Bataillons légers (laotiens) (7 in total) 
Mortar companies (3 in total) 
Artillery batteries incl. Batterie autonome d’artillerie laotienne (BAAL) 
Compagnies d’escorte (laotiens) (6 in total) 
1er and 2e Escadron de reconnaissance (laotien) 
Groupe d’artillerie (laotienne)  
Compagnies de génie (laotiens) (7 in total)  
Compagnies de transport (laotiens) (3) 
Compagnie de train (laotien) (2) 
Compagnie de transmission (laotienne) 
Compagnie de matériel (laotien) 
Compagnies de l’intendance  
Antenne chirurgicale mobile 23 and 24 
Bataillon léger laotien 
Service de santé de l’Armée royale du Laos 
Staff at the Hôpital Commandant Guenon 
Supplétifs (19 in total)976, para-military forces977, partisans978 and interpreters 
Comité permanent de défense franco-laotien (from 1951 on) 
Staff of the Ecoles d’instructions (Dong Hene, Chi Nai Mo) and Centre de formation 
téchnique and Ecole de sous-officiers (both at Pakse) 
 
 
Armée royale khmère:979 
 
Etat-major de l’Armée royale khmère (EM/ARK) 
Régiment mixte du Cambodge (RMC) 
1er, 4e and 7e Bataillon de chasseurs cambodgiens (BCC) 
Bataillon de parachutistes khmers (BPK) 
Commando blindé du Cambodge980 (turning into the 8e Escadron du 5e Régiment de 
cuirassiers) 
3e Escadron monté du Cambodge (transferred to the ARK in 1950) 
Service de santé de l’Armée Royale Khmère 
 
 
Regular units composed of minorities:  
 
1er, 2e and 3e Bataillon Thaï981  
Commando Thaï 
                                                          
970   Becoming the 12e Bataillon d’infanterie laotienne. 
971  Dissolved in 1950 and integrated into the 1er and 2e BIL. 
972  Integrated into the GCMA. 
973  Became the 7e, 8e, 9e, 10e and 12e BIL in 1954. 
974  The last one became the 6e Commando franco-laotien in 1947. 
975  12 such battalions existed by the end of the war. 
976  Eventually labelled Compagnies légères de supplétifs militaires. 
977  Later integrated into the Garde nationale. 
978  The latter mainly served as self-defending militia and village guards. 
979  It proved extremely difficult to locate any Cambodian units in the few existing lists. The ones mentioned above  
should therefore be seen only as a few examples of a larger force. 
980  Strictly speaking not a unit of the ARK as the latter wasn’t in existence yet when the unit operated. 
981  Originally from the Compagnies autonomes Thaï des provinces de Son La, Nghia Lo and Lai Chan. 
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1er and 2e (Bataillon) Muong982 
Groupement Nung 
Parachute units composed of Muong, Nung and Tho 
 
 
Auxiliaries, sects and partisans:  
 
• The French formed irregular commandos for counter-guerrilla operations throughout 
the war. But from 1951 Groupements de commandos mixtes aéroportés (GCMA)983 
waged war on the Viet Minh in the highlands of the Tonkin. These troops, for the most 
part recruited among minorities, eventually totalled up to 20,000 men and were led by 
French officers and NCOs. 
 
• Sect militia: Hoa Hao, Cao Dai and Bin Xuyen (plus French liaison missions and 
advisors) 
 
• Unités mobiles pour la défense des chrétientés (UMDC)  
 
• Supplétifs (manning watchtowers for instance), including Compagnies légères de 





1er Régiment de chasseurs à cheval  
4e Régiment de dragons portés  
5e Régiment de cuirassiers ‘Royal Pologne’  
Régiment d’infanterie coloniale de Maroc985  
1er Régiment étranger de cavalerie986  
2e, 5e and 6e Régiment des spahis marocains and 8e Régiment des spahis algériens987  
6e Groupe des spahis marocains portés (formed at the end of the war, probably with 
elements of above) 
Régiment blindé colonial d’Extrême-Orient (Set up in 1950 with tanks and tank 
destroyers to counter a possible Chinese attack in the north.) 
Commando blinde du Cambodge (after 1946 8e Escadron du 5e Régiment de 
cuirassiers) 
9e Régiment de dragons (later Groupement d’unités d’armes lourdes de la brigade 
d’Extrême-Orient) 
Escadron autonome de reconnaissance 
Bataillon porté du groupement blindé Haut-Tonkin (dissolved and attached to the RICM 
after 1947) 
Groupe d’escadron de marche de l’armé blindée (dissolved in 1947) 
Escadron lourd de réparations (after 1951 attached to the RICM) 
4e Régiment de dragons portés 
5e Régiment de cuirassiers 
Groupement blindé du Tonkin (GBT) 
 
                                                          
982  Towards the end of the war some of these units were incorporated into the ANV. 
983  Later Groupe mixte d’intervention (GMI). 
984  These often comprised sizeable Vietnamese motorised infantry units. Upon his arrival de Latter set up first 
Sous-groupements blindés (SGB) (1 tank squadron with tanks, half tracks and lorried infantry companies). The 
equally formed Groupes d’escadrons de reconnaissance (GER) counted 1 reconnaissance squadron of 
armoured cars, howitzers and local infantry. 
985  Despite its name an armoured unit, supported by tanks and infantry. By 1952/3 it comprised 2 tank and 3 
reconnaissance squadrons, plus 5 infantry companies. It formed GB3 and GER2 operating in Annam and the Tonkin. 
986  Served initially in an infantry role, later with armoured cars, trucks, jeeps and tanks.  It introduced ‘crabe’ and 
LVT (Landing Vehicles Tracked) ‘Alligator’ in amphibious operations. In 1953 it comprised 18 squadrons located 
in Tourane and Haiphong. 
987  These changed in equipment and use starting as infantry units in 1949, later employing tank and halftrack 
squadrons forming GB4 and operating in Annam. The 8e RSA began as an infantry unit and later grew into GB1 




Groupes mobiles:  
 
Self-reliant motorised brigades set-up from 1950-1 on. They usually comprised three 
lorried infantry battalions with some towed artillery, light armour and/or tanks, engineer, 
signals and medical elements numbering 3,000-3,5000 men. Throughout the war 17 of 
these groups were formed from French, Foreign Legion, African, Vietnamese and 
montagnards troops. They were primarily used for threatened sectors in the Tonkin. 
Among them was the Groupement Vanuxem (GM8, S/GB 2). 
 
 
Amphibious units:  
 
• Set up for operations in swamps and canals, i.e. the Plaine des Joncs, the Tonkin 
Delta and the Annamese coast. By 1954 two Groupements amphibies existed, staffed 
with elements from the 1er REC. The consisted of 3 squadrons of US-type weasels 
(‘Crabes’), 3 of LVT and 6 of the latter with howitzer turrets. 
 
• The Dinassauts (Divisions navales d’assaut) 1, 3, 5 and 12 (operating in the Tonkin), 
2, 4, 6, 8 and 10 (operating in Annam and Cochinchina) also had their own 





2e Régiment étranger du génie 
17e Régiment du génie 
19e Régiment du génie 
31e Régiment du génie  
61e Régiment du génie 





1er Régiment d’artillerie coloniale du Maroc (RACM) 
3e Régiment d’artillerie coloniale (RAC) 
41e Régiment d’artillerie coloniale 
69e Régiment d’artillerie 
69e Régiment d’artillerie d’Afrique (RAA) 
Groupe d’artillerie coloniale (GAC) de l’Afrique occidentale française (AOF) 
3e Groupe du 10e Régiment d’artillerie coloniale (RAC) 
2e et 4e Groupe du 4e RAC 










71e and  72e (Compagnie) coloniale de transmission (CCT) 





                                                          





503e, 513e, 515e, 516e, 518e and 519e Groupe de transport 
555e Compagnie muletière 
71e Compagnie de circulation routière (CCR) 
Train du Laos 
Train du Cambodge 
Train de troupes françaises d’Indochine du Sud  
Train de troupes française d’Indochine du Nord  
Train de troupes française d’Indochine du Centre Annam  
 
 
Supply and repair: 
 
5e Compagnie moyen de réparation de la légion étrangère989  
730e Compagnie d’alimentation en essence, dépôt no. 8990 
3e Compagnie d’alimentation en munition991  
 
 
Medical (and social) units: 
 
Direction du service de santé du corps expéditionnaire  
Direction des services sanitaires en Extrême-Orient 
Service de santé (militaire) de l’avant 
Service de santé de corps de troupe 
Service d’aide médicale urgente (SAMU) 
Hôpitaux mobiles de campagne 
Hôpital d’évacuation motorisé (HEM) 415 
Antennes chirurgicales de l’avant (ACA) (such as ACA 403), mobiles (ACM 20-40) and 
parachutables (ACP 1-10)  
Equipes chirurgicales mobiles (ECM) 
Postes de secours 
Sections de triage 
Compagnies de triage-traitement 
Compagnies de ramassages 
Dépôt de réserve sanitaire (DRS) 451 
Dépôts d’approvisionnement sanitaire (DAS) 
Ambulances parachutistes 
29e Détachement chirurgicale mobile  
Corps des infirmières militaires 
Convoyeuses de l’air (Groupement des moyens militaires de transports aériens 
(GMMTA)) 
Ecole de médecine militaire vietnamienne 
 
 
HQs and political:  
 
Missions militaires auprès des états-associés  
Mission française d’assistance auprès les états associés  
Etat-major opérationel (EMO) Sud  
Groupement opérationnel du nord-ouest (GONO) 
Etat-major particulier (EMP) 
Etat-major interarmés des forces terrestres (EMIFT) 
1ère Groupe de commissaires d’exploitation opérationnel992  
Garde républicaine  
Gendarmerie 
                                                          
989  My translation from the English. 
990  Ditto. 






Direction générale des études et recherches (DGER)  
Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure (DGSE) 
Service de documentation extérieure et de contre-espionnage993 (SDECE) 
Sécurité militaire 
Services spéciaux  
Service de renseignement (SR) 
Service de renseignement opérationnel (SRO) 
 
 
Administrative and social services: 
 
Corps/cadres administratifs des forces armées d’Extrême-Orient (CAFAEO)994 
Auxiliaires féminins de l’armée de terre (AFAT) 
Personnel féminin de l’armée de terre (PFAT)995 
Centre d’instruction fixe (CIF) 
Corps de liaison administrative d’Extrême-Orient (CLAEO)  
Service de presse 
Etablissement cinématographique et photographique des armées (ECPA) 




Involved in considerable number but not listed anywhere systematically are units from the 
















Sources: Bodin, La France et ses soldats, 15, Les combattants français face à la guerre d’Indochine, 263-4, ‘Les laotiens 
dans la guerre d’Indochine, 1945-1954’ in Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains, 2008/2 - nº 230, pp. 5-21 (made 
avalaible on CAIRN) and ‘Le corps expéditionnaire français à la veille de la bataille de Dien Bien Phu’ in Guerres 
mondiales et conflits contemporains, 2003/3, nº 211, pp. 11-27 (CAIRN), J. Dalloz, Dictionnaire de la guerre d’Indochine, 
101, 140-1 and 228, H.-J. Lousteau, Les derniers combats d’Indochine (1984), p. 264 and Annexe 1, Fall, Hell in a Very 
Small Place, Appendix A, Lemaire, Le service de santé militaire dans la guerre d’Indochine, 66-71, 75-89, 222-32, 315-8 
and 335-8, Lieutenant-Colonel C. Franc, ‘L’armée nationale vietnamienne et le recours aux formations supplétifs,997 
Cahier de la recherche doctrinale, Centre de doctrines et d’emploi des forces (CDEF), Division recherche et retour 
d’expérience (DREX) (2009), Thabaut, Médecin Lieutenant au 1er Bataillon Muong, 143-4 and 148-50, De Galard, Une 
femme à Dien Bien Phu, 29, SHD/DITEEX 1KT 1218, M. Windrow & M. Chappell, The French Indochina War, 11-7, P. 
Héduy, La guerre d’Indochine, 1945-1954 (1981), pp. 221, 330-50,  
www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/cahiers_drex/cahier_retex/retex12.pdfand, www.68raa.com, 
www.witzgilles.com/regiments_et_bataillons_indochine.htm998 and www.anac-fr.com. 
                                                          
993  Ditto. 
994  Mostly contractors. 
995  Members of these female services supported mainly but not exclusively the SSM. 
996  My translation from the English term. 
997  This is not an academic article but a study by the French military in view of the build-up of Afghan forces. 
998  This site was set up by a researching ex-serviceman named Jean-Claude Dubuisson, who is particularly 
interested in the Foreign Legion. After some correspondence the author sent me a list of roughly 60 books he 
had used as references. I double-checked some units and, having found them to be correct, decided to use his 
list to fill in service and Vietnamese units in particular. Mr. Dubuisson further brought several useful books and 






Commanders-in-chief of the land forces in Malaya, 1948-57 
 
Introductory notes: This list focuses on the military commanders. But it should be born in mind 
that until April 1950 operations were coordinated by the commissioner of the police, Colonel Gray, 
with the army and RAF assuming supporting roles. In strategic and political terms responsibility 
rested with the high-commissioner. 
     This set-up changed somewhat with the arrival of Lieutenant-General Briggs. Technically, he 
was equal in rank to the chief secretary and held full co-ordinating powers over the police, the 
navy, army and air force. However, commanders of these branches could appeal to their superiors 
in London in case they strongly disagreed with orders. 
     Further, it should be noted that both politically and militarily, Singapore represented a separate 
realm although the authorities assisted in the counter-insurgency efforts. This was done 
principally through patrols in the waters separating the island from the mainland. The city-port 
also served as headquarters for the navy and (initially) the air force. The latter was eventually 
moved to Kuala Lumpur to be closer to the Malayan HQ. 
     Finally, internal security was handed over to the Malayan government in 1956 although much 
of the British military machine remained in the territory, including the last commander-in-chief. 
 
 
1948: Major-General Sir Douglas Ashton (Lofft) Wade (general officer commanding) 
 
1948-50: Major-General Sir Charles Boucher (general officer commanding) 
 
1950-1:  Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs (director of operations in civilian role) 
 
1952-4:  General Sir Gerald Templer (director of operations & high-commissioner) assisted by 
 
 1952-3: General Sir Rob Lockhart (deputy director of operations) 
 1953-(probably 1954): Major-General W. P. Oliver (principal staff officer)  
  
 and  
 
 1952-3: Major-General Sir Robert Urquhart (general officer in command) 
 1953-4: Major-General Sir Hugh Stockwell (general officer in command) 
 
1954-6:  Lieutenant-General Sir Geoffrey (Kemp) Bourne (director of operations/GOC Malaya) 
 












French commanders-in-chief (commandants supérieurs/commandants-en-chef) 
 
September 1945-March 1946:   General Philippe Leclerc (de Hautecloque) 
June 1946-February 1948:  General Jean Valluy 
February 1948-April 1948:  General Raoul Salan 
May 1948-September 1949:  General Roger Blaizot 
September 1949-December 1950: General Marcel Carpentier 
December 1950-January 1952:  General Jean de Lattre (de Tassigny)999 
January 1952-May 1953:  General Raoul Salan 
May 1953-June 1954:   General Henri Navarre  
June 1954-June 1955:   General Paul Ely1000 
June 1955-February 1956:  General Pierre Jacquot 
 
 
Commanders-in-chief of French troops in northern Indochina (Troupes françaises de l’Indochine du 
nord (TFIN))1001: 
 
May 1947-February 1948:  General Raoul Salan 
August 1948-September 1949:  General Chanson1002 
September 1949-November 1950: General Marcel Alessandri 
February 1951-May 1953:  General François (Gonzalez de) Linarès  
June 1953-October 1954:  General René Cogny 
 
 
Commanders-in-chief of French troops in Southern Indochina (Troupes françaises de l’Indochine du 
sud (TFIS))1003: 
 
December 1946-February 1948:  General Georges Nyo 
February 1948-September 1949: General Pierre Boyer de la Tour (du Moulin) 
September 1949-July 1951:  General Chanson 
September 1951-June 1953:  General Paul Bondis 
June 1953-October 1954:  General Roger Gardet 
 
                                                          
999  In conjunction with the job of high-commissioner. 
1000  In conjunction with the job of high-commissioner. 
1001  Later Troupes françaises du Nord Vietnam (TFNV). 
1002  None of the sources list his first name. 
1003  Later Troupes françaises du Sud Vietnam (TFSV). 
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Additional commanders were specifically in charge of the Armée de l’air (air force) and the Marine 
(navy) operating in Indochina, as well as of the Forces terrestres de l’Extrême-Orient (FTEO)1004, 
the Forces terrestres du Centre Vietnam (et des plateaux) (FTCV(P))1005, the Forces terrestres 
du Laos (FTL)1006 and the Forces terrestres du Cambodge (FTC).1007 The last two were for much 
of the war instructed and directed by the Missions militaires françaises auprès du gouvernement 
royale laotien/cambodgien.1008 Vietnamese land forces were incorporated into the Armée 






























Sources: Bodin, Dictionnaire de la guerre d’Indochine, 123-4 and Les combattants français face à la guerre d’Indochine, 
263, Lt.-Col. Franc, ‘L’armée nationale vietnamienne et le recours aux formations supplétives’ in Cahier de la recherché 
doctrinale (CDEF/DREX), 40. 
                                                          
1004  Far Eastern Land Forces. 
1005  Originally Forces terrestres du Centre Annam (TFCA). 
1006  Later incorporated into the Armée nationale du Laos (ANL). 
1007  Later incorporated into the Armée royale Khmère (ARK). 






Ranks and unit levels in the British Army 
 
Note: Units could strongly vary in strength. Most have been under strength throughout history, 
except during the world wars. The numbers quoted here are therefore approximate. Further, the 




Field-Marshal Title given to certain generals (Montgomery, Slim and Templer for 
instance) for great distinction in their service. It was eventually 
abolished by the government. 




Colonel Staff appointment and honorary title 
Lieutenant-colonel Battalion 
Major Company 
Captain “                (second-in-command) 
Lieutenant        Platoon 
2nd lieutenant “                (second-in-command and stand-in) 
Warrant officer class 1 
(WOI) 
Senior NCO in a regiment and colonel’s link to his men. 
Responsible for day-to-day business and discipline. They have 
often been regimental sergeant majors or artificer sergeant 
majors. 
Warrant officer class 2 
(WOII) 
Similar responsibilities but lower ranked. They have usually 
been senior sergeants. 
Staff/colour sergeant Responsible for drill and arms 
Sergeant Platoon (second-in-command) 
Corporal Section 








Unit level Consisting of Strength 
   
British Army Divisions and/or regiments Approx. 100,000 in peace  
time, approx. 500,000 in war 
Corps1009 Several divisions (flexible) Up to 50,000 
Division 3-4 brigades Up to 20,000 
Brigade1010 3-4 battalions Up to 5,000 
Regiment 1-4 battalions1011 400-1,500 
Battalion1012 Usually 3-4 (rifle) companies plus support 
and HQ companies.1013 
4-800 
Company1014 3 and more platoons 1-200 
Platoon 2-3 sections 24-50 













Sources: Interviews, questionnaires, memoirs and regimental journals cited in appendix A plus 
www.army.mod.uk/structure. Military training, service, promotions, ranks and numbers were further discussed in an 
interview on 6.5.2007 with a long-serving colonel. He also checked above lists and provided me with a booklet he 
published in 1998. He wished to remain anonymous. 
 
                                                          
1009  Have rarely been set up. 
1010  Could be part of a division or exist by themselves. 
1011  During the world wars more battalions were raised within a regiment. 
1012  Commando for the Royal Marines. 
1013  In Malaya the support company usually featured signalling and mortar platoons. Generally, it could also 
comprise pioneer, reconnaissance, anti-tank and machine gun platoons. The HQ company has traditionally 
included quartermasters, sergeant-majors, adjutants, administrators and caterers, as well as intelligence and 
medical officers. Further, a battalion has traditionally featured officers’ and NCO’s messes (incl. staff), a 
regimental band and orderlies, which/who were also present in Malayan army camps. Due to shortages even 
such camp staff was sent on patrols. 
1014  In the artillery the equivalent has been a battery or troop. For parachute, SAS and tank units as well as for  






Ranks and unit levels in the French Army  
 
Introductory notes: The French Army has been structured in more complicated ways than its 
British counterpart. Varying terms for similar roles and units have been used in different arms. To 
simplify things, the lists below represents mainly ranks, definitions, roles, strengths and structures 
in the infantry. It should be pointed out that the details entailed are largely based on handbooks 
from the 1930s and 1940s. The military of 1945 and after experienced changes and saw new 
branches come into existence, such airborne units. Figures quoted usually refer to the peacetime 
army. This owes to the fact that France operated in a peacetime mode between 1945 and 1954 
and that most units were constantly under strength in Indochina.  
 
Rank British equivalent Commanding/responsibility 
   
Maréchal (de 
France)1015 
Field-Marshal Military as a whole  
Général d’armée1016 General Army 
Général de corps 
d’armée1017 
Lieutenant-general Corps 
Général de division Major-general Division 
Général de brigade Brigadier Brigade 
Colonel Ditto Regiment (assisted by 2 
lieutenant-colonels) 
Lieutenant-colonel Ditto  Regiment 
Commandant1018 Major Battalion (assisted by adjudant) 
Capitaine Ditto Company1019  
Lieutenant Ditto Section1020 (platoon) (assisted by 
sous-lieutenant and NCOs) 
Sous-lieutenant 2nd lieutenant Section 
Aspirant1021   
Major Sergeant-major Most senior NCO1022 
Adjudant-chef (de 
compagnie, bataillon or 
régiment) 
Warrant officer I/regimental 
sergeant-major1023 
Company, battalion or regiment 
Adjudant (de 




Company, battalion or regiment 
Sergent-chef1025 Quarter-master sergeant Company, battalion or regiment 
                                                          
1015  As in Britain, this has usually been an honorary title for very distinguished generals. It was awarded  
posthumously to Leclerc and de Lattre. 
1016  This has usually been a général de division charged with directing an army.  
1017  This has usually been a général de division charged with directing a corps.  
1018  Alternatively called chef de bataillon or chef d’escadron in the cavalry and artillery. 
1019  Squadron in the cavalry or battery in the artillery. 
1020  The French translation of a platoon is ‘peleton’ but the term has been reserved for cavalry/armoured units. 
1021  Not yet commissioned officer in training (after being an officer cadet) or volunteering (particularly in war). 
1022  Mostly responsible for administrative tasks in a company, battalion or regiment. 
1023  British sources differ in regard to the exact responsibility of and British equivalent for this rank. 
1024  Ditto. 
1025  Maréchal de logis chef in the cavalry and transport units. 
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Sergent1026 Sergeant Section (assists lieutenant) 
Caporal-chef Lance-Sergeant Groupe de combat (section) 
Caporal1027 Corporal “            “ 
Soldat de première 
classe1028 
  







Unit Consisting of Number of troops 
(officers and other ranks) 
   
Armée1030  Headquarters (HQ), varying number of 
corps and additional divisions kept in 
reserve, at least one cavalry division, 
troops and services1031 
Between 80,000  
and 400,000 
Corps1032 HQ, 2-4 divisions and corps troops Up to 80,000 (war 
strength) 
Division HQ, divisional artillery HQ, divisional 
infantry HQ, 3 infantry regiments and 
one divisional artillery regiment 
Ca. 18,000 (war 
strength)1033 
Brigade HQ, demi-brigade of chasseurs (HQ 
and three battalions) and infantry 
regiment 
Ca. 3,000 (cavalry) 
Régiment HQ, HQ company, signal and close 
support weapon company (engines 
d’accompagnement) and three 
battalions 
Ca. 1,600 
Bataillon HQ section, machine gun company and 





HQ and 3 sections Ca. 120 
Section 3 groupes de combat 30-40  
Groupe de combat  One rifle and one L.A.1035 équipe Up to 10 





• Members of the metropolitan army, largely conscripts, were stationed in France (and after 
WWII in Germany) unless they volunteered for service overseas. The Armée d’Afrique, 
whose cadres were mostly metropolitan, and the Coloniale could be employed anywhere.  
                                                          
1026  Maréchal de logis in the cavalry and transport units. 
1027  The caporal-chef and caporal have been a brigadier in the cavalry, artillery and transport units. 
1028  Not a rank per se but a distinction for experienced or outstanding soldiers.  
1029  Depending on the branch they have been referred to as tirailleur, chasseur, legionnaire (all infantry), pionnier 
(pioneering), servan (artillery), cavalier (cavalry), sapeur (engineering and signaling), chasseur (tanks) and 
infirmier (medical service). 
1030  Often organised into groupes d’armée, armies could vary in composition and strength. 
1031  Artillery, engineer, air, anti-aircraft, tank, signal, survey, intendance, medical, veterinary, remount, light  
railway, road transport corps (train) and labour units. 
1032  Have not existed in peace time. 
1033  13,500 for a cavalry division. 
1034  ‘Light infantrymen’. 
1035  The term isn’t explained in the British source and could mean a number of things but probably stands for ‘light arms’. 
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• Within these armies specific, regional units existed such as the tirailleurs sénégalais (a 
generic term for indigenous troops raised in West, East and Equatorial Africa), the 
tirailleurs tunisiens, algériens, annamites and cambodgiens, zouaves (composed of 
French residents in North Africa), chasseurs d’Afrique (French cavalry units stationed in 
North Africa), spahis (mixed cavalry units in North Africa), goums, moghzens (Moroccan 
irregulars with French cadres, temporary in the first and permanent in the second case) 
and méharistes (camel corps companies in the Levant). Some of these units were 
structured differently from their metropolitan counterparts. Goums for instance counted 
between 160 and 180 men and were commanded by officers of the services des affaires 
indigènes.1036 
• Generally, the size and composition of armies in the overseas territories tended to be 
more limited and simpler then those in mainland France. They usually featured 2-3 
infantry brigades (or regiments in Morocco) plus individual battalions, up to six cavalry 
regiments (except in sub-Saharan Africa and Indochina), up to three artillery regiments, 
up to two engineer battalions (or individual companies) and usually one light tank battalion 
(two companies in Indochina), plus auxiliary units. The Foreign Legion consisted of five 
infantry regiments (including a depot), a cavalry regiment (including a depot) and a 
disciplinary company.  
• Within the metropolitan army two main types of units existed: field and fortress units.1037 
The latter differed in strength and composition from infantry units, albeit not dramatically.  
• Headquarters on all levels down to a division usually consisted of four (later five) bureaux 
whose responsibilities were as follows: 
 
o 1er Bureau: personnel and material 
o 2e Bureau: intelligence 
o 3e Bureau: operations 
o 4e Bureau: transport and supply  
o 5e Bureau: propaganda1038 
 
• Officers could also be employed in headquarters (usually after attending the staff college) 
and as liaison officers with foreign forces. Apart from short spells with their original units 
for the sake of promotions, they worked permanently at general staff.  
• The smallest unit capable of functioning independently was normally the regiment. 
Exceptions were to be found in the light infantry (chasseurs à pied incl. chasseurs alpins) 
where the battalion assumed this role. 
• In contrast to its British counterpart, almost all arms in the French Army were set up in 
the manner of services with their own budgets and directorates at the Ministry of Defence. 
Services were normally commanded by a director.  
                                                          
1036  Part of the services spéciaux. 
1037  The entire frontier area from the North Sea to the Mediterranean was organised into fortified areas and  
sectors, directed by regional commanders and their staff. 
1038  This section usually existed at the highest levels. It turned into actions psychologiques during the Algerian War.  
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• In the colonies French units served alongside native and mixed units. In all three types 
the relatively high number of officers and NCOs were mostly French. Indigenous 
servicemen could in theory attain higher ranks but their numbers remained extremely 
small until decolonisation. 
• The following arms did not exist in peace as independent units: reconnaissance, anti-
aircraft machine gun, anti-tank, trench mortar and signal. In peace signallers for instance 
formed part of the corps of engineers. 
• The gendarmerie assumed partly military roles but was/is a force apart from the army. It 
provided forces for Indochina, which were responsible for security and training. It was 
also represented in other colonies, where its members strengthened the native guards. 
The gendarmerie usually recruited ex-soldiers between 21 and 40 years of age, who 
signed up within 5 years of leaving the army. The body was responsible, apart from police 
duties, for recruiting and mobilisation, while also operating as a military police in the form 
of detachments within army units.  
• The gendarmerie included the Garde républicaine mobile. Apart from maintaining order, 
the latter trained gendarmes. In war it was dissolved, with the other ranks assuming the 
roles of NCOs for the reserve. It was organised in legions and peletons and counted 
roughly 13,000 troops in the 1930s. It should not be confused with the Garde républicaine 
(de Paris), whose tasks ranged from protecting official buildings to assisting the police in 
time of upheaval, both in Paris. In the 1930s it amounted to roughly 3,000 men.  
• The Service de l’intendance, responsible for supplies, some ordnance stores, pay, etc. 
came closest to a British service. Like the finance, legal and medical wings its staff were 
both army personnel and civilians with distinctive ranks.  
• Transport was a separate entity in the French Army and was undertaken by the road 
transport corps (train). Every regiment in turn had its own second line of transport – the 
train régimentaire.  
• The medical service operated on four levels: regiment, division (with a divisional 
ambulance group), corps (with a casualty clearing station) and general headquarters (with 
a secondary casualty clearing station). Smaller contingents operated in battalions and 
field artillery regiments. The veterinary service was coupled with the cavalry and existed 
only in war.  
• Anti-aircraft defence fell into the responsibility of the Armée de l’air (air force) in peace 
time. But in war those installations set up in army zones were under the command of the 
commander-in-chief. 
• Coastal defence was the responsibility of the navy. Three coastal sectors existed in  
France, one in North Africa.  
 
Sources: General Staff, War Office, Handbook of the French Army (1932), pp. 54-5 and 63-4, IWM, 03(44).0/4, 87/1216; 
General Staff, War Office, Handbook of the French Army (1940) (reprinted by the IWM in 2004), pp. 47-55, 61-99, 105-
113, 129-41, 153-75 and 177-82; L. Sharp, The French Army, 1939-40: Organisation, Order of Battle, Operational History. 





























Introductory notes: The questionnaire included a consent form and information regarding purpose 
of the study and copyrights. Forms not signed were not used. Participants were reminded that the 
questions referred to their thoughts and experiences during their tour (and not after) – as far as 
they could remember them. The forms were slightly adjusted over the course of the research as 
new issues came up. The one shown here represents a late example. Obviously, the original 
documents offered more space for answers. 
 
Name:      Address : 
Phone:      E-mail (if available): 
Date questionnaire was filled out: 
Date and location of birth:   Father’s (and mother’s) profession: 
Your social background: Schools/professional training: 
Personal interests/hobbies before your tour in Malaya: 
Newspapers and (radio) programmes you read/listened to before your service: 
Date of entry into the army:   Reason for joining:       Trained as: 
Original assignment/regiment (after basic training): 
Nature of service in the army (please tick box):   National Serviceman   Regular   Reserve/TA 
Division/regiment/battalion (attached to) in Malaya: 
Dates of tour in Malaya:   Locations you were based in Malaya: 
Primary roles and responsibilities: 
Injuries/illnesses and/or other problems during your tour (or resulting from it): 
Other postings and units (apart from Malaya and throughout your military career): 
Length of service in the British Army/military in general: 
Rank/status (upon leaving the army):  Career after military service: 
 
Were you taught about the British Empire when you grew up? If so, what? 
Did you hear or read about it in the news? 
Was the empire discussed in your family, among friends, in school or at work? If so, which aspects? 
What did it mean to you personally? Were you in any way interested in it? 
What about the Cold War? Did you read much about it? Was it a topic in the family, in school or 
at work? 
Did you know anything about Malaya/Southeast Asia when you left Britain to serve in the 
emergency? 
What were your first impressions of Malaya (and Singapore) when you arrived? 
From what you saw, how did you judge the quality of the (civilian) infrastructure? 
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Were you briefed about the reasons for the fighting? Were you given any official information by 
the colonial/military administration? If so, what were you told and what kind of material did you 
receive? 
In your own view at the time, what were the security forces fighting for and against what kind of 
enemy? 
What did you think about the insurgents (Communist Terrorists), their methods, goals and 
motivation? 
Did you feel that the security forces had sufficient/suitable equipment and manpower? 
If not, did you consider this to be normal or did you think it may have reflected the (economic 
and political) strains on Britain and the empire? 
How did you judge Britain’s role and standing in the world? 
Did you hear at the time of the Indochina War raging north of Malaya? If so, what did you think 
about it? 
Did you encounter any French soldiers (including Foreign Legion and colonial troops) on your 
journey to Malaya? 
If you had any, what did you do during leave and rest? 
Did you get to see much of Malaya and its people? If so, what? 
Did you have much contact with the population (any ethnicity, age or gender)? If yes, under 
what circumstances? 
What were your impressions of the different ethnic groups (Malays, Chinese, Indian, Europeans, 
aborigines, etc.)? 
Did you witness any serious relationships between (Commonwealth) soldiers and local women 
of any race? 
How did you regard relations between soldiers and civilians in general? 
What impression did the colonial administration, police, planters, managers and their families 
make on you? 
How did you judge health, education, accommodation and working conditions of the non-
European population? 
Were your family and friends informed about events in Malaya? If so, how and when? 
Did you like Malaya as a whole? Which aspects did you appreciate and which ones not? 
Have you returned to Malaya after the end of your tour? If so, how often? 
What has been your attitude towards Malaya’s independence, your role in the conflict and the 
end of the British Empire? Has it changed over the years? 
Are there aspects about the emergency and your role in it which you would rather not discuss 
with outsiders? (Obviously, you can simply hint at such topics.) 















  Tony Hamilton, 19.9.2006 
Brian Lloyd, 8.8.2007 
Tony Rodgers, 21.8.2006 
George Tullis, 25.4.2007 
A retired colonel preferring anonymity, 6.5.2007 
 
(All interview transcripts and tapes are currently in my possession.) 
 
Imperial War Museum (sound section), London: 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel John Adams, 9707, 16.2.1987 
Harold Atkins, 12440, 2.3.1992 
Captain Arthur Banks, 16654, 14.5.1996 
Noel Baptiste, 10107, 3.11.1986 
Colonel John Bell, 12219, 16.9.1991 
Derek Blake, 8943, 11.8.1985 
George Booker, 9127, 5.11.1985 
Richard Broome, 8255, 24.7.1984 
Brigadier Michael Calvert, 9989, October 1987 
Napier Crookenden, 16395, 2.1.1996 
Lieutenant-Colonel John Cross, 8487, 1983 
Adrian Evill, 9854, 1.7.1987 
Field-Marshal Sir John Harding, 8736, 1984 
William Harper, 17224, 4.1.1997 
Lemon Hart, 9480, 3.11.1986 
William Hewlett, 8433, 1983 
Henry Hill, 9314, 13.6.1986 
Michael Jones, 21060, 8.3.2001 
Philip Longbon, 8451, 1983 
Peter Maule-Ffinch, 10120, 16.2.1988 
Robert Perkins, 8462, 1983 
Dennis Ryan, 18006, 5.5.1998 
George Saunders, 13660, 4.1.1994 
William Tee, 16397, 6.1.1996 
Colonel Humphrey Williams, 6185, 15.10.1979 
264 
 
The Australian Film Archive (www.australiansatwarfilmarchive.gov.au):  
 
Arpad Bacskai, 2029, June 2004 
 
Bureau des témoignages oraux (BTO) du département de l’innovation technologique et 
des entrées extraordinaires (DITEEX), Service historique de la défense (SHD), 
Vincennes : 
  
Général Georges Buis, 3K 27, 6.11.1997 and 13.3.1998 
Général Jean Crépin, 4K 2, 16.6.1995 
Conseiller d’état Alain de Lacoste Lareymondie, 3K 23, 21.10.1997 
Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Denis, 3K 41, 5.8.1998 
Général Hugo Geoffrey, 3K 37, 14.5.1998 
Général Francois Gérin-Roze, 3K 3, 21.6.1996 
Général Guy Hinterlang, 3K 8, 13.5. and 24.6.1997 
Colonel Charles Lachéroy, 3K 18, 13.5.1997 
Capitaine Raymond Lagier, 3K 47, 27.1.1999 
Commandant Paul Léger, 3K 42, 6. and 13.8.1998 
Général Guy Méry, 3K 4, 22.10, 6. and 26.11.1996 
Colonel André Perrin, 3K 39, 3.6.1998 
Lieutenant-Colonel Hubert Puga, 3K 43, 16.11.1998 
Général Bernard Saint-Hillier, 3K 6, 3., 14. and 21.2 as well as 30.6.1997 
Général Albéric Vaillant, 3K 13, 15.5.1997 
 
 
Questionnaires filled out by 
 
Arpad Bacskai, 29.5.2007 
Alexander Birks, 17.8.2006 
Archibald Elkington, 12.7.2007 
Peter Franklin, mid July 2007 
E. Guest, 28.8.2007 
Georges Gibson, 5.7.2007 
Terence Haley, 5.6.2007 
Robert Hall, 6.7.2007 
Raymond Hill, 9.9.2007 
Norman Horton, 1.6.2007 
Roland Howes, July 2007 
Harold Kirk, 2.6.2007 
Dennis Leek, 21.7.2007 
Peter Leigh, 26.9.2007 
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Donald Mott, 26.9.2007 
Geoff Parkes, July 2007 
David Sleeth, 12.7.2007 
Leonard Spicer, 14.5.2007 
Ron Stevens, 6.6.2007 
John Veys, 1.6.2007 
David Wright, 24.7.2007 
Two veterans preferring anonymity, 5. and 31.7.2007 
 
(All forms are currently in my possession. Those with a later date were slightly adjusted once the first 
questionnaires were returned.) 
 
 






(All accessed in 2006.) 
 
 
Excerpts from correspondence with and background information from 
 
Steve Finnis, curator of the Queen’s Own Royal West Kent Regiment Museum,   
24.8.2006 
Général de division Guy Simon, director of ANAI, 14.10. and 28.11.2008 
Mme MD Huteau-Bidoir (in regard to her father, Pierre Huteau), May 2009 
Captain Robert Bonner, chairman, Museum of the Manchester Regiment, 25.3.2010 
Annie Burden, webmaster, www.nmbva.co.uk, 26.7.2010 
Liz Grant, archivist, Somerset Archive & Record Service, 9.6.2009 
Celia Green, customer services manager, the Regimental Museum of the Royal Welsh,  
 12.6.2009 
 





Imperial War Museum, London: 
 
Captain R. T. Booth papers, 7628 (98/3/1) 
   Major  I. S . Gibb papers, A Walk in the Forest 1884 (86/3/1) 
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Field-Marshal Lord Harding (of Petherton) papers, 5568 (96/40/1) 
 
Royal Hampshire Regiment Museum, Winchester: 
 
Colonel Peter Halliday, unpublished and undated memoirs 
 
National Army Museum, London: 
 
 Major-General David L. Lloyd-Owen papers, 8011-132-2 
 
Service historique de la défense (SHD), Vincennes1039: 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel Jacques Britsch papers, La vie quotidiènne à Hanoi au  
temps de Dien Bien Phu: Journal du Tonkin, 1934-1954, 1K 705 
Robert Dibon papers (1981), 1KT 330 
Colonel Henri Esquilat papers, 1K 638 
Médécin inspécteur général Régis Forrisier papers, ‘Le service de santé au  
cours de la guerre d’Indochine’, Revue Médecine et Armées (1991) (copy), 1K 665 
Général Georges Fricaud-Chagnaud papers, 1K 590 
Général Jean Le Chatelier papers, De la forêt laotienne à la forêt noire  
(appendix handed in during 2002), 1KT  
442 Colonel Raymond Legoubé papers Un bataillon obscur dans une bataille  
célébrée: le BT3 à Dien Bien Phu (2000), 1KT 1218 
 
 
Military and veterans’ journals and newsletters 
 
Royal Hampshire Regiment Museum: 
 
 Journal of the Royal Hampshire Regiment 
 
May 1954  




The Royal Green Jackets Museum, Winchester: 
 
Major H. G. Parkin (ed.), The Rifle Brigade Chronicle, 1957 
 
 
                                                          
1039  The archive does not list the dates when these papers were submitted. In some cases the authors have  
indicated the years the (unpublished) memoirs were written. 
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The Queen’s Own Royal West Kent Regiment Museum, Maidstone: 
 
 Journal of the Queen’s Own Buffs Regimental Association: 
 
December 2003 
Autumn 2004   
Spring 2005 
 
Union nationale des combattants, Paris : 
 
La voix du combattant: 
 
December 1947  
July 1954  
January 1955 
 









Imperial War Museum: 
 
General Staff, War Office, Handbook of the French Army (1932), IWM 
03(44).0/4 (87/1216) 
General Staff, War Office, Handbook of the French Army (1940), reprinted by 
the IWM in 2004), IWM 03(44).0/4 (87/1216) 
 
 Liddell Hart Military Archive, London:  
 
Revue de défense nationale, 2e année, September 1946 
“          “    “            “              , 9e année, tome XVI, January 1953 
 
London School of Economics: 
 
Parliamentary Papers (GB): 
 







Public Relations Office, Singapore, Handbook to Malaya and the Emergency 
(May 1952), LSE 42 (2631)  
 





Chroniques d’outre-mer, études et informations, LSE 44 (R92): 
 
no. 1, January 1951  
no. 4, April 1951 
no. 7, July 1951 
no. 8, August-September 1951 
no. 10, November 1951  
no. 4, April 1954 
 
La documentation française, France, problèmes économiques (1948), LES 
(R130) 
 
Rhodes House Library, University of Oxford: 
 
H. R. Hone, ‘Report on the British Military Administration of Malaya, September 
1945 to March 1946’, 915.13 s. 6 (1946:1) 
 
R. C. Burgess & Laidin Bin Alang Musa, Division of Nutrition, Institute for 
Medical Research, Federation of Malaya, ‘A report on the state of health, the 
diet and the economic conditions of groups of people in the lower income levels 
in Malaya’, September 1950, 915.12 r. 58 (3) 
 
Colonial Office/Central Office of Information, Malaya: The Facts Behind the 





National Archives, Kew: 
 
 Colonial Office: CO 1022/46, CO 968/385, CO 1022/148 
Foreign Office: FO 1091/37, FO 959/56, FO 959/49 
Ministry of Health: MH 78/286 
War Office : WO106/5990, WO 291/1670, WO 258/124 
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Service historique de la défense, Vincennes : 
 
 10H 149 
10h 151 
10H 212 





Printed articles in newspapers and magazines 
 
Liddell Hart Archive, London: 
 
 Colonel J. F. McQuillen, ‘Indochina’, Marine Corps Gazette, January 1955, LHI  
15/5/487 
Horne, Alistair, ‘Continuing cost of Dien Bien Phu’, The Daily Telegraph,  
2.7.1967, LHI 15/5/487 
 
Paris Match, no. 84, 28.10.1950 and no 173, 5-12.7.1952 
 
Le Monde, dossiers et documents, no. 331, Les guerres d’Indochine (May 2004) 
 
New York Times, 10.3.2001 
 
 
TV and radio documentaries 
 
Fleur Albert, Le silence des rizières (2003) 
BBC Radio 4 (presented by Charles Wheeler), The Peacetime Conscripts (2001) 
Marcela Ferraru, Face à la mort: les témoignages des prisonniers du Ho Chi Minh (2008) 
Danièle Rousselier, Vietnam: la première guerre (2006) 





Jean-Jacques Annaud, L’amant (1992) 
Philip Noyce, The Quiet American (2002) 
Rithy Panh, Un barrage contre le Pacifique (2009) 
Pierre Schoendoerffer, Dien Bien Phu (1992)  
-----------------------------, La 317e section (1965)  
Regis Wargnier, Indochine (1992) 
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Digital (media) archives 
 
The Times: http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive 
The Independent (obituaries): www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries 
The Daily Telegraph (obituaries): www.dailytelegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries 
The Economist: www.tlemea.com/economist.com 
Time: www.time.com/time 
Die Zeit: www.zeit.de/2010/index 
The Cambodia Daily: www.camnet.com.kh/cambodia.daily/selected_features/duras.htm 
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The Imperial War Museum, London: 
 
AMD 1570 (produced in 1956)  
COI 670 (1948) 
COI 621 (1954) 
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Institut nationale de l’audiovisuel (www.ina.fr): 
 
 Les actualités françaises 
   
News clip on 16.1.1947 
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